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Provisions of USSR Secession Law Criticized

90UNI791A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 25 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by Ya. Tolstikov: "Without Putting Down the Period: The Law on Secession—Where Is the Secession?"]

[Text] The USSR Law "On the Order of Solving Issues Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR" was passed on April 7, 1990. The law was published in the press and came into effect at that time. Did it solve problems related to the possible secession of republics (including the Estonian SSR) from the union? Not at all. Rather, it further complicated this already complex tangle.

The impression is that the law was passed in a hurry, spurred by events in Lithuania which had just declared its independence from the USSR and by the decisions of the Estonian Supreme Soviet which had declared the existing state power in the republic illegal.

The legislators were late not by several weeks but by a year if not a year and a half. At least. I would like to express my own opinion on this issue, that of a journalist.

First, the law itself. Its basis is a referendum conducted by a secret vote among USSR citizens permanently residing in the republic when the issue of secession is raised who have the right to vote in accordance with the USSR law. The decision to secede from the USSR is considered passed if as a result of the referendum (i.e., popular vote) at least two thirds of permanent residents of the republic with the right to vote support it.

I quoted the article almost verbatim and yet stumbled a little.

Indeed, why the referendum and not a decision of the Supreme Soviet elected by the expression of free will of the people of the republic? As is well-known, no republic entered the Soviet Union as a result of a popular referendum and the three Baltic states were incorporated into the USSR, i.e., were made to join it by force. Where is logic?

"The right to vote according to the USSR law." According to that law, practically any person over 18 years of age has the right to vote. There is no mention of the length of residency requirement. If today you get a stamp in your passport attesting that you have a permit to live in any street of any city or town of the republic, tomorrow you can go to the polls and have a say in the fate of a people among whom you have barely started to live, without having time to appraise the situation.

Is it logical?

The law hedges the voting in the referendum with a number of major restrictions. For instance, Article 3 states that if a republic has areas where different ethnic

groups reside compactly and make up a majority, conditions for voting in that area are to be set separately.

For the Estonian SSR (here and below, our republic is used only as a putative example), this refers specifically to Narva and Sillamäe, speaking of the Russian or Slavic population. The law does not specify which majority nationalities it has in mind. It follows from this also that the results of the vote should be tallied differently in some other parts of the republic, such as areas where Estonians reside in compact groups. This refers, undoubtedly, to the entire south of Estonia and the islands.

Why did the law established such a system is open to speculation. Once again applying the law to the conditions in our republic, it may have been done to determine which districts could leave the USSR outright and which would have to stay in the union for the time being. Thus, the southwest of Estonia would be pitted against the northeast. Then, something like a demilitarized zone could be drawn somewhere in-between.

Furthermore, the results of the referendum will be submitted for deliberation first to all other union republics (Article 8) and then to the congress of USSR people's deputies (Article 9), which...

Which will approve the secession? No. The congress will first establish a period of transition lasting up to 5 years, during which time various issues related to the secession of the republic from the USSR will be decided. Those issues are listed in Article 14.

Plus, there is another condition. Article 19 states that a second referendum may be held in the final year of the transition period. Moreover, if one tenth of USSR citizens residing in that republic request it, such repeat referendum is compulsory.

In effect, it appears that a repeat referendum will be necessary if only one tenth of the republic's voters vote against secession in the first referendum. Naturally, disagreeing with the majority opinion, this group will demand a second popular poll and if no more than two thirds voted for secession the first time, it would be more difficult to achieve such victory a second time. It may even be impossible, for during the 5-year transition period (this is why, most likely, so lengthy a period was stipulated), citizens from other regions of the country, clearly opposed to the idea of becoming foreigners, may be artificially mobilized to move to the republic on orders from the center.

This situation, speaking putatively once again, could arise in Estonia where the indigenous population makes up a little over 60 percent, as is well-known. It would seem that if only one sixth of non-Estonian voters voted for secession, which in my opinion is quite possible, then... But some politicians would probably try to manipulate this wavering group during the transition period.

Finally, Article 20: it turns out that according to the new law only the congress of people's deputies, that is to say

Moscow and not Vilnius, Tallinn, Riga or another republic capital can make the final decision on the issue of secession from the union. And it may decide not to give its permission. In other words, it is not the people of the territory, those who according to the USSR Constitution have the right to self-determination, that will decide its own fate but the metropolis and the supreme power of the united state.

It is hard to accept this.

It is no accident that during the debate on the draft law at the congress some deputies called that document not a law on secession but a law **against** secession by republics from the USSR. I would add that the new law is feudal in its essence. In the old times, the master used to decide whether to set his serf free or to keep him in bondage for good.

It is well-known that most deputies from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia took no part in debating the draft law and voting for it. This is not surprising. **In their opinion**, that law does not apply to the Baltic republics and other territories acquired (or, to use a stronger term, occupied) by the Soviet Union in 1940. One may disagree with this point of view. (I personally and, I am convinced, the overwhelming majority of the multilingual citizenry of Estonia resent the claim of occupation.) Yet, we should understand them: if a referendum is needed today, it is the one which, albeit 50 years too late, would help decide whether or not citizens of the Estonian republic and their direct descendents (yes, they and no one else) wish to **join** the USSR. After that, we could address all other problems. One can predict with certainty what would be the outcome of this hypothetical referendum among a part of Estonia residents, one that did not happen in 1940.

Does it mean that establishing (or, more precisely, reestablishing) independent states is the only possible way to achieve political change in the Baltic? Either by applying the new, imperfect, law or by some other political means? I can not say so with certainty and I doubt anybody can.

I think that it would be possible for the Baltic republics to enter (yes, to enter and not to secede from) the USSR on a special basis that would be different from other regions of the country and would take into account the realities of 1940. Nor would it be wise to reject out of hand the idea of creating a confederation of states modeled on the EEC, where every state is a full-fledged member of the community of nations while retaining its formal independence, even though in essence their political, not just economic, stance is one and the same.

Legal status on the international arena may be the only thing which the Baltic republics still lack. Can this be the solution to the situation? Maybe we should now think not of a law that grudgingly permits secession but of government acts **sincerely** welcoming sovereign and independent states **entering** into a completely new political and economic union?

Spate of Obkom 'Voluntary' Resignations Examined

90UN17644 Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN
in Russian No 7, Apr 90 pp 17-21

[Article by V. Churilov: "Why Are They Resigning?"]

[Text] Even in our society, which was regarded until recently as one devoid of conflict, the time has come for waging political battles in the open. The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee plenum in February on relinquishing the party's monopoly of power has provided the imprimatur of approval for the transition to pluralistic forms of life. And although only yesterday many of the so-called informal associations concealed their true intentions, today they are entering the political arena as opponents of the CPSU and as contenders for power. However confrontational the nature of the activities at hand, they must not be allowed to lay claim to any power for the present that could prove decisive to the outcome.

Under these conditions, the vanguard role of the party organizations and their authority in the labor collectives is now undergoing a crucial test. Not all communists, and particularly communist managers, can withstand such a test. Those who, as before, restrict themselves to reassuring slogans, but whose words are not followed by actions, will as a rule go down to defeat. The events of recent months in which a number of party obkom first secretaries have retired serve to validate this principle.

There is nothing, of course, to prevent certain party leaders from radically restructuring their activities—from being more demanding of others, while assuming greater responsibility for their own personal conduct. The tragic implications of these "voluntary" resignations provide in this respect considerable food for thought.

It is no secret that party leaders, such as those at the level of an oblast committee first secretary, were ordinarily selected during the years of stagnation not for personal qualities but in accordance with certain well-known principles of rank in the nomenklatura. These principles go back to a time when there was a serious shortage of qualified personnel, and when a person's official duties served in themselves as a weighty criterion of competence and leadership ability—in any capacity, quite apart from one's background and education. Such leaders—welded, if that is the word, into an official caste—tended to think of themselves as irreplaceable and infallible, and their appointments to positions of leadership virtually for life were regarded as no more than their due. Over the years a psychology of authoritarian leadership became instilled in them that was at times devoid of any doubts about the correctness of decisions taken.

It was precisely this process of forming party cadres in accordance with the principles of the nomenklatura that gave rise to the peremptory administrative system about which the party itself has recently begun to express concern. More than anything else, this system puts a premium on obedience, an unquestioning willingness to

execute any decisions made by those in positions of authority, and utter subservience of lower to higher elements in the chain of command.

For a while the party masses were reconciled to the system, taking such a way of doing things for granted. It was the task of rank-and-file members to follow the guidelines, recommendations, and commands of those in authority. But perestroika upset the smooth operation of the system. People experienced a sense of their own worth, as their fears of the nomenklatura dissipated, and a desire to put their house in order, so as to be its masters instead of its servants as intended in the first place.

Not all party workers succeeded in coming to terms with these altered circumstances. Learning to rely on the will of the masses rather than on the chain of command, and adapting to the truth no matter how bitter the truth might be, rather than to the person one step above, turned out for many members to pose an insuperable psychological barrier. A lack of comprehension and at times a refusal to accept social changes marked the beginning of a personal tragedy and the end of a career in the party.

Offensive, yes, of course, to serve the party, as they say, faithfully all one's life, honorably executing instructions without sparing one's self, working seventeen hours a day. And this is one's reward—retirement.

But, let me emphasize, such is the logic of perestroika. Ardent advocates of the peremptory style of administration inevitably come into conflict with the will of the masses and under pressure from their demands yield their places to those who are better able to grasp the needs of the day—people averse to strong-arm tactics.

The following first secretaries of party obkoms are among those who have been obliged to resign their posts: G., Bogomyakov, Tyumen Oblast; L. Bobykin, Sverdlovsk Oblast; and R. Khabibullin, Bashkir ASSR. The grounds given for resignation varied but the reason was essentially the same in each case—an authoritarian style of leadership coupled with a lack of desire to deal with public opinion. From the rostrums of plenums and party conferences they mouthed the right words about cultivating intra-party democracy, personal initiative, and independent action among the masses, but in practice they kept on "tightening the screws," while remaining oblivious to what went on beyond the walls of their offices.

R. Khabibullin, for example, worked for about three years as first secretary of the Bashkir Obkom. By his arbitrary and capricious activities he created a dangerous state of public tension in the autonomous republic by erecting a wall of misunderstanding between the obkom and an aroused public.

Advocates of improving urban ecological conditions, for example, were recognized as "green extremists" by the obkom. Even the organizers of a club for promoting of the Tatar language, literature, and culture were regarded

as extremists. The Bashkir Association of Voters and People's Deputies was accused by the obkom of usurping power and creating parallel organs of executive action. And an attempt by journalists of SOVETSKAYA BASHKIRIYA to reprint an article on their activities from a central newspaper so aroused the indignation of the first secretary that he threatened to discharge the editor-in-chief and the entire editorial staff.

Such a style of leadership, needless to say, was never a part of the process of perestroika going on in the party, and it is therefore in no way surprising that leaders of this kind should "voluntarily" be going into retirement.

Another, no less alarming aspect, however, is to be observed in the resignations of party leaders from top posts: the lack of resistance with which party leaders surrender their duties. They submit their resignations at times without any effort to defend themselves. Why is this?

To be a political fighter for the party is the professional obligation of party officials. Let me stress the word professional. Yet now the question arises: Where—and how—could party committee first secretaries (and not only the first secretaries) acquire the lessons to be learned in genuine political struggles? Within the system of political education? In the party school or the Academy of Social Sciences? No questions are asked there about knowing how to implement the party line or exhibiting intransigence in maintaining one's point of view. And who is there to debate, argue, or learn to hold one's own with when both teachers and students (or those in the audience) are of one mind in terms of ideology?

Perhaps, in practical terms, the thing for them to do is to plunge into battle for the "bright future"? Alas, this "bright future" likewise until recently suited everyone alike, and opponents of it were not to be found.

Thus it happened that there was nothing to struggle for, and no one to struggle with. Party workers engaged in whatever they pleased with the single exception of their direct responsibilities. They organized the plowing, the sowing, and the harvests—the fulfillment and the over-fulfillment of plans and commitments. And they discussed the "historical tasks" that lay ahead.

But as political passions became heated, and new forces appeared laying claim to power, party leaders turned out to be unprepared to engage in political struggle. The inappropriate functions that they had heretofore fulfilled—let us say it directly, the atmosphere of officialdom in which they found themselves—blunted the edge of their fighting prowess. Under the pressure of spontaneous public meetings, they buckled, lost their nerve, became panicky, and succumbed to horror in the face of open political discussion and debate.

Let us take as an example the former first secretary of the Voroshilovgrad party obkom, I. Likhov: a veteran of the Donbass, a former miner, a faithful comrade, and a man

with a keen sense of social justice. Yet when the representatives of certain "informal" associations began to contend for power, shouting insistently at meetings about far-fetched schemes being unmasked and stirring up thousands of people, he gave up and retreated from the battle—then by submitting his resignation. A mood of disbelief and pessimism prevailed over the sense of responsibility for his assigned duties. It was, one might suppose, not so much his fault as his misfortune. For political manhood is not acquired under conditions of unity and concord. It is forged in the heat of uncompromising ideological clashes with adversaries and in contested rivalries with them for influence over the masses.

Unfortunately, I. Likhov is not alone now in seeking refuge in a safe harbor. Many party leaders, who have become accustomed not to interject themselves, not to offer resistance, not to "rock the boat," but rather to do everything they were told to from above, have lost the ability to act on their own without instructions from central authority, to think for themselves, and to find the arguments that would command attention amid the noisiest sort of public meetings. As a result, we see the "voluntary" resignations that have followed and, more to the point, the personal tragedies involved in relinquishing their duties.

It remains for us only to offer our sympathies to these leaders that have failed and to wish them a rapid political recovery. There are still other party leaders, however, who resign and walk away to their retirement amid the indignant stares of their working comrades. I am speaking of those who have compromised themselves by misuse of their office or by exhibiting such traits as a lack of humility and arrogance.

This is not just a problem of the present day but one that is old indeed. The struggle has been going on for decades to root out leaders who exploit their offices for selfish personal ends, oblivious of the needs of the people. It would seem that there is no limit or end of this struggle. Even in this respect, however, perestroika has introduced valid correctives of its own.

With the development of democracy, the lives of leaders, including party committee first secretaries, have become increasingly open and accessible to people. Glasnost makes it easier to recognize their strong and weak points and to make an assessment of one's own with regard to their performance; and not simply to make a judgment but to actively intercede in the determining their fate if they should confuse their personal accounts with those of the state treasury, for example, or if they should commit any impropriety with respect to a subordinate, or surround themselves with sycophants, and so on and so on.

In other words, the selection and disposition of party cadres is now becoming a matter of concern not only of party organs exclusively but the public at large, and the party committees can no longer ignore this fact, especially if those "up front" have discredited themselves and soiled their reputations in the eyes of the workers.

At another time, the retirement of a top official with a tarnished reputation might not even occur, at least, within a short period; and if it did occur, it would be carried out in a ceremonious style with a red carpet strewn with flowers, in gratitude for "stupendous efforts" leading to a "well-deserved rest." Today to avoid or delay relieving from duty a leader who has disgraced himself, let alone thank him for his great work, means to incur the wrath of the people.

The people's patience is exhausted when, amid a most severe shortage of housing in Volgograd, for example, local leaders are to be found dividing up land among themselves and their relatives along the densely settled shore of the Volga, in many cases illegally, and building fancy dwellings. The wave of public protest that rolled through the city ended, it is well known, in the resignation of the obkom first secretary, V. Kalashnikov, and the obkom buro.

Press reports of the practice of distributing motor vehicles in the Karelian ASSR caused a storm of indignation among workers, who charged that was not in keeping with standards of morality or principles of social justice. Public outrage exceeded all bounds when it was revealed that out of the most recent consignment of GAZ-24 Volgas (16 vehicles), all went to top officials and not a single worker was able to buy one. The former first secretary of the party obkom, V. Stepanov, purchased a Zhiguli for his son with obkom funds. Later, he applied to purchase a YAZ-469, and this vehicle also was allotted to him. Under public pressure within the republic, the party obkom buro proposed removing the former obkom first secretary from the Central Committee, of which he is a member, and making him accountable for his actions to the party.

Similarly, the last drop filling the cup of public patience to overflowing in Chernovtsy Oblast was occasioned by a trip to Yugoslavia in the course of which many party organization officials went on a spree abroad (one of them the son of the party obkom first secretary) that was against the law and principles of social justice as well as out of place. The outcome in this case was the same as it was in Volgograd and Petrozavodsk [Karelian ASSR]. N. Nivalov was forced to resign his position as obkom first secretary.

It is possible to continue to cite such instances. Unfortunately, they abound in the practice of public life. It is still a common occurrence for certain top officials to utter heart-warming words about social justice in public, before leaving, say, in a limousine with special plates, entering through a specially guarded gate, and taking a special elevator up to their private offices.

Hypocritical officials of this kind must not nowadays be allowed within a cannon shot, as the saying goes, of leadership responsibilities. If they have been admitted to positions of authority, be prepared to answer for it—and not before the nomenklatura, but before the people! The people today, we are convinced, instead of murmuring

and complaining about injustice, or illegality, or red tape, or a lack of concern for their needs by the powers that be, are directly intervening in the cadre policies of the party committees and organizations and forcing them to take more radical measures to rectify conditions.

In summary, the so-called voluntary retirements of party committee first secretaries are indeed tragic for them personally. At the same time, they attest to the fact that the reserve of confidence and trust in the leadership is running out in a number of places. This reserve of trust, moreover, may dry up altogether if the party committees continue to keep in place the framework of the system of administration by command.

Only by repudiating the functions of coercive force, along with obsolete operational stereotypes, and by focusing attention on the needs of the people, can the party committees restore the trust of the workers wherever it has been lost. And when that happens, no other political force will have it in its power to shake the foundations of this trust.

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CPSU Ideology Official on Political Role of Sociology

90UNI733A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN
in Russian No 6, Mar 90 (signed to press 5 Mar 90)
pp 3-12

[Article by A. Kapto, chief of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, doctor of philosophical sciences: "The Sociology of Party Life"]

[Text] A year and a half have gone by since passage of the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Raising the Role of Marxist-Leninist Sociology in Solution of the Key Social Problems of Soviet Society." We think that the time has come to sum up preliminary results, to talk about how implementation of the resolution is going, what has been done correctly, and where it is necessary to introduce corrections.

The CPSU Central Committee resolution defined the status of sociology as an independent science within the system of knowledge about society and assigned it tasks of solving fundamental theoretical and practical problems of socialism. The first steps have been taken on the way to these assigned goals.

Regarding measures of an organizational nature, the presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences has stipulated the formation of scientific institutions and units of a sociological profile. Fundamental research is getting into full swing at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology. An all-union center for study of public opinion as it relates to social and economic questions, subordinate to the VTsSPS [All Union Central Council

of Trade Unions] and the USSR State Committee for Labor, has begun to turn out its first scientific production.

Sociological work in the branches of the national economy and at enterprises has begun to be carried out more actively. A central laboratory for social and economic measurements has been established under the USSR Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Statistics. A network of laboratories for particular problems is being developed within the system of the State Committee for Education. Training of specialists in sociological specialties has been begun in institutions of higher education. Evening universities of Marxism-Leninism have introduced a course in Marxist-Leninist sociology into their study programs.

During the past year additions have begun to be made to the sociology book shelf; several sociological publications prepared by leading Soviet scholars have already come off the presses. At the same time, beginning this year, the Nauka publishing house is beginning to publish a series entitled "Sociological Research." Data concerning the results of sociological analysis and opinion surveys by press media have become common materials on the pages of central and local newspapers and journals. All this, unconditionally, is facilitating the formation of an educated view of sociology by the population and is contributing to the professional growth of specialists.

In a word, an impulse has been given to the development of sociology in all directions. The tree of sociological science has taken well to the soil of perestroika and is beginning to gather strength.

However, it is necessary to look at things soberly—it is still a long way to an abundant harvest. Moreover, in some places, we are beginning to see symptoms of disease which sociology has already had earlier. An increase in empirical studies is noticeable. Of course, without an empirical base any science, and all the more so sociology, is condemned to failure. But if this process is not accompanied by the development of theoretical knowledge, sociology risks again falling into the "infantile disorder" of empiricism.

Research that is conducted on a weak conceptual base, and frequently also without one, without an approved methodology, produces unreliable information and directs scientific inquiry onto a false path. Therefore, today, the task of increasing theoretical sociological knowledge ranks as one of the most important. An urgent need has arisen to accelerate and intensify the process of conceptual sociological interpretation of the changes that are taking place in society. The most important task is to involve all the resources of sociological science in the development of a modern conception of socialism.

The LOGIC OF DEVELOPMENT of the political processes, which is reflected in the materials of the February (1990) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the

party platform for the 29th Congress once again convinces us that life itself is advancing sociology and the possibilities of its tools to the center of work of the party committees.

It is important today to introduce clarity into the area of the practical problems of sociological analysis of the problems of party life and of ways to their solution. And it is necessary to begin with a correct idea of the social and political problem situation that has developed. What are the characteristics of the political moment we are living through, its structure and relationships, if we look at the processes that are going on in society through the prism of methodological analysis?

The party is shifting to new political methods of work. This is not a forced measure. It is a demand of the objective circumstances. Society has entered a new stage in its development, one that is characterized by a multiplicity of forms and by a complexity of social relationships and processes that has increased with the speed with which they have proceeded.

Processes of integration and decentralization are going on in parallel within our political, ideological and other structures and new, earlier unknown political elements are appearing. What do they bring: benefit or harm? Where is the process an objective one and where is it being initiated out of selfish motives?

The complexity of the situation lies in the fact that a reevaluation of the entire mass of theoretical knowledge about society is going on simultaneously. Naturally, fundamentally new approaches are required to the traditional problems of sociology as well. We cannot continue to develop new social knowledge while living by yesterday's ideas.

To act a priori, as was said in the report at the February (1990) CPSU Central Committee plenum, in accordance with an earlier "constructed scheme," means to "serve as a rigid framework for the vital creativity of the masses." Indeed, it is also impermissible to make mistakes—the price of a mistake has grown too much.

Sociology attempts, on the basis of a strict methodology and procedures, to reflect social reality as completely and reliably as possible. It has become an indisputable scientific fact that broad democratization is accompanied by a growth of political pluralism. Under conditions of a landslide of information, of the breakdown of dogmatized ideological structures, and of the rejection of scientific-like application of clichés to empirical information it is important to preserve a high degree of correctness in the interpretation of primary sociological information and a sober scientific mind when developing practical recommendations.

If we ask the question, "What does political pluralism mean for the party?" many will answer: "While carrying out a policy of political consensus and consolidation of society, the party committees need nevertheless to learn how to work under conditions of political competition

and even stiff political struggle." In order to hold out and prevail in political competition, the party must renew itself and restructure its own ranks, its own organization. Of course, without the help of sociologists, of specialists who have mastered a system view and analysis of party life, it is complicated to carry out this work.

These problems also determine the first group of tasks of party sociology—to ensure sociological monitoring of the process of restructuring the party and the development of effective recommendations.

In this connection, it is first of all necessary to make more precise our very approach to providing sociological support to renewal of the party and of its work under modern conditions. In other words, it is necessary to clearly define methodological guidelines for the studies that are being carried out.

It seems to us that, in resolving this problem, it is expedient to distinguish two interrelated aspects of the matter. In the first place, important significance attaches to sociological analysis of the party, of all its units and organizations, as an organic part of the political system of society. In the second, and this is no less fundamental, the party has a need for self-knowledge as a relatively independent social organism.

In the first case, attention is being concentrated on how adequately the party committees and organizations are reflecting and realizing the interests of the working people, of the various social strata, of the community, and of groups; what sort of relations does the party have with the popular masses and with democratic forces and movements; do the content, forms, and methods of political, ideological, and organizational work, as well as the policy being conducted as a whole, respond to the needs of people and the demands of the times?

Perestroika has disturbed the former flow of life and has set enormous masses of people in motion. A great number of problems have arisen, the causes and content of which we still understand very superficially, either because we lack comprehensive information or because we are analyzing it poorly.

How to restore the values of socialism? How to react to the various movements, associations, and groupings in political life that are growing like mushrooms after a warm rain? What needs to be done so that an atmosphere of true comradeship is strengthened within our party, so that all party organizations are possessed by a striving for ideological and organizational unity?

The answers to these and to dozens and hundreds of other questions require thorough sociological development. So far, nobody is carrying this out thoroughly. We are not saying that we, in general, have no ideas about paths to their solution. The essence of the matter lies elsewhere—in assuring that measures proposed for restoring health to the party and society are based on all-round knowledge enjoying a status of public trust. Only the collection, analysis, and generalization of social

information, carried out on the level of contemporary demands, will provide such a status.

SOCIOLOGY at the same time is an important source of knowledge, now sharply lacking, about the real processes that are taking place within society, about moods and convictions, about the readiness of various categories of the population to solve the tasks of perestroika. The party committees are faced by a matter of enormous importance—to unite the sociologists, to help them to penetrate into dynamic processes and to reflect them in the language of science and practical recommendations. At the same time, today, party committees, organs of state administration, and all forces interested in perestroika are in need not of general discourses but of a maximally precise knowledge of the nature of the social, political, and spiritual processes, of the mechanism of the social activeness of the masses, of the entire system regulating the behavior of individuals, social groups, and communities. Until there is an excellent understanding of the "mainsprings" of social tensions and conflicts, of the conditions and factors of the formation of public opinion, and of other aspects of existing activity, we cannot count on long-term and serious success in the policy of perestroika.

The changed conditions for the development of sociology are a result of the restored health of Soviet society. On the other hand, sociology represents a powerful means for further renewal. Such is the general relationship. However, this relationship does not arise automatically. The hope that it is possible to know society without concealment and embellishment, that research will be carried not to earn a "check mark" but for real solution of problems, will become reality only if the party committees pay serious, truly interested attention to sociology.

The main thing here is determination of precise guidelines for party influence. The impact of sociology will depend upon by whom, where, and how specialists will be trained and oriented toward scientific search. Therefore, it is important to examine attentively the content and quality of sociological education in institutions of higher learning and to restore it within the system of party study, first of all in evening universities of Marxism and Leninism. Sociology can emerge from its state of prolonged stagnation only if there are cadres of specialists available who are striving for the transformation of social life.

Determination of priority directions of research work is of no lesser importance. Analysis of published sociological materials shows the presence of a real danger of being carried away by themes of momentary advantage and of attempts to impose tendentious views on society in scientific-appearing sociological "packaging." An administrative outcry does little to overcome these illnesses of growth. A more productive route is to draw sociologists into a deep-going analysis of what really is taking place in the country.

Determination of the basic directions and pressing problems of sociological research under contemporary conditions is, of course, a matter for the sociologists themselves. There can be no dictates here. Nevertheless, we must and should convince scholars of the fact that their role as analysts and social planners of the new society will be greater the closer that they interact with the party. The principle basis of such interaction is the development and implementation of a strategy and tactics for the further restructuring of Soviet society, in which the party and the entire people are vitally interested. In this connection, great theoretical and practical significance attaches to studies of the restructuring of the social structure of our society, without a knowledge of which thorough consideration of the needs and interests of Soviet people is impossible, to long- and short-range social and economic planning, and to ensuring a differentiated approach to ideological work.

An equally important line of scientific problems for sociological analysis is study of the social and political movements, organizations, associations, and the processes of the political pluralism that springing up. Without appropriate knowledge, we cannot count on effective actions for consolidating the healthy forces of society and neutralizing the extremists.

A key direction of enquiry is the study of man—both as the main element of the productive forces and as the subject of political life, intellectual creativity, etc., in a word, in many hypostases. To penetrate into the world of the individual, to be able to integrate the interests of the individual and of society, is one of our most complex and important tasks.

In the second case, the political, ideological, and social-psychological, organizational, and other relationships that tie the party into a single whole are the subject of scientific analysis and the recommendations that flow from it.

Materials from sociological studies show that, despite the increasingly critical evaluations of party committees, their leaders, and rank-and-file Communists, a majority of the country's population ties the success of perestroika to renewal of the party. In the opinion of most, there is no serious political force in the country, other than the party, that is capable of leading perestroika. However, people see that many party organizations remain isolated from labor collectives and the population and are continuing to operate in accordance with old bureaucratic schemes. It is necessary to overcome the lag of party organizations behind the restructuring initiated by the party, to emerge from a state of protracted wavering, and to turn our face toward the vital interests of people. Scientific justification and weighed recommendations are required for practical realization of this goal.

Such recommendations are no less, and perhaps even more necessary for solving problems of restructuring intraparty relationships. A person who has attentively

followed the discussion surrounding the party will obviously have noted that the main thing being talked about is organizational restructuring. At the same time, surgical methods of treatment are also being proposed—a purge of party ranks, replacement of the apparatus of party committees, dismissal of the former membership of elected party organs, etc. In a number of cases, it is possible that such measures would bring benefit. But the problem has deeper roots. Its sources lie in historically obsolete relationships between Communists—members of one and the same party, in obsolete mechanisms for regulating its social composition, in the motives for joining the party.

In order to confirm what has been said, let us refer to materials from a survey of CPSU members. It turned out that only a fourth of them are counting on real help from their party organization in the case they find themselves in a difficult situation. Only a third said that they are frank and sincere with their comrades in the organization. Finally, an overwhelming majority of the Communists expressed the opinion that relationships of intraparty comradeship are fundamentally deformed, that they have found themselves in the position of statistics when political decisions are being approved and implemented.

The problem of ideological and organizational restoration of the party as the political vanguard of society, as its moral authority, has presently emerged full-blown. Moreover, not as an impersonal mechanism, as an "order of knights," or a command force, but as a union of like-thinkers, each of whom is an individual really participating in the solution of the current and long-term problems of social development. There is no need demonstrate that sociology, studying the state of consciousness of people in interrelationship with their behavior and with the mechanisms of social development, can and should propose its own view of ways for renewal of intraparty relationships.

A second group of problems of the sociology of party life is also produced by the sharp needs of political practice and is connected with sociological analysis of public opinion. This study is acquiring particularly important significance today with regard to the destinies of the party, society, and perestroika. Supporting this proposition, we will indicate the purposes for which this is being organized and carried out today. First of all for:

- raising the scientific level of party leadership of perestroika and reducing the risk of latent, unpredicted reactions by the population to domestic and foreign political actions;
- providing a basis for party decisions on fundamental questions of political leadership that touch upon the interests of various social strata, communities and groups;
- improving the "feedback" between leading party organs and the population;
- predicting conflict situations and working out the social technology of escaping from them;
- increasing the effectiveness of organizational and ideological support to important political campaigns;
- developing recommendations for improving the style and methods of party work;
- providing qualified examination by experts of the results of public opinion studies carried out by various sociological subunits, excluding possibilities of manipulation of survey materials.

It is particularly necessary to distinguish a group of problems that face the sociology services of party committees and that are connected with the formation of elective organs of popular self-rule on the basis alternatives. Essentially, the political future of the party committee depends upon the reliability of scientific recommendations. And here, we think, it is necessary to outline more precisely the circle of high-priority problems and lines of research that confront party sociology. Of course, each party committee in organizing research work should proceed from the particular political situation and the social-demographic and professional characteristics of the region. To be considered here are historical, ethnic, social and everyday, and many other special characteristics which require priority study. Each party committee and its sociological service makes up a plan of research on the basis of first-priority needs.

Further, it is expedient to move from questions of a methodological character to the methodical and organizational problems of the activities of the sociological services of party committees.

In the present situation, the problem of effectively utilizing the results of sociological research in party work has acquired key significance. How many times have many sociologists become exasperated when their scientific reports and recommendations have been "shelved" or, in the best case, two or three impressive figures have been cited from speakers' platforms and thereupon all work to introduce their scientific recommendations has come to an end?!

TODAY SOCIOLOGY is living through its second renaissance. Its rise is a product of the renewal of our society, which is in need of serious sociological support. Will sociology fulfill this "historical order," that is, will it become an effective lever of perestroika? M.S. Gorbachev, in an article entitled "The Sociological Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika," notes: "...We would have committed a theoretical error if we had begun again to thrust ready-made schemes upon society and to force life, actual reality, into a "Procrustean bed" of stereotyped patterns. This distinguished Stalinism, a path which we are not taking. We are acting in accordance with Lenin. And to act according to Lenin means to study how the future is developing from present-day reality."

The problem of strengthening the ties of sociology with life is a pressing one for the entire spectrum of its directions. But it has particularly urgency in solving the problems of political leadership of society, which is realized by the Communist Party. Indeed, the policies of the party, its concrete decisions, will bring success only when they become the property of the masses, when the masses participate consciously and with interest in the realization of a designated line. The methodological and methodical arsenal of sociology can provide a great service here. Can, but still, unfortunately, is serving poorly. One of the reasons for this lies in inadequate development of the social-engineering function of the sociology of party work.

Such a critical judgement will probably cause some to raise a question. It would seem that research is gathering force. Interest in it on the part of party committees is growing. The number of publications is increasing in which various sociological data figure. Many party committees have established sociological services based on volunteers, etc. But, very unfortunately, such animation often represents no more than a petty enthusiasm for figures and a gliding over the surface of events. Elementary analysis of analytical memoranda concerning the results of research, scientific reports, and publications leads to this painful conclusion. In a majority of them, practical recommendations to party committees are either not concrete, in simple terms, are banal, or are missing entirely. Frequently, research studies remain no more than intellectual exercises which bind nobody to anything. With such a situation, an increase in their numbers creates only an appearance of scientific sustenance for party work.

Incidentally, the themes of sociological studies of party life are also very one-sided. Primary attention is devoted to the study of public opinion regarding individual questions, the reaction of people to propaganda measures, the collection of information when preparing one or another question for discussion at sessions of party committees. This poverty of themes engenders similarly weakened recommendations. In essence, until recently, problems of the alienation of the individual from society, labor, and politics, problems of the real, and not the declared authority of the party and its leaders, problems of the dialectic of individual and collective, ethnic and interethnic, and many other interests, and other problems as well have remained outside the field of vision of sociologists. For a number of reasons, sociology has been excluded from the system of political leadership of society and social experiments as one of its methods of understanding and means of contact with practice have become the province of textbooks.

At the basis of such a situation there is a mutual braking mechanism between science and practice that has caused great harm to sociology. The fact is that its cognitive and social-engineering functions are especially closely intertwined with the ideological function. The latter, however, was dogmatized, degenerated into an apologist for the existing state of affairs, and stifled lively thought.

And even when such thought found an escape in conclusions and recommendations, it was buried alive in the archives under the stamp of "secrecy." This was correctly and graphically noted in an editorial in the journal "Sociological Research"—what was required was "not so much to uncover existing contradictions as to conceal them."

The weak practical return from studies of party life is conditioned not only by the fact that sociology turned out to be in a "social vacuum." The ties between it and life were weakened and violated at all stages of the research cycle, in particular at the stage of theoretical generalization of empirical information and its translation into the "language" of administrative decisions. And today, when all floodgates are open to scientific enquiry, when the party committees urgently need practical recommendations, we, as formerly, are engaged only in the selection of facts and their storage. For number of reasons, among them because scholars have a poor understanding on of the real problems of political leadership, sociology of party work is still weak in fulfilling the role assigned to it.

There is one way out—by necessity, this is persistently and patiently to develop a dialogue between sociologists and party workers. This was pointed out in the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Raising the Role of Marxist-Leninist Sociology in Solution of the Key Social Problems of Soviet Society." Emphasis was placed, on one hand, on the necessity of orienting science toward the solution of management problems and, on the other, on the importance of utilizing its conclusions in perfecting the style, forms, and methods of party leadership.

The whole question is how to escape from the situation that has developed. Consideration of this leads inevitably to the "discovery" that, in fact, no study has been given to the question of utilizing the data from sociological research in the practice of party work, of a mechanism for the practical implementation of recommendations. We spend a great deal of effort on developing programs of scientific enquiry and, at the same time, we do not have any kind of serious program for the "materialization" of those ideas for the sake of which so much work has been done.

For purposes of clarity we will cite the following fact. Content analysis of periodical journals published during the past 10 years has shown that only a dozen and a half articles have been devoted to the theme of utilizing sociology in party work, and books on this subject have been even fewer. This is one side of the matter. Another is even less encouraging: A majority of the publications maintain that sociology and party work are practically blood relatives, although in actuality the relationships between them are, at the best, platonic.

What specifically can be gleaned from available publications with regard to methods of introducing the results of research into practice? Declarations about the necessity of their introduction. Further, reminders of the fact that

the results of research have been reported at meetings and conferences and have been used in preparation of the decisions of party committees. But how they have been used remains to be guessed. Finally, the authors instruct the reader that sociology is necessary for analysis of party work, for monitoring its quality, and for the developing predictions. Recommendations in this regard are just as superficial as they are difficult to carry out, because it is not shown how, precisely, to solve standing problems.

It follows from all that has been said that it is necessary to learn how to increase the practical returns from sociology in party work. And not only to learn but, in many ways, to relearn, recalling that sociology also should be restructured, for in some ways we have succeeded in cluttering it up with dogmas and primitivism. For example, for many years, pieces of advice regarding optimization of the environment that forms the personality have predominated in the recommendations of sociologists. But, at the same time, sight has been lost of the fact that the environment itself is changed by man, that the main thing is to uncover the potential of people, to free their energies as an inexhaustible source of social progress. What we have in mind is not the notorious ideological mobilization of the masses and exploitation of their enthusiasm but an emancipation of their creative essence, when conditions exist for this.

Thus, a study recently carried out by sociologists from the CPSU Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences (AON) showed that two-thirds of workers and kolkhoz workers are not working at full capacity; they themselves say, and that they could work better. At the same time, even today, economic reform is providing a definite scope for creative labor. However, there is almost no movement in this regard. The principle brake is the subjective factor, concerning the increased role of which sociological odes are being sung.

There are many other similar examples of the power that stereotypes of sociological thinking hold over us. These stereotypes are hindering the development of alternative variants of practical actions. A majority of recommendations boil down to proposals of the type "increase the staff," "allocate funds," "change the organizational structure," and so on. We will not argue that such pieces of advice have a right to life. But it is possible to hit upon them even without sociology.

THE PROBLEM OF THE EFFECTIVENESS of utilization of the results of sociological research in party work is a part of a general question—the question of the unity of theory and practice. Its solution is possible only with a strengthening of ties between research and fundamental theory and also everyday party life. This is not a new thought but is an invariably timely one. Let us turn attention at least to the fact that sociological studies in the area of the ideological and organizational activities of the party do not rest on any kind of developed methodology for sociological analysis of party life. There has been no serious study of questions of the place of the

Communist Party within the socio-political organization of socialist society and of the party as the subject of economic, social, demographic, ethnic, and other policies. By constantly repeating, until recently, that it performs a leadership role that allegedly is steadily growing, we have hardly contributed to forward movement.

Evidently what is required today is a deeper professionalization of the sociology of party life as a relatively independent branch of scientific knowledge that focuses on the specific mechanism of political leadership and the analysis and generalization of its experience. But this is possible only if sociology will call into service all the statistics of party practice and if the decisions of party committees are accompanied in a timely and systematic way by social expertise.

The relationships that the sociology of party work has with other sciences are of exceptionally great significance in the matter of increasing the practical returns obtained from it. It is difficult to count on true effectiveness of study of the process of party democratization without working in collaboration with, for example, lawyers, or of the style of intraparty life—without contacts with party developers, etc.

In our view, one of the reserves for raising the professional level of research being done lies in close coordination of activities and a timely exchange of information and experience between the sociologists of all the country's party committees. This can be achieved only if the Center for Sociological Research of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences closely coordinates its own activities with the laboratories of the higher party schools, with the staff and nonstaff sociological services of the union republic CP central committees and of kray and oblast party committees, and also with the sociological laboratories of local institutions of higher education. It stands to reason that relationships here need to be bilateral and mutually beneficial.

Experience exists in such collaboration. Deserving of support, for example, is the joint work of the Center with the sociological laboratory of the Krivorog pedagogical institute, the mainstay of the Academy of Social Sciences, and the Krivorog city committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

It is necessary to note the joint activities of the Center with the sociological services operating under the aegis of the Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Saratov, Orlov, and a number of other oblast and kray party committees. In this collaboration sociologists from the academy bear the main burden with regard to theoretical and methodological development and methodical support of research programs and local sociologists and party workers carry out the practical implementation of scientific projects. The benefits are two-way: The former obtain a proving ground for scientific enquiry and the later—sociological information in the form of analytical memoranda.

But, with all the positive significance of the accumulated experience of joint work by various sociological services, it should be noted that at the present time a more thoroughly grounded system of mutual action is necessary.

The CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Center for Sociological Research is called upon to play an important role in establishing smooth relationships. It is necessary to pass quickly through the organizational period and to get to work on promising long-term and operational research. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the party committee and organs of management are experiencing a real hunger for reliable sociological information that reflects the political processes in society and within regions.

A great deal of work stands to be done in local areas. Sociological laboratories in higher party schools are being expanded. A fundamental change in attitude is needed toward studies of social consciousness and especially toward such a specific and effective form of this as public opinion. Life itself leads to this conclusion. It is obvious that, without feedback, the personification of which is public opinion, we can neither build a law-governed state nor renew socialist society.

IT CAN BE SAID that we still do not have a well-founded system for the study of public opinion. In creating a vertical structure for its study it is necessary to take one more step and go to each party committee. The system for study of public opinion, for investigating the effectiveness of management decisions that are introduced, should be expanded and should work reliably and surely. What are the key factors in achieving this?

First of all, it is important that the party committees accept sociologists not as guests but be seriously interested in strengthening contacts with them. A true and firm interest can be developed under the condition that leading party organs give scientific collectives a distinctive kind of social order for research. This is precisely the path being taken now by the CPSU Central Committee which, taking into account the real possibilities of the academy's Center for Sociological Research, has developed and approved an order-plan for the fulfillment of concrete assignments connected with the sociological analysis of party restructuring on the threshold of the 28th CPSU Congress. We think that the sociological services of republic and oblast committees could also take this path. Of course, this does not exclude other forms of collaboration as well, in particular contract relationships. As is known, many committees are using this actively.

At the same time, it is necessary to note that, when commissioning studies to be made on specific subjects, the party committees are called upon to provide practical assistance in their fulfillment. This presupposes a search for possibilities for the translation of questionnaires and other sociological documents into the national language, for their circulation, for the selection

of permanent groups of research organizers and interviewers, and for the solution of other practical problems.

For its part, the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Center for Sociological Research, together with the sociological services of the party committees, bears a responsibility for the high quality of the information that is obtained, of conclusions, and of recommendations and prognoses, and also for the obligatory and timely provision of information to party committees concerning the results of studies that are carried out.

In our opinion, it is possible and necessary at the present stage to create the following sociological service network. The head organization in it should be the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Center for Sociological Research. The sociological laboratories of the higher party schools (VPSH) are, so to say, branches of the Center and form the basis of this network in local areas. Besides this, it should include the sociological services of 40-50 kray and oblast party committees relating to various regions of the country. Specifically what committees will become base ones needs to be decided taking into account how well-grounded scientifically their representatives are and whether they have real potentials. For desire alone is not enough here. An important guarantee of success is also that this network work on the basis of a unified plan which, of course, does not exclude the possibility of conducting research on the basis of their own initiative.

In the future, centers for sociological research will also have to be established under the union republic CP central committees. In modern conditions, we no longer have the right to tolerate and make allowances for a lack of professionalism and a low level of competence on the part of sociologists. Moreover, it is already necessary to attract the best professional sociologists of the region into the party committees and to create conditions for them to work. Once the party sets the task of being the political vanguard of society, then the most reliable and trustworthy political sociology service in the country should also be established.

In order to solve this and many other urgent problems it is necessary to overcome the undervaluation of sociology and old stereotypes in attitudes toward it. And this, for the moment, is the problem of problems. Its solution, on one hand, is tied to the necessity of developing the sociological thinking of party cadres, who are not always able to define a clear-cut order for research and who sometimes lack experience in analysis of sociological information and therefore do not see a benefit from the sociological services and do not create conditions for them to work productively. Thus, sociological studies in the 1970's threw light on the deformations of intraparty relations, including the indifference of many members of the party to instructions, the formalism of political studies, etc. But, unfortunately, the essence of the processes taking place remained outside their field of vision

and have been revealed today in the crisis phenomena that are occurring within the party.

THE REAL CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIOLOGISTS to raising the scientific level of the political leadership is seen in the regular presentation to party committees of memoranda about the nature of public opinion regarding critical problems of social development; in the preparation of analytical materials related to the conduct of plenums and other measures; in the compilation of overviews of public opinion for the party press and the publication of timely informational materials for party committees and ideological activists.

Let us turn attention to one other problem that has become critical. Life today demands an attentive, extremely thorough and correct attitude toward the entire complex of problems connected with sociological science. In recent times, a great deal of analytical information has printed in the pages of newspapers and mass publications, including information of a sociological nature. Very frequently this is called upon to reflect the situation in the "hot" and even "inflamed" areas of social consciousness. In these cases, the interpretation of data that is obtained by scientists acquires a special degree of social significance.

Unfortunately, we also run into instances when publications that contain sociological information do not serve the consolidation of society and carry a destructive charge. A question arises: With all the importance of sociological information, is the position of certain sociologists not being transformed into a means for foisting their own views off onto other people?

Take, for example, a telephone survey of the residents of Moscow. It is perfectly legitimate to use such a method. But can the results of such a survey be presented as the opinion of the residents of the entire country? Is there not in this a rashness, a hastiness, even a mistakenness, pretensions only to one's own truth. Indeed, in this way science can be discredited by the hands of the sociologists themselves, moreover in conditions that are favorable for the development of sociology.

Or let us recall the press survey of public opinion about people's deputies that was prepared by certain newspapers on the basis of letters sent to their editors. The fact that this analysis was carried out in itself deserves attention. But can the conclusion be made that this analysis of letters presents in a representative way the public opinion of the entire country? It is possible to doubt this, just as it is possible to doubt how well the sociologists that drew such a conclusion understand the specifics of their own methods.

In these cases, as a rule, questions arise concerning the level of the methodological and methodical standards and the level of qualification of the researcher.

Sociology is a powerful tool of social knowledge and it is important that it reflect the realities of social life. The cost of each mistake or error is very high.

In this connection the question arises of the training of sociologists. We cannot let this process go uncontrolled. We think that it is necessary to look on the problem of sociological education somewhat more broadly. Solution of the problem of forming sociological thinking requires the organization of universal sociological education. In the first stage this must be accomplished among party, soviet, and economic leaders. The leader of any rank must be made to appreciate the potentials of sociology. Indeed, to the extent that we are drawn into the processes of perestroika, the need for sociological knowledge is growing at all levels of the social organization of society.

It is necessary also to think about a fundamental change in attitude toward non-Marxist sociology. The problem is not to deny outright and to no purpose a great deal that is being confirmed by the entire course of life, but also not to mechanically transferring the conclusions of Western sociology to our own soil without any thought and analysis.

The scales and significance of the political decisions being made today by the party are extremely enormous. We see that even a small blunder results in people losing faith in perestroika and lowers its authority. The party is making a transition to work in what are for it are unfamiliar conditions of pluralism of opinion and political struggle. And, in these conditions, neither ill-considered theoretical constructions, nor simplified recommendations, nor fruitless illusions should take the place of the real components of the political process.

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Implementation of Unified Party Control Organs Examined

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pp 32-36

[Unattributed article: "Unified Control Organs: On the Results of an Experiment Carried Out After the 19th All-Union Party Conference"]

[Text] As is known, the 19th All-Union Party Conference, examining paths for further development of the CPSU, proposed the establishment within the party of a system of unified control organs—an independent CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission and corresponding structures on the local level. The intention is at the same time to abolish the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Commission and the Central Auditing Commission, as well as the party and auditing commissions of local organizations. As an experiment, with the goal of a practical test of this idea, unified control and auditing commissions (kontrolno-revizionnaya komisiya—KRK) have been elected beginning since 1988 in a number of kray, oblast, city and rayon party organizations—all together 81 commissions.

The CPSU Central Committee passed a resolution on this question and approved temporary regulations concerning the new commissions. As their main task, the unified organs were assigned the tasks of accumulating experience in control and auditing work on the basis of a revival of the Leninist principles of intraparty control, of ensuring reliable guarantees against subjectivism, arbitrariness, and the influence of personal and accidental circumstances on the conduct of party policy, and of facilitating a strengthening of party and state discipline and a deepening of the democratism of intraparty life.

How is this task being carried out? To what extent does the practical experience that has already been obtained in the course of the experiment confirm the expedience of the unified control organs? What should their organizational structure be like and how should the mutual activities of the control and auditing commissions and party committees be structured?

A recent conference within the CPSU Central Committee party building and cadre work department of secretaries and department chiefs from those party committees where the experiment is being conducted was devoted to a discussion of these and other urgent questions of improving intraparty control.

Participants in the conference, bringing together the views of a broad segment of party activists, unanimously supported the urgent necessity of the fastest possible restructuring of intraparty control. Its present state, in which the most important thing—the independence of control organs from party committees—is not guaranteed, leads to simplification and, in some places, even primitivism in the organization of control and to work by auditing and party commission based on “orders” from party organs and restricts their possibilities for a timely influence on preventing and eliminating shortcomings. **Auditing and party commissions operating in parallel frequently duplicate and sometimes substitute for one another.**

The situation within the party and surrounding it is now changing, as they say, before our eyes. There is a process going on of decisively freeing party committees and party organizations from bureaucratic layers, from obsolete forms and methods of work, from cadres who preach yesterday's style and inhibit pressing democratic changes within the CPSU. This process is in extreme need of timely control. Unfortunately, impulses for change are frequently originating outside party organizations and internal mechanisms are not being developed for purposes of self-cleansing and self-control. The independent control and auditing commissions at level levels of the party structure are also called upon to become such a mechanism. The methods, strategy and tactics of their operation is being developed in the course of the experiment that is now being carried out.

A majority of the addresses at the conference expressed **active support for the establishment everywhere of control and auditing commissions that have equal rights in terms**

of status with the party committees and are independent of them (more correctly, of their apparatus). In the opinion of V. Novikov and A. Kostyurin, second secretaries of the Moscow and Tula oblast party committees respectively, and the chief of the party organization and cadre work department of the Krasnodarskiy Kray party committee, Yu. Garkusha, active operation of such unified control organs in the Center and in party organizations can become one of the decisive measures for democratic renewal of the CPSU and for strengthening its authority among the masses. Such viewpoints are being expressed in pre-congress mail to the CPSU, in the mass information media, and in many proposals from party committees and individual Communists.

Speaking about the practical results of the experiment that is underway, participants in the conference confirmed by specific example that, when their work is organized as it should be, **the control and auditing commissions are emerging as a restraining factor against manifestations of adventurism and violations of the principle of collectivity of leadership and of party ethics.** The unified control organs are helping to raise the professional responsibility of Communists for their assigned affairs and for fulfillment of party decisions. They are noted to be having a positive role in creating an atmosphere of principled criticism and self-criticism and of party comradeship. The fact that, along with the right to conduct investigations, the control and auditing commissions have received the possibility of making decisions on their own, right up to imposing party punishments, raises the authority of these organs and contributes to a strengthening of party and executive discipline.

The new commissions, in the opinion of the first secretary of the Kireyevskiy Rayon CPSU committee in Tula Oblast, A. Butenko, and the head of the party organization and cadre work department of the Kiev City Ukrainian CP committee, I. Perekhoda, has demonstrated its ability to positively influence improvement of the work style of the party committees. **The control and auditing commissions are boldly undertaking examination of such areas of their activities which earlier, perhaps, the party or auditing commissions never “reached.”** The result has been a two-sided effect. On one hand, additional control is being provided over the quality of the activities of the party committee and its apparatus; each of its subdivisions keenly feels upon itself the demanding eye of the control and auditing commission. On the other hand, having been freed of a part of the problems assigned by charter which they earlier solved, having transferred them to the commissions, the kray, oblast, city, and rayon party committees have obtained an opportunity to devote more attention and time directly to organizational and political work within collectives.

In the organizations where the experiment is being conducted there have been changes in approaches to examination of the personal cases of Communists. A massive rehabilitation of CPSU members who innocently suffered during the years of the personality cult

and stagnation is now going on. As a whole, the number of personal cases has greatly increased during recent years and, of course, each requires urgent, careful, and principled investigation. Having fully taken this complicated work on themselves, the control and auditing commissions have not only "unburdened" the bureaus of the party committees, but also are analyzing the disciplinary practice of the primary party organizations more deeply than this was done earlier and are making a more thorough and better quality review of the appeals of Communists. In Moscow, for example, the number of Communists made subject to party penalties at a level higher than the primary organizations was reduced three-fold during 1989. The number of appeals received by higher-level organs has been sharply reduced.

Participants in the conference shared experiences in the rational organization of the activities of unified control organs. There was also discussion of how, on the basis of the temporary regulation regarding the control and auditing commissions, a mechanism is gradually being worked out for a division of labor and interaction between the commissions and the party committees and party organizations.

City and rayon control and auditing commissions, said the secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, A. Nemtinov, are manifesting themselves not simply as a mechanical combination of the former auditing and party control commissions, but as qualitatively new elected party organs, the voice of which is carrying ever increasing weight. In a majority of the committees, well thought-out planning of work has been organized, with selection of truly priority questions for examination at sessions of the control and auditing commissions and plenums, including joint ones with city and rayon party committees. Two thirds of the examinations in 1989 were devoted to problems of intraparty life. The secretary of the Moscow City Committee noted that the practice of the control and auditing commissions at the rayon level of working practically without an apparatus that has been freed [from other functions] is regarded as a positive one.

Party workers from Alma-Ata Oblast and Krasnodarskiy Kray told the conference how methodological assistance to the commissions and training of activists elected to them has been organized and how glasnost is being assured in the activities of the new organs.

At the same time, many of the participants in the conference stressed that the limited nature of the experiment in terms of its scale and the length of time it has been conducted still have not permitted discovery of all the pluses and minuses of the new control organs. Depending upon the concrete conditions, the approaches that are being taken toward matters are manifesting themselves in various ways. In particular, parallelism and duplication is noted in the activities of control and

auditing commissions and the corresponding party committees, especially in questions of monitoring the activities of Communists in the economy. The second secretary of the Alma-Ata Oblast committee of the Kazakh Communist Party, V. Manankov, and the first secretary of the Leningradskiy Rayon CPSU committee, N. Bedrin, spoke with concern about this. During the past year, the control and auditing commission of the Alma-Ata Oblast party organization examined 116 cases. Ninety-seven of these were devoted to economic problems. The plans of certain commissions are overburdened with "current economic matters" and the desire to be involved with truly important, decisive questions is not being pursued. Moreover, examination frequently takes place through the prism of the naked figures of statistics, and not the party responsibility of Communist managers.

I. Perekhoda, a department head from the Ukrainian CP Kiev City committee, noted the impermissible, in his view, one-sided approach of many control and auditing commissions toward pressing problems and their enthusiasm for only verifying negative facts or the mistakes of party organizations and cadres. Where are the necessary conclusions, the constructive proposals of the commissions themselves to improve matters? Impassive signals and the absence of measures to prevent shortcomings, of course, do not add to the authority of the commissions.

Burdened with questions of control and personnel matters, the commissions are devoting little time to auditing work, noted the second secretary of the Ukrainian CP Kiev Oblast committee, A. Kikot. At the same time, under today's conditions, the interest of party members in the formation of the party budget and in the expenditure of CPSU funds has increased substantially, many problems have arisen with regard to the payment of party dues by party members, etc. Therefore, there is a need for strict day-to-day monitoring of the financial side of the life of the party and for complete glasnost with regard to where and how party money is being spent. An expansion in the economic activities of CPSU institutions and enterprises lies in our future. Increased control is also required here.

As the experiment shows, the new organs are still having a weak influence on the primary party organizations and on the state of affairs within them. This shortcoming in the activities of the control and auditing commissions is of concern to a majority of the participants in the conference.

And indeed, the party's foundation is in the primary organization, where today much work is not getting done and there are many violations, where the success of perestroika is being forged, and where the process of democratizing the CPSU is based. Speaking of the necessity of intensifying intraparty control, the first secretary of the Kropotkin City CPSU committee in Krasnodarskiy Kray, A. Chumakov, and his colleague from the Ilyiski Rayon party committee in Alma-Ata Oblast, B. Baymukhanov, spoke out in favor of the creation of independent control commissions within the primary

party organizations. They could be established on the basis of the earlier existing commissions for monitoring the activities of the administration.

There was active discussion at the conference of the problem of mutual relationships between the control and auditing commissions and the party committees. The temporary regulation, in the opinion of those who spoke, lacks clarity in its positions on this account. For example, the right of the control and auditing commissions "to present the conference a conclusion about the activities of the corresponding party organ" appears questionable. Although there is also the stipulation "within the limits of its authority," this thesis would seem to raise the commission above the party committee.

But, perhaps, most of all there was a concern about the fact that the **formation of unified control and auditing organs conceals within itself the danger of creating structures that stand in opposition to the party committees and monopolize the right to criticism.** Moreover, as the practice of the experiment shows, individual directors of control and auditing commissions, lacking needed political culture, are trying to take upon themselves functions that are not theirs, are endlessly examining the work of party committee departments, are giving instructions to its secretaries, and are demanding excessive information.

Party workers from Moscow Oblast directly posed the question: How legitimate is control by the control and auditing commissions over the activities of the apparatus of an oblast, city, or rayon party committee? The party committee forms the apparatus and is subordinate only to this committee, and an organ established on an equal footing with the party committee is beginning to control it. Or the following problem—who controls the commission itself? Here the regulation concerning the control and auditing commissions obviously requires additional appropriate detail and precision.

In practical activities, conflict situations can arise (and in some places are already arising) between the party committees and the control and auditing commissions. Who should be the arbiter? This can be a joint plenum of the two organs. A conflict can also be examined at a party conference, or a congress. Taking this into account, the second secretary of the Tula Oblast party committee, A. Kostyurin, spoke out in favor of giving permanent status to the delegates to party conferences and congresses, which will make it possible, in his opinion, to solve on a timely basis any intraparty problems that arise. V. Kotov, a first deputy department head in the Moscow City party committee, proposed that a superior party organ be given the right to support or revoke a decision of a lower-level control and auditing commission if the question is not resolved on the appropriate level.

The participants in the conference emphasized the importance of well thought-out organization of the activities of the control and auditing commissions, which are called upon to be not only a weapon in a decisive battle with bureaucratism within internal party life, but also themselves not to fall subject to this dangerous disease. For the present, however, the new organs are to a large extent using old forms and methods—the same sessions, plenums, presidiums and, in some places, bureaus of presidiums, etc. To a maximum degree, the work of the control and auditing commissions must be democratized and conducted openly, before the eyes of the broad party masses. **It is proposed to elect several co-chairman for leadership of the commissions, who could take turns heading the executive organ of the control and auditing commission and representing it in party committees.** The control and auditing commission needs its own apparatus, of minimum size in terms of workers, and corresponding independent material and technical support.

As in any matter, the results of the work of the control and auditing commissions are to a considerable degree determined by the quality of work of the cadres elected to its active membership. Specific examples were presented at the conference, which convincingly confirm this thought. It is also important in the future to form the commissions from the most authoritative people in the party organization, to arrange for their training, to organize methodological assistance, and to ensure informal support of them on the part of party committees. Special care, stressed the first secretary of the Belaya Tserkov city committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, A. Belichenko, should be shown that directors selected for the commissions are honest beyond reproach, principled, and know their business. He was actively supported by other speakers.

It was of course not possible during the conference to find simple answers to all the questions that were raised. Additionally, new facets of the problem of perfecting intraparty control were also uncovered. Certain comrades proposed that the experiment as a whole be terminated and that we revert to the old structure of separate functioning by party and auditing commissions. Others were for unified control and auditing commissions only at the level of the entire party and of republic, kray, and oblast party organizations. V. Buzinov, a department head in the Moscow Oblast party committee, proposes as an alternative the formation of a control and auditing commission along with other commissions within a unified party committee, but with special status for the control and auditing commission.

Summing up the results of the conference, the deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee party building and cadre work department, Yu. Ryzhov, emphasized the timeliness and usefulness of the discussions that had taken place for working out an optimal variant for the control organs of the party. **The construction of these organs and their functioning can take various forms, but the main thing is that these should be organs that stabilize**

the situation within the CPSU and are aimed at strengthening its unity and the conscious discipline and organization of Communists. When thinking about their future destiny and the tasks and methods of their work, it is important to ensure broad consultation with party organizations and party activists. This work should be carried out within the context of the overall process of democratization of intraparty life that is actively

unfolding at the present time. The forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress will provide a final answer to the question, which has been raised by life, of what the party's control organ during the present stage of its renewal will be like.

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New Russian Party's Political Program Published
90UN1648A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian No 16, 20 Apr 90 pp 6, 7

[Article from Leningrad by LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA special correspondent Anton Kuprach: "A New Party Is Formed"]

[Text] The founding congress of the Russian Republic People's Party, at which about 100 delegates from Leningrad, Vologda, and Novgorod were in attendance, took place a few days ago in Leningrad. Members of the Russian People's Patriotic Center, created a year ago for the purpose of helping Deputies of patriotic forces in the preelection struggle, formed the party's base. Now the Center has grown up into an organization with a fundamentally different status—a political party. But why the party anyway? As V.V. Antonov, its leader, feels, the time has passed for the Center's existence as a movement. In the present situation, when the people's dissatisfaction with the results of perestroika, which is being carried out without regard for Russia's national characteristics and the historical background of its statehood, is growing, and when the country is moving toward economic and spiritual chaos instead of law and order, the people's values are not being respected, and, their own great cultural and economic background having been slandered, a Western model is being held up as paragon to Russia's downgraded and betrayed peoples—in just this situation, V.V. Antonov feels, the creation of a political party, the basic principles of which will be statehood, national distinctiveness, and democracy, is essential.

He stresses one more dangerous tendency that is being observed lately: the turning of a substantial part of the CPSU toward social democracy, and toward union with radical left groups, to which Russia's dignity as a great state is odious and its integrity unnecessary. These groups, exploiting their nearly absolute control over the press, are now actually seizing power in outlying areas. These forces' coming to power will lead to the society's destabilization, economic chaos, and the young democracy's demise.

Yet another phenomenon, which has a tragic background in history, is also occurring—the intelligentsia's shift to the left. True, the shift is dictated by a sense of protest that is almost always based on emotions. However, it is probable, nevertheless, that the radical left perspective is not determinative. Serious realities exist, which can counter this perspective. These are the people's self-consciousness and sense of truth.

At this point, it is appropriate to announce several planks in the party's platform:

1. State Machinery. Russia is a sovereign republic, developing on the basis of a multilayered economy and its own system of administrative and economic management.... Russia enters into peer relations with the other union republics from positions of sovereignty, which

presupposes fair and proportional political, juridical, and economic representation in the union's organs of authority, administration, and planning. It is essential to adopt a new Russian Constitution, and create the kinds of state power mechanisms through which the state machinery will constantly meet its citizen society's needs. The RNPR [Russian Republic People's Party] affirms the need for initiating Russian Republic citizenship and the republic's direct participation in international organizations. The RNPR is for precedence of the republic's legislation over All-Union legislation. The RNPR is for recognition of the traditional state symbols. The RNPR is for the reinstitution of trial by jury. The Russian Republic is responsible for the fate of every Russian citizen living in other regions of the country.

2. Economics. The RNPR demands the Russian economy's orderly and rapid conversion to full cost accounting. Every product produced in Russia must be sold at prices in keeping with world price levels beyond its borders. The RNPR demands a variety of ownership and economic activity forms, with retention of state ownership for defense enterprises and strategic raw materials. The RNPR demands freedom of association for workers, stock companies, mutual credit companies, and other forms of entrepreneurial initiatives. The RNPR demands national credit. The RNPR takes a public stand in favor of according the right to choose their forms of ownership to state enterprise labor collectives. The RNPR is for reforming the bank system. The RNPR is for guaranteeing free establishment of enterprises to Russian citizens. It is essential to return the land to those who work it.

3. National Policy. The RNPR takes a public stand for the freedom of national [ethnic] life, supporting the cooperation and equitable dialogue of all of the peoples that populate the country, while firmly taking a public stand against any sort of violence, chauvinism, or ethnic intolerance. The Russian peoples' rebirth does not portend infringement on the national and other rights and interests of the other USSR nations and peoples. The RNPR takes a public stand for immediate resolution of Russia's most painful national issue—restoration of the Russian statehood eradicated in 1917. The RNPR recognizes and supports the Russian people's inalienable rights to independent statehood within the RSFSR's confines and to the creation of national schools and theaters and national mass information media.

4. Social Policy. The basic directions in the social sphere's development are: Establishment of social protection and health care funds, a social reserve, and a pension fund. Intensification of goods production and services for invalids, pensioners, children, and other categories of citizens requiring state care. Social protection of citizens must be guaranteed with glasnost and scientifically sound calculations of minimum and average standards of living. A state ecology program is essential. Enaction of a law on the Russian population's ecological safety. New social guarantees: a ban on work-Saturdays, a 40-hour workweek, a 24-day minimum

vacation, and a minimum pension of 70 percent of earned pay. Repeal of personal pensions. Introduction of an inheritance tax. Prohibition of state subsidies to any sociopolitical organization. Indexation of pensions, stipends, and state enterprise workers' salaries according to price increases.

5. **Culture.** The RNPR feels that the wealth and originality of the peoples' cultures can be preserved only with the free development of each people's innate spiritual values. The RNPR views state subsidization of cultural institutions as an important means of maintaining culture. The RNPR, considering national origins the most important element in every culture, supports the principle of national creative associations, unions, publishing houses, and cultural centers. The RNPR supports the earliest possible reestablishment in Russia of its own Academy of Sciences, National Music Conservatory, opera and theater, Institute of the Russian People, and Russian Cultural Center with branches in the country and abroad. National [ethnic] minorities, including the Slavic, which reside in the territory of other republics, must be guaranteed and provided the conditions for preserving their cultural distinctiveness. The RNPR considers religion the backbone and most important aspect of the people's life. It is essential to return to the Russian Orthodox Church, as its permanent and non-confiscable estate, all of the personal and real property taken from it for the performance of its important social role in improving the people's moral condition, and to permit it to create, without hindrance, the parishes, monasteries, and other institutions necessary for its activity. The Russian Orthodox Church must be ensured free access to the mass information media, given the right to have its own such media, and allowed extensive publishing activity. All other religious faiths must also be ensured these rights.

The Russian Republic People's Party appeals to all Ukrainian and Belorussian political and national associations for cooperation when they are proceeding in their activity on the basis of the historically proven commonness of the East Slavic peoples' development.

The new party—the RNPR—adopted a party platform and constitution, and selected a control center. Historian V.V. Antonov, the party's leader, presented a report on Russia's current status and its role in the world system. N.N. Lysenko presented drafts of the party's platform and constitution. Delegates to the congress made many constructive suggestions during discussion of the platform and constitution. At the congress, a call rang out to Leningrad's other patriotic organizations to unite with the RNPR, and to all proper forces in the society, including communists feeling their responsibility, to unite on the basis of recognizing the precedence of state and national interests over narrow party interests. The congress passed a resolution to begin preparation for the RNPR's All-Russian Congress, at which the party's program will be adopted. The All-Russian Congress will take place at the end of summer this year.

For information: The telephone number to call is 555-35-84. Call on Thursday and Friday between 1700 and 2200. The address is: N.N. Lysenko, Cosmonauts Prospect 86, Building 2, Apartment 87, Leningrad 196233.

Anne, please check over this format, something about this article seemed a bit screwy to me, JUDY

Russian Party Congress Issues Appeals

90UN0199A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 May 90 p 2

[Conclusion of the resolutions of the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party belonging to the CPSU; first installment published in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA on 13 May: "To Acknowledge the Actual Existence of..."]

[Text] On Proposals for Additional Work on the Draft CPSU Statute

To charge the Leningrad Initiative Committee with gathering, analyzing, and summarizing proposals from the field, as well as preparing a report "On Proposals for Additional Work on the Draft CPSU Statute" for the second stage of the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party belonging to the CPSU.

To the People of Leningrad, to the Citizens of Soviet Russia

The Initiative Congress of Russian communists who have arrived from all over the Russian Federation in the city of Lenin has learned with a feeling of profound outrage about a blasphemous attempt of a group of Leningrad City Soviet deputies to force through a resolution on refusing to finance anniversary celebrations devoted to the 120th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Ilich Lenin, the founder of our party and the Soviet socialist state.

Being ideologically unified by the teachings of Lenin, we express our indignation with the behavior of a number of CPSU members—Leningrad City Soviet deputies who have voted in favor of this immoral decision.

We censure their immature and nonparty actions and demand that the peoples of Russia may know who is who, who comes out in favor of Lenin, and who comes out against him!

Appeal of the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party belonging to the CPSU to the Peoples of Russia

Dear fellow countrymen!

Our country is in trouble and in a state of alarm. The economic independence of this great country is in danger. The history of our motherland, the heritage of our great ancestors, the cause of our fathers and mothers are being subjected to desecration; a shadow is looming over the future of our children. The national feelings and

sacred places are being insulted, social ideals are being switched, culture and morals are declining. The Armed Forces, law-enforcement organs, and patriotic movements are under a destructive attack.

Our parents, who have sacrificed everything for the greatness of our country and the salvation of the world from enslavement by Fascism, are openly termed "slaves" and "occupiers," individualism and neglect of the Motherland are being instilled in the minds of the young people.

This political, economic, and spiritual aggression is being carried out by those who are seeking social and military revenge, the perpetuation of inequality, and the restoration of capitalism.

It is advantageous for those who are prepared to sell their Motherland for dollars, who believe that they do not need the Motherland, or who would like to use their stay in Russia to plunder it for personal enrichment. It is advantageous for those who have brought on the crisis in our country through their incompetent leadership, and at present, offering excuses, are attempting to push the people into the abyss of market anarchy, dismember the Soviet Union, turn Russia into a raw-material appendage of imperialist powers, a market for the sale of old stocks, a reservoir of cheap labor, and a radioactive waste dump.

The communists are determined and capable of rallying the creative forces of the peoples of Russia to revitalize our Motherland and ensure the future of the socialist Motherland.

The Initiative Congress of the communists of Russia was held on 21 and 22 April, the days of the 120th anniversary of the birth of the great Lenin, in a city which bears his name. Expressing the will of the millions of communists of a majority of autonomous republics, krais, and oblasts of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], the congress acknowledged "the actual existence of the Russian Communist Party belonging to the CPSU, which is in need of completing its organizational establishment before the 28th CPSU Congress."

This decision has been preordained by the urgent need to ensure justice, progress, and accord for the peoples of a multinational Russia, bring its political system in line with its economic potential, and meet the need for knowledgeable and efficient political leadership of the republic.

The Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party belonging to the CPSU asks that party organizations and nonparty members, all working people, display initiative and help in completing the organizational establishment of the Russian Communist Party before the 28th CPSU Congress. Demand the publication of the documents of the Initiative Congress. Organize meetings and rallies in support of its decisions. Elect delegates to the 28th Congress who subscribe to the position of completing the

organizational establishment of the Russian Communist Party belonging to the CPSU at a congress of Russian communists on 19 June. Collect the signatures of communists in favor of creating it on a Leninist foundation. Implement persistently the resolutions of the Initiative Congress, send it your proposals on the theses "Program of Restoration of the Russian Communist Party 'For Justice, Peace, and Harmony'" and "The Fate of Russia and the Tasks of the Russian Communist Party," and proposals for candidates for the Central Committee and Central Control and Audit Commission of the Russian Communist Party belonging to the CPSU.

The Initiative Congress calls on the primary party organizations of the republic and the nonparty members to engage in vigorous work on preparing the second stage of the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party belonging to the CPSU, which will be held in Leningrad on 9 and 10 June. Delegate to the congress your representatives elected from rayon party organizations, organizations whose party committees enjoy the rights of rayon committees, military collectives, or party electoral districts of 2,000 to 4,000 communists.

Comrades!

Everything hinges on your initiative, determination, and the firmness of your spirit.

Toward the rebirth of Russia!

On Coverage of the Congress Proceedings

The Initiative Congress of the communists of Russia attended by 615 participants representing more than 1.5 million members of RSFSR party organizations, advocating complete glasnost and an opportunity for every party organization and every communist to judge the course and decisions of the congress on his own, appeals to the leaders of party organs, from the CPSU Central Committee to the party committees of primary organizations, and to the mass media (primarily those of the party) with an insistent demand to publish the main documents of the congress (reports, resolutions, appeals, and releases of the press center of the congress).

Russian Congress Disclaimer on Andreyeva

90UNI999B Leningrad *LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 15 May 90 p 2

[Press release of the Press Center of the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party belonging to the CPSU: "In the Press Center of the Initiative Congress"]

[Text] The Press Center of the Initiative Congress considers it necessary to communicate that the presence of N. Andreyeva at the congress was the result of a provocation planned in advance. She did not have an invitation or the credentials of a delegate. Nonetheless, N. Andreyeva made a statement about the injustice which was supposedly allowed to occur with regard to her, a person elected by 5,000 communists, in front of the

entrance to the building where the congress was being held. This disinformation was replicated in the hall of the proceedings. Under the influence of disinformation, a majority of participants in the Initiative Congress voted in favor of allowing her to enter the hall.

It has been established by verification that N. Andreyeva deliberately misled the Initiative Congress, and this was announced to those gathered. She used her presence at the congress for issuing a number of statements and giving interviews to correspondents for the purpose of personal ambition, which has nothing in common with the goals of the revival of the Russian Communist Party belonging to the CPSU. However, this did not prevent some of the mass media from exploiting the very presence of N. Andreyeva for the demagogic association of the participants in the Initiative Congress with the "image" of this odious personality.

Press Center of the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party belonging to the CPSU.

Moscow Soviet Faction Representatives Interviewed

*90UN1550A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 15, Apr 90 pp 12, 13*

[Interview with Moscow Soviet people's deputies by Lev Aleynik, special correspondent: "The Moscow Soviet: The Beginning of a New Path"]

[Text] Next week marks the beginning of the First Session of our capital's Soviet of People's Deputies. Muscovites' interests will be represented by the people's elected representatives, delegated to Moscow's highest organ of power after the recently held, direct, and secret elections on an alternative basis.

Intensive work is being conducted these days on preparing for the session, which promises to be strikingly different from all the preceding ones. The Deputies' Organizational Committee is holding sessions until late at night in the red-and-white building of the Moscow Soviet. Today it is already clear that unity on many points of the work to be done by the people's elected representatives will have to be achieved during the course of the session and the practical work following its completion.

The editors of our weekly newspaper sent special correspondent Lev Aleynik to the Organizational Committee in order to interview those people's deputies elected to the Moscow Soviet who adhere to various viewpoints and who take their stances on the platforms of the following blocs: "Democratic Russia," "Fatherland," "Moscow," and "Independents." On the eve of the First Session they were requested to answer the following series of questions:

1. What program did you advocate during the election campaign and now that you have been elected to the Moscow Soviet?

2. As a people's representative, what do you intend to accomplish in the immediate future?

3. Inter-ethnic problems have become exacerbated not only in a number of republics but even in our capital. What does the future hold in this regard?

ANPILOV, Viktor Ivanovich, 401st District (Solntsevskiy Rayon). Commentator for USSR Gostelradio [State Television and Radio], CPSU member:

I've joined the deputies' group entitled "Moscow," which now includes 93 deputies. It was formed immediately after the first meeting of the deputies of the new convocation. At this meeting it became clear that the pre-election deputies' bloc entitled "Democratic Russia" intended to continue their bloc-type demarcation and to decide questions by their bloc majority—they exercise a numerical superiority by reason of having twice as many seats as the other blocs.

1. I've been a CPSU member since 1972. I'm 45 years old, and I consider the following factor to be the main thing that helped me to gain the favor of the voters in the second, i.e., final round of the election struggle: my promise to fight with all my strength against corruption in trade, against the merging of "shady" capital with state capital, and for putting things in order as regards trade.

2. Where we live in Solntsevo and Peredelkino we can see in the evenings apartment houses with whole floors which have been uninhabited for years. Many, many apartments are standing idle! Our "Moscow" bloc advocates introducing a differentiated rent for housing, depending on its size and quality: so that whatever exceeds the norm can be charged a progressive rate of interest. And as to quality, specialists would help us to work out the parameters. All this is to be done so that, by these means, we can lower apartment rents for low-income families—something which is very important....

3. In my opinion, we need to recognize and acknowledge the fact that Moscow is the historical and cultural center of the Russian people and the peoples of Russia.... Last October there was a conference in Kuybyshev of the Volga Region's working people. And at this conference Georgiy Shashkin, a Bashkir worker at the Novocheboksary Tractor Plant, stated the following: "without Russia, we Bashkirs could not even imagine our life, since we see our strength in unity." I think that the representative of any people or ethnic group, upon arriving in Moscow, must see this strength, must be charged with the energy of friendship and unity among people. Everyone should understand and acknowledge that Moscow is the cultural and historical capital of Russia; otherwise there is an infringement on the ethnic feelings not only of Russians, but also those of the Chuvash, Mordvinians, Tatars, Evenki, and all the others. Because we have all lived in Russia for a long time, our destinies have become interwoven, and our blood has become mixed. It seems to me that we must oppose the idea, by now transmitted practically by rote,

that Moscow should acquire the status of some kind of "free city," free, that is, to attract foreign capital. But this would surely cut the capital city off from the rest of the country and, in the first place, from my republic—Russia.... After all, you know, the Vyatichi also built Moscow at one time....

NAUMOV, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 175th District (Orekhov-Borisovo) Lieutenant-Colonel in the Air Force, CPSU member:

I've considered it possible to join the bloc entitled "Independent Deputies": there are specific matters of Russian culture which unite approximately four-tenths of the Moscow Soviet's deputies. But this will not hinder us from participating in all other deputies' formations.

1. Moscow is a zone in ecological trouble, and this is at the center of my program, as well as social problems, the struggle against the privileges of the apparatus, and restructuring the system of public administration, which is extremely ineffective these days.

2. Regular, harmful emissions into the atmosphere by the Kapotninskiy Oil Refinery and the polymetals plant in the Moscow River area have been quite detrimental to the health of my fellow-townsmen. Several enterprises do not have ecological certification. We must put an end to this: we must alter the production profile, move such enterprises beyond the city limits and perhaps even outside the oblast, widen the capital's "greenbelt," and cease industrial construction in it. I'm disturbed by the problems of supply—it must be radically restructured.

3. One cannot be indifferent to this: Moscow now has many refugees from Transcaucasia and Central Asia; people are disturbed. We must provide at least moral support for those unfortunate persons who have been left without a roof over their heads. It is up to us as deputies of the Moscow Soviet to solve this urgent problem; it is an international problem. All people of various nationalities deserve pity and kindness when they ask for help.... Over the course of the centuries Moscow has been a multi-ethnic city and has not experienced any particular inter-ethnic strife. And so let's glance back at our past and seek out acceptable compromises to solve the inter-ethnic problems. This is our duty as the Muscovites' elected representatives.

CHETVERIKOV, Vitaliy Stefanovich, 206th District (Kuybyshev Rayon). Docent in the Department of Administrative Law and Administration, Higher Juridical Correspondence School, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, CPSU member:

I represent a society for the spiritual and cultural rebirth of Russians entitled "Fatherland"; our bloc has 10 people's deputies in the Moscow Soviet. I am a specialist in the field of law and administration.

1. In my program, my comrades-in-arms in our deputies' group and I are providing a solution for Muscovites' vitally important problems. I consider that all the troubles in the economy stem from the incompetence of our

leading officials. And, naturally, their irresponsibility. The form of "collegial" discussion and working out decisions under the aegis of one-man leadership essentially engender a lack of responsibility. Not once during the Brezhnev period, nor even in recent times did we hear that it was officially acknowledged who the leader was who makes decisions unilaterally and that he was seriously disciplined or punished as a consequence of failure. Our other main troubles are poor performance, weak discipline, and the non-implementation of laws. As a deputy of the Moscow Soviet, I will oppose these things.

2. In the immediate future I deem it necessary to review and revise the system of recruiting, selecting, and deploying personnel at all levels of the Moscow Soviet. We must also review and revise the structure and staffs of the Moscow Soviet Ispolkom during the next few months.

3. In order to relieve inter-ethnic tension and avert conflicts, we need, first of all, to have an evaluation of our past. Second—it is necessary to have an exhaustive glasnost on all issues of cultural development, the handing down of cultural-historical traditions, and the full, equitable development of each nation and people without any infringement of its rights. In this matter too the main factor is glasnost. I do not support the idea of a proportional representation of each nationality or ethnic group in the organs of power, cultural institutions, VUZ's, etc.—I consider this a dead-end road and absurd.

BOKSER, Vladimir Oskarovich, 453rd District (Frunzenskiy Rayon). A physician specializing in endoscopy at the Children's Clinical Hospital No 3, CPSU member:

For more than two years I have been engaged in sociopolitical activity as a member of the Coordinating Council of the Moscow Voters' Association (MOI), and logic has led me to the necessity of speaking out in the elections from the stance taken by the bloc entitled "Democratic Russia." It represents the widest association of deputies of all levels of Soviets adhering to a fundamental program which is quite radical and, at the same time, rational and sensible: the democratization of society and radical economic and social changes. The program is based on the proposals advanced by the Inter-Regional Group (MGD) of USSR People's Deputies.

1. My overall political program coincides with the MGD program, but its principal part is devoted to solving Muscovites' problems. During the course of implementing it, as has already been stated in the MOI's election appeal to Muscovites, we do not promise that rivers of milk will begin to flow immediately from the very first days.

2. Together with other deputies, we will take part in making an inventory of the capital's housing and non-housing stocks. The "apartment problem" is a very sore point for this city: at a time when the shortage of housing is most acute, there are 200,000 meters of vacant

housing. To distribute it without delay would mean improving the housing conditions of 20,000 Muscovites. And this is merely the minimal data according to official sources alone....

Let's inspect and re-zone land sections within the city limits so as to turn them over for housing construction and thereby eliminate the acuteness of the waiting-lines.

Let's put gardening-and-dacha sections in better order; up to now they are within 120-150 kilometers, located in poorly productive lands. The deputies do not intend to put up with such a situation; we are seeking out possibilities for solving this problem in a comprehensive manner.

3. Solution of inter-ethnic problems has been complicated by those political forces which are not at all interested in furthering the cause of perestroika, inasmuch as they are losing their own illegitimate privileges and positions. They have actively helped to stir up and fan chauvinistic attitudes. I anticipate that such tension will be further exacerbated over the course of the next few years. Nevertheless, with a steadfast implementation and execution of the articles and laws presently existing in the Constitution, we can eliminate extreme factors in this field.

FEADEYEV, Valeriy Valeryevich, 334th District (Proletarskiy Rayon). Sociologist, scientific associate of the Perspektiva NTK [Scientific and Technical Collective], a non-party member:

I support the platform advocated by the bloc of deputies elected to the Moscow Soviet entitled "Democratic Russia." As a result of the pre-election struggle and the support of a significant majority of Muscovites, they won 283 deputies' seats.

1. I have quite a radical program, and my proletarian voters have supported it. Its principal past was made up of the need for moral purification and rebirth; specifically, the liberation of our society from the dictates of the KGB in various matters and the disclosure of its secrets. In particular, we are concerned about the burials on Moscow's territory and the obtaining of information from the KGB archives. This is the most notable part of my platform.

2. In the immediate future I intend to submit an inquiry to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs with regard to organized crime and certain of its types: prostitution, the drug trade, "dividing up" the capital among various gangs.... At the same time I will also submit an inquiry to Moscow Oblast's KGB Administration regarding the points already cited above and, in particular, relating to lists of persons who suffered from political repressions from 1953 down to our times—persons whom we have an obligation to support and rehabilitate.

3. There has always been friction among peoples, and I submit that our path—the path of "Democratic Russia"

should consist of not attempting to put down the conflicts which arise, or, as people sometimes still say: to "remove" them by force. They will not disappear. We must seek out the true grounds, utilize the paths of negotiations, and require the observance of the Constitution and legality. Judging by certain well-known incidents which occurred in Moscow, these things are not being observed nowadays. In that same Central House of Literature public speeches by I. Sychev and D. Vasilyev, the leaders of "Pamyat," who are engaging in stirring up and inciting inter-ethnic hostility, but who usually do not have any punishment at all inflicted on them for this. In fact, Article 74 of the RSFSR Criminal Code is inoperative.... Also adding something to this growing tension is the fact that in our city there is virtually no development of those strata and traditions whose remnants still exist. Because, of course, since olden times Moscow has been inhabited by Tatars, Germans, Georgians, Armenians, Jews, and people of dozens of nationalities besides Russians. But if we look around to see how many mosques, Protestant churches, synagogues, and houses of prayer there are in this city, and whether there are enough cultural centers for associations of fellow-countrymen, or schools for the various nationalities, we become convinced that these problems have not been solved for decades.

KRUGOVYKH, Igor Erikovich, 100th District (Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon). Political scientist of the Diplomatic Academy, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CPSU member:

Our deputies' group of independents was already formed after the split-up of the Moscow Soviets' deputies into the following two blocs: "Democratic Russia" and "Moscow." We came to the conclusion that it would be best and most sensible to conduct a policy independent of blocs and to be accountable solely to our voters. We have not joined any factions or organizations, nor will we do so.

1. Our slogan is: restore the power of the Soviets with which the October Revolution was carried out.

2. I actively support proposals regarding certain very urgent measures. It is important for me to normalize, first of all—no matter how strange it may sound—the delivery of bread. It is not sufficient for Muscovites in the outlying rayons. There are many complaints from elderly persons who are incapable of covering the 2-3 kilometers to a bakery. We must rectify the situation with regard to pavements, the clutter in courtyards, and streets even in the very center of the city—not to mention the "bedroom" rayons.

3. We must strengthen Moscow's position within the fraternal alliance of fraternal republics, stabilize its international prestige, and its links with the world's peoples. Some Muscovites—Belorussians, Ukrainians, Tajiks, Georgians—have their own cultural societies and organizations, while others do not. And if we are to set up relations merely on the basis of cultural associations, we will not be able to conduct an honorable nationality or ethnic policy. Because democracy is for everybody and

not just for the energetic ones.... A just and equitable nationality policy must accord an equal status to the representatives of all peoples living in Moscow, regardless of their number. No one particular nationality should be singled out, including, let me emphasize, the Russians, who comprise the majority of the capital's inhabitants. The strength of the nationality policy exercised by the new body of deputies in the Moscow Soviet will also lie in implementing this.

Leningrad City Soviet Election Results

90UN1606A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Mar 90 pp 2,3

[Unattributed article: "List of People's Deputies to the Leningrad City Soviet Elected on 18 March 1990"]

[Text] 34. **BOLDOVSKIY, Kirill Anatolyevich**, born 1963, non-party member, bricklayer, RSU No 7 Glavleningradremstroy, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 193.

35. **BOLTYANSKIY, Andrey Vladimirovich**, born 1955, non-party member, temporarily unemployed, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 85.

36. **BORISENKO, Viktor Nikolayevich**, born 1936, CPSU member, director of the central polyclinic at the Military-Medical Academy imeni S. M. Kirov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 21.

37. **BORISOVA, Vera Vasilyevna**, born 1931, CPSU member, retired, resident of Lomonosov. Electoral district No 320.

38. **BORYAK, Aleksandr Vasilyevich**, born 1950, CPSU member, director of School No 69, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 87.

39. **BRONNIKOVA, Yevgeniya Sergeyevna**, born 1945, CPSU member, editor of the newspaper SOVETSKIY UCHITEL of the Leningrad State Pedagogical Institute imeni A. I. Gertsen, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 284.

40. **BRUSNITSYN, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich**, born 1954, non-party member, engineer at the "Zarya" Production Association, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 239.

41. **BRUSOV, Gennadiy Petrovich**, born 1947, CPSU member, director of the Interscholastic Educational-Production Combine in Kalinin rayon, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 84.

42. **BRYUZGIN, Stanislav Viktorovich**, born 1939, CPSU member, chief of the internal affairs administration, Krasnoselskiy rayon soviet ispolkom, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 200.

43. **BUYEVICH, Vadim Ivanovich**, born 1948, CPSU member, legal consultant for "Tovarishchestvo

yriskonsultov" [Comradeship of Legal Consultants], resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 100.

44. **BULKIN, Sergey Aleksandrovich**, born 1936, CPSU member, senior foreman at the production association "Zavod 'Bolshevik'", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 269.

45. **BUKHARTSEV, Igor Georgiyevich**, born 1932, non-party member, chief of the laboratory at the central scientific-production association "Leninets", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 382.

46. **BAKULOV, Sergey Ivanovich**, born 1936, CPSU member, chief technologist at the Leningrad Machine Tool Building Association imeni Ya. M. Sverdlov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 66.

47. **VASILYEV, Sergey Aleksandrovich**, born 1957, CPSU member, laboratory director at the Leningrad Finance-Economics Institute imeni N. A. Voznesenskiy, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 128.

48. **VASYUTOCHKIN, Georgiy Sergeyevich**, born 1937, non-party member, lead scientific associate at the Institute of Exploratory Geophysics, scientific-production association "Rudgeofizika", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 1.

49. **VDOVIN, Yuriy Innokentyevich**, born 1938, non-party member, lead designer at the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Radio Broadcasting Reception and Acoustics imeni A. S. Popov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 312.

50. **VENIAMINOV, Viktor Nikolayevich**, born 1935, CPSU member, deputy chief of the Leningrad Higher Military Engineering School of Communications imeni Lensovet, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 360.

51. **VERETENNIKOV, Nikolay Vladimirovich**, born 1945, non-party member, head of the laboratory at the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Synthetic Rubber imeni S. V. Lebedev, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 109.

52. **VERESHCHAGIN, Valeriy Vladimirovich**, born 1957, non-party member, lead engineer at the "Lenzheldorproyekt" Institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 397.

53. **VESELOV, Aleksandr Anatolyevich**, born 1951, non-party member, dramatist, member of the Leningrad Committee of Writers, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 78.

54. **VETOSHKIN, Vladislav Ivanovich**, born 1940, CPSU member, assistant to USSR People's Deputy Yu. P. Sychev, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 199.

55. **VINNIKOV, Aleksandr Yakovlevich**, born 1939, non-party member, docent at the department of theoretical principles of electrotechnology, Leningrad Polytechnical Institute imeni M. I. Kalinin, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 22.

57. **VLADIMIROV, Vladimir Yuryevich**, born 1949, CPSU member, deputy chief of the Expert-Criminology Administration under the Lenoblgorispolkom Internal Affairs Main Administration, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 59.

58. **VOVCHENKO, Boris Danilovich**, born 1936, non-party member, section deputy chief designer at the "Baltiyskiy zavod" production association, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 9.

59. **VOLKOV, Yevgeniy Grigoryevich**, born 1935, non-party member, chief of the production organization group at the specialized design-technological buro "Biofizpribor", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 326.

60. **VORONIN, Vladimir Aleksandrovich**, born 1943, non-party member, scaffold worker at the production-technical equipment administration of the "Sevzapelektromontazh" trust, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 394.

61. **VORONIN, Oleg Vasilyevich**, born 1939, CPSU member, docent at the Leningrad Engineering-Construction Institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 224.

62. **VORONTSOV, Aleksandr Vladimirovich**, born 1960, CPSU candidate-member, engineer-designer 2nd category, Union Design-Assembly Buro of Machine Building "Malakhit", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 228.

63. **VORONTSOV, Vladilen Nikolayevich**, born 1939, non-party member, chief specialist at the "Giprotransignalsvyaz" institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 53.

64. **GABRIYELOV, Viktor Nakhimovich**, born 1939, CPSU member, inspector at the city committee for public education inspection, resident of Pavlovsk. Electoral district No 353.

65. **GAVRILYUK, Aleksandr Ivanovich**, born 1947, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the Physical-Technical Institute imeni A. F. Ioffe, USSR Academy of Sciences, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 91.

66. **GALINSKAYA, Tatyana Sergeyevna**, born 1947, CPSU member, director of Secondary School No 530, resident of Pushkino. Electoral district No 347.

67. **GAPANOVICH, Oleg Ivanovich**, born 1934, CPSU member, group leader at the Central Maritime Design Bureau "Almaz", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 18.

68. **GENKIN, Valeriy Lvovich**, born 1937, non-party member, engineer at the central scientific-production association "Leninets", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 250.

69. **GIRENKO, Nikolay Mikhaylovich**, born 1940, CPSU member, section chief at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography of USSR Peoples, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 306.

70. **GLADKOV, Yuriy Pavlovich**, born 1949, CPSU member, instructor at the Leningrad Electrotechnical Communications Institute imeni Professor M. A. Bonch-Bruyevich, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 212.

71. **GLOBA, Aleksandr Valentinovich**, born 1948, CPSU member, deputy chief of the Frunze RUVD, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 383.

72. **GLUKHOV, Valeriy Dmitriyevich**, born 1940, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the Higher Trade Union School of Culture, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 365.

73. **GOLOV, Anatoliy Grigor'yevich**, born 1946, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the small state enterprise "Agentstvo sotsial'noy informatsiyi" [Social Information Agency], resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 253.

74. **GOLOVINA, Nadezhda Grigoryevna**, born 1943, CPSU member, chief of the design office, State Institute for Study and Design of Communications Structures "Giprosvyaz-2", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 273.

75. **GOLUBEV, Mikhail Grigoryevich**, born 1949, non-party member, brigade leader of a fitter's brigade at the Lengaz Production-Operation Gas Management No 6, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 88.

76. **GOMZIKOV, Georgiy Georgiyevich**, born 1948, CPSU member, chief of the LOEP "Svetlana", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 36.

77. **GORBUNOV, Valentin Mikhaylovich**, born 1942, CPSU member, fitter-assembler at the scientific-production organization "Rudgeofizika", resident of Sestroretsk. Electoral district No 354.

78. **GORDIYENKO, Gennadiy Alekseyevich**, born 1945, CPSU member, chairman of the economics department, Leningrad branch of the Institute for Advanced Training of Managers and Specialists, USSR Minstankoprom, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 43.

79. **GORNYI, Mikhail Benjaminovich**, born 1949, non-party member, electronics engineer 1st category, Northwestern Lumber Management Enterprise, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 231.

80. **GRIYS, Dmitriy Rudolfovich**, born 1956, CPSU member, machine tool foreman at the production association "Kirovskiy zavod", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 101.
81. **GRIGORYEVA, Galina Aleksandrovna**, born 1938, non-party member, physician at City Children's Polyclinic No 58, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 276.
82. **GUBANOV, Boris Sergeyevich**, born 1944, non-party member, docent at Leningrad Mechanical Institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 373.
83. **GULISH, Leonid Kharitonovich**, born 1955, CPSU member, engineer at the Leningrad scientific-production association "Proletarskiy zavod", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 280.
84. **GUSHCHIN, Yuriy Yuryevich**, born 1959, Komsomol member, engineer at the Leningrad Admiralty Association, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 204.
85. **DANILOV, Vladimir Alekseyevich**, born 1951, CPSU member, instructor at the Leningrad Higher Military-Naval Engineering School imeni V. I. Lenin, resident of Pushkino. Electoral district No 345.
86. **DEYEV, Vladimir Viktorovich**, born 1937, CPSU member, department chairman at the VIKI [All-Union Institute of Cinema Engineers] imeni Mozhayskiy, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 309.
87. **DEREVYANKO, Yuriy Dzhanovich**, born 1960, CPSU member, deputy director of the NTTM [scientific-technical youth creativity] center "Astron", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 29.
88. **DESYATKOV, Yuriy Konstantinovich**, born 1946, CPSU member, chairman of the state acceptance office of house-building combines No 2 and 5 Lenstroykomitet [Leningrad Building Committee], resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 242.
89. **DMITRIYEV, Sergey Yuryevich**, born 1953, non-party member, engineer at the Scientific-Research Institute of Electrophysical Apparatus imeni D. V. Yefremov, scientific-production association "Elektrofizika", resident of the settlement of Metallostroy. Electoral district No 151.
90. **DOBRIKOV, Valeriy Alekseyevich**, born 1952, CPSU member, BKhSS [struggle against misappropriation of socialist property and speculation] section chief, line department of internal affairs at the Leningrad-Finland station, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 172.
91. **DOMBROVSKIY, Andrey Vladimirovich**, born 1960, non-party member, assistant at Leningrad Pedagogical Institute imeni A. I. Gertsen, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 183.
92. **DROBYSHEV, Sergey Nikolayevich**, born 1956, non-party member, scientific associate at the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Television, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 190.
93. **DROZDOV, Viktor Aleksandrovich**, born 1953, CPSU member, military serviceman, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 94.
94. **YEGORENKOV, Vadim Anatolyevich**, born 1943, CPSU member, chief of the medical service, Leningrad Military-Naval Base, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 299.
95. **YEGOROV, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich**, born 1947, non-party member, deputy chief of the technological section, scientific-production association "Burevestnik", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 177.
96. **YEGOROV, Aleksandr Kiryanovich**, born 1954, non-party member, graduate student at Leningrad Engineering-Economics Institute imeni P. Togliatti, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 369.
97. **YEGOROV, Sergey Nesterovich**, born 1952, non-party member, docent in the department of instrument making, Leningrad Institute of Precision Mechanics and Optics, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 211.
98. **YELANOV, Konstantin Korneyevich**, born 1950, non-party member, driver of column No 2, Leningrad Taxi-Motor Transport Enterprise No 2, resident of Leningrad Oblast. Electoral district No 274.
99. **YELKIN, Vladimir Ivanovich**, born 1948, non-party member, lead engineer at the scientific-production association "Uran", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 42.
100. **YEMELYANENKO, Ivan Vasilyevich**, born 1938, non-party member, section chief at the Central Scientific-Research Institute "Morfizpribor", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 311.
101. **YEROSHENKO, Vladimir Nikolayevich**, born 1945, non-party member, driver at the Leningrad Bus Transport Enterprise No 4, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 281.
102. **YERSHOV, Sergey Ivanovich**, born 1956, deputy director of the rayon cost accounting association "Fizkultura i zdorovye" [physical culture and health], resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 32.
103. **ZHAROV, Vladimir Sergeyevich**, born 1954, non-party member, scientific associate at Leningrad Institute of Informatics and Automatization, USSR Academy of Sciences, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 8.
104. **ZHGUN, Leonid Maksimovich**, born 1931, CPSU member, general director of the production association "Nevskiy zavod" imeni V. I. Lenin, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 258.

105. **ZHURAVLEV, Mikhail Romanovich**, born 1959, non-party member, chief of the KIPiA machine building plant "Vpered", "Red October" association, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 68.

106. **ZHURAVSKIY, Nikolay Nikolayevich**, born 1953, non-party member, electrician at repair-operation administration-1, Ocityabrskiy production repair-operational association, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 291.

107. **ZHURKOVICH, Vitaliy Vladimirovich**, born 1947, CPSU member, director of motor pool No 6, "Spetsstrans" association, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 176.

108. **ZAVIRYUKHA, Maksim Dzhorzhevich**, born 1966, non-party member, student at Leningrad Institute of Pediatric Medicine, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 28.

109. **ZAKORDONSKIY, Vladimir Petrovich**, born 1955, CPSU member, chief of the 71st militia detachment, Petrograd RUVD, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 301.

110. **ZAKHAROV, Vladimir Konstantinovich**, born 1936, non-party member, lead scientific associate at the State Optical Institute imeni S. I. Vavilov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 153.

111. **ZELENKOV, Aleksey Aleksandrovich**, born 1949, non-party member, section chief at the production association "Nevskiy zavod" imeni V. I. Lenin, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 290.

112. **ZIBAREV, Vladimir Stepanovich**, born 1946, non-party member, engineer at the Leningrad Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 389.

113. **IVANOV, Vladimir Vitalyevich**, born 1950, CPSU member, chief of the department for exploration and design of railroads, "Lengiprottrans" Institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 368.

114. **IVANOV, Leonid Nikolayevich**, born 1937, non-party member, chief engineer at the project of the State Design-Exploratory and Scientific-Research Institute of Maritime Transport "SoyuzmorNIiprojekt", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 371.

115. **IVANOV, Sergey Nikolayevich**, born 1951, CPSU member, director of PTU-54, Vyborgskiy rayon, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 55.

116. **IVANOV, Sergey Pavlovich**, born 1946, CPSU member, section chief of the criminal investigations administration for combatting misappropriation of state property, Lenoblgorispolkom internal affairs main administration, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 313.

117. **ILYIN, Viktor Alekseyevich**, born 1945, CPSU member chairman of the department of higher special officer's classes of the military-naval forces, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 180.

118. **KADYSHEVICH, Antonina Ivanovna**, born 1932, CPSU member, retired, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 400.

119. **KALININ, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich**, born 1950, CPSU member, head of laboratory at the Scientific-Research Institute of Economics and Organization of Agricultural Production in the RSFSR Non-Chernozem Zone, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 346.

120. **KALUGIN, Vyacheslav Sergeyevich**, born 1940, CPSU member, lead engineer-designer at the "Gipromashobogashcheniye" Institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 292.

121. **KARASEV, Anatoliy Vladimirovich**, born 1940, non-party member, docent at the Leningrad Forestry Academy imeni S. M. Kirov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 164.

122. **KARPOV, Andrey Yuryevich**, born 1960, CPSU member, engineer at the Central Scientific-Research Institute of Structural Materials "Prometey", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 363.

123. **KARTASHOV, Anatoliy Germanovich**, born 1955, non-party member, scientific associate at the scientific-production association "All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of High Frequency Currents", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 339.

124. **KIRYANEN, Aleksandr Ivanovich**, born 1947, non-party member, docent of Leningrad State University, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 13.

125. **KISELEV, Igor Pavlovich**, born 1947, CPSU member, docent at Leningrad Institute of Railroad Transport Engineers, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 294.

126. **KISELEV, Mikhail Mikhaylovich**, born 1964, non-party member, economist at Leningrad Finance-Economics Institute imeni N. A. Voznesenskiy, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 305.

127. **KISLITSYNA, Galina Aleksandrovna**, born 1950, CPSU member, senior agronomist at the "Detskosl'skiy" sovkhov, resident of Pushkino. Electoral district No 348.

128. **KLIMOVA, Tatyana Lvovna**, born 1959, non-party member, section head at the Institute of Physical Culture imeni P. F. Lesgaft, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 196.

129. **KOVALEV, Aleksey Anatolyevich**, born 1963, non-party member, council chairman at the scientific-research archeological association, Leningrad branch of the Center for Scientific-Technical Activity, Research

and Social Initiative under the USSR Academy of Sciences, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 214.

130. KOVALEV, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1953, CPSU member, engineer-designer at the design bureau for special machine building, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 37.

131. KOZYREV, Aleksey Sergeyevich, born 1944, CPSU member, general director of the territorial-production association "Leningrad Cable Television", Lensovet ispolkom, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 221.

132. KOLOVAY, Vladimir Grigoryevich, born 1950, CPSU member, president of the joint enterprise of the Soviet-West German industrial-foreign trade concern "Lenvest", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 238.

133. KONKIN, Nikolay Yevgenyevich, born 1964, Komsomol member, engineer at the Central Scientific-Research Institute imeni A. N. Krylov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 391.

134. KOPEYKIN, Pavel Fedorovich, born 1943, non-party member, lead designer at the Leningrad scientific-production association "Vektor", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 256.

135. KOSAREV, Vladimir Valentinovich, born 1944, non-party member, scientific associate at the Physical-Technical Institute imeni A. F. Ioffe, USSR Academy of Sciences, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 245.

136. KOTOV, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, born 1949, non-party member, economist at the production association "Kirovskiy zavod", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 123.

137. KRAVTSOV, Yuriy Anatolyevich, born 1953, non-party member, scientific associate at the scientific-research design-technological institute of turbine compressor construction under the production association "Nevskiy zavod" imeni V. I. Lenin, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 257.

138. KRAVCHENKO, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, born 1941, CPSU member, electric arc welder at the production association "Leningrad Metallic Plant", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 154.

139. KRASIKOVA, Margarita Yakovlevna, born 1936, non-party member, physician at city hospital No 38 imeni N. A. Semashko, resident of Pushkino. Electoral district No 350.

140. KRASNITSKIY, Yevgeniy Sergeyevich, born 1951, CPSU member, electrical installer at the Leningrad Maritime Trade Port, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 111.

141. KRASNYANSKIY, Valeriy Evaldovich, born 1940, CPSU member, docent at Leningrad State University, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 327.

142. KRIVELEV, Vladimir Yegorovich, born 1958, CPSU member, shop foreman at an electromechanical plant in the "Signal" association, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 197.

143. KROTOV, Yuriy Vsevolodovich, born 1953, CPSU member, deputy partkom secretary at the Leningrad Admiralty Association, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 203.

144. KRUGLOV, Mikhail Vasilyevich, born 1947, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the scientific-production association "Burevestnik", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 179.

145. KUZNETSOV, Vyacheslav Stefanovich, born 1942, CPSU member, head of the laboratory at the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Hydrotechnology imeni B. Ye. Vedeneyev, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 79.

146. KUZNETSOV, Sergey Alekseyevich, born 1949, CPSU member, section chief at the State Institute on Designing Plants for Instrument Making and Means of Automation "Giproprigor", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 162.

147. KUZMENKO, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1953, non-party member, engineer-technologist at the production association "Leningradskiy Metallicheskiy zavod" [Leningrad Metal Plant], resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 174.

148. KUZMIN, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, born 1951, CPSU member, docent at Leningrad Polytechnical Institute imeni M. I. Kalinin, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 38.

149. KULESHOV, Leonid Vladimirovich, born 1949, CPSU member, planer at the production association "Leningrad turbine blades plant" imeni 50th Anniversary of the USSR, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 287.

150. KURBATOV, Nikolay Vasilyevich, born 1950, CPSU member, lead designer at the production association "Izhorskiy zavod", resident of Kolpino. Electoral district No 142.

151. KURNIKOV, Boris Dmitriyevich, born 1943, CPSU member, docent in the department of general chemistry, Leningrad Polytechnical Institute imeni M. I. Kalinin, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 80.

152. KUCHERENKO, Igor Mikhaylovich, born 1947, CPSU member, deputy chief of the Frunze RUVD [rayon internal affairs administration], resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 372.

153. **LANOKOV, Petr Mikhaylovich**, 1961, non-party member, graduate student at Leningrad Engineering-Economics Institute imeni P. Togliatti, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 271.

154. **LAPINSKIY, Vladislav Vadimovich**, born 1955, CPSU member, lead designer at the TsKBA LNPOA "Znamya truda" imeni I. I. Lepse, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 300.

155. **LASHUTINA, Tamara Vasilyevna**, born 1944, non-party member, engineer-technologist at the production association "Izhorskiy zavod", resident of Kolpino. Electoral district No 145.

157. **LEBEDEV, Gleb Sergeyevich**, born 1943, CPSU member, docent at Leningrad State University, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 219.

158. **LEBEDEV, Yuriy Ivanovich**, born 1940, CPSU member, director of the test-experimental plant "Start", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 387.

159. **LEGKIY, Vladimir Mikhaylovich**, born 1939, CPSU member, buro section chief at the production association "Kirovskiy zavod", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 126.

160. **LENKOV, Dmitriy Nikolayevich**, born 1940, non-party member, lead scientific associate at the Physiological Scientific-Research Institute of Leningrad State University, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 362.

161. **LIVEROVSKIY, Aleksey Alekseyevich**, born 1947, non-party member, docent in the department of higher mathematics, Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute imeni V. I. Ulyanov (Lenin), resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 24.

162. **LINCHENKO, Viktor Nikolayevich**, born 1950, CPSU member, buro chief at the scientific-production association "Elektron", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 31.

163. **LOBACH, Vladimir Grigoryevich**, born 1948, CPSU member, mechanic at Leningrad Cargo Motor Transport Enterprise No 176, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 168.

164. **LOGINOV, Viktor Timofeyevich**, born 1957, non-party member, textile transporter at the spinning-weaving factory "Rabochiy", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 279.

165. **LOPAREV, Robert Nikolayevich**, born 1937, senior scientific associate at the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Television, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 40.

166. **LUPANOV, Vasiliy Zinovyevich**, born 1949, CPSU member, director of the combined tram-trolley motor pool, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 93.

167. **LUSHNIKOV, Aleksey Germanovich**, born 1966, non-party member, governing board chairman of the "Youth for Charity" society, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 287.

168. **MAYOROV, Valentin Viktorovich**, born 1949, CPSU member, editor of the newspaper VECHERNIY LENINGRAD, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 241.

169. **MAYOROV, Petr Grigoryevich**, born 1952, CPSU member, deputy chairman of the Kirov raysovet ispolkom, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 124.

170. **MAKAROV, Mikhail Vladimirovich**, born 1963, non-party member, engineer at the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Radio Apparatus, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 12.

171. **MAKSIMOV, Boris Ivanovich**, born 1934, non-party member, senior scientific associate of the Leningrad branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 399.

172. **MALKIN, Aleksandr Yefimovich**, born 1943, non-party member, lead engineer at the scientific-production association "Elektron", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 82.

173. **MALYSHEV, Yuriy Petrovich**, born 1956, non-party member, scientific associate at the Main Geophysical Observatory imeni A. I. Voykov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 201.

174. **MAMEDOV, Yuriy Vladimirovich**, born 1956, CPSU member, associate at the KGB administration for Leningrad oblast, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 316.

175. **MANKOV, Vladimir Mikhaylovich**, born 1940, CPSU member, worker at the Leningrad Machine Tool Building Association imeni Ya. M. Sverdlov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 216.

176. **MEDVEDEV, Aleksey Yegorovich**, born 1942, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the Electrotechnical Institute of Communications imeni M. A. Bonch-Bruyevich, resident of Lomonosovo. Electoral district No 322.

177. **MEZENTSEV, Dmitriy Fedorovich**, born 1959, CPSU member, secretary of the Komsomol committee of the student batallion, Leningrad Higher School for Railroad Transported Forces and Military Structures imeni M. V. Frunze, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 298.

178. **MIGOV, Yuriy Dmitriyevich**, born 1949, non-party member, radio apparatus installer at the Leningrad Plant for Radiotechnical Equipment, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 226.

179. **MIRONOV, Vladimir Fedorovich**, born 1951, CPSU member, deputy chairman of the military tribunal of the Leningrad garrison, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 113.

180. **MITCHIN, Konstantin Aleksandrovich**, born 1938, non-party member, lead engineer at the 1st Leningrad Medical Institute imeni Academician I. P. Pavlov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 332.

181. **MIKHEYEV, Boris Nikolayevich**, born 1953, CPSU member, history teacher at Secondary School No 105, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 27.

182. **MOISEYEV, Boris Aleksandrovich**, born 1942, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the USSR Ministry of Health Toxicology Institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 277.

183. **MOLCHANOV, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich**, born 1953, CPSU member, deputy chief of the 21st militia department, Kalinin RUVD, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 70.

184. **MONAKHOV, Viktor Nikolayevich**, born 1947, CPSU member, docent at Leningrad Engineering-Economics Institute imeni P. Togliatti, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 370.

185. **MUROMTSEV, Viktor Antonovich**, born 1928, non-party member, chief of the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Television, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 188.

186. **MUSAKOV, Aleksey Nikolayevich**, born 1960, non-party member, director of the "Bioinf" laboratory, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 366.

187. **NAGORNYI, Anatoliy Konstantinovich**, born 1948, non-party member, teacher at School No 390, resident of Petrodvorets. Electoral district No 314.

188. **NESTEROV, Yuriy Mikhaylovich**, born 1945, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the Leningrad section of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociology Institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 14.

189. **NEFEDOV, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich**, born 1942, CPSU member, chief of the Kalinin rayispolkom RUVD, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 103.

190. **NIKESHIN, Sergey Nikolayevich**, born 1958, CPSU member, director of building trust No 20, Lentsroykmitet, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 130.

191. **NIKIFOROV, Boris Yuryevich**, born 1937, CPSU member, military serviceman, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 351.

192. **NIKIFOROV, Sergey Mikhaylovich**, born 1950, non-party member, scientific associate at the Radium Institute imeni V. G. Khlopin, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 198.

193. **NIKOLAYEV, Oleg Ivanovich**, born 1940, CPSU member, lead engineer at the production association "Kirovskiy zavod", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 385.

194. **NOVIKOVA, Nina Ivanovna**, born 1957, CPSU member, editor of the main editorial office of information and propaganda, Leningrad Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting of the Lenoblgorispolkoms, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 302.

195. **OVCHINNIKOV, Viktor Aleksandrovich**, born 1947, CPSU member, foreman at the production association "Kirovskiy zavod", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 117.

196. **ORLOV, Yuriy Ivanovich**, born 1949, CPSU member, docent, assistant dean at Leningrad Mining Institute imeni G. V. Plekhanov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 11.

197. **OSIPOV, Anatoliy Maksovich**, born 1940, non-party member, scientific associate at the scientific-production association "Lentsroykcommash", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 89.

198. **PAVLOV, Boris Alekseyevich**, born 1937, non-party member, lead engineer at the LNPO "Vektor", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 106.

199. **PAVLOV, Valeriy Anatolyevich**, born 1947, non-party member, teacher at Special Boarding School No 36, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 34.

200. **PAVLOV, Vladimir Alekseyevich**, born 1949, non-party member, assistant in the physics department, Leningrad Technological Institute of the Refrigeration Industry, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 218.

201. **PAVLOV, Sergey Anatolyevich**, born 1967, Komsomol member, 4th year student in the mathematics-mechanics department at Leningrad State University, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 317.

202. **PAYDIYEV, Leonid Yevgeniyevich**, born 1957, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the LFEI imeni N. A. Voznesenskiy, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 384.

203. **PALAMARCHUK, Andrey Ivanovich**, born 1946, non-party member, engineer at the LOEP "Svetlana", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 98.

204. **PANASYUK, Ivan Mikhaylovich**, born 1938, CPSU member, chief physician at City Hospital No 38 imeni N. A. Semashko, resident of Pushkino. Electoral district No 344.

205. **PANOV, Valentin Aleksandrovich**, born 1947, non-party member, deputy section chief of the Committee for Environmental Protection of Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 108.

206. **PATYEV, Aleksandr Yuryevich**, born 1956, non-party member, senior engineer at the All-Union Scientific-Research and Design Institute "Mekhanobr", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 261.

207. **PASHINA, Natalya Ivanovna**, born 1945, non-party member, instructor at the Leningrad Technical-Vocational School of Naval Instrument Making, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 86.

208. **PEYBO, Anatoliy Borisovich**, born 1954, CPSU member, engineer-designer at the Central Design Bureau of Naval Engineering "Rubin", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 30.

209. **PERCHIK, Ernst Borisovich**, born 1937, non-party member, scientific associate at Leningrad Polytechnical Institute imeni M. I. Kalinin, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 166.

210. **PETROV, Leonid Nikolayevich**, born 1943, CPSU member, physician in the radiation hygiene department, Leningrad State Sanitary-Epidemiological Station, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 392.

211. **PETROV, Yuriy Borisovich**, born 1937, CPSU member, professor at Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute imeni V. I. Ulyanov (Lenin), resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 132.

212. **PIROGOV, Mikhail Ivanovich**, born 1945, non-party member, departmental assistant at Leningrad Engineering-Construction Institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 156.

213. **PLAVNIK, Yuriy Alekseyevich**, born 1959, non-party member, senior engineer at the Biological Scientific-Research Institute of Leningrad State University, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 135.

214. **PODVITSKIY, Viktor Mikhaylovich**, born 1948, CPSU member IL-86 airplane pilot, Leningrad United Aviation Detachment, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 398.

215. **PODOBED, Sergey Mikhaylovich**, born 1959, CPSU member, chief engineer at the "Zarya" holiday hotel, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 357.

216. **POLOKHOV, Leonid Mikhaylovich**, born 1947, CPSU member, military serviceman, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 127.

217. **POMOGAYEV, Sergey Aleksandrovich**, born 1967, Komsomol member, student at Leningrad State University, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 121.

218. **POPOV, Aleksandr Gennadyevich**, born 1962, CPSU member, worker at the production association "Znamya Oktyabrya", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 134.

219. **POPOV, Sergey Alekseyevich**, born 1948, non-party member, senior instructor at Leningrad Polytechnical Institute imeni M. I. Kalinin, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 293.

220. **POPOV, Sergey Anatolyevich**, born 1960, CPSU member, junior scientific associate at Leningrad Polytechnical Institute imeni M. I. Kalinin, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 296.

221. **POPOV, Yuriy Gavrilovich**, born 1934, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute "Elektron", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 335.

222. **POSTOYEV, Aleksandr Konstantinovich**, born 1932, CPSU member, laboratory chief at Leningrad Polytechnical Institute imeni M. I. Kalinin, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 77.

223. **PRYTKOV, Andrey Viktorovich**, born 1956, non-party member, lead engineer at Leningrad Scientific-Research Radiotechnical Institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 35.

224. **PUKHOV, Dmitriy Grigoryevich**, born 1947, non-party member, engineer-designer at the production association "Kirovskiy zavod", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 325.

225. **PYASKOVSKIY, Roald Vladimirovich**, born 1931, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the Leningrad department of the State Oceanographic Institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 120.

226. **RADCHENKO, Yuriy Fedorovich**, born 1944, CPSU member, docent at Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute imeni V. I. Ulyanov (Lenin), resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 383.

227. **RADKOV, Nikolay Grigoryevich**, born 1951, CPSU member, engineer 1st category, LNPO "Vektor", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 51.

228. **RACHKOV, Boris Mikhaylovich**, born 1936, CPSU member, chief of the neurosurgery department, Scientific-Research Institute of Traumatology and Orthopedics imeni R. R. Vreden, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 304.

229. **REVIZTSEV, Anatoliy Nikolayevich**, born 1954, non-party member, chief technologist at Mechanical Plant imeni K. Libknekht, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 90.

230. **REYTER, Nina Aleksandrovna**, born 1931, CPSU member, investigator for the procurator's office of Dzerzhinskiy rayon, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 17.

231. **RESHETOV, Aleksey Aleksandrovich**, born 1940, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the

All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Transport Machine Building, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 131.

232. **RITARI, Arne Eynarovich**, born 1954, non-party member, engineer at the Radium Institute imeni V. G. Khlopin, resident of Kolpino. Electoral district No 141.

233. **RODIN, Vladimir Nikolayevich**, born 1959, CPSU member, ispolkom chairman of the Zelenogorskiy city soviet, resident of Zelenogorsk. Electoral district No 358.

234. **RAMONKOV, Leonid Petrovich**, born 1937, non-party member, senior scientific associate of the Institute of Analytic Instrument Making, Scientific-Technical Association, USSR Academy of Sciences, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 26.

235. **RYBAKOV, Yuliy Andreyevich**, born 1946, non-party member, gas boiler room operator at the production association "Farmatsiya", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 374.

236. **RYBIN, Aleksandr Nikolayevich**, born 1941, CPSU member, senior scientific associate at the Lomonosov branch of the scientific-production association "VNII Metrologiyi imeni D. I. Mendeleyeva", resident of Lomonosov. Electoral district No 319.

237. **RYABOV, Sergey Aleksandrovich**, born 1959, CPSU member, electrical installer at the extradepartmental security, ispolkom UVD [internal affairs administration], Krasnoselskiy rayon soviet, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 182.

238. **SAVIN, Nikolay Petrovich**, born 1940, CPSU member, instructor at the Higher Juridical Correspondence School, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 173.

239. **SAZANOV, Aleksandr Petrovich**, born 1952, non-party member, correspondent for the newspaper SLAVA TRUDU of the production association "Leningrad Turbine Blades Plant" imeni 50th Anniversary of the USSR, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 282.

240. **SAZONO, Viktor Mikhaylovich**, born 1943, CPSU member, head of laboratory at the Leningrad Association of Electronic Instrument Making "Svetlana", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 97.

241. **SAPRYKIN, Vyacheslav Alekseyevich**, born 1937, CPSU member, department chief at the Higher Military-Naval School of Radio Electronics imeni A. S. Popov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 315.

242. **SEVENARD, Yuriy Konstantinovich**, born 1935, CPSU member, chief of the production construction-installation association "Lengidroenergostroy", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 208.

243. **SELEZNEV, Viktor Gerasimovich**, born 1940, non-party member, chief department specialist at the

State Planning and Scientific-Research Institute "Gipronikel", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 19.

244. **SELIVANOV, Valeriy Nikolayevich**, born 1939, CPSU member, senior instructor at the Leningrad Nakhimovskiy Military-Naval School, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 330.

245. **SEMASHKO, Lev Mikhaylovich**, born 1941, non-party member, engineer-consultant at the center for youth production associations under the Komsomol obkom, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 48.

246. **SEменова, Yevgeniya Semenovna**, born 1944, non-party member, engineer at the VIASM scientific-production association "Soyuzavtomatstrom", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 194.

247. **SEменова, Liya Borisovna**, born 1935, CPSU member, section chief at the scientific-production association "Avrora", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 54.

248. **SENIN, Viktor Tikhonovich**, born 1939, CPSU member, first deputy chairman of the Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 331.

249. **SERGEYEV, Yevgeniy Viktorovich**, born 1954, CPSU member, deputy secretary of the Baltic Steamship Line party committee, resident of Kolpino. Electoral district No 143.

250. **SERYAKOV, Aleksandr Vasilyevich**, born 1946, non-party member, scientific associate at the scientific-production association "State Institute of Applied Chemistry", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 297.

251. **SIVAKOV, Yuriy Grigoryevich**, born 1935, non-party member, driver at a Leningrad enterprise, Motor Taxi Transport No 2, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 265.

252. **SIVAKOV, Vladimir Borisovich**, born 1936, non-party member, engineer at the Central Scientific-Research Institute "Gidropribor" of the scientific-production association "Uran", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 379.

253. **SIMAKOV, Aleksey Yuryevich**, born 1956, non-party member, packer-transporter at the 12th Bakery Plant, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 243.

254. **SINELNIKOV, Valeriy Nikolayevich**, born 1955, CPSU member, brigade leader of fitter-assemblers at the production association "Izhorskiy zavod", resident of Kolpino. Electoral district No 140.

255. **SKOYBEDA, Vitaliy Valeryevich**, born 1961, non-party member, mechanical assembly operations fitter at LenNIIgiprophim, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 63.

256. **SLOBODIN, Vadim Igorevich**, born 1962, non-party member, assistant at the Technological Institute imeni Lensovet, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 160.
257. **SMEKALOV, Aleksandr Stefanovich**, born 1949, CPSU member, head of the resuscitation department at Rayon Territorial- Medical Association No 57, resident of Kronshtadt. Electoral district No 205.
258. **SMIRNOV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich**, born 1937, CPSU member, instructor at the Polytechnikum imeni M. V. Frunze, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 380.
259. **SMIRNOV, Valeriy Nikolayevich**, born 1947, non-party member, grinder at the Sestroretsk Instrument Plant imeni S. P. Voskov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 355.
260. **SMIRNOV, Viktor Konstantinovich**, born 1934, non-party member, lead engineer at the Central Scientific-Research Institute imeni Academician A. N. Krylov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 252.
261. **SMIRNOV, Kirill Vladimirovich**, born 1956, CPSU member, "Astron" NTTM center director, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 46.
262. **SMIRNOV, Leonid Pavlovich**, born 1941, CPSU member, trade union committee chairman at Construction-Installation Administration No 9, Lenmetrostroy, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 210.
263. **SMIRNOV, Nikolay Nikolayevich**, born 1954, non-party member chief project engineer at the "Lengiprogor" institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 167.
264. **SMIRNOV, Oleg Mikhaylovich**, born 1938, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the Scientific-Research Institute of Physics, Leningrad State University, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 122.
265. **SNEGIREV, Vladimir Ivanovich**, born 1953, CPSU member, section chief at Petrodvorets rayon military commissariat, resident of Petrodvorets. Electoral district No 318.
266. **SOKOVNINA, Mariya Mikhaylovna**, born 1935, CPSU member, buro chief of the production association "Izhorskiy zavod", resident of Kolpino. Electoral district No 139.
267. **SOKOLOV, Vladimir Mikhaylovich**, born 1956, CPSU member, assistant foreman at the spinning-textile factory "Rabochiy", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 259.
268. **SOKOLOV, Igor Leonidovich**, born 1952, CPSU member, ispolkom chairman of the Lomonosov city soviet, resident of Lomonosov. Electoral district No 321.
269. **SOKOLOV, Leonid Grigoryevich**, born 1936, CPSU member, head physician at medical unit No 122, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 310.
271. **SOCHAGIN, Andrey Georgiyevich**, born 1957, non-party member, assistant editor of the newspaper KUPCHINSKIYE NOVOSTI, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 386.
272. **SPESHILOV, Aleksandr Viktorovich**, born 1943, CPSU member, serviceman in a military unit, resident of Kronshtadt. Electoral district No 209.
273. **SPITSA, Galina Vasilyevna**, born 1959, non-party member, engineer at the State Planning Institute "Lenpromstroyproyekt", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 235.
274. **STADNITSKIY, Georgiy Vadimovich**, born 1934, non-party member, professor at Leningrad Technological Institute of the Cellulose- Paper Industry, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 107.
275. **STAROVEROV, Andrey Removich**, born 1961, CPSU member, scientific associate at the Central Scientific-Research Institute of Structural Materials "Prometey", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 178.
276. **STARODUBTSEV, Vladimir Vladimirovich**, born 1941, non-party member, chief of machine tools and handlers with programmed control at Leningrad Experimental Electrical Machine Building Plant, scientific-production association "Elektrofizika", resident of Kolpino. Electoral district No 148.
277. **SUNGUROV, Aleksandr Yuryevich**, born 1951, CPSU member, senior scientific associate at the Central Scientific-Research X-Ray Radiological Institute, USSR Ministry of Health, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 39.
278. **SURODIN, Yuriy Nikolayevich**, born 1958, CPSU member, director of the Leningrad-Sortirovochnyy-Moskovskiy October railway station, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 264.
279. **SUKHAREV, Valeriy Ivanovich**, born 1941, non-party member, section foreman at the Leningrad Carburetor-Armature Plant imeni V. V. Kluybyshev, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 390.
280. **SUKHARSKIY, Stanislav Boleslavovich**, born 1947, CPSU member, senior section inspector at the 39th militia department, Kolpino RUVD, resident of Pontonnyy. Electoral district No 149.
281. **SUKHOTSKAYA, Margarita Vladimirovna**, born 1941, non-party member, temporarily unemployed, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 58.
282. **SUCHKOV, Sergey Vasilyevich**, born 1945, CPSU member, assistant chief of the Higher Military-Naval

Underwater Navigation School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol on Legal Work, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 225.

283. **TALANOV, Viktor Lvovich**, born 1951, CPSU member, scientific associate at the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute of Communications imeni Professor M. A. Bonch-Bruyevich, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 213.

284. **TARASOV, Viktor Andreyevich**, born 1948, CPSU member, shop mechanic at the production association "Zavod 'Bolshevik'", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 260.

285. **TEMKIN, Anatoliy Borisovich**, born 1954, non-party member, engineer-programmer at the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Electric Arc Welding Equipment, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 396.

286. **TIMOFEYEV, Evgeniy Petrovich**, born 1953, CPSU member, dock worker-machine operator at the Leningrad Commercial Seaport, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 118.

287. **TOLMACHEV, Andrey Valeryevich**, born 1961, non-party member, engineer-programmer at a special design buro of the Physical-Technical Institute imeni A. F. Ioffe, USSR Academy of Sciences, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 157.

288. **TRUBACHEV, Aleksandr Viktorovich**, born 1954, CPSU member, scientific associate at the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Transport Machine Building, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 189.

289. **TRUBIN, Aleksandr Konstantinovich**, born 1948, CPSU member, instructor at the Pushkin Higher Military Engineering Construction School, resident of Pushkino. Electoral district No 349.

290. **TRUBNIKOV, Georgiy Ivanovich**, born 1940, CPSU member, senior scientific associate at the Scientific-Research Institute of Electrophysical Apparatus imeni D. V. Yefremov, scientific-production association "Elektrofizika", resident of Metallostroy. Electoral district No 150.

291. **TRUSKANOV, Gennadiy Borisovich**, born 1946, non-party member, senior work producer at the Promstroyontazh-71 trust, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 115.

292. **UDALOV, Sergey Nikolayevich**, born 1953, CPSU member, group chief at the production association "Izhorskiy zavod", resident of Kolpino. Electoral district No 144.

293. **USHAL, Anatoliy Kazimirovich**, born 1952, non-party member, senior laboratory technician at the Institute for Expert Investigation of Work Capacity of the Disabled, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 72.

294. **FADEYEV, Aleksandr Borisovich**, born 1937, CPSU member, professor at Leningrad Engineering-Construction Institute, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 222.

295. **FARTANOV, Vsevolod Konstantinovich**, born 1939, non-party member, worker at the Leningrad Machine Tool Building Association imeni Ya. M. Sverdlov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 69.

296. **FEDOROV, Venedikt Konstantinovich**, born 1938, CPSU member, military serviceman, resident of Khvoyny. Electoral district No 192.

297. **FEDOTOV, Sergey Vasilyevich**, born 1951, CPSU member, military serviceman, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 170.

298. **FILIPPOV, Dmitriy Nikolayevich**, born 1944, CPSU member, secretary of the Leningrad CPSU obkom, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 361.

299. **FILIPPOV, Petr Sergeyevich**, born 1945, CPSU member, department head at the journal EKO, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 249.

300. **FIMIN, Boris Vasilyevich**, born 1939, non-party member, lead engineer at the LNPO "Avantard", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 71.

301. **FIRSOVA, Nataliya Yevgenyevna**, born 1948, non-party member, senior scientific associate at the Leningrad branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Machine Studies, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 61.

302. **FROLOV, Yuriy Vasilyevich**, born 1947, CPSU member, instructor at Leningrad Polytechnical Technical-Vocational School, MGO "Tekhnokhim", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 47.

303. **KHMELNOV, Vitaliy Aleksandrovich**, born 1960, non-party member, technician-technologist at the Leningrad enterprise "ERA", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 341.

304. **KHODAKOV, Sergey Sergeyevich**, born 1937, CPSU member, commander of a special detachment, Lenoblgorispolkom GUVd, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 92.

305. **KHODYREV, Valentin Yegorovich**, born 1935, CPSU member, military unit commander, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 158.

306. **KHODYREV, Vladimir Yakovlevich**, born 1930, CPSU member, Lensovet ispolkom chairman, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 352.

307. **KHOLMANSKIY, Vitaliy Ivanovich**, born 1954, CPSU member, senior section inspector at the Leninskiy RUVD, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 223.

308. **KHROMOV, Aleksandr Nikolayevich**, born 1955, CPSU member, director of the Center for Scientific-Technical Creativity of Youth "Gals", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 246.

309. **KHUDOLEY, Konstantin Konstantinovich**, born 1951, CPSU member, docent at Leningrad State University, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 15.

310. **TSYMLYAKOV, Aleksandr Ivanovich**, born 1958, CPSU member, heat specialist at the Leningrad production association "Pargolovskiy zavod", resident of Levashovo. Electoral district No 56.

311. **TSYPLENKOV, Pavel Vadimovich**, born 1956, CPSU member, junior scientific associate in the department of sports biochemistry, Leningrad Scientific-Research Institute of Physical Culture, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 25.

312. **CHAUS, Anatoliy Vasilyevich**, born 1947, CPSU member, first secretary of the CPSU Smolninsk raykom, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 359.

313. **CHERVYAKOV, Viktor Vasilyevich**, born 1948, CPSU member, scientific associate at the scientific-production association "GIPKh", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 129.

314. **CHERNYSHEV, Vladimir Anatolyevich**, born 1951, non-party member, scientific associate at the Scientific-Research Institute of Chemistry, Leningrad State University, resident of Pesochnyy. Electoral district No 356.

315. **CHUMAK, Aleksey Ivanovich**, born 1949, CPSU member, shop foreman at the aviation-technical base of the Leningrad United Aviation Detachment, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 254.

316. **CHUPRASIV, Vladimir Borisovich**, born 1951, non-party member, head of the department of chronic genodiyalysis at City Hospital No 26, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 240.

317. **CHUROV, Vladimir Yevgenyevich**, born 1953, CPSU member, lead engineer at the special design buro "Integral", Leningrad State University, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 155.

318. **SHATALOV, Vladimir Vasilyevich**, born 1934, CPSU member, deputy general director of the production association "Lenprod mash", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 215.

319. **SHVEDKOV, Aleksandr Vasilyevich**, born 1950, CPSU member, director of School No 351, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 251.

320. **SHVEDKOV, Vladislav Nikolayevich**, born 1940, non-party member, scientific associate at the Scientific-Production Association for the Study and Design of Power Equipment imeni I. I. Polzunov, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 67.

321. **SHESTAKOV, Vyacheslav Zakharovich**, born 1944, CPSU member, deputy chief of the Krasnoselsk RUVD, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 195.

322. **SHITAREV, Vladimir Ilyich**, born 1947, CPSU member, Lensovet ispolkom secretary, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 220.

323. **SHISHLOV, Aleksandr Vladimirovich**, born 1955, non-party member, laboratory head at the Scientific-Research Institute of Hygiene of Sea Transport, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 307.

324. **SHMAKOV, Andrey Arnoldovich**, born 1959, CPSU member, official secretary of the Leningrad Resurrection Fund, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 10.

325. **SHPAGIN, Aleksandr Vasilyevich**, born 1944, CPSU member, head of the scientific-research laboratory at Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute imeni V. I. Ulyanov (Lenin), resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 288.

326. **SHTAGER, Vitaliy Valeryevich**, born 1960, Komsomol member, junior scientific associate at the scientific-production association "State Institute of Applied Chemistry", resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 116.

327. **SHUMSKIY, Vladimir Alekseyevich**, born 1952, non-party member, ship hull builder at the production administration of the Baltic Steamship Lines container pool, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 136.

328. **SHCHERBAKOV, Vladislav Grigoryevich**, born 1938, CPSU member, scientific associate at the Scientific-Research Institute of Program Software, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 244.

329. **SHCHERBAKOV, Vyacheslav Nikolayevich**, born 1940, CPSU member department head at the Military-Naval Academy imeni A. A. Grechko, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 328.

330. **YUDIN, Yevgeniy Pavlovich**, born 1932, CPSU member, chairman of the Leningrad City Committee for People's Control, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 102.

331. **YASKIN, Sergey Vasilyevich**, born 1944, CPSU member, senior instructor of Higher Special Officers Classes at the USSR Military-Naval Fleet, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 285.

332. **YASHIN, Valeriy Vasilyevich**, born 1945, CPSU member, first secretary of the CPSU Krasnoselsk raykom, resident of Leningrad. Electoral district No 202.

For electoral districts No 52 and 230, repeat elections of people's deputies to the Leningrad soviet were not held, since less than half of the registered voters participated in them.

For electoral district No 227, at the decision of the Leningrad city electoral commission, repeat elections of people's deputy to the Leningrad soviet were deemed invalid.

For electoral districts No 44, 169, 283, and 336, by decision of the district commissions, repeat elections of people's deputies to the Leningrad soviet were deemed invalid.

According to the results of repeat voting in electoral districts No 2, 5, 33, 74, 95, 99, 112, 133, 184, 295, and 376, the Leningrad city electoral commission received protests which are being reviewed by the commission. Information on these districts will be published at a later date....DISTRICT ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS FOR THE ELECTION OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES TO THE LENINGRAD SOVIET.

Workings of New Leningrad Soviet Viewed

90UN1562A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 15 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by V. Mamontov and A. Molokov, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA special correspondents: "Like a Squirrel in a 'Fifth Wheel'"]

[Text] I caught this phrase while walking through the white and gold corridors of the Mariinskiy Palace: "This session of the Leningrad City Soviet is spinning like a squirrel... in a 'Fifth Wheel'." For those who do not watch Leningrad television programs, let me explain: that is the name of a show which did much during the last elections to ensure the victory of candidates from the "democratic forces." And it is precisely those forces, the "forces of hope and renewal," as they were characterized in campaign handbills, who won a sizable majority in the Leningrad City Soviet yet now have spent nine days running around in circles, wasting a great deal of energy, sometimes generating an inordinate amount of heat, throwing off solar flares like the nighttime procession of deputies to Leningrad Television and interrupting the applause of American democrats who had come to visit the city on the Neva—but the coefficient of useful activity generated by the session was truly about the same as that of the wheel in a squirrel cage.

Leningraders can see this with their unaided eyes: in the spirit of glasnost the session is being broadcast on television in full and without any deletions. They are trying to convince people just to wait and see, things will fall into place and the most important procedural issues will be resolved. People are writing to VECHERNYY Leningrad: "I want to ask the Leningrad City Soviet deputies this question: do they know about production discipline?" "Tell me what this is: a working parliament or, pardon me, a gathering of feuding groups?" "The things that are happening at the session are not doing anyone any good."

We can assume in advance that opponents—and in Leningrad many people feel that a "fighting soviet" was

elected—will seek out these quotations in the 10 April issue and will accuse the letter writers, saying "and just who is criticizing the Leningrad City Soviet?" Retirees and veterans of labor...? However, the last opinion quoted above did not come from some anonymous "conservative," but rather from P. Filippov, one of the leaders of the Leningrad People's Front, and it was taken from our interview with him. It would be difficult to suspect Petr Sergeyevich of antipathy toward the "forces of hope and renewal." However, as we see, his assessment fits in perfectly with the first two...

This is once again confirmation of the fact that if one weighs in an unbiased and objective manner the decisions made by the new Leningrad City Soviet and the issues which it has rejected without even considering them, then it becomes clear that what one finds is nothing more nor less than a disheartening absence of a businesslike atmosphere. Sometimes one gets the impression that the soviet is reacting only to those situations and images with which it is familiar from its campaign battles. A rally on Palace Square held to protest "the use of military force in our own country?" Sanction it! A church service in St. Isaac's Cathedral? Treat it with all possible respect. An appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet regarding Gdlyan and Ivanov? Approve it at once!...

All these things are no doubt important and pressing, but the session only managed to agree on procedures governing its own functions on day five. It also shirked its responsibilities when faced with the question of whether to render patronage assistance to rural residents: if it did decide to help, would that not be a throwback, God forbid, to the command-administrative style? And if the deputies did not help, would they be strong enough to debate on an empty stomach come autumn? And it was in vain that the deputies of the Leningrad Oblast Soviet came, at the behest of that body's first session, to request support from the Leningrad City Soviet and wait for an enthusiastic response from the city government.

The deputies also gave a cold reception to an address to the session by V. Khodyrev, current Leningrad Gornispolkom chairman. In point of fact the speech was shorn of rhetorical flourishes and reflected the real state of affairs. The speech made reference to more "low-level," day-to-day realities: a meat plant, a microrayon, repair work, contracts, shipments... The chairman did not avoid criticism of himself, either, but he also proposed cooperation, at least until such time as the session finished its endless, laborious debates. However, as soon as discussion of urgent issues began it turned into hopeless bickering, and then the issues were abandoned altogether, for some better time. That, you will remember, is the tack taken by the most inveterate stagnationists: just ignore a problem as if it did not exist.

We realize that this analogy is probably insulting to the deputies: where are the similarities between such different bodies of authority? Deputy V. Drozdov, a captain second class who served as co-chairman of a meeting, attempted to prove to us that this analogy was unfair:

"The things we are encountering here result mainly from a lack of experience; a pile of problems is coming down on us, and we are terribly short of time..."

Yes, there probably is a lack of experience and a certain naivete on the part of many deputies as regards the fine points of parliamentary debate. But it would be easy to improve that somewhat: in this regard recommendations to the chairman have already been developed by sociologists and approved by a working group. It will be more difficult to correct something else: the lack of constructive ideas and responsibility which is integrally inherent in this particular group of deputies. Incidentally, we should clarify that we are not referring here to specific individuals, but rather to our overall impression.

"The new majority rejects any help from the professionals who served on the old soviet and is starting everything over from scratch. There is a certain logic in that, but today we also face the real danger that the management of the city will simply become more and more difficult," is the opinion of V. Borisov, Krasnogvardeyskiy CPSU Raykom first secretary.

"In the present campaign many people made it into the soviet through rejection, borne on a wave of rallies," says deputy P. Filippov. "Now something completely different is demanded of the deputies..."

Here is the opinion of Yu. Boldyrev, USSR people's deputy from Leningrad (we quote from the transcript of a "Fifth Wheel" broadcast specially distributed by the session's press center): "I can quite consciously state that this victory (author's note: reference is to the 1990 election) was not a victory for democratic forces, but rather an opposition victory. We were all born in this society and we have yet to become democrats, and at this level we must go through our 'trial by power'."

As they say, there is nothing you could either add to or subtract from that... The only problem is that since the opposition has become the majority it has not paid much attention to completely reasonable voices, even when they come from within its own ranks. Nor has it been too diligent about its lessons in the school of democracy. It is itself teaching, but in a somewhat different tone. I read the following on one of the Democracy-Wall-like posters (they cover the whole foyer of the Mariinskiy Palace: "Children play with rats at the Children's Hospital imeni Filatov... That is horrifying. But it was even more horrifying to see our elected officials turn their backs on us when the expert report on health care was presented. That was a strange moment, and it seemed that the session had been interrupted...")

What issue were the 147 deputies who left the auditorium, all of them elected as if by personal appointment from the "Democratic Elections '90" list, attempting to resolve? The reader and viewer have probably already guessed: at issue was the granting of live air time to N. Ivanov, USSR people's deputy and investigator for the procuracy. The whole story about the television takeover has already received much press coverage and there really would be no point in dwelling on it if all the things that have been written were the truth. The exaggerated version of a parliamentary visit to hand over a demand that the chairman of Leningrad Television resign crumbles when one takes a look at the resolution itself, a resolution written right there in the office, hurriedly, with things crossed out and added in... Where were the deputies in such a hurry to get to that they acted in violation of both ethics and the law? If we are to believe V. Drozdov, they were rushing to "defend the Constitution and to prove that the new government is something to be reckoned with..."

As we read the various items crossed out of the heavily scribbled sheet we catch ourselves thinking that we have already seen things like this on more than one occasion. Where? In historical films, of course. People in leather coats or pea jackets walking into offices and peasant huts, licking their pencils... There's your authority, there's your mandate, there's the door... So much has been done during the election campaign and in recent years in general to strip the romantic aura of dictators from the ones in the leather coats. But look now: all the most vitriolic critic has to do is be given power, and suddenly everything is solved as if by magic! Hence the steel in people's voices... One needs only attend a session of the Leningrad City Soviet Commission on Economic Reform to hear statements which make one nauseous:

"We must crush the opposition," says deputy S. Yegorov, "and we must take harsh action, like the heroine of the comedy film 'Diamond Hand': 'And if not we cut off the gas.'" Just a rhetorical turn of phrase, the deputy hastened to add.

Will not these rhetorical phrases lead us back to the unfortunate past if the members of the new soviet in practice really only want to defend the concept of power? One of the people's elected officials went even further: all rhetoric aside, he declared that the Leningrad City Soviet's decisions are above the law! True, his colleagues did not support him.

Incidentally, this discussion took place in connection with a very specific issue, and in this regard it was an improvement over the plenary sessions. The issue raised was a difficult one, and the new soviets will have to resolve it in a new way. At the commission session the following figure was cited: only approximately two percent of all enterprises are presently under the control of the Leningrad City Soviet. And under the old traditions the heads of the centrally-controlled industrial giants would not even allow local deputies into their waiting rooms in all cases! So the reform commission was

wondering: what to do about those who only carry out a resolution after they receive an order from their minister instructing them to do so? How to force them to tremble before the authority of the Leningrad City Soviet?

Or do they perhaps not need to tremble? Is it perhaps not necessary to put pressure on them? For they, too, are Leningraders and Soviets, people who, incidentally, are competent at what they do and who have good reason to be dubious about the competence of the new group of deputies... Should the government's authority be established by force?

"I am alarmed by the confrontational approach taken toward these union enterprises," said deputy S. Vasilyev, chairman of the commission session. "On the contrary, we should develop cooperation. We should invite the heads of enterprises to attend our sessions."

Unfortunately this logic of reason has not yet won out in the Leningrad City Soviet. Why? Because by following that logic one would have to move from declarations, no matter how radical or resounding, to hard, dirty work, day in and day out. It appears that some of the current ispolkom officials are afraid that they will become constant objects of attacks and criticism and will enjoy none of the soviets' confidence at all. We would not like to prophesy, but neither is it impossible, that the staff of the Leningrad Gorispolkom will choose the "Omsk option" and resign. Who stands to gain by that?

"We need a whole regiment of innovative, enterprising people to fill posts in and become part of the structure of city administration," said P. Filippov at one session. But where can they be found? At this point it seems that there are only two posts, one of which—soviet chairman—everybody wants, and another—ispolkom chairman—which nobody wants... Indeed, there do not seem to be many takers for the posts held by the viciously criticized "stagnationists," "apparatchiks" and "bureaucrats," or many who could bear the crushing burden of city administration better than they do. Therefore the most outrageous proposals are being made. USSR people's deputy Yu. Boldyrev, for example, does not exclude the possibility that citizens of other countries might come to fill the posts which require initiative and a spirit of enterprise. Incidentally, he added a caveat to what he said, saying that he meant it mainly to show how important it is to renounce dogmas. Well, one can renounce any dogma in words from one moment to the next. Yet we see that the prejudice that Russia cannot get along without the "Varangians" has not even been overcome by those who during the campaign promised the people a land of milk and honey if only they were elected to the soviet...

Running in circles. In the corridors during the session we happened to overhear this opinion: the delay is occurring because a schism is imminent within the "democratic majority" itself. P. Filippov and Ye. Salye, the leaders of the Leningrad People's Front, and their respective supporters have diverged on the priorities of the Leningrad

City Soviet and its session. Whereas the "pragmatists" and the "economists" would like to make a transition to decisive measures aimed at realizing economic reform, Salye and his supporters, who made a name for themselves on that same wave of rallies, are demanding that we go further with the exposures and the shakeups and are putting forward ever more radical slogans. The result of this internecine strife has been as follows: true, messengers have not yet been dispatched to the "Varangians," but people are being asked to vote for A. Sobchak, USSR people's deputy, in one of the 27 electoral districts where a second round of voting is slated. We dare assume that this was the reason the Leningrad City Soviet has been dragging out a procedure so vital to its very life as the selection of its chairman.

Yet the soviet really does have urgent tasks of a political nature. Consider, for example, the creation and official recognition of factions among the deputies. It is high time to bring discussion within civilized parliamentary bounds, especially since spontaneous demarcation is already underway.

"And that is the real way out of this dead end," opines Deputy V. Borisov. "We must bring the deputies together on the basis of a constructive platform. We have announced the formation of a group called 'Leningrad Rebirth' [Vozrozhdeniye Leningrada]. Its main purpose will be to strengthen the multi-tiered economy, develop self-administration at all levels and pursue a policy of popular concord and revitalization of Russia. The 'Dialogue' [Dialog] group is being organized on a broad basis, for we realize that even among our opponents there are soberly thinking individuals, with whom dialogue is a path to convergence, agreement and action..."

The reader has a right to ask: is life in Leningrad going on as usual? Or has it been swept up in the whirlwind of political passions? Life goes on! Just as it always has. At the Alexander Nevskiy Monastery the conservatory singers thrill both worshippers and the atheists who happen by to the depth of their souls; an impassioned week is drawing to a close. People stand in line in front of the department stores, and the newspaper offices keep getting complaints, and one suddenly catches oneself thinking that the discussion raging in the Mariinskiy Palace seems somehow distant and less colorful than real life. It is taking place off on the sidelines, off on a tangent—like a fifth wheel.

New Sverdlovsk Obkom First Secretary Elected

90UN1548A Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN*
in Russian No 16, Apr 90 p 3

[Article by V. Semenov, correspondent: "The Matter Was Directed by Energetic Persons"]

The new leader of the Sverdlovsk Oblast party organization was determined late in the evening. The tallying

commission proclaimed the following results: by an overwhelming majority of the votes—532 out of 664 delegates—Aleksandr Petrovich Gusev was elected first secretary of the party obkom. His nearest competitor garnered only 88 votes. Most likely, there would not have been anything surprising in such an outcome if it had not been for one detail: up to just a few hours before the oblast party conference began its work, Gusev's name was not on the list of aspirants for the post of first secretary...

The sociopolitical situation which had evolved in the oblast at the beginning of this year required radical personnel changes in the apparatus of the party obkom. At meetings and conferences, as well as in labor collectives, the communists directly expressed their lack of confidence in the old body of the obkom and its buro. In order not to exacerbate this crisis, the obkom buro suggested to Comrade L. Bobykin, the obkom first secretary, that he submit his resignation and retire. And, after a certain amount of vacillating, he did just that.

And the obkom, in turn, began to prepare for an extraordinary accounts-and-election conference. Also participating in it genuinely and actively were the primary organizations, inasmuch as they had been granted the right to nominate candidates to the body of the future obkom in accordance with a specific quota, as well as to elect conference delegates by direct balloting on an alternative basis.

And this radically affected the composition of the delegates. New people attended the conference, people who were sincerely motivated to renovate the style and methods of party work, who were actively seeking a way out of the crisis situation.

This was also the first time that party organizations themselves nominated candidates for the post of obkom first secretary. Their brief biographies were published in the press. Therefore, even prior to the conference the delegates knew who the aspirants were, could put questions to the comrades, and consult with their own organizations as to whom they should vote for. All this shattered the hitherto prevalent "unity of viewpoints and positions." Adherents of the "Democratic Platform" made their presence known. They formed something like a faction, but, as subsequent events have shown, they do not reject either dialogue or compromises; on the contrary, they even seek them. It is precisely this which allowed them to avert a split or a confrontation and which brought about a serious, constructive discussion with regard to finding ways out of the crisis.

In the delegates' opinion, the report which was delivered so resoundingly at the conference by V. Manyukhin, the obkom second secretary, merely repeated the commonly known situation, recited the shortcomings, and outlined partial solutions to minor problems.

Speeches by the delegates leveled sharp but impartial, unprejudiced criticism at the party obkom secretaries for being out of touch with the primary organizations, for their lack of dialogue with the masses, and for their

"armchair" style of work. People spoke directly about the failure of ideological work, which was headed up by obkom secretary V. Andrianov, and about the excessively authoritative style of obkom secretary V. Romanov. It was specifically this man who, in running agriculture, has rejected or, at best, ignored the new forms of managing land.

Therefore, there is nothing surprising in the fact that this conference deemed the work of the party obkom to be unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the delegates also agreed with the lack of confidence in the composition of the CPSU obkom buro by several of this oblast's primary organizations.

Eight candidates were proposed for the post of first secretary, but at the conference itself the delegates nominated A. Gusev, who had worked as first secretary of the Asbestovskiy Party Gorkom and served as chairman of the City Soviet of People's Deputies. In this young party official, a candidate of technical sciences, people saw a readiness and a determination to carry out those complex changes which are so necessary nowadays in order to find a way out of our complicated situation here.

Belorussian SSR People's Deputy Runoff Election Results

90UN1710A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 23 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Report by Special Commission on Election of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR: "Results of Runoff Election"]

[Text] The Central Commission has examined the results of the runoff elections held in 194 election okrugs for election of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR, where two candidates had run for office and had received the most votes in the general election.

There were 4,523,673 persons on the voters' lists for the election of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR in the 194 election okrugs; 3,494,607, or 33.2 percent, took part in the runoff elections. In the city of Minsk, 64.9 percent took part in the runoff election; 78.7 in Bratsk Oblast; 80.4 in Vitebsk Oblast; 75.8 in Gomel Oblast; 78.9 in Grodno Oblast; 82.2 in Minsk Oblast; and 72.9 percent of the voters in Mogilev Oblast.

Elections were held in all 194 election okrugs, and 131 persons were elected People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR. In the 63 election okrugs where neither of the two candidates running for office received more than half the votes of the electors taking part in the runoff election, repeat elections will be held on 5 May 1990 in accordance with Article 57 of the Law on the Election of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR.

The Central Commission on Election of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR has registered all People's

Deputies of the Belorussian SSR elected in the runoff election, in accordance with Article 53 of the Law on Elections.

There were two women among those elected People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR, or 1.5 percent; 129 men were elected, or 98.5 percent. There were ten workers, or 7.6 percent; and ten were kolkhoz members, 7.6 percent. Among the deputies 102, or 77.9 percent, are CPSU members; 29, or 22.1 percent, are non-party members, to include 3 Komsomol members, or 2.3 percent.

The list of elected deputies is being published.

In all, according to the results of the two rounds of elections, 279 were elected People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR, out of the 360 authorized in the Belorussian SSR Constitution.

A runoff election was also held in a number of election okrugs for elections to local Soviets of People's Deputies. A report will be published on this as well.

**LIST of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR
Elected from Territorial Okrugs in the Runoff Elections:**

Aksamit, Nikolay Vladimirovich, a worker on Gnezdno Sovkhoz in Volkovysskiy Rayon, city of Volkovysk, Grodno Oblast; from Volkovysskiy City Election Okrug No 248.

Alampiyev, Viktor Petrovich, CPSU member, chief of the computer information center at the Pinsk Textile Production Association, city of Pinsk, Brest Oblast; from Pinsky-Severnny Election Okrug No 134.

Aleshchenko, Mikhail Petrovich, CPSU member, director of the Timonovo Stock Farm in Klimovichskiy Rayon, village of Timonovo, Mogilev Oblast; from Klimovichskiy Election Okrug No 297.

Andreyenko, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, CPSU member, a lathe operator at the Kalinkovich Mechanical and Repair Plant, city of Kalinkovich in Gomel Oblast; from Kalinkovichskiy City Election Okrug No 213.

Andreychenko, Vladimir Pavlovich, CPSU member, first secretary of the Verkhnedvinskiy Rayon Committee, Belorussian Communist Party, city of Verkhnedvinsk in Vitebsk Oblast; from Verkhnedvinskiy Election Okrug No 144.

Antonchik, Sergey Antonovich, apparatchik at the Minsk Production Association imeni V.I. Lenin, city of Minsk; from Yeseninskiy Election Okrug No 17.

Apatskiy, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, CPSU member, chairman of the Bolshevik Kolkhoz in Kopylskiy Rayon, village of Zhilikhovo, Kopylskiy Rayon, Minsk Oblast; from Semezhvskiy Election Okrug No 64.

Bambiza, Ivan Mikhaylovich, CPSU member, ispolkom chairman at the Rechitskiy Rayon Soviet of People's

Deputies, city of Rechitsa, Gomel Oblast; from Vasilyevichskiy Election Okrug No 228.

Baranovskiy, Valerian Vladimirovich, CPSU member, chief physician at the medical section of the Gomel Chemical Plant, city of Gomel; from Gomelskiy-Promyshlenny Election Okrug No 196.

Bedulin, Yevgeniy Makarovich, CPSU member, machinist at the Brest locomotive depot station, city of Brest; from Brestskiy-Poleskiy Election Okrug No 102.

Belenkiy, Yuriy Adamovich, chief of the financial section at the Minsk Udarnik Plant, Dormash Scientific-Production Association, city of Minsk; from Kuybyshevskiy Election Okrug No 36.

Bobochenok, Stanislav Ulyanovich, CPSU member, chief of Repair-Construction-Installation Administration No 1, Mogilevkhimremont Trust, city of Mogilev; from Mogilevskiy-Kuybyshevskiy Election Okrug No 277.

Boris, Vasily Ivanovich, CPSU member, chief of the organizational-party and cadre work department, Belorussian CP Central Committee, city of Minsk; from Ruzhanskiy Election Okrug No 138.

Borshchevskiy, Leonid Petrovich, senior instructor at the Novopolotsk Polytechnical Institute, city of Novopolotsk, Vitebsk Oblast; from Novopolotskiy-Molodezhnyy Election Okrug No 174.

Brodskiy, Ivan Sergeevich, CPSU member; chairman, Kolkhoz imeni Skvortsov i Mayorov in Starodorozhskiy Rayon; village of Yazyl, Starodorozhskiy Rayon, Minsk Oblast; from Starodorozhskiy Election Okrug No 93.

Bubnevich, Sergey Dmitrievich, CPSU member; tractor operator on Kolkhoz imeni Lenin, Volozhinskiy Rayon; village of Podbolot, Volozhinskiy Rayon, Minsk Oblast; from Volozhinskiy Election Okrug No 58.

Bulakhov, Dmitriy Petrovich; investigator at the Internal Affairs Administration, Mogilev Oblispolkom, city of Mogilev; from Mogilevskiy-Yubileyniy Election Okrug No 275.

Vasilevskiy, Mikhail Vladimirovich, CPSU member; ispolkom chairman, Chashnikskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, city of Chashniki, Vitebsk Oblast; from Chashnikskiy Election Okrug No 163.

Vasilev, Vasily Ivanovich, CPSU member; director, Lida Shoe Factory imeni 60th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution, city of Lida, Grodno Oblast; from Lidskiy-Sovetskiy Election Okrug No 257.

Vakhromeyev, Kirill Varfolomeyevich (Filaret), metropolitan [bishop] of the Minsk and Grodno Patriarchate and exarch [archbishop] of Belorussia, city of Minsk; from Storozhevskiy Election Okrug No 47.

Vashkevich, Iosif Fedorovich, CPSU member; first secretary, Zavodskiy Rayon Committee, Belorussian Communist Party, city of Minsk; from Tashkentskiy Election Okrug No 12.

Vlasenko, Viktor Semenovich, grinding-machine operator at the Molodechno Training and Production Association, city of Molodechno; from Molodechnenskiy-Zavodskiy Election Okrug No 74.

Vorobey, Vladimir Stepanovich, CPSU member; chief physician at the Zhlobinskiy Rayon Central Hospital, city of Zhlobin, Gomel Oblast; from Zhlobinsko-Metallurgicheskii Election Okrug No 211.

Gerasimenko, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, CPSU member; second secretary, Minsk Gorkom, Belorussian Communist Party, city of Minsk; from Stepyanskiy Election Okrug No 25.

Gerasyuk, Ivan Nikolayevich, CPSU member; department chief in the editorial offices of SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, city of Minsk; from Kopylskiy Election Okrug No 63.

Germenchuk, Igor Ivanovich, CPSU member; staff correspondent at NOVOSTI Press Agency, town of Kolodishchi, Minskiy Rayon; from Borovlyanskiy Election Okrug No 71.

Gilevich, Nil Semenovich, CPSU member; poet, city of Minsk; from Krasnenskiy Election Okrug No 77.

Glushkevich, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich, CPSU member; deputy chief for socio-domestic questions at the Vitebsk melioratsiya Land Reclamation Construction-Operation Association, city of Vitebsk; from Orshanskiy-Zavodskiy Election Okrug No 168.

Golubev, Valentin Fedorovich, CPSU member; scientific associate at the Institute of History, Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, city of Minsk; from Alibegovskiy Election Okrug No 15.

Golubovich, Olga Nikolayevna; department chief at the editorial office of NASTAUNITSKAY GAZETY, city of Minsk; from Traktorozavodskiy Election Okrug No 24.

Gorelik, Nikolay Nikolayevich, CPSU member; director of Secondary School No 11, city of Slutsk, Minsk Oblast; from Slutskiy-Leninskiy Election Okrug No 83.

Grib, Mechislav Ivanovich, CPSU member; chief, Internal Affairs Administration, Vitebsk Oblispolkom, city of Vitebsk; from Vitebskiy-Sovetskiy Election Okrug No 178.

Gribanov, Vladimir Mikhaylovich; military serviceman, city of Minsk; from Kuleshovskiy Election Okrug No 7.

Davidovich, Sergey Fedorovich, CPSU member; operations duty officer, Internal Affairs Administration, Minsk Oblispolkom, city of Minsk; from Kharkovskiy Election Okrug No 43.

Davlyud, Aleksey Vladimirovich; electrician-cable layer at the Optik plant, city of Lida, Grodno Oblast; from Lidskiy-Krasnoarmeyskiy Election Okrug No 256.

Danilevich, Ivan Nikolaevich, CPSU member; director, Sovkhoz-Agrofirm imeni 60th Anniversary of the Belorussian Communist Party, Berezovskiy Rayon, Village of Malets, Brest Oblast; from Berezovskiy Election Okrug No 114.

Deyko, Leonid Ivanovich, CPSU member; electronic engineer at the Kletsk Machine Works, city of Kletsk, Minsk Oblast; from Kletskiy Election Okrug No 62.

Dzichkovskiy, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich; senior priest at the Svyato-Pokrovskiy Cathedral, dean of Baranovichskiy Rayon, city of Baranovich, Brest Oblast; from Baranovichskiy-Proletarskiy Election Okrug No 107.

Dolgolev, Vasilii Borisovich, CPSU member; deputy director of the Diaproektor Plant in Rogachev, Gomel Oblast; from Rogachevskiy City Election Okrug No 229.

Domashkevich, Nikolay Fedorovich, CPSU member; first secretary, Sennenskiy Rayon Committee, Belorussian Communist Party, city of Senno, Vitebsk Oblast; from Sennenskiy Election Okrug No 160.

Domenikan, Nikolay Vladimirovich, CPSU member; first secretary, Baranovichskiy Rayon Committee, Belorussian Communist Party, city of Baranovich, Brest Oblast; from Gorodishchenskiy Election Okrug No 113.

Dragan, Petr Stefanovich, CPSU member; chairman of the Maloritskiy Raykom, Trade Union for Workers in the Agro-Industrial Complex, city of Malorit, Brest Oblast; from Maloritskiy Election Okrug No 131.

Yevshalov, Dmitriy Nikolayevich, CPSU member; director of the Dzerzhinskiy Sovkhoz, Narovlyanskiy Rayon, village of Dzerzhinsk, Narovlyanskiy Rayon, Gomel Oblast; from Narovlyanskiy Election Okrug No 222.

Yermolayev, Valeriy Semenovich, CPSU member; locomotive acceptance inspector, Orsha Locomotive Depot, city of Orsha, Vitebsk Oblast; from Orshanskiy-Zapadnyy Election Okrug No 167.

Zhidilyaev, Ivan Ivanovich, CPSU member; director of Building Trust No 18, city of Orsha; from Orshanskiy-Leninskiy Election Okrug No 169.

Zablotskiy, Vladimir Nikolayevich, CPSU member; department chief at the Electronic Computer Scientific Research Institute, city of Minsk; from Nekrasovskiy Election Okrug No 35.

Zverev, Leonid Aleksandrovich, CPSU member; department chief at Mogilev Oblast Hospital, city of Mogilev; from Mogilevskiy-Pervomayskiy Election Okrug No 276.

Kakovka, Viktor Fedorovich, production engineer at the Izmeritel Plant, city of Novopolotsk, Vitebsk Oblast; from Novopolotsk-Industrialnyy Election Okrug No 176.

Kalmychkov, Ivan Fedotovitch, CPSU member; chairman of the board, Grodno Oblast Consumer Society, city of Grodno; from Dyatlovskiy Election Okrug No 251.

Karpov, Aleksey Alekseyevich, CPSU member; automobile driver for the editorial office of the Bobruysk Rayon newspaper, TRYBUNA PRATSY, city of Bobruysk, Mogilev Oblast; from Bobruyskiy-Leninskiy Election Okrug No 284.

Kovalev, Albert Andreyevich, CPSU member; general director, Zhlobin Artificial Fur Production Association, city of Zhlobin, Gomel Oblast; from Zhlobinskiy-Zheleznodorozhnyy Election Okrug No 210.

Kozik, Leonid Petrovich, CPSU member; director of the Borisov Garment Factory imeni N.K. Krupskaya, city of Borisov, Minsk Oblast; from Borisovski-Yuzhnyy Election Okrug No 53.

Konoplya, Yevgeniy Fedorovich, CPSU member; director of the Radiobiological Institute, Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, city of Minsk; from Uruchskiy Election Okrug No 31.

Konyushik, Nikolay Maksimovich, CPSU member; chairman of Rossiya Kolkhoz in Luninetskiy Rayon, village of Dvoret, Brest Oblast; from Mikashevichskiy Election Okrug No 129.

Kopytov, Nikolay Yermolayevich, CPSU member; director of Mogilev Silocon Combine, city of Mogilev; from Mogilevskiy-Orlovskiy Election Okrug No 274.

Korniyevech, Nikolay Fomich, CPSU member; first deputy chairman, Belorussian SSR Gosplan, city of Minsk; from Lebedevskiy Election Okrug No 76.

Korotchenya, Ivan Mikhaylovich, CPSU member; first secretary Vileyka Gorkom, Belorussian Communist Party, city of Vileyka, Minsk Oblast; from Vileyskiy Rural Election Okrug No 57.

Kotov, Sergey Mikhaylovich, CPSU member; chief physician at Territorial Medical Association No 2, city of Grodno; from Grodnenskiy-Folyushskiy Election Okrug No 243.

Kravchenko, Petr Kuzmich, CPSU member; Minsk Gorkom secretary, Belorussian Communist Party, city of Minsk; from Avtozavodskiy Election Okrug No 8.

Kryzhanovskiy, Nikolay Kirillovich, CPSU member; design bureau chief in the office of the chief designer at the Belorussian Automotive Plant, city of Zhodino, Smolevichskiy Rayon, Minsk Oblast; from Zhodinskiy-Avtozavodskiy Election Okrug No 86.

Kudlash, Vladimir Vladimirovich, CPSU member; first secretary, Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee, city of Minsk; from Tolochinskiy Election Okrug No 161.

Kudryavets, Viktor Mikhaylovich, CPSU member; ispolkom chairman, Grodno City Soviet of People's Deputies, Grodno; from Grodnenskiy-Vrublevskiy Election Okrug No 237.

Kuzmenkov, Aleksandr Yevseevich, CPSU member; director of the Vetrinskaya Experimental Base, Polotskiy Rayon, village of Zhernoseki, Polotskiy Rayon, Vitebsk Oblast; from Polotskiy Rural Election Okrug No 156.

Kuznetsov, Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, CPSU member; ispolkom chairman, Sovetskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, city of Minsk; from Koltsovskiy Election Okrug No 34.

Kuzma, Anatoliy Fomich, CPSU member; director, Svisloch Feed Lot, town of Svisloch, Grodno Oblast; from Svislochskiy Election Okrug No 266.

Kulichkov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, CPSU member; deputy ispolkom chairman, Mogilev Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, city of Mogilev; from Bobruyskiy-Minskiy Election Okrug No 286.

Kudryukov, Valeriy Nikolayevich, CPSU member; instructor at the Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee, city of Minsk; from Lidskiy-Komsomolskiy Election Okrug No 258.

Letko, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, CPSU member; chairman of Lenin's Path Kolkhoz, Ivyeviskiy Rayon, town of Ivye, Grodno Oblast; from Ivyeviskiy Election Okrug No 254.

Lobach, Nikolay Ivanovich, CPSU member; director of the Borisov Machine Accessory Plant, city of Borisov, Minsk Oblast; from Borisovski-Severnny Election Okrug No 50.

Lobko, Nikolay Nikolayevich, CPSU member; ispolkom chairman, Baranovichi City Soviet of People's Deputies, Baranovichi, Brest Oblast; from Baranovichskiy-Krasnogvardeyskiy Election Okrug No 110.

Luzhinskiy, Stanislav Antonovich, CPSU member; chairman of the Bolshevik Kolkhoz, village of Pugachi, Volozhinskiy Rayon, Minsk Oblast; from Pershayskiy Election Okrug No 59.

Lukashev, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, CPSU member; director of Cherven Motor Vehicle Pool No 20, city of Cherven, Minsk Oblast; from Chervenskiy Election Okrug No 97.

Lukashenko, Aleksandr Grigoryevich, CPSU member; director, Gorodets Sovkhoz, village of Ryzhkovichi, Shklovskiy Rayon, Mogilev Oblast; from Shklovskiy Election Okrug No 310.

Makarevich, Iosif Adamovich, CPSU member; charman, Baratsba Kolkhoz-Combine, village of Zazerka, Pukhovichskiy Rayon, Minsk Oblast; from Rudenskiy Election Okrug No 82.

Malashko, Vitaliy Alekseyevich; leading engineer at the Automation Scientific Research Institute, city of Minsk; from Pervomayskiy Election Okrug No 30.

Malyshev, Vladimir Nikolayevich; metal-worker at the Mozyr Oil Refinery, city of Mozyr, Gomel Oblast; from Mozyrskiy-Yuzhnyy Election Okrug No 219.

Marinich, Mikhail Afanasyevich, CPSU member; deputy ispolkom chairman, Minsk City Soviet of People's Deputies, city of Minsk; from Zakharovskiy Election Okrug No 23.

Markevich, Nikolay Nikolayevich; GRODNENSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper correspondent, city of Grodno; from Grodnenskiy-Prinemanskiy Election Okrug No 241.

Martos, Konstantin Vikentyevich; physician at Baranovich City Hospital, Baranovich, Brest Oblast; from Baranovichskiy-Zapadnyy Election Okrug No 108.

Moiseyev, Gennadiy Fedorovich, CPSU member; electrician at the Polimir Production Association, city of Novopolotsk, Vitebsk Oblast; from Novopolotskiy-Yubileynyy Election Okrug No 175.

Mordashov, Anatoliy Andreyevich, CPSU member; first deputy ispolkom chairman, Vitebsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, chief of the Main Planning and Economic Administration at the Oblispolkom, city of Vitebsk; from Vitebskiy Rural Election Okrug No 145.

Novik, Vladimir Vladimirovich; section chief at the Alfa Independent Design Bureau, city of Minsk; from Zheleznodorozhnyy Election Okrug No 18.

Novikov, Vladimir Mefodyevich, CPSU member; chairman, Zarya Kommunizma Kolkhoz, village of Torguny, Dokshitskiy Rayon, Vitebsk Oblast; from Dokshitskiy Election Okrug No 150.

Novikov, Yevgeniy Viktorovich, CPSU member; physician at the 4th Clinical Hospital, city of Minsk; from Lermontovskiy Election Okrug No 13.

Obrazov, Aleksandr Ivanovich, CPSU member; first secretary, Vitebsk Gorkom, Belorussian Communist Party, city of Vitebsk; from Vitenskiy-Gagarinskiy Election Okrug No 177.

Palagecha, Igor Ivanovich, Komsomol member; military serviceman, city of Shchuchin, Grodno Oblast; from Shchuchinskiy Election Okrug No 271.

Parul, Aleksandr Vladimirovich; department chief at Polotsk Central Rayon Hospital, city of Polotsk, Vitebsk Oblast; from Polotskiy-Tsentrallyy Election Okrug No 172.

Plotskiy, Roman Eduardovich; deputy chief physician at Mosty Territorial Medical Association, city of Mosty, Grodno Oblast; from Mostovskiy Election Okrug No 261.

Popkov, Sergbey Petrovich, CPSU member; technological design bureau department chief at Integral Scientific-Production Association, city of Minsk; from Oktyabrskiy Election Okrug No 21.

Pakhilko, Yevgeniy Polikarpovich, CPSU member; general director of the Bobruyskfermmash Production Association, city of Bobruysk, Mogilev Oblast; from Bobruyskiy-Severnnyy Election Okrug No 287.

Pyrkh, Igor Ivanovich, CPSU member; chief of the Department for Preservation of Public Order, Gomel Oblispolkom Internal Affairs Administration, city of Gomel; from Gomelskiy-Pushkinskiy Election Okrug No 197.

Radkevich, Leonid Ivanovich, CPSU member; first secretary, Frunzenskiy Rayon Committee, Belorussian Communist Party, city of Minsk; from Olshevskiy Election Okrug No 42.

Radomyslskiy, Viktor Aleksandrovich; senior priest at Svyato-Troitskaya Church, town of Orekhovsk, Orshanskiy Rayon, Vitebsk Oblast; from Orekhovskiy Election Okrug No 155.

Savitskiy, Boris Parfenovich; department chief at Gomel State University, city of Gomel; from Gomelskiy-Yubileynyy Election Okrug No 187.

Sadovskiy, Petr Vikentyevich; docent at Minsk State Pedagogical Institute imeni Gorkiy, city of Minsk; from Odintsovskiy Election Okrug No 46.

Sakovich, Vasiliy Andreyevich, CPSU member; Vitebsk Obkom secretary, Belorussian Communist Party, city of Vitebsk; from Gorodokskiy Election Okrug No 149.

Sapranetskiy, Nikolay Kirillovich, CPSU member; chairman, Kolkhoz imeni 22nd CPSU Congress, city of Krichev, Krichevskiy Rayon, Mogilev Oblast; from Krichevskiy Election Okrug No 301.

Semashko, Ivan Ivanovich; physician at Pruzhany Central Rayon Hospital, city of Pruzhany, Brest Oblast; from Pruzhanskiy Election Okrug No 137.

Semdyanova, Galina Georgiyevna, CPSU member; inspector at Novogrudok City People's Control Committee, city of Novogrudok, Grodno Oblast; from Novogrudskiy City Election Okrug No 262.

Sereda, Nikolay Mikhaylovich, CPSU member; chief, Internal Affairs Administration, Gomel Oblispolkom, city of Gomel; from Petrikovskiy Election Okrug No 224.

Seredich, Iosif Pavlovich, CPSU member; deputy editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, city of Minsk; from Pinskiy-Vostochnyy Election Okrug No 133.

Sivitskiy, Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, CPSU member; ispolkom chairman, Mogilev City Soviet of People's Deputies, city of Mogilev; from Mogilevskiy-IKirovskiy Election Okrug No 278.

Sinitsyn, Leonid Georgiyevich, CPSU member; chief engineer at Lavsanstroy Trust No 17, city of Mogilev; from Mogilevskiy-Gagarinskiy Election Okrug No 279.

Skorynin, Nikolay Pavlovich, CPSU member; production process control brigade leader at the Etalon Plant in Minsk; from Kizhevatovskiy Election Okrug No 22.

Slabchenko, Sergey Ivanovich; instructor at the Baranovichi Technological Tekhnikum of Belkoopsoyuz [Belorussian Union of Consumers' Societies], city of Baranovichi, Brest Oblast; from Baranovichskiy-Oktyabrskiy Election Okrug No 111.

Smolyar, Ivan Nikolayevich, CPSU member; Gomel Obkom secretary, Belorussian Communist Party, city of Gomel; from Mozyrskiy-Vostochnyy Election Okrug No 218.

Soldatov, Nikolay Nikolayevich, CPSU member; Berestovitskiy Rayon Committee first secretary, Belorussian Communist Party, town of Bolshaya Berestovitsa, Grodno Oblast; from Berestovitskiy Election Okrug No 247.

Spiglazov, Aleksandr Fedorovich; physician at Zhabinka Central Rayon Hospital, city of Zhabinka, Brest Oblast; from Zhabinkovskiy Election Okrug No 119.

Sosnov, Aleksandr Viktorovich, CPSU member; department chief at Gomel Polytechnical Institute, city of Gomel; from Gomelskiy-Zavodskiy Election Okrug No 189.

Stepanenko, Aleksey Nikolayevich, CPSU member; ispolkom chairman, Zhitovichskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, city of Zhitkovichi, Gomel Oblast; from Turovskiy Election Okrug No 209.

Syrovkash, Dmitriy Ivanovich, CPSU member; director, Belorussian Motor Works, city of Zhodino, Smolevichskiy Rayon, Minsk Oblast; from Zhodinskiy-Fabrichnyy Election Okrug No 87.

Telezhnikov, Vladimir Ivanovich, CPSU member; director of the building materials combine, city of Polotsk, Vitebsk Oblast; from Polotskiy-Borovukhskiy Election Okrug No 171.

Titkov, Stanislav Petrovich, CPSU member; chairman, Mogilev Oblast People's Control Committee, city of Mogilev; from Bykhovskiy Election Okrug No 291.

Trusov, Oleg Anatolyevich, CPSU member; department chief at Belspetsproektrestavratsiya Institute, city of Minsk; from Miroshnichenkovskiy Election Okrug No 33.

Turok, Anatoliy Nikolayevich, CPSU member; director, Rechitsa Experimental Industrial Hydrolysis Plant, city of Rechitsa, Gomel Oblast; from Rechitskiy-Tsentralnyy Election Okrug No 227.

Udovikov, Mikhail Dmitriyevich, CPSU member; Internal Affairs Administration department chief at the Brest Oblispolkom, city of Brest; from Brestskiy-Zapadnyy Election Okrug No 98.

Urenyuk, Vladimir Yevgenyevich, CPSU member; chief physician at Brest Oblast Pediatric Hospital, city of Brest; from Brestskiy-Stroitelnyy Election Okrug No 101.

Fedorchuk, Nikilay Alekseyevich, CPSU member; ispolkom chairman, Vitebsk City Soviet of People's Deputies, city of Vitebsk; from Vitebskiy-Vostochnyy Election Okrug No 180.

Furmanov, Vladimir Alekseyevich, CPSU member; general director, Svetlogorsk Chemical Fibre Production Association imeni 60th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution, city of Svetlogorsk, Gomel Oblast; from Svetlogorskii-Molodezhnyy Election Okrug No 232.

Kholshchevnikov, Yakov Ivanovich, CPSU member; deputy chief physician at the Dobrush Central Rayon Hospital, city of Dobrush; from Dobrushskiy City Election Okrug No 205.

Tsumarov, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich; teacher at Secondary School No 180, city of Minsk; from Shabanovskiy Election Okrug No 10.

Shekushov, Vladimir Mikhaylovich, CPSU member; first deputy chairman, Belorussian SSR Gosnab, city of Minsk; from Dzerzhinskiy Rural Election Okrug No 61.

Chepik, Vasiliy Vasilyevich, CPSU member; Postavskiy Rayon Committee first secretary, Belorussian Communist Party, city of Postavy, Vitebsk Oblast; from Voropayevskiy Election Okrug No 158.

Shachek, Vasiliy Mikhaylovich, Komsomol member; newspaper correspondent from the city newspaper SHLYAKH ILICHA, city of Slutsk, Minsk Oblast; from Slutskiy-Molodezhnyy Election Okrug No 84.

Shevtsov, Vladimir Mikhaylovich, CPSU member; ispolkom chairman at Mozyrskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, city of Mozyr, Gomel Oblast; from Mozyr Rural Election Okrug No 221.

Sheyman, Viktor Vladimirovich, CPSU member; military serviceman, city of Brest; from Brestskiy-Yuzhnyy Election Okrug No 105.

Shilko, Boleslav Piusovich, CPSU member; chairman of the Druzhba Kolkhoz, village of Kamai, Postavskiy Rayon, Vitebsk Oblast; from Postavskiy Election Okrug No 157.

Shipko, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, Komsomol member; engineer at Motor Pool No 16, city of Glubokoye, Vitebsk Oblast; from Glubokskiy Election Okrug No 147.

Yakobson, Aleksandr Serafimovich, CPSU member; ispolkom chairman at Svetlogorsk City Soviet of People's Deputies, city of Svetlogorsk, Gomel Oblast; from Svetlogorskiy-Leninskiy Election Okrug No 231.

Yakubets, Nikolay Zakharovkch, CPSU member; director, Krasnoye Znamya Sovkhoz, city of Baranovich, Baranovichskiy Rayon, Brest Oblast; from Baranovichskiy Rural Election Okrug No 112.

Yakubovskiy, Mikhail Ivanovich, CPSU member; deputy chief physician for Vileyskiy Rayon, city of Vileyka, Minsk Oblast; from Vileyskiy City Election Okrug No 56.

'Aprel' Members View Lithuanian Events

90UN1571A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
31 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Igor Duel and Valentin Oskotskiy: "No to Violence"]

[Text] A few days ago Vilnius hosted writers Igor Duel and Valentin Oskotskiy, council members of the "Aprel" writers' movement for restructuring. Before their departure they left their comments with our editorial offices, relating the goal of their visit to Lithuania and sharing their thoughts on the social and political processes being experienced by our republic.

Below we present those comments to our readers.

A quote from a handbill signed by the Lithuanian CP (CPSU Platform) gorkom and four other bodies, including some anonymous "soldiers of the garrison": "The decisions made by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet are not the decisions of the people of Lithuania!..."

From an anonymous handbill, one of the ones dropped from an airplane: "Some people want to turn our common striving toward Lithuanian sovereignty to the benefit of those who ruled bourgeois Lithuania, decided the fate of its people, sold its land and factories to foreign capital, condemned hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians to unemployment and forced them to seek a means of making a living in foreign lands..."

From slogans quoted at a rally held in Vilnius on 18 March: "We do not want to live in bourgeois Lithuania..." Words so beloved by the editors of the newspaper ZA RODINU, which made them the title of its report from the rally (in its 20 March issue)...

What can one say: what a sharp contrast between the hysterical outbursts quoted above and the tranquility which greeted us on the streets of Vilnius, the business-like atmosphere in which on 21 March a writers' meeting was held at the Palace of Arts Workers, to which meeting we had been invited as soon as we arrived; what a contrast to the openness and frankness of a subsequent amicable meeting at the Lithuanian Writers' Union; what a contrast to the enthusiasm and confidence in the correctness of the whole people's cause which prevailed at meetings of Sajudis and Labora at which we spoke and responded to numerous questions.

It is time to introduce ourselves: we are council members of "Aprel," the writers' movement in support of restructuring. Established one year ago within the 2,000-member Moscow writers' organization, it counts approximately 600 writers as members. An Aprel council has been elected whose co-chairmen are Anatoliy Pristavkin, Anatoliy Zlobin, Anatoliy Strelyanny and Yuriy Chernenchenko.

The sociopolitical, newspaper-aesthetic, organizational-creative program of the movement, which strives to develop and deepen the principles of democracy and humanism, was greeted with understanding and support not only in Moscow but also in many other cities and oblasts in Russia and other union republics. This was the impetus for convening the founding congress of an all-union Aprel, preparations for which are being handled by an organizing committee, also headed by four co-chairmen: Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, Anatoliy Pristavkin, Vadim Sokolov and Mikhail Shatrov.

We were drawn to Vilnius by a desire to state Aprel's position in regard to the Lithuanian Republic's declaration of independence and to express our resolute disagreement with those who are, by stirring up tension, acting counter to the will of the Lithuanian people. Aprel's stance differs radically from the imperial, great-power, chauvinistic stance set forth in the platform of the so-called Russian social-patriotic movements. The writers who support that platform angrily slandered A. N. Yakovlev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, at a recent plenum of the RSFSR Writers' Union Board, calling him "the one to blame for the events in Lithuania." This same ridiculous charge was also made in all seriousness in a two-column article directed a few days ago against A. N. Yakovlev in a Black-Hundreds-style rag called MOSKOVSKIY LITERATOR. That is not surprising: an empire whose lifeblood is Stalinist nationalities policy is now crumbling, but the imperial consciousness and imperial ideology continue to resist this irreversible process, futilely but aggressively. One of the most striking manifestations of this were the anti-Lithuanian speeches given at the most recent CPSU Central Committee plenum, including one by Ye. K. Ligachev, Politburo member.

No matter how splendid constitutional provisions about the right of peoples to self-determination and their equality of rights and sovereignty may sound, they will

remain nothing more than flowery rhetoric without a guaranteed right for any people to have their own independent state entity and without the right for any people to withdraw from the USSR. And if a people, on the basis of the free expression of its will, makes its historic choice, then no one has a right to hinder that people in that choice. No one but the people themselves can determine the time when that choice will be made.

In view of this, we have a few questions for those who wrote the slogans we quoted before. Can it be that the majority of deputies' seats in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet belong to Sayudis not as a result of its election victory, but instead were monopolized through some illegal seizure of power? Can it be that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet was not elected by the populace but instead, like in the old days, decreed and formed by higher-ups in the apparatus? Can it be that those who comprise it are not working people's representatives, but instead puppets of the "shadow economy," of some sort of land-owning mafia, as the anonymous writers write in an attempt to frighten people? As for the "bourgeois" system, what would you call—capitalism or socialism—the high living standard achieved, for example, in Japan, where according to B. N. Yeltsin after he returned from a recent visit to that country workers enjoy good pay, live in comfortable homes and are reliably protected by a social security system?

In the words of A. D. Sakharov, the greatest humanist of our time, there exists one universal criterion which allows one to differentiate with complete accuracy between the truth and lies, between what is genuine and what is false in national movements. Nonviolence! Truth is not proved, is not defended, is not established from a "position of strength." And not just the strength of that dark force which threatens bloodshed, but also of the bloodless force which urges civil disobedience. It is equally an arbitrary dictate from which it is but a short step to a voluntaristic dictatorship. In nonviolence and the rejection of force on principle lies the sole reliable key to solving interethnic the disputes and misunderstanding which cannot help but arise at the present time of sharp reversal. Lithuania's Russian and Polish populations both have a right to demand firm guarantees of their equal status as citizens. Mutual tolerance and a persistent and painstaking search for reasonable solutions in the interests of common accord, mutual respect and mutual understanding among Lithuanians, Russians, Poles, Jews and all free citizens of Lithuania is the primary prerequisite for the spiritual dignity and moral authority of an independent state.

One cannot help but admire the will of the Lithuanian people, who have demonstrated tenacity and courage in their efforts to achieve their common national objective. Therein, incidentally, we see the significance of a document to which we would eagerly add our signatures if we lived in Lithuania: the statement from the Lithuanian Interethnic Coordinating Association to the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet.

The first issue of the *Aprēl Almanac*, which is slated to become one of our movement's periodical publications, opens with a poem by Yevgeniy Yevtushenko. It was written in that shameful August of 1968, yet is only now being published for the first time. "The tanks are rolling in Prague... the tanks are rolling over the truth..." exclaims the poet, seeing himself crushed by those very same tank treads.

We want to ensure that no Russian poet has to experience those feelings ever again.

Estonian Deputies Comment on Role of Parliament

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in Russian 18 Apr 90 p 1*

[Interview with Yu. Telgmaa and M. Titma, people's deputies, by correspondent Nelli Kuznetsova: "Parliament As Seen by the Deputies' Eyes"]

[Text] In the lobby I customarily look at the rows of hangers in the coat room where the deputies usually take their coats off. Have they come yet? How many of them are there? It is still an hour and a half until the plenary session begins, but many deputies are already in place. Some of them are hurriedly drinking coffee, others are chatting in a corner, or over by the window, discussing certain general problems and joint actions. Many places in the auditorium have also been occupied already. Papers are rustling, and the deputies are reading the documents attentively. Later on they will vote and little green and red lights will flash on the display. In favor... Against... Abstaining... We often perceive them as some kind of overall mass. But they are all different. And frequently it is difficult for them. In any case, for certain of them. Because the everyday life of parliament is complicated. Complicated and contradictory. What do the deputies think about the sessions of the Supreme Soviet? How do they evaluate themselves? What kind of parliament do they want to see?

Nelli Kuznetsova, our parliamentary correspondent, asked a number of deputies these questions. This is what they answered.

People's Deputy Yu. Telgmaa

What do I expect from parliament? What, in general, do rural deputies want? To put it succinctly: action. To have someone finally begin to do something about the economy. Maybe this sounds sharp or too categorical. But that's the way it is. The rural areas currently are probably less interested in problems, so to speak, of a general political nature. Inasmuch as there are urgent economic ones. For example, we have been sowing crops for a long time. But the villager does not have any confidence. Because first it is necessary to define, for example, how much agricultural output Estonia will need. That will determine a lot. And that, in its turn, must be determined by the government. It is possible, say, to reduce the production of agricultural output, and

to reduce its shipments to the other republics. Or to stop them completely. But then it is necessary to say how, and at whose expense, the rural population will live, because the question will arise: in this instance will we get, say, combined fodders? Because each ton of them produces an increase in profit. Can we get along without it?

The government has assigned the task of striving to restore independence. This is good. But it would seem that this is, rather, a task for the Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless the government must do something about the economy. I would like to believe in E. Savisaar's talent and organizing capabilities, and that he will find a path, his own policy, his own strategy. But time marches on. And it is expensive. We are concerned, for example, about why no candidacy for the position of minister of agriculture has been proposed yet. Does this always necessarily require a new person? The previous minister, A. Vyali, is a competent person. He is highly respected in the rural areas. Moreover, how many changes can there be?

The rural way of life requires stability. In the course of the past decade the rural area was shaken continuously, if one can express it that way. Ministers were replaced, the RAPO [rayon agroindustrial associations] were created, then they were disbanded and Agroprom was created, and then Agroprom was replaced. But this "shakeup" is costing agriculture a lot. Here it is impossible to make rapid changes. It is possible to change rapidly the area of specialization for a plant or an institution. But in agriculture this can lead to ruin. What is needed is a state policy that will protect the rural producers and their interests.

I would say that for the time being the arguments that have been occurring in the parliament are basically among the leaders of various groups and public movements. In a word, they have been among city dwellers. As everyone knows, the city has its own political games, its own passions, its own struggle. For the time being, the rural deputies are standing somewhat to the side. What does a politician risk? Only his reputation. We have become accustomed to taking a different attitude toward problems. This, I would say, is responsibility of another order.

People's Deputy M. Titma

Probably the most important thing for our parliament lies currently in understanding that representative democracy assigns two functions to the parliament.

The first of them is this. All the significant political forces in society must operate through the parliament. Infringement upon them in parliament is, practically speaking, the pushing away of them toward a policy outside of parliament. And that is bad. Parliamentary democracy always strives to prevent this. It is only in exceptional situations that a particular public group or party is evicted, so to speak, from parliament. Well, for

example, there was this situation in Sweden—the fascist party was evicted from the parliament. But these are only isolated facts.

Therefore I, for example, spoke out against attempts to prevent the "Equal Rights" group from using the conditions of parliamentary democracy for certain actions of theirs. This is a normal phenomenon. They represent a definite group of the population, and if they are not given the right to use the opportunities provided by parliament for conducting their ideas and for protecting the interests of their constituents, they will simply be forced to seek other forms and methods of struggle. It is necessary to understand this.

Second. It is necessary to create, as it were, counterbalances in parliament. On the one hand, those who have the majority are given the right to form a government. It, so to speak, obtains the power. On the other hand, there must also be some part that will execute the function of opposition. We must get away from the ordinary idea that opposition is something harmful, from another time, from another dictionary, that it is a counteraction that we must get rid of. No. It is also a definite function of parliament. It lies in assuring that those who are in power do not get corrupted, do not make decisions behind the back of public opinion and the parliament, and that they operate openly and publicly. The opposition must play specifically this role. In addition, it must be ready to assume the power if the leaders, the ruling majority, lose people's trust. If one speaks about our parliament, then one can note that the possible opposition behaves in a very tolerant manner. It is only in exceptional instances that it attempts to oppose. Once E. Savisaar has obtained the opportunity to form his cabinet, as a rule, the candidacies recommended by him will be approved. This also is normal. He is assuming the responsibility for the government's future, for its actions, for its program. I would even prefer for him to represent for us the government as a whole. This is, in the final analysis, his job.

And there is a third factor that I would like to mention. People usually speak in the name of the nation. But there is no nation as some kind of abstraction. The nation includes definite groups of people. It is those groups, with their concerns and interests, that have been represented in parliament through their deputies. They are their representatives. And therefore those deputies express various interests. Precisely because the parliament must carry out a search for intelligent compromises. This is normal. What is abnormal is something else, when different versions of one and the same document—sometimes versions are completely opposite to one another—are submitted for discussion. This damages the situation. Commissions exist for this purpose in parliament, and they must carry out that search for a compromise. And if they cannot find any, then the following political gesture is made before parliament as a whole: we cannot come to a mutual agreement, so here are two drafts... Help us. But for the time being this kind

of intelligent approach is not being taken. Most frequently, documents are presented in crude form. Once again one senses the opposition. And this keeps making us suffer. Although there is no ill will here.

How is the largest group in parliament behaving? This is very important, because it is precisely at this time that we are beginning to create various traditions and unwritten rules. Because it is impossible to formulate all of this in a legal manner. But in every parliament such unwritten laws do exist. In the United States, for example. It is a rich, large country. The Soviet Union is also a large country. It is possible for them to make major changes in everything. But Estonia is small. Why am I saying this? It is necessary to think about what every serious decision, what every major change, will cost Estonia. And in this regard, and especially in parliament, it is necessary to weigh carefully the results of actions, decisions, and intentions. For example, the People's Front has achieved a situation in which nine positions of chairmen of deputy commissions are occupied by its people, by its representatives. Is that a victory or a loss? If they want to assume all the responsibility, leaving everyone else off to the side, then it definitely is a victory. But it is fraught with the possibility that "everyone else" will consolidate against the People's Front. And is that really possible? Because they will prove to be uninvolved in things. And the responsibility borne by all these commissions for the possible consequences of their actions will lie directly on the People's Front.

In my opinion it would be more intelligent to travel along another route. As in Finland, for example, where commissions are divided among the different parties so that everyone is represented and bears the responsibility equally. This really creates a more stable situation in the parliament.

And, finally, the problem of the government... Of course, it can be formed from specialists. Essentially speaking, E. Savisaar did not take that route. But this is a route that, rather, corresponds to the past, when the party's power monopoly existed... But there is another route. It is the one that small countries travel along. What is the main feature here? The minister is a politician. And the ministry's apparatus is separated from politics. These people are governmental employees. The ministers come and go. But the apparatus is stable. It is not replaced. And in this regard, I think, L. Meri was not completely correct when he recommended to all the ministry workers that they hand in their resignations. That could have some effect in the States, where there are a lot of people, a lot of personnel, where there are major reserves and large amounts of money. It is possible to argue with both groups of people. In Estonia every person—I have in mind, of course, the specialists and prominent people—is accounted for. And if he senses instability, or lack of confidence in state service, all the needed competent people will leave. We cannot allow ourselves to do this. And this is a parliamentary question. I myself intend to bring up this problem at the session. Because it is a major political question that can have serious consequences.

That is, the state apparatus must be stable. To no small degree that will also determine the stability in society.

Vagris Speech at 25th Latvian CP Congress

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[Speech by Janis Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee, at the 25th Latvian CP Congress held 6-7 April 1990 in Riga: "Political Report of the Latvian CP Central Committee to the 25th Congress of the Latvian Communist Party"]

[Text] Honored congress delegates and guests!

We Communists of Latvia are beginning our regular 25th congress at a historic time.

First of all, it has been exactly 5 years since the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum which chose the policy line of perestroika and the revolutionary renewal of our society.

Second, the regular 28th CPSU Congress will take place in just a few months and should become a new and important milestone in the pursuit of the policy of perestroika.

Drafts of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th congress and the new CPSU Charter have already been published and submitted for nationwide discussion. Both of these documents were compiled in an atmosphere of intense debate and are therefore ambiguous.

On the whole, however, they will create new opportunities to strengthen democracy and turn the Soviet State into a free union of free republics, and also to accomplish the thorough democratization of party affairs and to consolidate the autonomy of republic party organizations.

These documents contain several proposals made by Latvian Communists with regard to the exercise of state sovereignty, the principles of democracy, and the autonomy of party organizations.

When the Latvian CP Central Committee was working on the draft documents submitted to the 25th congress, it proceeded from the general guidelines in the previously mentioned draft documents of the CPSU Central Committee with regard to thorough perestroika in the party. Our documents were supported in principle by members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo at a meeting with members of the Latvian CP Central Committee Buro in Moscow the day before yesterday.

As a matter of fact, the 25th Latvian CP Congress is of a somewhat irregular nature.

And not only because the last Latvian CP Congress was held just over 4 years ago and the term of office envisaged in the party charter for the present Central Committee is not up yet.

The irregular nature of the congress stems from the fact that perestroika processes in the republic, just as in the rest of the country, have reached the critical point at which the future of perestroika and the future of the Communist Party of Latvia will be decided.

The preparatory work for the 25th Latvian CP Congress took place in an atmosphere of intense intra-party controversy.

In the past year several ideological platforms have come into being within the Latvian Communist Party, and the Communists of the republic have rallied round different platforms in line with their feelings about two closely related and exceptionally important matters—the state sovereignty of Latvia and the autonomy of the Latvian Communist Party.

Several drafts of Latvian Communist Party policy planning documents and draft charters were published under the auspices of these platforms just before the congress.

The Central Committee believes that the policy line stipulated in the Latvian Communist Party program of action "To Advance Latvian Sovereignty" must be pursued consistently, because the preservation of a fundamentally renewed and organizationally unified Communist Party of Latvia is an essential condition of political stability and democratization.

The obvious pressure exerted on the public and on the legislative branch by some sociopolitical organizations and their efforts to secure the passage of biased and confused resolutions could have dire consequences for the entire Latvian society and could cause the dangerous escalation of social and ethnic confrontations.

The commission formed at the January (1990) Latvian CP Central Committee Plenum has prepared the drafts of a Latvian Communist Party Charter and Program and has published them for discussion by Communists and the general public.

Of course, the drafts of these documents are a bid for political consensus. Central Committee members and experts attempted to take the most significant aspects of all of these published drafts into account and thereby lead the way to a common stance rather than to confrontation.

The discussion of these drafts is part of the congress agenda, but the Central Committee did not feel the need to prepare special reports on them, especially in view of the fact that this political report is based completely on the draft documents.

The years since the last Latvian Communist Party Congress have been filled with extraordinarily profound and dynamic socioeconomic processes.

The party's role and place in them was supposed to have been defined to a considerable extent by the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which was convened for the purpose of providing new momentum for the perestroika processes in the society and in the party itself while carrying out the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress.

Although it did represent a tremendous advance in the accomplishment of glasnost and democratization processes in our society, the plans for the perestroika of the party itself have not been carried out successfully yet.

If we recall the proposals the Communists of our republic made just before the 19th party conference and compare them to the present views on these issues, we must admit that we have simply been marking time, or even that our actions have been inconsistent and inadequate, in many areas, especially the perestroika of party affairs.

Of course, today it is also appropriate to recall that the Latvian CP Central Committee, its buro, and its secretariat did make some important suggestions with regard to the implementation of the perestroika policy before the 19th party conference and especially after it.

Today many of them have already won widespread public support and are being actively promoted by other organizations committed to the ideals of perestroika.

Here are just a few examples.

Back in fall 1986 it was precisely the Latvian CP Central Committee leadership that proposed the revision of the earlier economic policy which had led to the dramatic and virtually uncontrollable growth of inter-republic migration. It also proposed that the spirit of democratization and glasnost be embodied in the approach to questions about language policies and practices as an important condition of the humane resolution of problems in inter-ethnic relations and nationwide problems.

The initial reaction to this, even in some party organs, was quite cool or even negative. The main thing was that many people did not want to assess the situation objectively and to begin surmounting the negative tendencies in earnest.

I want to stress that the party was directly responsible for several important initiatives in the sphere of language policy. Back in spring 1987 a Central Committee commission on nationality and inter-ethnic relations was formed, and by August it had already produced an analytical document.

The public appreciated the Central Committee initiative, and some positive changes did take place, but in many locations it was the Communists themselves, especially party officials, who lacked the energy and goodwill to listen to the Central Committee's recommendations and to take action on them.

When the tension in inter-ethnic relations reached its highest point in spring 1989 and when one part of the republic population took a defiant and destructive stance on the language bill, it was the principled position expressed by Central Committee members and Communist Supreme Soviet deputies at a plenum and session convened expressly for the discussion of this bill that helped to stabilize the situation.

Back in fall 1988 the Latvian CP Central Committee and the members of its buro made a number of proposals regarding the new composition of the Soviet Federation and the guarantee of the genuine autonomy of union republics as constitutionally sovereign states.

In the final analysis, the idea expressed today in specific bills regarding the new system of treaty relations as the judicial basis of the existence of the USSR was once proposed in the Baltic zone. In Latvia it was first proposed from the party rostrum, and members of the Latvian CP Central Committee Buro were among the first to carry the suggestion to the union level. Besides this, Communists also suggested the discerning reassessment of important milestones in Latvian Communist Party history. It was at the suggestion of the Central Committee that many of the historical accounts of the party, the ordeals of 1959 and subsequent years, and the crucial reversals in the history of Latvia and the party in 1939 and 1940 were published. In view of the fact that these matters were also discussed here, at the congress, the new members of the Central Committee should form a special commission for a complete review of the history of the Latvian Communist Party.

Of course, many of these initiatives and proposals did not win immediate approval, and the reaction to most of them could even be called negative, but later events proved that these were the first indications of genuine public interest and enthusiasm.

In the vortex of current events and processes, we must not forget how many of them began. Many of the processes of perestroika and democratization and many of the economic and political reforms in Latvia were the result of Communist activity and initiative.

But we must be aware of our faults and admit that the Latvian Communist Party has not always performed its functions to the best of its ability and that other socio-political organizations, especially those engendered by the perestroika process itself, have sometimes had to be the ones to take action on these ideas.

Furthermore, the party has certainly not been free of many decelerating factors rooted in its history, the crisis of traditional forms of organization and activity, and the inability of some party members to keep up with current standards and surmount the stereotypes of the old thinking and, what is most important, behavioral stereotypes.

The forces whose views and activities are objectively reducing the party's ability to work according to current

guidelines are being clearly revealed in the present clash of ideas and the debates within the Latvian Communist Party.

I am referring to the Communists who cannot let go of the old utopian dogmas and beliefs, although they profess their loyalty to basic principles.

I am referring to those who verbally advocate a sovereign Latvia while continuing to think of it as a province.

I am referring to those who essentially oppose the economic autonomy of the republic because of their commitment to centralized and bureaucratic agencies.

I am also referring to those who make statements in support of democracy and glasnost but will not let any journalists get within 10 feet of any of their gatherings, and to those who talk about objectivity but feel that only they have the right to decide what is or is not objective.

Finally, I am referring to those who express verbal support for the self-determination of nationalities and the democratic resolution of ethnic problems but take action in defense of unification and the principle of "ubi bene, ibi patria" and object to democratic language practices in a national republic with a multinational population.

It was during the period between congresses that the thorough reassessment of values began, but it certainly has not ended yet. We are seeing facts that once seemed immutable in a new light. Many seemingly objective statements have been refuted, and one "outstanding Leninist" and "loyal son of the people" after another has been knocked off his pedestal.

Problems firmly rooted in the conscious and subconscious mind of generations, however, cannot be solved by renaming streets and ships and removing monuments. They keep sending up new shoots, and the most frightening are probably the sprouts of ethnic and social revenge and of ethnic hostility.

Each day we can see more clearly how these weeds are spreading in various parts of our multinational country, including Latvia. Today Communists must not only be merciless in pulling these weeds out of their own plot, but also have to do everything within their power to keep them from smothering the young and still fragile shoots of democracy, sovereignty, and freedom.

In Latvia the morning of perestroika was illuminated by the colors of a public awakening, but the Latvian Communist Party was late in responding to it as a unified political organization and as the ruling and only political party.

It was at that time that the party began losing the initiative, and we learned from experience just how important close communication with the masses is to the success of party activity.

The party cannot be certain that it is needed by the people until the masses support its views and activities.

We must base our efforts to solve current problems on this belief.

One of these problems concerns the ability to be a political leader.

Many people would be happy if the party were still the judge and censor of everything and could continue evaluating each event and each action of a political nature in society as if it were grading them.

Last spring the Latvian CP Central Committee declared that the ability to formulate its own theory, its own view of the most important aspects of its development, and to present this view to the public, and not the ability to judge and criticize others, should become the basis of the genuine authority of the party in a democratic society.

In spite of this, the Latvian CP Central Committee is still being criticized pointedly for failing to condemn or praise yet another rally or statement by the Popular Front or Interfront, for failing to deliver yet another principled verdict.

It is as if they are implying that this is the reason for all of our difficulties and all of the problems of this complex period in republic history.

There is something I would like to say to these critics once again: Comrades, it is time for us to surmount the inertia of our own thinking, and we must not simply reconcile ourselves to the new situation, but must put down deep roots and become part of the situation if we truly want to keep seeing our party among the forces for perestroika and even in the vanguard of these forces.

No, it is not belated judgments or directives that lie at the basis of our problems, but the protracted delays in the perestroika of the party itself.

These delays in the fundamental perestroika of the Latvian Communist Party erected the dangerous obstacles along the road to the democratization of the entire Latvian society and certainly had a negative effect on the party itself by diminishing its authority radically in the public eye.

The Central Committee and its buro and secretariat must take the responsibility for this.

Is the Latvian Communist Party capable of concentrating its political, ideological, and organizational potential for the correction of these delays today?

Is the Latvian Communist Party capable of serving as the vanguard in the process of social development today, even without any constitutional backing?

These questions are difficult to answer, especially now that the party is being attacked ruthlessly from the right and the left—although today it is hard to say who is on the left and who is on the right.

It is difficult to look into the party's future when its past is being criticized so vehemently and so thoroughly and when the party might have to resist, perhaps down to its last man, to keep the threat of division from becoming an institutionalized reality. Some people already lack the political will and desire to prevent this, and others already want division at any price because they see it as a way of realizing their own political ambitions.

The Latvian Communist Party is now experiencing one of the most difficult trials in its 86-year history, and the great interest that Communists and the general public have expressed in the past of the Latvian Communist Party is quite understandable.

We must learn all of the details. Otherwise, it will be difficult to conduct a calm and discerning assessment of the current state of affairs in the republic party organization, set accurate and realistic party objectives for the future, and find honest and logical answers to the previously cited questions.

In a special declaration this January, the republic Supreme Soviet reaffirmed the Latvian Communist Party's status as the historical and political successor to the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party established in 1904.

In general, the Latvian Communist Party was the first political party of our people. From the first days of its existence, it was truly in the vanguard of the people's national and social liberation struggle.

It became a mass party, with 20,000 Social Democrats as its members, at the time of the revolution of 1905. There is no question that it was the leading force in the revolution.

Later the Latvian Social Democrats, the members of the RSDRP autonomous territorial organization, were in the vanguard of the revolutionary forces, especially the rifle regiments, in 1917.

The October Revolution and the declaration of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia did much to exacerbate the polarization of political forces in Latvia over the issue of government structure, and this led to the division of the Social Democrats of Latvia.

The right wing renamed itself the Social Democratic Workers Party of Latvia and formed a party advocating the creation of an autonomous Latvian state. On 18 November 1918 this party took part in the declaration of the Latvian Republic and was active in politics until the time of the Ulmanis coup.

The Bolshevik current named itself the Communist Party of Latvia in March 1919 and became the ruling party in the Latvian Socialist Soviet Republic as part of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) with the powers of broad autonomy.

In the days of the Latvian Republic the Communist Party was an autonomous illegal party and was also a section of the Communist Internationale.

In the circumstances and events imposed on the people by the agreement concluded in 1939-1940 by Germany and the Soviet Union and its executors, the Communist Party of Latvia was both an active participant and a victim of sorts.

In summer 1940 the party supported the formation of Soviet Latvia and its inclusion in the Soviet Union, and in October it became part of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik).

We always were and always will be proud of the Communist Party of Latvia's participation in the armed struggle against the Nazi invaders and of the fact that many generations of conscientious workers in urban and rural locations and many prominent representatives of the artistic and scientific intelligentsia were members of the party.

Today, however, we must also bear the moral and political responsibility for the active participation of some party members in the prewar and postwar deportations and the implementation of Stalinist dogmas in the economy and culture.

Today, of course, it would be difficult to rectify all of the errors and injustices committed more than 50 or 30 years ago, but the Central Committee and the majority of Communists in the republic are striving to learn a lesson from history.

The individual opinions and judgments expressed here should not be regarded as a final account of Latvian Communist Party history, which we are trying to canonize with the aid of the authority of the party congress.

Let the experts make the necessary corrections in the science of history, and we will be responsible for the political conclusions. While we are doing this, we must always remember that the historical consciousness of the society is an important factor contributing to its ideological, political, and even inter-ethnic climate.

The interests of the fundamental renewal of the Latvian Communist Party require us to categorically reject the negative aspects of our heritage. We can only do this by judging our history objectively and honestly, boldly revealing all of its details, and carefully preserving and augmenting our democratic traditions.

The fundamental reorganization of the party's ideological institutions without delay could be an important step in this direction.

To this end, we must unite the potential of the Party History Institute of the Latvian CP Central Committee, our theoretical and political journal KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVIJ, the Political Enlightenment Center, the University of Marxism-Leninism, and the Advanced Courses for Party and Soviet Personnel.

This would not only produce a perceptible savings in party resources, but also contribute to the fundamental perestroika of the party's ideological structures, reveal the most relevant areas of investigation, and secure the connection between theory and practice.

We are accountable to Communists of all generations for our party archives, representing one of the oldest and richest collections of Communist Party documents in the world.

The archives are of unique scientific and cultural-historical value, and we must preserve them as a single set of historical documents, as a part of Latvia's national wealth, while simultaneously, of course, completely democratizing them and solving problems in their preservation, restoration, and scientific investigation.

We must admit that the Latvian Communist Party now has enough intellectual and material-technical potential to take a principled and honest look at its past and evaluate its experience objectively in order to help the entire party, and especially the Communists of the younger generation, get rid of the heavy burden of past errors.

This potential simply needs to be adapted to meet today's requirements.

Comrades!

The situation in the party is closely related to the deep-seated economic, political, ideological, and moral crisis our entire society is experiencing today.

For this reason, we can only speak of surmounting the crisis in the party in close conjunction with the perestroika of the society in Latvia itself.

There is nothing new about this.

Much has been said about the general and specific aspects of the problems of the entire society and party from this rostrum and in the press. Obviously, the party's theoretical position cannot change within a few weeks or a few months. All that can happen in this time is that new facts might come to light and present a clearer view of a specific development.

The draft of the Latvian Communist Party program outlines this theory, and a repetition of these ideas is therefore unlikely to be necessary.

I feel that here, at this congress, we should consider our priorities.

There is no question that the status of the Latvian Communist Party, its place and role in republic politics, and the nature of future relations between the Latvian Communist Party and CPSU are the main questions.

It would be impossible to answer them before we have a clear idea of the opinions of Communists with regard to the state status of Latvia, its political structure, and its relationship to the USSR.

The debates in the party and the society prior to the congress indicated that there are three possible ways of approaching these matters.

The first view is that Latvia today, just as in the past, is still a formally sovereign, but actually constituent part of a unitary power, with all of the ensuing political and socioeconomic consequences.

You will agree that in this case any discussion of party autonomy would be essentially meaningless because political activity in a unitary state, as earlier decades confirmed, is most consistent with a centralized party, with its territorial organizations exercising an extremely limited set of rights and powers handed down from above.

The second approach is based on the assumption that only the immediate constitutional registration of Latvia as a complete independent state and the severance of all government-legal ties with the USSR can secure the quick and successful resolution of all problems in Latvia.

In this case, any political and organizational connection between the Latvian Communist Party and the CPSU would be artificial or would suggest the need to begin discussing the efforts to restore the Communist Internationale again, but this has already been done, and we know from experience what this did to our party and to the international communist movement.

This means, when we look at the second approach in detail, that the only logical status is that of a completely independent political party, which would, furthermore, have to take extremely quick action under the conditions of a fundamentally different political system.

It is clear that because of the underdeveloped economy and the generally low level of the political culture and of the social and national infrastructure and other conditions, any attempt to separate Latvia immediately, unilaterally, and completely from the rest of the USSR would certainly lead only to the dramatic exacerbation of conflicts in the society.

Besides this, we have no guarantee that this process will be peaceful and non-violent, not to mention guarantees of democracy or respect for human rights.

It is most probable that it will culminate in the more or less open monopolization of power and ideology by rightwing forces, otherwise known as a dictatorship.

Regrettably, it is already obvious that political forces striving to occupy an exclusive position are already active in our society.

We condemn the days when the party asserted that it was the only leading and guiding force in the society, the only force capable of recognizing and defending the public interest, but recently we have been hearing almost the same assertions, day and night, from other political forces.

There is not the slightest doubt that the abrupt disruption of the multilateral relations between Latvia and the rest of the union would be an indication of militant anticommunism, the first symptoms of which are already quite evident in our republic: the harassment of nonconformists and many other types of behavior which are completely inconsistent with concepts such as democracy, human rights, the pluralism of opinions, the social protection of the individual, etc.

I think you will all agree with me that both of these essentially mutually exclusive approaches are fundamentally unacceptable to us, the members of a democratic party of leftwing forces, the party of the socialist choice. They are thoroughly inconsistent with the democratic and creative essence of the policy of perestroika and its goals and objectives.

The first is unacceptable if only because it ignores the inalienable right of nationalities to self-determination in the name of the unitary and centralist biases that were cultivated for so many years.

The second is unacceptable because it does not take existing geopolitical and socioeconomic realities into account, and because it unjustifiably identifies the attempts of leaders of organizations professing social revenge to monopolize political power with the realization of the interests and legal rights of all of the Latvian people.

There is also a third approach, however, and in our opinion it is the best approach for Latvia.

It is founded on the following basic premises.

First of all, the restoration of the sovereign state is not a goal in itself, but a means of securing a civilized existence for the people of Latvia.

Second, the actual process of the restoration of Latvia's state sovereignty in line with the principles of democracy and human rights cannot and will not be accomplished immediately with a single act.

It will entail a purposeful and gradual transition, during the course of which democratic methods must be employed in coordinating not only the interests of the republic and neighboring states, but also the rights and legal interests of the native nationality and other ethnic groups living in Latvia and of different social strata.

Third, the dismantling of the old authoritarian-bureaucratic system has not been completed yet, and the new democratic institutions are still fragile and cannot serve as guarantees against possible ethnic conflicts and social upheavals. For this reason, the democratic leftwing forces in Latvia must take the side of the forces for radical perestroika in the USSR, and perhaps should even be in their vanguard. It is in our interest to promote perestroika and democratization throughout the Soviet Union. This is the quickest way of guaranteeing the security and stability of all people, and, of course, primarily of our own people.

Fourth, only the genuine economic independence of Latvia will make its genuine political independence possible, but today Latvia does not have any of the economic structures characteristic of the sovereign state.

The most diverse economic ties took shape and developed through the years, and now they connect the Latvian national economy with the USSR, its crude resources, and its sales markets.

Any complications in this sphere as a result of various types of rash political actions, which are already apparent today and could continue in the future, are certain to have a negative effect on the republic economy and on the already low standard of living of its population.

The establishment and consolidation of the economic independence of the republic, which is the only guarantee of the normal life and work of its inhabitants, will necessitate several radical reforms.

We will be discussing these in greater detail later. Here it is important to stress that domestic political stability in Latvia and careful and thorough preparations are important prerequisites for their accomplishment.

The legislative bases for the perestroika of all production relations must be drafted and approved this year so they can serve as a basis for economic reform in industry, agrarian reform, price reform, and financial and credit reform.

In my opinion, these premises support the conviction that the political and economic prospects of the Latvian state and people will depend, at least until the economic and sociopolitical crisis has been completely surmounted, on the success of the concerted efforts of democratic forces throughout the Soviet Union to establish a new intergovernmental union based on equitable dialogue, balanced interests, and treaties, instead of the present, essentially unitary state.

The republic leaders' recent meeting with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR clearly indicated that both sides are ready for dialogue and constructive cooperation in this area. All it will take is specific and realistic proposals, and not emotional outbursts or unilateral ultimatums.

On the basis of these premises, we Communists of Latvia advocate a sovereign Latvia in a union of independent socialist states, founded on treaties.

This solution to the problem of Latvian sovereignty would allow Latvia to become a subject of international law within the near future and take its place among the democratic countries of the world.

We propose the fundamental transformation of the Latvian Communist Party in line with possible changes in the status of the Latvian State.

These processes will not be quick or easy.

We will also need a definite transition period, during which the status of the current oblast organization of the CPSU will be changed. During the transition period the Latvian Communist Party will have to establish another organizational structure, master new forms and methods of action, and create a new mechanism of cooperation and interrelations with the party organizations of other republics and the executive agencies of the CPSU.

Important elements of these changes are already listed in the draft documents for the 28th CPSU Congress, and much of this has already been included in our own documents.

Nevertheless, today's party will still have to undergo a lengthy period of profound change before it can become a genuinely democratic organization conforming to parliamentary patterns of activity.

We will have to learn how to do many things in completely new ways, but it is already obvious today that the political viability of the Latvian Communist Party will depend directly on two conditions.

The first is the party's smooth inclusion in the gradually formed multiparty political system in Latvia. The second is the party's effective representation and defense of republic interests in the political structures of the future union of sovereign states.

For this reason, the perestroika of the Latvian Communist Party must be viewed from two standpoints—domestic policy and foreign policy.

The first encompasses the group of issues connected with the Latvian Communist Party goals and objectives, the nature of its activity, the social base of the party, its inclusion in possible political alliances and coalitions, and its place and role in republic politics.

The foreign policy aspect will cover the perestroika of Latvian Communist Party relations with the CPSU.

Obviously, the final answer to all of these questions should be provided by the future Latvian Communist Party program, the draft of the fundamentals of which has been distributed to you today. At this time, however, I would like to point out some basic considerations.

First of all, if the Latvian Communist Party wants to express and defend the interests of the multi-ethnic population of Latvia, especially the interests of the laboring public, it cannot be a mono-ethnic party.

There is no question that priority must be assigned to the social interests of workers of any nationality, but the party must also respect the diverse ethnic interests and needs of republic inhabitants equally, especially the interests of the native nationality.

Almost 50 different parties, organizations, and movements recently sprang up with amazing speed, just like

mushrooms after the rain. Obviously, they include transitory political groups and groups formed to satisfy the political ambitions of individual leaders.

Furthermore, it appears that many of them tried to attract attention by beginning their activity with a "search for enemies," and, regrettably, among the Communists of the republic.

This is the reason for the bombastic demands for the dissolution of the Latvian Communist Party, or at least its relegation to the political periphery. This has evoked a quite understandable negative response from many party organizations and Communists and has escalated the tension in the society.

Nevertheless, we must realize that the past experience of the party and the political practices of other countries prove that the parties in a democratic society with a multiparty system cannot expect to win any serious victories without actively seeking allies.

The draft Latvian Communist Party program sets forth some of the basic principles of action in this sphere and also expresses our willingness to do this.

I must tell you that the Central Committee and its bureau have already tried to begin this kind of dialogue in recent years, although it has not always been successful.

For instance, there were the meetings, which were so regular at first, with the leaders of the Latvian Popular Front and the consultations on the coordination of policies on major political issues.

Attempts were made, at least during the initial period, to begin an impartial dialogue with the International Labor Front of the Latvian SSR.

I must say that the leaders of the largest new sociopolitical organizations and movements willingly took part in this dialogue, even if our views did not coincide completely or even partially.

Nevertheless, the dynamism of contemporary politics far exceeded the ability of party committees, including the Central Committee, to influence political affairs.

The new organizations continued to grow more radical, and, regrettably, essentially in an atmosphere of anti-party slogans.

As a result of this, the first attempts at dialogue and regular contacts were interrupted. Recent events have indicated that the mere declaration of willingness for dialogue is not enough. The desire of both sides to conduct it is also necessary.

It must be conducted patiently and without excessive emotion, without attempts to dictate one's own terms, and without impermissible mutual accusations. In other words, it must be a dialogue between equals.

Today, however, we must admit that there is no such dialogue. Furthermore, there are more pointed mutual

accusations, growing suspicion, and an explosive situation. In spite of this, we will have to sit down at the negotiating table and seek social and ethnic reconciliation, because I believe that there is no other road to stability, reliability, and emergence from crisis.

For this reason, today we will speak in brief, without making any claims to a complete in-depth analysis, about the development of at least the two largest sociopolitical organizations over the past year.

Predictably, when the Latvian Popular Front was established at the end of 1988, it became something like a "roof" for many political currents. From the first days of its existence, the dominant factor in its development was always the idea of national awareness and Latvian national interests, which are naturally shared by large segments of all of the social strata and groups of the native population.

The adoption of the front's second program and the commencement of efforts to carry out this program marked a cardinal reversal in the policies and activities of the People's Front of Latvia [NFL]. The appeals to reject the existing sociopolitical order and create a completely independent Latvian state, with no political-governmental ties to the USSR, aroused vehement objections and a sense of alarm in the rest of society. There was some division within NFL ranks, because not all of its members were ready for radical change.

There is no question that the radicalization of the NFL, its increasingly anticommunist and anti-party slogans, the political aggressiveness of its actions, and its intolerance for criticism are escalating the already heightened social tension in the republic, especially among the Russian-speaking inhabitants.

Although the People's Front of Latvia is still polarized to some extent and its "center" has not acquired organizational form as yet, the NFL is nevertheless the most influential political organization in the republic at this time and it expresses the interests of much of the native population.

This is evident just from the results of the first round of elections to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet: The majority of elected deputies were NFL candidates.

This is a fact the Latvian Communist Party must take into account in its future activity.

The International Labor Front [IF] of the Latvian SSR and the groups political allied with it—for example, the United Council of Labor Collectives and some associations of war veterans and reserve officers—are among the most conservative leftwing organizations in our republic, just as they are in other parts of the Soviet Union.

In the organizational sense, the IF is extremely amorphous, with no membership records and no definite structure. Because an important role is played in the IF by well-organized and experienced members of the

bureaucracy and reserve officers, the lack of a distinct organizational structure provides an opportunity to freely manipulate various data on its supporters or activists because it would be virtually impossible to check these figures.

The social base of the IF and the organizations which have associated themselves with it is made up primarily of Russian-speaking inhabitants of the republic, mainly urbanites.

Most of them moved to the republic in the postwar years and later. All of us want these people to take a greater interest in Latvia as a national republic and in its history, culture, and traditions. This is also important because it is in this group that there is so much uncertainty about the processes of perestroika and the fear of losing earlier social privileges and status.

It is no coincidence that the IF leaders chose the creation of an oppressive atmosphere, social discomfort, and the "refugee syndrome" as the main topics of their speeches and articles and as the main form of activity among its supporters.

On this wave, the Interfront was able to conduct mass rallies and win some victories in the elections to soviets of people's deputies.

Some IF representatives were elected deputies of local soviets and deputies of the Supreme Soviet after the first round of elections.

Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the IF will have difficulty winning support from the voters in the future, because this organization does not have a sufficiently clear and positive program for the perestroika of republic society that will satisfy the needs of Latvia and its population directly.

Furthermore, IF actions are usually directed against the ideas and slogans of other organizations, especially the People's Front, and are also aimed at defending the unitary and centralized system.

Of course, sociopolitical practices introduce new elements into the party's relations with other sociopolitical organizations each day. In our work in soviets on all levels, we and our potential partners in cooperation must be consistent in rejecting absolute ideological criteria and must assign priority to the vital interests of the society, to political expediency, and to reasonable compromise.

While we are analyzing the machinery of the new relationship between the society and the party, we must investigate another significant aspect.

Within the near future the party agenda will have to include decisions on the basic principle of party structure: production-territorial or purely territorial.

Recently there have been more persistent demands for the reduction or curtailment of the activities of primary

party organizations in certain specific spheres of government and public affairs in the multiparty system.

Of course, these demands are logical to some extent, but we must not allow the Latvian Communist Party to be put in a politically inconvenient position by forbidding it to take action in areas where the main links of other sociopolitical organizations are still operating successfully.

Consequently, there is only one solution. This matter must be settled by means of legislation, and possible restrictions must apply equally to all political parties, sociopolitical organizations and movements, and other social groups conducting political activity.

I want to say a few words about the material prerequisites for the normal functioning of the party.

The autonomy of the Latvian Communist Party and its organizations will create an absolutely new situation in this sphere.

Congress delegates will be given specific and detailed information in the report of the Latvian CP Auditing Commission, but some issues require special consideration.

First of all, I would like to remind you that the party, just as any other legal entity, has the right to manage its own property freely within the confines of the law. The law will protect party property in the same way as any other legal form of property.

Of course, when changes are made in the structure of party organs and in requirements for facilities or other property, the Central Committee will regularly review its commitments and return the facilities the party has been using to the jurisdiction of local soviets.

Second, I would like to stress that the Latvian Communist Party has been financially independent for 12 years, using only its own funds, without any subsidies.

In the future, however, under the conditions of complete autonomy and with a possible reduction in membership fees, we will have to master even more economical methods of management.

I want to say a few words about the party press.

Our fundamental policy on this matter has already been recorded in the Latvian CP program of action and has been discussed at earlier Central Committee plenums. For this reason, I will not repeat myself here, but I do want to direct your attention to some of the political implications of the work of the party press under these new conditions.

When the party gave up its constitutionally secured monopoly in the political system, it simultaneously ceased to serve as the overseer of the news media and began establishing its own network of party news media last year.

There is no doubt that the press is prominent in publicizing and implementing party policy and that the press is an important source of strength and popularity for any political party or organization. For this reason, the party has always had, does have, and will continue to have its own publications.

Regrettably, we must admit that at a time when other political forces are concentrating on establishing their own publications and on publicizing their own views in the news media in general, the journalists of our party publications have not always used their own potential effectively and have been too timid in their political statements in this atmosphere of acute political struggle.

We must admit that the Central Committee and many party gorkoms and raykoms have not been able to find politically effective forms of work yet in the establishment of a relationship with the personnel of their press organs.

We have not achieved the objective portrayal of party policy and events, without any excesses of primitive anticommunism, even within the confines of Latvian radio and television broadcasts. It is a well-known fact, however, that these media occupy a special position, sometimes resembling a monopoly, in the shaping of public opinion.

The new members of the Central Committee will probably have to take vigorous steps to turn the work with Communists in the news media and with the party press in general into a permanent field of party activity. I would like to stress that the Riga party gorkom's choice of methods in dealing with RIGAS BALSS is not a good example.

The present political situation and the current level of glasnost and democracy require that this be done by people with high political standards, the potential for independent thinking, and the ability to defend party policies with logical arguments.

Now I want to say something about the foreign policy aspects of the perestroika process in the Latvian Communist Party.

First of all, there is the Latvian Communist Party's relationship with the CPSU, or with the political organization—for instance, a union of communist parties of the USSR—that might be created within the near future as a result of the transformation of this party.

The Latvian CP Central Committee's position on this matter is also expressed in the published draft Latvian CP program, and the only thing I want to repeat here is that we must take an active part in the perestroika and renewal of the party and promote this process, which we regard as a natural and objective trend, and promote its democratic, legal, and therefore progressive development.

We will not be able to take productive action, however, if we separate ourselves from the perestroika of the

CPSU. On the contrary, we must participate in this process as much as possible.

It is even possible that a special representative agency of the Latvian Communist Party might be established in Moscow as part of the CPSU Central Committee. In this way, we would have more opportunities to influence and accelerate the restoration of the state sovereignty of Latvia.

In the future the Latvian Communist Party could be a separate, equal, and full-fledged member of the union of communist parties of the USSR.

Through its representatives in the executive bodies of the party union, the Latvian Communist Party would participate in the planning of political strategy and coordinate its activities with the other parties making up the union.

In short, Lithuania's choice would not be suitable for us.

Obviously, membership in the union of communist parties would not exclude the possibility of all-round cooperation with all other constructive political forces in Latvia and other republics, thereby contributing to the development of economic, political, and other intergovernmental ties on a new basis.

The 28th congress will also be an important milestone in the perestroika of the entire party, and this is why the proposals of Latvian Communists should be heard there as well.

I think that the statements made here could be considered part of our proposals to the 28th CPSU Congress.

If the Latvian Communist Party acquires the status of an autonomous communist party, it will certainly have many more opportunities to establish bilateral and multilateral ties with communist, workers, and other leftist parties in foreign countries, especially the Baltic countries.

These opportunities will be even greater when sovereign Latvia is viewed as a subject of international law.

I think that these ties might be extremely useful to us because they will allow us to learn about new experience, avoid errors and, finally, make our own contribution to the noble cause of international rapprochement.

Comrades!

The establishment of a multiparty system in place of the single-party political system provides clear evidence of perestroika.

This has been revealed most quickly and distinctly in the Baltic republics.

I think that this is why we are experiencing the crisis in the party, which actually exists throughout the country, more directly and severely.

The fundamental lack of correspondence between the party as a governmental structure, as something like a political ministry, and the social model we want to establish lies at the basis of today's problems.

A smooth and comfortable transition, without any painful clashes, from the situation in which the Communist Party was the only political party, and a mass party, with an effective monopoly on power, ideology, and administration, to a situation in which the party will have to support its extremely logical claims to the role of political leader in the society only with its theoretical and practical activity, only in honest and legal competition with other political forces, would be impossible.

Another unique feature of Latvian politics is the fact that the new organizations have been established not only outside the party, but also within the Latvian Communist Party itself—and perhaps even not so much outside the party as within it.

In any case, the party base has contributed to most of them.

It was in the Baltic zone that the ideological platforms began evolving into parties at least a year earlier than in other locations.

At first it seemed as though we were trying not to take notice of them.

On the one hand, we confined ourselves to the issuance of tactful instructions to Communists, advising them to uphold the party line in other sociopolitical organizations and essentially leaving their behavior to their own discretion.

On the other hand, we tried to counteract this tendency with clearly sectarian and dogmatic appeals "recalling" the Communists from one or another of the fronts, or from all of the fronts.

At that time, new forms of activity and new appeals and slogans, especially after so many years of stagnation, turned out to be much stronger than our policy of procrastination and our lack of preparedness to take precise and radical steps toward the perestroika of the party and the society.

Finding no opportunity to display their creative energy and vent their emotions in the party itself, tens of thousands of Latvian Communist Party members found an outlet for them in the new organizations and movements.

By the same token, when these comrades did not receive any support or understanding from the party, they were frequently unable to resist the pressure of more radical forces and they either retired to the sidelines or gradually began opposing the party, beginning with objections to its traditional ideological premises and organizational structures.

For this reason, I want to stress that we probably have no reason to dissociate ourselves from these new developments in Latvia, to define them only as alien anti-Soviet currents and as evidence of the former capitalists' thirst for revenge, and to seek internal enemies and advise their repression.

We must also accept our share of the responsibility for the "degeneration" of some of yesterday's party personnel into vociferous anticommunists and for the activities of the veterans and party functionaries who are loudly extolling Stalinism today.

These are indications of our unsatisfactory work with people, especially Communists, our procrastination, our inability to make independent decisions and conduct the necessary explanatory work, and many of our other, now regrettably traditional problems.

The elections to soviets on different levels and their results have had a significant effect on the sociopolitical situation in the republic.

For this reason, today we cannot ignore this long year of election races.

The first phase—the elections of people's deputies of the USSR—took place in an overall atmosphere of competition between individuals and certain compromises between the leading sociopolitical forces of that time—the Latvian Communist Party and People's Front.

The election results gave rise to some optimism in party committees, because 48 of the 52 deputies were Communists, and to disappointment and more vigorous efforts by other political forces.

The second phase—the elections to local soviets—began with fierce confrontations and fights between various sociopolitical organizations. The internal conflicts between the organizations united under the NFL "roof" were settled largely by means of a much more rightist platform in the second NFL program.

This gave the front a chance to enter the elections to local soviets with a single list of candidates, representing all of the organizations making up the NFL, and to concentrate all of these forces in the campaign.

Regrettably, the ideological polarization over attitudes toward Latvian sovereignty and Latvian Communist Party autonomy was growing more pronounced at that time in the Latvian Communist Party. The plan for solving these problems, proposed in the Latvian Communist Party program of action "To Advance Latvian Sovereignty" did not, unfortunately, produce the anticipated results.

Opponents preferred to further their own political ambitions by taking a confrontational stance, which began to acquire the nature of ethnic polarization in the general public and even among Communists.

This difficult political situation had serious consequences.

The central party staff was incapacitated to a certain degree.

The balanced Central Committee decisions aimed at consolidation were virtually ignored by raykom and gorkom staffs, which began to lean toward one extreme or the other.

The party as a whole, meanwhile, was drawn into these internal conflicts, while other sociopolitical forces were able to reach an internal compromise just before the elections to the local soviets.

The polarization processes reached their peak at the local elections, as a result of which the soviets were made up of clearly delineated and even conflicting groups of deputies representing the views of the Popular Front or Interfront.

The internal divisions in the Latvian Communist Party created a vacuum in the center of the political spectrum in spite of the high number of Communists who were elected to local soviets.

Republic Communists are so polarized that they have sometimes been unable to pursue a single policy in the local soviets.

A vivid example of this was the crisis in the Riga city soviet of people's deputies, where the forces of deputy factions were balanced, and the Communist deputies, representing two-thirds of the total number, could not manage to unite and fuse the deputy corps.

It was under these conditions that the third and final phase of the election race took place—the elections to the republic Supreme Soviet.

The People's Front of Latvia has campaigned for a single ticket and still has a chance of winning around two-thirds of the seats in the republic parliament.

It is possible that more than half of the new Supreme Soviet deputies will be party members, but it is probable that the Latvian Communist Party will be in the parliamentary opposition for the first time since the war. This will present the party with fundamentally new strategic and tactical objectives.

What do we think we should do under these conditions?

First of all, we have to create a Latvian Communist Party faction in parliament and draw up a legislative program envisaging certain types of cooperation with certain political organizations.

We must formulate our own proposals on the composition of the governing bodies, commissions, and committees of the Supreme Soviet and the composition of the republic administration. One of the most important legislative acts in this connection will be the law on

parties and social organizations, which must be drafted and approved without delay.

Second, we must begin working right away on the fundamental reconstruction of party staff and organizational structures on all levels for the purpose of establishing the kind of election and campaign mechanism that will contribute to successful campaigning and the implementation of the programs approved by party congresses through party representatives in soviets on all levels.

Third, guided by the fundamental requirements of the Latvian Communist Party Program, we must initiate and sustain a dialogue with sociopolitical organizations and parties in the republic.

Of course, this will only be possible if we surmount the internal crisis in the party itself and establish an essentially new, democratic party of leftwing forces, a party with socialist aims and the ability to offer the republic a precise and realistic program of measures to surmount the crisis, a program which will express and defend the common interests of all population groups and strata on an international basis.

Comrades!

There is a direct connection between the party's ability to adapt to the new situation, and to take successful action in it, and the quantitative and qualitative composition of its ranks.

On 1 January 1990 there were 177,409 Communists in the Latvian party organization, a figure comparable to the one recorded at the last congress.

The state of the internal crisis in the Latvian Communist Party is also indicated by the dramatic rise last year in the number of Communists wishing to leave the party. This is the first time the party has had to face this kind of situation in almost 50 years, and it has worried and even alarmed Communists and the heads of party organizations, especially in rural regions.

Whereas 374 people left the CPSU in 1988, in 1989 the figure had already risen to 4,408 party members and candidates for membership. It is significant that more than half of them, 54.6 percent, were on the rolls of party rural raykoms, although these rolls represent only 37 percent of all Communists in the republic. Furthermore, 58.4 percent of them were Latvians. The proportional number of Latvians among those leaving the party last year rose by 8.7 percent, while members of the native nationality represent only 39.2 percent of the membership of the republic party organization.

Around 38 percent said they no longer wished to be party members because of the declining authority of the party and their own lack of faith in its policies, and because they were dissatisfied with the speed and progress of perestroyka in the party and society. Therefore, this is an

essentially political problem, and the solution lies in the immediate and thorough perestroyka of the entire society and the party itself.

Today we must be fully aware of the fact that if the Latvian Communist Party does not undergo thorough and radical perestroyka, it will be abandoned first by the Latvians, who already represent just over one-third of its members.

A Latvian Communist Party with virtually no Latvian members will never be able to win any kind of real authority among the Latvian people even if its membership figures remain high.

This would also apply to a party consisting almost wholly of Latvian members.

In this connection, we must not indulge in any kind of illusions, because the structure in question is not an territorial organization of the CPSU, but a communist party of a national republic, a party capable of representing a multinational and socially and demographically complex population.

There is also another side to this problem.

All of us joined the party for quite different reasons.

Before perestroyka, membership in the party could help us rise in society, and sometimes it was even the only way of legally defending the legitimate interests of our people and of performing creative work in our chosen field.

The real reasons for leaving the party are just as varied today, now that the general situation and the political atmosphere have changed. Some of the people who spent years enjoying the bureaucratic privileges that are being criticized today are loudly denouncing the party in the current campaigns, turning even this abandonment of the party into a "political asset."

Nevertheless, the absolute majority of Communists who support the radical perestroyka of the CPSU and the revitalization of the Latvian Communist Party are still members of the party today.

The increasing number of Communists leaving the party has certainly weakened it and has also hurt all of the forces for democracy, glasnost, and economic and political reform.

This means that we must concentrate on one thing—without giving in to panic and yielding to the pressure of anti-party forces, we must accomplish the perestroyka of the party itself, preserving its democratic potential, to keep conservative forces from dominating the Latvian Communist Party.

In the final analysis, we have to care about who will be speaking for the Latvian Communist Party in the future and what social, political, and national ideals and values it will be representing!

What is the collective social profile of the Communists who elected us?

All of the social strata and ethnic groups in our society are represented in the party, and considerable intellectual potential is concentrated in it, but the party is not dominated by any single stratum or class, and I feel that this is one of the main indicators of its common social nature and significance.

Party statistics, which regrettably took the form of unchanging indicators for years, now tell us that 30.2 percent of the Communists in Latvia are workers.

If we consider the fact that this figure includes sovkhos tractor operators and milkers and other laborers, including restaurant waiters and bartenders, these are infinitely different people in the social sense.

The percentage of Communists who are workers in modern industry is certainly much lower.

Almost half of the Communists (45.1 percent) fall into the equally indefinite category of employees, and just under 10 percent work on Latvian kolkhozes.

Statistics indicate that 14.6 percent of the Communists are retired, but this does not include all of the different groups of people who are receiving a pension but are still working (especially retired servicemen).

The average age of party members has risen constantly in recent years and has already reached 48.

These are dry figures, but they stand for living human beings with diverse interests and views. We must admit quite frankly that our party has been turning into a party of employees and retired individuals in recent years for purely objective reasons.

Much has been said about the ethnic composition of the Latvian Communist Party, especially the relatively low proportional number—around 39 percent for several years now—of Latvians in the party.

In recent years the Central Committee has always sensed the gravity of this problem and has made a maximum effort to settle disagreements over major questions connected with the sociopolitical development of Latvia between party committees, and especially their leadership, in big cities and rural communities.

We must be discerning enough to admit, however, that we have not always succeeded.

Many party organizations have recently been more likely to assign higher priority to the local interest of their cities and rayons than to realistic goals in their activity.

Their actual policies are distinguished from opportunism, however, by the sense of responsibility for the situation in the republic as a whole and the prospects for the development of the entire republic and the party. Their policies are not guided by the prevailing attitudes in a single rayon or city.

The qualifications of party personnel, their professional skills and diligence, are among the major conditions of effective party work.

Although the staff of party organizations on different levels has been reduced considerably in the last year and a half, we are still being guided by the same bureaucratic and largely formal principles of personnel policy, and the real changes here have been minimal.

In the final analysis, the main thing is not the formulation of personnel policy in a document to be locked up in a safe, but the offer of concrete assistance to talented and energetic people who have proved their ability to guide others, have won authority in their groups, and can further the party's policy aims.

Around a year ago we reorganized and reduced the party staff on all levels.

Many sectorial departments of the Central Committee were dissolved, and new structural subdivisions were created. At that time it seemed to us that these could meet present requirements and the needs of perestroika more effectively.

There is no doubt, however, that the party staff will have to undergo radical reorganization rather than mere reduction within the near future.

It is time to review and clarify the specific functions and obligations of elected bodies and their staffs on the republic, city, rayon, and lower levels.

It is time to stipulate the precise concerns of the party staff, the exact number of personnel this will require, and the number the raykom or Central Committee can afford to keep.

Of course, positions on the party staff are not the most popular jobs today. In fact, even the salary increase did not alleviate the personnel shortage. People are still leaving jobs on the party staff, and this will eventually affect staff quality.

Unfortunately, the group of Latvian Communist Party personnel has recently also been distinguished by the following changes—the number of personnel with a higher education under the age of 40 is decreasing, but the number of personnel over 50, including retired individuals, is increasing.

The corps of secretaries of primary party organizations is also growing older, and their educational level has declined slightly.

The fundamental renewal of the Latvian Communist Party and the guarantee of its autonomy will necessitate bold and non-traditional decisions.

The party has a great need for a change of generations and the substantial renewal of its theoretical and organizational forces.

The party's future success will depend largely on the intellectual potential and ideological convictions of its members and on the competence of professional personnel and their organizational abilities. For this reason, we need new people who are free of the routine of authoritarian management and of Stalinism and imperious thinking.

They must be republic patriots, willing to defend the vital interests of the entire population of the republic through their daily labor, and not just through words, and capable of rising above ethnic biases and stereotypical thinking. They must be democrats and genuine politicians in their outlook and their convictions, and not just in their words.

Without this, a new party with a new image will be simply inconceivable. I am calling upon the congress delegates to approach the elections of the new Central Committee members and leadership with a sense of complete responsibility.

Honored congress delegates!

The perestroika processes in Latvia are taking place against the depressing background of the low standard of living. People's attitudes are being affected by their inability to satisfy their daily physical needs.

There have been more and more shortages, long lines, speculation, and a rising crime rate. There is no need to illustrate these phenomena with statistics. The delegates have experienced these things and are aware of them.

They know that the output of many of the most important manufactured goods and of meat and milk has been reduced, that prices have risen, and that less housing and fewer cultural and social facilities are being built.

Most people, however, measure the success or failure of perestroika with their own accurate yardstick—the specific results of economic reform and a genuine economic reversal toward the satisfaction of the vital needs of the individual. Regrettably, however, the state of the economy has not improved during these 5 years of perestroika. On the contrary, it has become even more critical.

Of course, the Latvian Communist Party and its Central Committee and buro must accept their share of the blame, along with the republic government. We have not been able to accomplish the necessary changes and stop the national economy's progression toward a state of crisis.

The situation is acquiring the features of a state of emergency. For this reason, we will have to continue taking fundamental and decisive action in the future.

Under these conditions, the Central Committee believes that the Latvian CP Congress must support the concept of economic autonomy for the republic in the form in which it has been elaborated by the government and recorded in our program. This is expected to stabilize the

economic development of Latvia and secure the satisfaction of public demand for food, consumer goods and services, and education, the improvement of the ecological situation, and the establishment of favorable conditions for cultural development.

This concept envisages the attainment of the following basic objectives during the perestroyka of the economic relations of an economically autonomous republic:

The transfer of all national economic potential within Latvian territory to the jurisdiction of the Latvian State, leaving the armed forces and their property, the main oil and gas pipelines, and possibly some other facilities of strategic importance under union jurisdiction on the basis of the appropriate agreements;

The establishment of stable treaty relations between government agencies of the republic and the USSR and agencies of other union republics for the purpose of equal and equivalent commodity exchange. Measures must be taken to establish a unified Baltic market. Foreign economic ties must be broadened, especially with the Baltic and Scandinavian countries;

Measures accompanying the establishment of many different forms of ownership to guarantee their equality and legislative protection, the freedom of different forms of economic management on the basis of commercial relations, and the revival of private enterprise;

The use of primarily economic methods of regulation in management practices, without any direct interference in the economic operations of enterprises;

The protection of the domestic commercial market of the republic by setting export and import quotas, creating our own monetary system, and conducting the perestroyka of customs operations in the republic's interest;

The augmentation of the legal and economic autonomy of cities, rayons, and rural communities in the republic through the decentralization of territorial administration;

The planning and accomplishment of democratic agrarian reform aimed at the intensive development of agricultural production and the considerable improvement of the living conditions of the rural population;

The accomplishment of significant changes in the structure of the entire national economy, the freeing of labor resources, and their redistribution among branches. Besides this, real social guarantees will have to be secured unconditionally for all inhabitants of the republic, and only the normal functioning of the entire economy will make this possible.

For this reason, party committees and organizations must be guided by the belief that the quickest possible resolution of urgent problems is directly connected with the consistent implementation of economic reforms, the

improvement of the quality and efficiency of labor, and the establishment of firm discipline in all branches of the national economy.

We must not forget our own unpleasant experience: There have always been enough appeals for the mastery and implementation of the new economic thinking, but there has never been enough real effort.

The conditions of the successful development of the republic economy will certainly include a privatization process conducted in the interests of the entire society, in line with legislation, and with the aid of economic methods of regulation.

To this end, we should draw up a program of special undertakings in the spheres in which private initiative would have a greater economic impact than state ownership and would represent the most immediate way of balancing the consumer market.

Besides this, we must stress that this has nothing in common with a return to the economic structure and property relations that existed prior to the adoption of the resolutions on nationalization in 1940.

In this connection, there are no grounds for illusions or fear. In our economic policy we are constantly looking ahead and are relying on our own strength and intelligence. We are not calling for a return to the "good old days" or issuing appeals to our rich overseas uncles.

The Latvian CP Central Committee is aware of the political and social significance of the ecological crisis and believes that the continued escalation of this crisis in the republic is indefensible.

The Latvian CP Central Committee supports broader republic powers in the sphere of environmental protection and conservation.

Government agencies on all levels in Latvia must be granted the power to coordinate the ecological efforts of enterprises, regardless of their departmental jurisdiction. They must have the power to "veto" any technical project contrary to ecological legislation and the principles of environmental protection and improvement.

The party regards patriotism and a statesmanlike approach to environmental protection as important elements of political work, and this must be taken into account when decisions are made on any economic or social issue.

At the congress today we must admit that the mass collectivization which was imposed on Latvian agriculture at the end of the 1940's, and especially the methods and forms of its accomplishment, and the mass deportations were mistakes from the political and economic standpoints. The Latvian Communist Party will certainly accept its share of the political responsibility for this.

To correct these mistakes, we must revive Latvia's best farming traditions, which were once based on complete autonomy in production, responsibility for the intelligent use of the land, and a commitment to conscientious labor, and combine all of these in a single, highly respected landholder.

While we are correcting our old mistakes, however, we must not make new ones. We must not go to the other extreme and ruthlessly destroy everything that has been established in Latvian rural regions in the last 50 years.

No one is questioning the special importance of the classic form of cooperation in agriculture, the expediency of modern, highly developed collective farms, or their economic effectiveness, but this is certainly not true of all farms.

For this reason, the Central Committee is asking the congress for clear-cut support for a situation in which peasant farms and other farms run by citizens and by state, cooperative, and public enterprises, organizations, and establishments in the form of a rural collective or private property, be allowed to exist in the agrarian sector of the republic economy along with collective and state farms on a completely equal basis.

Let their viability depend only on economic results.

Comrades!

When we look through the minutes of the meetings of party organizations and sessions of party committees in the last few years and the published statements of organizations, movements, and individual citizens in the republic, we see that one of the main topics is the ethnic issue and the dangerously escalated tension in inter-ethnic relations.

We cannot deny that party and state leaders were not fully aware of the gravity of the problems that had accumulated in this sphere when they began perestroika and did not draw up any forecasts of future events in this sphere.

When we review the efforts of the Latvian Communist Party to arrive at a democratic solution to ethnic and inter-ethnic problems, we must admit that our main shortcomings in this sphere were delayed reactions, inertia, some inconsistency, and insufficiently energetic action.

In recent years party organizations have accumulated some experience in this sphere, but this has not put an end to the efforts of various political forces to manipulate the ethnic factor, and this is why we are facing the real danger that a political struggle might turn into an inter-ethnic confrontation.

Latvia has positive experience in the coordination of ethnic interests. The Latvian CP Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet Presidium supported the idea of convening a forum of the nationalities of Latvia along

with the Popular Front and did everything within their power to secure a businesslike atmosphere for the forum.

Under the influence of the forum, the subsequent policy planning documents of all democratic organizations and movements and their public statements regarding ethnic policy have been based on common democratic principles (regrettably, this is not always true of their actions).

Can we say anything new about this situation?

Because of the bombastic slogans of past years, people have had a restrained response to any declarations in the sphere of ethnic relations.

The model of inter-ethnic relations in Latvia consists of three elements. The first is the Latvians, the native nationality, and the Livonians, the ancient native ethnic group, for whom Latvia is their historical native land and the only place in the world where their language, culture, and national state can develop.

Then there are the national groups with deep historical roots in Latvia and special interests in the cultural sphere. This level is clearly defined in the activities of national societies and associations, including the reinstated national schools.

The third element consists of the citizens of different nationalities who live in Latvia but are relatively indifferent to the ethnic factor.

They must not be confused with ethnic nihilists and chauvinists.

When we make changes in inter-ethnic communication in Latvia, we must respect the interests of all three groups.

Many important and intelligent opinions have already been expressed with regard to the establishment of harmonious ethnic relations in Latvia, and several realistic and specific proposals have been made.

For this reason, I believe that a network must be set up in the republic to solve ethnic problems.

Within this network, representative bodies on all levels, from the local soviet to the Supreme Soviet, and executive agencies on all levels could meet regularly for the unbiased discussion and resolution of the problems that have been accumulating for years and any new problems that might arise.

Comrade delegates!

The future of the Latvian Communist Party and its status were the subjects of long and heated debates prior to the congress.

They were discussed at meetings and plenums on all levels, they were the subject of anxious letters to the Central Committee and other agencies, and they were debated in newspapers and on radio and television.

Some of the views that were expressed were genuinely constructive, intelligent, and sincere, and some were completely primitive ultimatums- "I will not be a member of the same party that does this or that."

The draft program and draft charter drawn up by commissions formed by the Central Committee, with the participation of representatives of different points of view, have been distributed to you today.

These documents have been published, and all congress delegates have had a chance to see that these documents represent compromises.

I want to repeat that these compromises were not made for the sake of the Central Committee or the members of its bureau.

The future of the party itself and its ties with the people of Latvia are at stake here.

I can honestly say that the future of the Latvian Communist Party is in your hands.

We could leave this congress through two doors, or even three. This would be the most convenient and easiest solution at this time.

I am deeply convinced, however, that it would be best for republic Communists, for all of the people of Latvia, and for their future if we were to leave the congress through a single door.

The present time is too crucial to allow a split.

Debate at the Latvian 25th CP Congress

90UNI626A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
10, 12, 13, 14 Apr 90

[Debate on the speeches and draft documents of the 25th Latvian CP Congress held 6-7 April 1990 in Riga]

[10 Apr 90, pp 3-4]

[Excerpts] A. Klauzens, First Secretary of Riga Party Gorkom

While we were listening to the report, many of us probably thought back to the atmosphere in this auditorium less than 5 years ago at the 24th Latvian CP Congress. Who could have imagined then, when we were defining what we regarded as the only correct policy line for the future, that the republic party organization would arrive at this state of crisis? But it did, and not because of outside forces. We created the crisis ourselves, we people with identical party membership cards but, as it turned out, different philosophies. The kind of explosive situation that has taken shape in the society and in our party has never existed in our republic in the entire postwar period.

It is difficult to accept the fact that the ruling party, the Latvian Communist Party, has turned into an opposition party and is gradually losing the fine traditions of the

Social Democrats of the Latvian territory, who were once held up as examples by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. We have to wonder how we reached this point. There are many reasons. Some of them were mentioned in the report, but many are still not being discussed.

Let us look each other straight in the eye at least here, at our congress, and say what Communists are saying in plants and factories and in organizations. They are saying, and with good reason, that at a time of great difficulty for the Latvian Communist Party, the Central Committee and its bureau were unable to influence processes within the party effectively. Speaking metaphorically, the thousands of soldiers in the communist army have no generals, and the party staff and personnel have no leadership. This is not surprising. One secretary was busy giving interviews to foreign newspapers, another was waiting for orders from Moscow, and a third was learning data processing techniques. How could they find the time for party work? The Central Committee Bureau was also stuck in its old rut. Events had been taking their course for a long time, but the resolutions produced by its sessions may have been correct, but were far removed from grim reality.

You would have every right to ask me: How did you manage to reconcile yourself to this situation, Comrade Klauzens? I must honestly say, and I think that many people in this auditorium would have to say the same, that I did not hold my tongue, I argued, and I demanded more clear-cut decisions and actions, but I have to admit that I was not persistent or forceful enough, and for this I deserve to be severely criticized.

Let us speak frankly: The negligence of the bureau and Central Committee of the republic Communist Party weakened the political-organizational unity of the Latvian Communist Party. Not once did they deliver a principled verdict on the actions of the double-dealing CPSU members who shook the foundations of the party. We were frequently influenced by the well-known motto of Leopold the Cat: "People, let us keep everything on a friendly level!" For too many years we overlooked the supposedly innocent pranks of the news media. As the saying goes, why blame the mirror when your reflection looks bad? But this mirror was not only crooked; it was also venomous. Today we must say in all seriousness that the biased newspaper, television, and radio coverage did not eliminate the problems, but made many of them more difficult to solve and even provoked some negative tendencies.

Let us ask ourselves something: If socialism and its values are constantly criticized and the advantages of the bourgeois way of life are exaggerated every single day for a year or two, which system is the public likely to prefer? I think the answer is obvious. To our deepest regret, several publications of republic party committees joined this anti-socialist and anti-party choir. Irreparable damage was inflicted on the party by those who began the destructive multiparty debates on the status of the Latvian Communist Party at such a crucial time in our

history. Today we are reaping their bitter fruit. And let us think back to the period when these debates broke out. This happened before the elections to local soviets and before the elections to the republic Supreme Soviet, when we should have been taking care of our own affairs but were being forced to deal with something else. As a result, we lost everything. Today, on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress, we are discussing the work of the party Central Committee. I will not make any general judgments. This is probably a job for the coming congress. As far as our affairs are concerned, however, it is clear that it took too long to define its position on the processes in the Baltic zone. There were no scientific forecasts of their development whatsoever. We still cannot understand who benefited when Comrades Yakovlev and Medvedev, the CPSU Central Committee secretaries, came to Latvia. Today we are in dire need of the support of our comrades and their good advice. After all, we are among the first in the country to work in a genuine multiparty system. I hope that Comrade Pugo will report our complaints and wishes to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Let us begin relying more on ourselves, on our Communists. Let us help the CPSU Central Committee restore order in the country.

Today we are facing a multitude of acute problems. Their resolution should stop the escalation of the crisis in the party and the society. I would like to discuss some of them in detail.

First of all, we must win the run-off elections to the republic Supreme Soviet at any cost. We all know that the People's Front has sent all of its forces to the remaining 17 precincts, and it is not concealing the reasons why it needs these mandates. The leaders of the People's Front are agitated by Landsbergis' success, and they can only deal with this by collecting two-thirds of the deputy seats. We also need mandates, but we want them so that we can block this adventure and prevent the further escalation of tension in the republic.

Second, we must define the projected status of our republic in a renovated federation. It is too risky to wait until separatists begin foisting their own ideas on us. The party and Central Committee must display some initiative here. We must make suggestions regarding the composition of the new government. I think it should be a coalition government, with the proportional representation of members of the republic Communist Party.

Third, we must begin drafting our concrete program for the republic's emergence from the state of economic crisis at this congress. We must decide exactly what has to be done, when it must be done, and how it is to be funded. These decisions should constitute our proposal to the new republic government.

Fourth, we must exert stronger influence in soviets on all levels through our deputies. We must direct them to deal with the specific concerns and needs of individuals.

Sometimes they use up all of their energy on the distribution of assignments and offices and the renaming of streets.

Fifth, it is time to put all party publications and publishing houses under party control. We do not need the publications of others, but we must also never give our publications away to anyone else. We do not intend to place restrictions on artistic freedom. Any journalist can find a publication meeting his own requirements. All we have to do is help him make the right choice. The Riga gorkom has begun working on this. Following the good advice of Comrade Vagris, who asked us to take more resolute action at the last Central Committee plenum, we stopped the publication of the RIGAS BALSS newspaper when its editors refused to implement the decisions of the buro and of party gorkom plenums and rejected our suggestion to seek a compromise as a solution to the problem, particularly by dividing the editorial staff among two newspapers—the soviet paper and the party gorkom paper—and when they began campaigning against the candidates supported by party committees in the city. Now we are being asked why we made the wrong choice and did what we did. What choice did we have? Why did the Central Committee not advise us or help us after we requested help several times? The last advice Comrade Kezbers gave us was to take the matter to court.

I think the time has come to consider an alternative television network in the republic. The basic requirements exist. A new television center and television tower have been built with the money of all of the taxpayers, and they cannot be the domain of only the People's Front.

Sixth, we must simultaneously improve our system of oral propaganda. The present situation obligates each party worker to become an active publicist and propagandist. This is not the time to sit in an office. We must go to plants, factories, and organizations, with figures in hand, to tell people about the problems that will be caused by separation from the USSR and the voluntary or involuntary severance of long-standing economic ties. To this end, we must start reorganizing the work of the party staff, beginning with the Central Committee and the entire party aktiv.

Next, we must defend the autonomy of labor collectives. It is no secret that people are having arguments today about whether certain enterprises should belong to the center or the republic. They belong to the people who work there. They should be the genuine proprietors of their enterprises. There is no other choice.

Furthermore, we must make a serious effort to strengthen urban-rural ties. The initiative here should probably be taken by Communists, especially urbanites. I know that the workers and peasants are not divided by a huge gap. They have a common concern—they want to make life better. It is the duty of Communists to help them. Young people require special attention. I think

that you will agree with me when I say that only a party with young members can expect to have a future. For this reason, we have an urgent need for our own unique policy on youth and our own unique approach to the concerns of youth.

Finally, our main concern today is the preservation of our party's unity. Will our congress be able to solve this problem? Will a reasonable compromise be reached? All of this can be accomplished in line with our principles, in line with the provisions of the CPSU Central Committee platform to the 28th CPSU Congress, in which the proposals of our congress will undoubtedly be taken into account. When we assess one another's positions at this congress, we must display maximum caution and tolerance. We must not forget that the wave of public activity is pushing many people first to the right and then to the left. Even during the most heated debates, we must remember that the party's strength will depend directly on united action. This is the mandate we have received from many Communists and many inhabitants of the republic.

The last thing I want to discuss is the picket line in front of the entrance to this building just before the congress began. The picketers were carrying a variety of signs. The imminent death of the Latvian Communist Party was announced on one sign with a black background. Speaking for myself and for our Communists, I would like to inform the honored delegates that, despite all of our problems and difficulties, the Latvian Communist Party existed in the past, exists in the present, and will exist in the future.

J. Geiba, First Secretary of Daugavpilsskiy Party Raykom

Our congress has been called historic in the reports and discussions. Yes, it is historic, and not only because it will decide the fate of the Latvian Communist Party, but also because its outcome and the documents it approves (or does not approve) will affect the future of thousands of people, and not only party members. For this reason, if we congress delegates can display enough restraint and political wisdom in our views on the present and future of our republic and if we can represent more than just our own ambitious group interests, and think of the people who live in Latvia today, we will be able, in my opinion, to find a way out of the difficult situation in the Communist Party.

The people have grown tired of our political battles and our vague and imprecise views on the most crucial matters, especially our vague definitions of the future of Latvia and its relationship to other republics and other nations. There are at least two points of view here, supporting a renewed federation or an autonomous state.

All of us probably realize that the absolute majority of the Latvian segment of the republic population has taken a definite stand and sees the Latvia of the future only as an autonomous state. This part of the population is

unlikely to accept any other goals and objectives we specify in our policy documents.

Of course, we could curse the people for this ambition, express our anger, intimidate them, and label them separatists or nationalists, but this will not stop them. Slogans, empty promises, and appeals to reason will not stop them either. The Latvian people have enough strong arguments to justify their hopes and desires. I think radical political decisions are the only solution here.

I realize that this will evoke immediate controversy and that people will remind me that the desires of the Latvian part of the population do not coincide with the interests of the other, extremely large segment of the republic population. Yes, today this is probably the biggest conflict in our society, and it is something we must discuss in clear and precise terms. We cannot make any progress in the political, economic, cultural, and social development of our republic until we have settled this conflict.

We cannot be naive and erase the last 50 years from republic history. During these years there were major demographic changes in the ethnic composition of the population for objective and subjective reasons. This is particularly true of Latgale, including Daugavpilsskiy Rayon.

The Latvian people cannot begin building a future for themselves, however, without considering the interests of other nationalities living in the republic. The future of Latvia must be based on the acknowledgement and respect of the interests and future of other nationalities. The only policy that can succeed will represent the interests of all nationalities in the republic. Of course, only the republic constitution can guarantee this. The renewed Latvian Communist Party, which unites all of the ethnic groups and nationalities living in our republic, can serve as the guarantor and agent of this policy.

If we succeed in drafting a program and charter of the Latvian Communist Party, the principles of its organizational structure, and the guidelines of activity protecting the interests of all nationalities at this congress, we will have taken a major step toward the further consolidation of national unity. Otherwise, the division of the people along ethnic lines will become more pronounced and the spontaneous escalation of ethnic emotions will grow more intense. Under these conditions, it will be difficult to solve any political, economic, or social problem.

I think that each speaker should concentrate on what we should do, how we should do it, and what kind of decisions we should make, so that our future actions will unite people instead of dividing them.

In my opinion, the draft program and charter submitted by the Latvian CP Central Committee are documents reflecting the goals of the Latvian Communist Party, its political, economic, and inter-ethnic policies, and its opinions on the governmental structure of the republic

and the organizational structure of the CPSU as a union of equal and autonomous communist parties.

Obviously, only a system in which the government and organizational structure of the party allow the people of the republic to decide their own fate and base their relations with other republics and other nations on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and mutual trust can be progressive and can lead our society along the road of progress.

Of course, the proposed program and draft charter of an autonomous Latvian Communist Party require additional modifications and adjustments, and radical changes are needed in the wording of some statements to clarify their meaning. We have submitted the proposals of the rayon party organization to the congress Editing Commission.

It is probably wrong to look for minor flaws in policy statements and indulge in mutual accusations regarding the betrayal of ideals. This road leads to a blind alley. The possible result can be predicted—the Latvian Communist Party will split into several groups purporting to have a monopoly on the truth, and each individual group will cease to enjoy the trust and support of the people and will consequently have to leave the political stage. The only way of emerging from the crisis is to search for the common factors uniting us.

Of course, this approach will not please the extreme left wing or extreme right wing of the party. I suppose that we will no longer be able to regard these people as fellow Communists of one party.

In the rayon party organization there were different opinions with regard to the future status of the Latvian Communist Party. There was no consensus, but at a party raykom plenum on 30 March the absolute majority of members there supported the idea that Communists should find a way out of the crisis by seeking compromises in which both sides would make certain concessions, not in the ideological sense, but in the views on the organizational structure of our party, because the party organizational structure has become the main criterion of disagreement for many Communists. The main things that should unite us are our common ideology and the strategic goal of building a humane and democratic socialist society based on the creative application of Marxist-Leninist theory. The tactics and methods of attaining this goal might differ, depending on the specific features of the political and economic situation in each republic. The organizational structure of the party should not be the main criterion and cornerstone of our unity.

The Latvian Communist Party is advised to base its relations with other union republic communist parties on equality and ideological unity. Therefore, the CPSU is seen as a union of equal communist parties in all of the republics, with its governing bodies made up of equal numbers of Communists representing each union

republic communist party. The resolutions of a governing body could be binding or advisory for the autonomous communist parties. Because these decisions will not be made by a single communist party, the raykom party plenum felt that the 25th Latvian CP Congress should be held in two stages:

During the first stage the delegates should discuss the Latvian Communist Party program and charter and recommend them as proposals (or alternatives) for discussion at the 28th CPSU Congress, and they must elect the members of the governing bodies of the Latvian Communist Party;

During the second stage the delegates should approve the Latvian Communist Party program and charter in line with the documents of the 28th CPSU Congress. Besides this, they could address the issues today's speakers raised and tried to include on the agenda—a review of the history of the Latvian Communist Party and other matters.

In our opinion, this method of organizing the proceedings of the 25th congress and the preparation of its documents could be the best way of taking into account the interests and wishes of all Communists wanting to preserve a single Communist Party.

I have not evaluated the performance of the Latvian CP Central Committee and its buro in this speech. In my opinion, choosing the right people to criticize is not the main thing. Furthermore, it would be difficult for me to analyze the degree to which the situation in the republic depends on the Latvian CP Central Committee leadership and the degree to which it depends on the state of affairs in our country. The main thing is the choice of future patterns of action and future decisions.

A. Svarts, First Secretary of Aluknenskiy Party Raykom

Our job today is far from easy. We have to find answers to an entire group of somewhat obscure questions. I think we will do this in line with party principles, I think we will do this the right way, if we begin by asking ourselves these questions and by trying to find the answers. I feel that this is what I have to do. The first of these questions concerns the future characteristics of the party we plan to improve, transform, and restructure at the 25th congress. Whom should the party represent and what purposes should it serve?

I can already hear quick responses from all sides, telling me that this is a simple question and that the party will serve the people. This is important, and I agree. But we must take a deeper look at the present meaning of this—the people we supposedly represent today. It is easy to describe the people in numerical terms: 50 percent are natives, or Latvians, and 50 percent are people of other nationalities. These are the people. The party is the mirror of the people, but it is a slightly skewed mirror and it reflects a party membership that is 60 percent foreign and only 40 percent native. Why? Obviously, because the people, and I mean the native

population, apparently do not see their own party, their own political party, as an organization expressing their genuine wishes. This is the reason for the disparity.

Now I want to say something about how this situation came into being in the republic and why the figures I mentioned exist. Obviously, this is a result of the faulty economic policy conducted from the center and of the consequent uncontrolled migration.

Our republic is small in area and population. Around 35 years ago it had a population of just over 2 million. Today the figure is over 2.5 million. During those years around a million people of other nationalities came to the republic for various reasons. This put a colossal social burden on the native population. In what kind of atmosphere did the million newcomers begin living here? They could not speak the local language and did not have to learn it, work teams were formed on the basis of nationality, conditions favored displays of chauvinism, and the Latvian people's right to national self-determination on Latvian territory was categorically denied. Some of the newcomers still believe that they did not move to a sovereign state, to put the matter in constitutional terms, but that they simply moved from one oblast in the USSR to another.

In this context, the capabilities of the delegates elected from the armed forces are amazing. Many of them have lived here only a few years, but they are already able to judge the interests of the Latvian people. I have no doubt that if they go to serve in Uzbekistan or Kirghizia tomorrow, they will be just as competent in deciding the future of those people. I think the army has another job to do. It should serve the law. It should serve the state.

It was in this atmosphere that the diametrically opposed views on two fundamental matters took shape: the status of the Latvian Communist Party and the Latvian state. No matter how hard we try to reconcile these diverging points of view, the congress' work will not be finished until both of these matters have been decided. The judgments we make on these matters will determine the place our people will allow us to occupy in the society and will lead either to public acceptance or further alienation.

I am disturbed by some of the terms that have recently been used so frequently: separatism, nationalism, and the restoration of capitalism. I think there are not that many people in Latvia who are too stupid to realize that we have no intention of building blast furnaces in Latvia or of growing cotton here. I think these problems will be solved on a cooperative basis, on the basis of contracts and reciprocal economic contacts. Therefore, I think any discussion of separatism is out of the question. This also applies to the restoration of capitalism. I think there is no basis for the worries of the comrades who are upset by the revival of commercial relations and the introduction of the economic principles of the free market. This has been called the restoration of capitalism. This term has also been used in reference to the present practice of

giving the peasants land and means of production as their private property. I think this will lead to responsible management, and not to anything else. I agree with what the Russian economist said in the IZVESTIYA article: There is no capitalism, there is no socialism, there is only the choice of development or non-development.

I want to say something about economic accountability. We are in favor of economic accountability on the level of the labor collective and we are in favor of the economic accountability of whole enterprises. We cast our ballots for this. As soon as someone mentions economic accountability for the Latvian people, who want to live within their own territory and manage their own accounts for all services and all goods, however, this economic accountability on the republic level is defined as separatism.

In conclusion, I want to discuss the refusal to learn lessons from history. Two-thirds of the delegates feel no need to learn from the mistakes of others. Two-thirds of the delegates, judging by the results of the voting today, are ready to make new mistakes and stupid errors without any consideration for the fact that our party already made these mistakes in the past. This is a symptom of extreme denial. An intelligent person would never make new mistakes after taking a look at the mistakes made by predecessors. We need to show some sense today. We need to analyze past experience. This is why I suggest that the congress set up a commission to evaluate the past performance of the Latvian Communist Party and to tell the people the truth, clearly and openly.

Yes, we are facing a crisis today. We are on the verge of schism. There is nothing worse than living under the same roof with ideological opponents. Each of us has a different ideology, different views, convictions, and attitudes toward events. For this reason, I think that no matter how small the new party might be, and no matter how difficult the work lying ahead might seem, the people who unite their efforts in this work will be strong. [passage omitted]

[12 Apr 90, pp 2-3]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

A. Cepanis, Deputy Chairman of Latvian SSR Council of Ministers

Comrade Beskrovnov, the delegate from Daugavpils, proposed consolidation also for the purpose of preserving the Latvian Communist Party in its present form and asked the supporters of an independent Latvian Communist Party not to convene their congress of 14 April.

As one of the members of the organizing committee of this party, I agree completely and I am therefore asking the delegates to consider and review the following proposals. A vote could be taken on them tomorrow.

Here are the proposals.

First, that our 25th Latvian CP Congress acknowledge that the political goals of the party are social justice and a democratic and open society in a free, independent, rule-of-law Latvian state, which should become a subject of international law.

Second, that in order to reach these goals, the Latvian Communist Party must become an autonomous public political organization and must base its relations with other democratic movements and organizations on the principles of respect, parity, and political partnership. This would refute the subordinate position of any other political organization in Latvia or beyond its borders.

Third, that the Latvian Communist Party reject the goal of building a communist society or any other society artificially projected in isolation from actual living conditions, conflicts, and possibilities as a utopian idea.

Finally, that the Latvian Communist Party acknowledge a variety of forms of ownership, legal guarantees, and the development of private ownership of land and means of production to be necessary conditions for the normal development of society. These are the proposals I wish to submit to the congress presidium.

I. Prokofjevs, First Secretary of Oktyabrskiy Party Raykom

Yesterday Comrade Geiba, our colleague from Daugavpilskiy Rayon, said that the evaluation of the past performance of the party Central Committee and its buro was not the main thing, but the events which made it necessary to hold our congress now testify that the situation in the republic party organization is critical. The views expressed today have covered such a broad range that we essentially have no more reason to speak of a unified communist party. The appeals voiced by some Communists for the dissolution of the party and the actions of the supporters of an independent communist party attest to the enviable persistence with which separatist political demagoguery is being foisted on us, and we must realize that it could split the Latvian Communist Party and exclude it from republic politics. Furthermore, an independent state which would not be part of the USSR is being declared the cure for all of our ills.

I want to say right away that real politicians, not dilettantes, are fully aware that the declaration of the republic's independence can and should be the result, and not the cause, of a vote reflecting the interests of all of the nationalities living in the republic.

If we are ready to call a spade a spade, we must admit that some of the wise men who traveled here are obviously trying to push the republic down the road of political anarchy and bourgeois reformation. The Communist Party is the main obstacle on this road. This is why they are making every attempt to undermine the unity of the party as the vanguard of the laboring public. The republic is suffering from unprecedented outbursts

of unhealthy emotions and from a state of anarchy expertly incited by the leaders of nationalist movements. All of this strong psychological pressure is being exerted on people's minds and is arousing their legitimate displeasure, indignation, and feelings of insecurity, and I think I am not wrong in saying that this is not the democracy and glasnost that were announced at the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum on behalf of, and for the good of, all people. Our indecision and the passivity of our Central Committee are being described and interpreted as weakness on the part of the republic Communist Party and are contributing to the rise of irresponsibility and permissiveness in politics. Matters have gone too far. During the last two campaigns I had frequent meetings with inhabitants of the rayon and labor collectives. The laboring public is justified in demanding effective measures to restore at least elementary order in their daily life and to stabilize the situation. They are demanding guarantees of social protection. Obviously, when these guarantees do not exist, the potential for dissatisfaction, including dissatisfaction with the central government, leads to separatist tendencies, with all of the ensuing consequences.

Today we are actually trying to democratize anarchy in the republic. We should not pretend that everything here is calm and peaceful, as the republic news media have tried to suggest. Completely forgetting the Leninist principle of the party press, or maybe not even knowing what it is, the Communist administrators of television and radio stations, under the cover of pluralism, have reached the level of perfection in what can only be described as political drug addiction. We must not ignore their efforts to fill the minds of thousands of people with lies about the party and about soviet and party personnel. Expressing an opinion that is not solely mine, I want to say that the Ideological Department of the party Central Committee and Comrade Secretary Kezbers himself should be held responsible for the state of affairs in the republic news media and for their efforts to publicize an alien ideology and the nationalist and separatist ideas that are clearly inconsistent with the requirements of genuine perestroyka. In general, the Central Committee's role in the present situation in the party is matter of special concern. The psychological pressure of the mass news and propaganda media was exerted on republic politics with the tacit consent of the Central Committee.

Party leaders and the Central Committee buro are completely alienated from political and theoretical work. It would probably make much more sense for our party history institute to stop working altogether instead of continuing its present efforts to split the party. The Communists of my rayon once wondered, and with complete justification, why the Central Committee was taking a defensive position. They kept asking this question until they realized that the perestroyka in the activities of our Central Committee was not a perestroyka, but a surrender of influence, a change of goals and slogans and, in the final analysis, a betrayal of ideals

to gratify the separatist feelings of the People's Front. The Central Committee and some of its secretaries have undergone an ideological reorientation. Any self-respecting political party official would resign in this kind of situation. This is the common practice throughout the world.

The leadership of our Central Committee apparently has a different point of view. For this reason, there is nothing surprising about the fact that the republic party organization marched so confidently toward the threat of a split under the leadership of this kind of Central Committee. A split is not what the party needs today. It needs a thorough cleaning: to clean out all of the conservatives who are committed to dogmas and do not want renewal, to clean out the liquidators, and to clean out the independents who have refused to fight for the establishment of socialism. The party always was and will continue to be a voluntary alliance of people sharing the same views, but sharing the same views is out of the question when one of the leaders of the Democratic Platform, Comrade Afanasyev, the people's deputy of the USSR who advocated immediate separation from the CPSU, has publicly declared that the Democratic Platform should not have to try to save the decaying corpse of the CPSU. I will not waste any time commenting on remarks of this kind. We have our own "independent" forces, and they are not inferior to the union ones in any respect. They have embarked on an open political struggle of opposition, coining slogans which are incompatible with the party line of perestroika.

Under these conditions, fundamental separation from them and the exposure of their real interests and goals and their real political and moral identity become unavoidable. We do not have to go far to find an example. When the Lithuanian Communist Party severed ties with the CPSU and proclaimed the creation of an independent Lithuanian state, it was essentially isolated from politics by Sayudis, which took on all of the responsibility for the direction of political processes in the republic. As a result, the independent Lithuanian Communist Party is not only losing prestige and members, but is also trying to turn into a completely different kind of political party.

Our party organization has also produced some leaders who are deliberately exaggerating existing conflicts and disagreements in the party and focusing attention on the creation of structures independent of the CPSU instead of seeking ways of solving the problems of the whole party. This is being done at a time when the precise definition of the Communist position is particularly important, as important as the ideological and organizational unity of the party, representing the only guarantor of perestroika under the conditions of political pluralism and the emerging multi-party system. The leaders and theorists of an independent communist party will have to try to understand this. This would be a good time to remind you of what V.I. Lenin said about the policy of schism and liquidation. "Some individuals, particularly those who have failed in their bids for leadership, might

persist in their errors for a long time, but the working masses will come together easily and quickly, when the time is right, and they will unite all genuine Communists in a single party capable of establishing the Soviet order" (V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], 5th ed, vol 41, p 94).

Struggle is struggle. As a political organization, the Communist Party cannot stay out of the struggle for influence and power. We must wage this struggle along with all forces in favor of the socialist choice and democratic renewal. Besides this, we must put up the necessary resistance when the interests of the laboring public are threatened and when the muddy waters of separatism rise to the surface. Our congress will decide which forces in the Communist Party will prevail: the separatist forces feeding off perestroika, or the consolidating forces advocating genuine perestroika in the party. One thing is clear: What our party needs is not schism and separatism or displays of group and national interests, but common interests and the desire for ideological and organizational renewal.

Many of yesterday's speakers already proposed a thorough performance evaluation of the Central Committee and buro. I agree with them. I propose that the discussion of the charter and program continue after our first session of the congress. The program and charter should be published and made available to the public because it still has not been discussed properly in primary party organizations. The final approval of the documents could be undertaken after the 28th CPSU Congress by the same delegates.

I propose the passage of the resolution on the status of the renewed Latvian Communist Party, which was sent to the congress secretariat by the Oktyabrskiy Rayon party organization, and I propose that it serve as our interim directive document until the charter and program have been adopted.

Yu. Ruben, Consultant in the Latvian SSR Gosplan Institute Delta Engineering Center

It is probably time for us to admit that our Communist Party did not look its best in the whirlpool of stormy current events. The reports and the speeches indicate that we are losing authority, we are giving up one position after another, and we cannot complete any of the programs we started.

Many Communists who cannot wait for change any longer are leaving the party or joining others. This must not go any further. If we want to save the party, we must find a way out of this crisis at our congress.

First of all, we must decide whose interests we are defending and how we will do this. In a multi-party system each party has its followers. We are revitalizing the party within the framework of the socialist choice, and the party cannot express the wishes and uphold the interests of those who question this choice.

I also want to say that the time has come to put an end to the political bigamy of the Communists who belong to two or three parties.

The party's goals must be clear and understandable, but the main thing is that they must be attainable and realistic. Our party's authority will depend largely on what we offer the people, on our interpretation of current problems, on our plans for solving them, and on our plans for leading the society to prosperity.

We say that this is the party of the socialist choice. It is important to realize that socialism does not mean that everything is the exact opposite of capitalism. Arguments about capitalism and socialism might be pointless today. Today it is more important to solve actual problems and to take steps, real steps, toward a better life, toward happiness and justice. This definition of our goals might seem too prosaic to the theorist, but this is just a matter of common sense.

What kind of organization will our party have to be in order to attain these goals? We have to consider at least two new conditions.

The party will have to work as an opposition force, and it has no experience in this. It has no experienced personnel or trained politicians. We must not ignore the facts. Distinct lines of demarcation are becoming evident in our party. The line dividing Communists does not run along some kind of theoretical or organizational controversies which might eventually be resolved. The lines of demarcation run along basic and fundamental issues. I personally cannot imagine how the two points of view can be reconciled: the development of the state as part of the USSR or outside the union, and the autonomous development of the party in connection with the CPSU or in isolation from it. A split will naturally weaken our party, and quite dramatically. Even today, although we are members of the same party, we are acting in different ways. This is apparent even here, at this congress. The restructuring of this kind of party will be difficult.

The party will not benefit from the proposed transformation into a parliamentary party either. The welfare of society ultimately will be decided not in parliament, but in plants, factories, and agricultural enterprises. For this reason, the party cannot sever ties with them. At a time as crucial as this, this would be tantamount to the death of the party. These actions will disarm the party and the working class and will leave this class without a leader.

All of this is certainly easier to say than to do. For example, I personally still cannot imagine what life will be like in a multi-party system. In my mind, I can understand that just as the competition between the goods of different manufacturers is the engine propelling the economy, competition for power is the motor of political advancement and development and a guarantee against stagnation. In any case, however, two—or, God forbid, three—communist parties would be, as they say, "a bit too much."

We cannot perform our functions today and fight for the vanguard role in the society without an international, democratic, and disciplined party, common ideological views, and concerted action. This must be an alliance of Communists sharing the same views. Furthermore, what makes the party strong is not its independence, but its ability to exercise political influence in the society. Of course, strong ties with the CPSU will be necessary in this area.

What kind of methods should the party employ in its work in order to attain its goals? The main thing is that we must refrain from making meaningless proclamations. The party must stop the flood of criticism and direct it into constructive channels. The methods can vary, but they must be based on common sense.

As we know, democracy presupposes a struggle of ideas and, consequently, of parties as well. We have seen this struggle, however, and we know what it represents. In short, the party Central Committee and its bureau surrendered to the People's Front without putting up any resistance. Today the People's Front is daily and hourly burning all of its bridges behind it after coining the slogan "Now or never!" This refers to secession from the USSR.

What kind of alternative to the People's Front can we offer today? First of all, we can offer the ethnic policy of the Latvian Communist Party, the cornerstone of which is the belief that the Latvian nationality is entitled to self-determination. For the Latvians and Livonians, Latvia is the only place in the world where they can exist as nationalities and where their language and culture can develop. We have no news media of our own to tell the entire population of the republic about this. We cannot stop the flood of slander and mud-slinging at the USSR and CPSU. For this reason, we cannot put up any real opposition.

Incidentally, what is the meaning of this paradox? People everywhere are saying that the party is bad, but the same people are saying that the leaders of the party and its secretaries are all good.

If no one shares the news media with us, we will have to establish our own media, no matter how complex and difficult a task this might be. This should be the primary concern of the new members of the party Central Committee. Without this, it will be absolutely impossible to continue our work. Furthermore, I must say that we have spent enough time tolerating the situation in which the party constantly has to defend itself and justify its existence. After all, we are capable of answering the critics with logical rebuttals—not simply rebuttals, but logical ones—especially the critics who are far from blameless themselves in the political and moral sense. The people who are substituting pluralism of action for the pluralism of opinions, with this action aimed at splitting and discrediting the party instead of renewing it, must be firmly rebuffed.

What do people need today? They need civic peace and national accord.

Today the whole population, and especially the Russian-speaking population, is growing increasingly alarmed about its future. There are constantly slanderous and insulting attacks on the army and on labor and war veterans. Each person you meet today has some kind of problems, which are literally growing in a vacuum. In our republic, with its unstable and tense atmosphere, continued confrontation cannot lead to anything positive. I would like to address all of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies on behalf of the congress: They must give some serious thought, weighing all of the options, to the decisions they plan to make. They must not make any premature or rash political decisions.

I want to say something about our documents. The activity of the party in a multi-party system, the struggle for broad segments of the population, and the concern about the growth of the party dictate the need to make the charter not only politically precise and logical, but, I would suggest, appealing as well. Does the present draft charter meet these requirements? Not completely. I do not remember where I read this, but our platform was written with both hands—the left and the right. Everyone wants compromise, but it is only beneficial in the choice of tactics, and it is harmful in the choice of strategy.

If we approve these documents, after the congress the people in the primary party organizations will ask us what we were doing at the congress. Any document we approve must meet the following requirement: It must stimulate increased activity by party members. Otherwise, it will not reach the heart or conscience. Besides this, it must arouse the uncommitted.

I want to say something about our party leadership. For a variety of subjective and objective reasons, a good performance evaluation of the present Central Committee and its bureau is unlikely. They did not solve many problems and they did not lay the groundwork for the new membership of the Central Committee, although many lovely speeches were made.

Any party, just as any system, must be managed not by a impervious hand, but by a hand acting in accordance with current social realities. This hand, regrettably, did not make its appearance. As a sailor might say, when a ship is at anchor it does not matter who stands at the helm. We are very much like this ship now, but it is time to move! And we must decide who should be at the helm.

In conclusion, I want to say that the main thing today is to avoid stupid mistakes, to always use common sense as a guide, and to not come up with a multitude of new theories and platforms, because we must remember that theory rarely coincides with practice, especially in matters pertaining to the lives of people. We must surmount

our main flaw—inactivity. Some of our personnel, especially administrators, get up in the morning and wonder whether they should go to work or do something constructive instead....

The party must train itself to fight in a multi-party system and in an atmosphere of hostility. We will fight! Do we have to lose all the time? We have experience. We have strength. We have fine minds, and we are no stupider than other parties. There will be victories!

K. Podnieks, Latvian University Laboratory Director

I want to discuss three fundamental matters on which there is disagreement in our party, and until we have reached some kind of decision on them, we will not be able to unite or separate. Everything I am going to say agrees with the views of the Democratic Platform of the CPSU and the views of the advocates of an independent Latvian Communist Party. The first matter concerns the attitudes toward the idea of reinstating Latvia as an independent state. In my opinion, the process which is leading to withdrawal from the USSR, at least in six republics, is already impossible to stop. It is impossible to call this process the result of separatist or extremist intrigues. It is too late for anyone to try this. For this reason, it would be wise to reconcile ourselves to this process, because our attempts to resist it would make this already complex process even more painful.

What is going on? The only real way the party can continue influencing events is to become actively involved in the process—in other words, it should join other forces in advocating the restoration of Latvia's independence as a state. This is the only way we can hope to prevent all of the negative developments the people are dreading today. Besides this, active involvement along with the people in the process of the restoration of independence and in the process of building a new Latvia is the most reliable way of winning security for ourselves and our children.

The second matter pertains to the attitudes toward the idea of the communist future and the idea of restoring private ownership. I do not support the compromise on this matter in the drafts published by commissions of the Central Committee. The private ownership mentioned in these drafts is confined to peasant ownership of the land, and all that they say about communism is that it cannot be expected in the near future. They do not say what the communist future will be. They do not say exactly what we should be doing today for the sake of this distant future. It seems to me that a serious political party cannot simply ignore this fundamental matter in its documents.

Private ownership has been the main generator of human progress for more than 200 years and it will continue to be this for a long time, because all of the attempts to build an economy based solely on public ownership have been utter failures.

What should we be doing today? Should we continue conducting experiments with our own people in an attempt to purge socialism of its deformities and breathe new life into it? I think we no longer have the moral right to continue these experiments. How much longer will all of the nationalities in our country be the poorest in the world? This is why we must reconcile ourselves to the prospect of the restoration of private ownership. This is certain to take place in Latvia and in the Soviet Union. It might happen directly or through joint-stock companies, but it is inevitable, and our attempts to resist it could make this process more painful too. Once again, the most reliable way of retaining our influence is to become involved in the process in a positive capacity.

We must make the categorical admission that the communist future does not offer any useful guidelines for our party's policy, and we must support the restoration of private ownership in the Soviet Union. This is the only way we can influence the process and fight for the same things as the parties of the laboring public throughout the world—for social guarantees. In my opinion, the principle of social guarantees is the best thing—and it is also the only good thing—the communist and socialist movement has added to human history.

Finally, the last matter concerns the attitudes toward the formation of primary party organizations in line with the production principle. Why do we need this? Why should all of the party members who work at a single enterprise have to belong to the same primary party organization, with their superiors and their subordinates, and with people they simply cannot bear to spend time with anywhere else. Why is this necessary? This means that the party makes a pretense of participating in the management of the enterprise and imagines that if it can win a majority in administrative bodies, it will be able to make decisions on technological processes in the plant. Why is this necessary? Why can we not allow party members to form primary organizations on the basis of voluntary agreements, as they do in normal democratic parties?

The supporters of the Democratic Platform of the CPSU regard this principle—the production principle of the formation of primary organizations—as the second premise of the vanguard-party theory. The first premise is democratic centralism. If the Latvian Communist Party is already in the opposition in a multi-party system, how can it pretend to be the vanguard party today and act on this basis? In the present situation, our party will have to become a normal parliamentary party, and we must not wait until our production cells are prohibited by law. I propose a vote on all three of the matters I discussed. These are matters of fundamental importance. [passage omitted]

A. Brils, Latvian CP Central Committee Secretary

I would dare to say that the main shortage our society and each inhabitant of our republic is suffering from today is the shortage of stability and security. The society and each of its members are living in a state of constant

stress. There are long lines, shortages, and constant political battles in which only the names of organizations and individuals change. There are around 30 sociopolitical organizations and parties in the republic, and each has its own program, its own demands, and its own ambitions. We can certainly criticize the Central Committee, its bureau, and its secretaries for their failure to act, but there is no question that the Latvian Communist Party is a stabilizing factor in republic life.

Yesterday, and especially today, the delegates made various suggestions regarding the future of our republic party organization. I will give you my opinion, based on my own convictions and on what I already said at the meeting with the Politburo members and secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee. I spoke frankly: "Respected Mikhail Sergeyevich, when we were drawing up the documents for the congress, the charter and program, we proceeded from the belief that we must establish an autonomous—I repeat, autonomous—Latvian Communist Party. Until we do this, the only real organization we will have is the CPSU. This autonomous sociopolitical organization, with its own program and charter, will make its own decisions on all personnel, organizational, and financial matters."

Comrade Gorbachev replied that this is envisaged in the draft charter in the section stating that communist parties can be autonomous and that the relationship with union republic communist parties will be an equal partnership. I will tell you what the document says. To attain the goals of perestroika, the party will take part in planning the strategy and tactics of the CPSU through its representatives in elected bodies. The charter says that first secretaries will be presidium members, and so forth. There is no mention of any subordinate relationship here.

As for the second question, the main one concerning the state structure, we hope to achieve the complete freedom of the individual, political and economic, and guarantee him the quality of life he deserves with the aid of democratic and humane socialism. The means of attaining this goal is the creation of a sovereign rule-of-law state and civic society in Latvia. In other words, this statement does not contradict the present Constitution of the USSR and corresponds to the political declarations approved by our republic Supreme Soviet. We drafted all of these documents with a view to these main principles of the future development of the state structure and the autonomy of the Latvian Communist Party.

Other Politburo members had no objections to these basic principles. As the meetings of the Editing Commission yesterday and today and the speeches of delegates demonstrated, these documents might need some additional editing. It is true that we cannot approve the final drafts of the charter and program at this congress, but the rough drafts will serve as a good basis for the activities of party organizations. After they have been discussed in the primary party organizations, we will have to return

to them and approve the final drafts. The principles are consistent with the present status of the party, with a view to the political analysis of the situation in the society and in social life in the republic in general, and, forgive my audacity, but this is how we see future developments in the republic's political, public, and governmental affairs. For this reason, honored delegates, I ask you to rally round the drafts of the documents proposed by the Latvian CP Central Committee plenum. It seems to me that other platforms will create an impasse.

[13 Apr 90, pp 2-3]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

F. Diminsh, Chairman of Ezertsyems Kolkhoz in Rihzskiy Rayon

Honored Congress Delegates!

Having to speak right after Comrade Pugo could certainly put me at a disadvantage, but I would like to express my opinions. While we are condemning Comrades Vagris, Kezbers, and Oherins and our Central Committee as a whole and giving them so much intelligent advice, while we are accusing these comrades of weakening the party's role in the society, let each of us answer a single question: What did I do personally, as a party member, to enhance the party's prestige and strengthen the Latvian economy? After I heard all of your speeches, I had one question. After all, it seems as though we are all appealing for consolidation, but the Law on the State Language—Latvian—has been passed in Latvia, and I wish you could tell me, respected congress delegates, why you, or at least those of you who spoke in Russian, could not address us in Latvian? This might seem trivial, but it would nevertheless point the way to consolidation. We would respect each other.

Now let us try to answer another question, and once again I could also accuse someone of weakening the party's authority: What did our Communist Party give the people? Do you think the people forgot the slogan "Our generation will live in communism"? They were taught to live by this slogan, and what did it give them? Empty stores, a huge foreign debt, inflation, and a crisis permeating the entire Communist Party. We Communists must be fully aware of this and make many changes. I feel that we Communists must change ourselves first and then make radical changes in our attitude toward what has happened in the republic. We must be honest with ourselves and others. After all, history is struggle, and history must be accurate.

I deeply regret the failure of most of the Russian-speaking congress delegates to realize this. Apparently, most of the people who came here from other republics do not realize how painful our people's life is either. My respected Communist colleagues, we, and I am including myself, owe a debt to the people because we did not solve one of their main problems. We dressed and fed our people just as they deserved. The peasant gene pool was

destroyed in Latvia under the supervision of the party. What kind of tribulations did we peasants not suffer? The corn campaign, the liquidation of separate farmsteads and subsidiary plots, the creation of unjustifiably large collective farms, and so forth. All of this took place under the supervision of the party, but we all believed that it was necessary. Now we can see that we simply moved from one gutter to another.

Prospects in rural areas are extremely bleak, especially in animal husbandry, for the young people who want to work and know how to work. Most of our young people do not even know what they want. My Communist Comrades, we must take the blame for this. After all, it was because of us that the young people lost the ideal of struggle. It seems to me that this is one of our most flagrant errors.

Comrade Congress Delegates, I would like to tell you briefly about the state of affairs in agriculture. We know that the economy lies at the basis of everything and that a sovereign state cannot exist without a strong economy. In reference to agriculture, I must tell you that we peasants will soon have to make an effort, under the supervision of our beloved Communist Party and government, to reduce the volume of agricultural production and our sales to the state. Today's price policy is slowly but surely pushing us into bankruptcy. Last year alone, our production efforts in animal husbandry caused our agricultural firm to suffer a loss of 700,000 rubles. Why? Did we do our work badly?

No, the rising cost of production in the last 3 years has been the result of the rising prices of equipment, mineral fertilizers, mixed feeds, and everything else. The only exception was the sale price of our products. There is a solution. One of the options the Council of Ministers is considering would raise the retail prices of meat and dairy products to cover their actual cost. In other words, a kilogram of meat would cost around 8 rubles, cheese would cost 10 rubles, and so forth. The inhabitants of Latvia would receive payments to compensate for the higher prices. They would not lose money. Guests and tourists would be welcome. Of course, everything would cost more. Comrade Cepanis would not have to wonder how to keep people from taking too much out of the republic. Let them take all they want, as long as they pay for it.

The main thing is that the peasant must produce more. As long as Comrade Pugo, the representative from Moscow, is present here today, I would like him to ask the government to finally begin restoring some order in the country. What kind of economically autonomous republic can we have when other people make our decisions for us? When we make alterations, I think we should measure everything seven times before we cut. Our farm has sent around 700,000 rubles to Moscow since February. As far as I know, other enterprises and farms are doing the same thing. We cannot live in a state of economic well-being. Is this a case of deliberate economic blackmail or just a common occurrence? You

see, you cannot even pay your own people's salaries without help from Moscow. I think something should be done immediately to restore order.

As far as the peasant movement is concerned, I personally sympathize with the movement and I believe that the land should be given to those who love it and know how to cultivate it. I think we are going to the opposite extreme here.

As for credit, it must not be extended indiscriminately—like the credit extended to peasants from sovkhozes and kolkhozes. The credit was not used where it was needed.

Economically strong and good farms which are operating successfully and know how to use the land wisely should not be divided and liquidated.

I think this movement is essentially justified and that it will produce results in 3 or 4 years. The main result, after we raise a new generation of peasants, is that children will not loaf around and get into trouble. Each will work on his own farmstead. In this way, we will produce a generation of conscientious peasants.

As for forms of ownership, I think that the Comrade Prokofjevs who spoke here has no reason to worry about the restoration of capitalism. If I am not mistaken, Lenin said that the order with superior economic strength would prevail. I think that land will become private property again. And Riga could offset the private property accounts with payments for public utilities and municipal services.

In reference to the congress and the plurality of opinions expressed here, I must say it is regrettable that some congress delegates still do not realize that the times have changed and that the Communist Party has neither the moral nor the legal right to portray itself as the ruling party in Latvia and dictate its own terms, deciding whether or not the Supreme Soviet Presidium should have a party organization and whether or not judges should belong to the party. I think there can and will be institutions of this kind wherever conscience is the highest law and the main party. Most of the history of the Communist Party consists of struggle, and I think we should continue the struggle and not be frightened by our current losses. We must come up with the kind of program of action that will appeal to the people. If the people accept our program as their own, we will win, and we will play a leading role again.

People in our agricultural firm were surveyed to see what they thought the Communist Party should do. Of the 120 Communists, 119 were in favor of an independent communist party and the remaining Communist had no comment. At the Rizhskiy Rayon party conference, most of the rayon Communists were in favor of an independent communist party in a sovereign Latvian republic, maintaining a treaty relationship with the USSR. These are the facts, and we must accept them, whether we like them or not.

As for ethnic conflicts, I have to say that we who work in rural areas have no disagreements based on ethnic considerations, and as far as I know, this is also true of workers, because our interaction is based on labor. Ethnic disputes are ignited artificially, and this is done by conservatives, by members of the Russian-speaking population, and certainly not by the workers or by top and middle management, who all have something to lose. After all, it is time to start learning the language, it is too late to keep using the privileges of newcomers, and so forth. It is a pity, however, that this movement is actually directed by Interfront.

I would like to tell you how I feel about the closure of the RIGAS BALSS newspaper offices.

Respected delegates from the Riga city party committee, do you really think that Riga belongs only to you and that only you can run everything in Riga? Riga is, after all, the capital of Latvia. I have just as much right to it as you. We also have as much right to RIGAS BALSS as the members of the Latvian Communist Party. Your behavior embarrasses me. Which newspaper will be next—LATVIJAS YAUNATNE? Or will it be a television program? The press should be free to express the full range of opinions in the republic.

It is difficult to say whether the congress has chosen the consolidation option, because some Russian-speaking delegates have made verbal appeals for consolidation but actually want everything to stay the same. This was made particularly clear in the statement by Comrade Prokofjevs: Each of us Russian-speaking delegates is a very good, decent, and competent person. We could reach agreements with you, but we never manage to find a common language when we get together.

I think the congress will have to state its opinion of the events in Latvia. Could the Latvian Communist Party support the arm-twisting tactics the USSR is using against the people of Lithuania? I think the Lithuanians can cope with their own problems and make their own decisions. Outside intervention is unnecessary. Each of the three Baltic republics will travel its own road to independence. The Lithuanian and Estonian communist parties have already chosen theirs. We also have to make a choice.

V. Varnas, First Secretary of Balvskiy Raykom of Latvian Communist Party

I will try to take up as little of your time as possible. In answer to the previous question, I want to say that I do not belong to the People's Front or Interfront, nor do I belong to the Russian part of the population or the Latvian part of the population.

I was also a member of the Central Committee for around a year. This is why today's discussion applies to me as well. I want to say right away that my work as a member of the Latvian CP Central Committee did not give me much satisfaction. Why not? My colleagues will remember how we would meet regularly in the beginning

to investigate many problems, make many decisions, and sponsor them at plenums, but I must say with regret that almost no one cared about carrying out these decisions.

This is why I support the proposals made here yesterday and today with regard to the unsatisfactory evaluation of the past performance of the Central Committee and its bureau.

I also want to say something about the Central Committee staff. In the present situation, this staff has been virtually paralyzed for a long time. If the staff is doing anything at all, it is mainly working for its own benefit. Although I must tell you that the party raykom staffs are also working for their own benefit in many cases and have gone far afield of the functions they performed earlier.

On the one hand, this was a result of the Central Committee leadership's lack of clear views on many fundamental issues. On the other, it was a result of the Damoclean Sword of staff cuts that hung over the head of each member of the Central Committee staff for a year or more. No one knew whom the cuts would affect or when the cuts would be made, but people have no incentive to do their work in this kind of atmosphere.

It is true that some staff members are unsinkable. Things were good for them in Brezhnev's time, they were good in Chernenko's time, and they have not been bad in Gorbachev's time. These people, however, are few in number.

Today I want to say that one of the main spheres of party activity is ideology. We probably have more problems in this area than anywhere else, but we secretaries of the rayon party committees know almost nothing about what the Ideological Department of the Latvian CP Central Committee has been doing for the last year or year and a half, or perhaps even the last two years.

I do not want to get stuck in the well-worn rut of endless criticism, but I do want to give you an example: There is an institution which was highly respected at one time—the University of Marxism-Leninism. We send our representatives there in the hope that they will learn something and come back to us as political warriors. They come back with quite reputable degrees, but there is something paradoxical about this. The comrades who teach the theory of Marxism-Leninism at the University of Marxism-Leninism are known to have rejected the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. I feel that the people who teach classes in an academic institution founded as part of the Latvian CP Central Committee and financed with Latvian CP Central Committee money should be people with strong convictions. I think we will not be sending any more people from our rayon party organization to the University of Marxism-Leninism because we do not have much need for this kind of institution. Furthermore, the salaries at the university are quite sizable. People say that party personnel are paid the highest salaries. This is not true. I do not make 10 or 15 rubles an

hour, but they are paid this much for each class or each hour. Maybe it would be better to send this money to the Charitable Fund or the Afghan Relief Fund or use it to help suffering children or the disabled or someone else. We could find other uses for the money. This is why I am criticizing the Ideological Department. I realize I am playing with fire, but I hope my comrades from the Latvian CP Central Committee staff will not be insulted. I think they deserve this criticism.

I also do not know what the other departments of the Latvian CP Central Committee, which are still so many in number, have been doing recently. I think one of the main intra-party concerns of the new Central Committee members should be the definition of the functions, spheres of activity, and forms and methods of work of the Latvian Communist Party and its organizations. Otherwise, the colossal potential accumulated in elected bodies and their staffs will be debased by inaction.

Now I want to say something about the political approach to the ideas set forth in the Central Committee report. In principle, I could have chosen not to speak, but some things bother me.

Some people here suggested that we should sit around at the congress for a while, pass a resolution or make a decision, and then go back home without approving a program or charter. I disagree categorically, and so does our delegation. We feel that we must stay here day and night, and perhaps another day if necessary, and that we cannot leave the congress until we have approved a program and a charter, or the fundamentals of a program and charter at the very least. They must be approved. Why? Because no matter how much we say here, we will still have to go back home sooner or later and tell our own Communists what we were doing here for 2 or 3 days or a whole week. People are waiting to hear.

I personally find the statements in the draft of the commission of the Central Committee acceptable, and I will certainly vote for both drafts. In my opinion, a few proposals should be added. I already submitted these proposals to the Editing Commission. Here is what I think is lacking. In the past our program said that we were building communism, and now we are not saying this, either because the draft documentation is different or because there was not enough material. In a highly diffident manner, we do not say a single word about this. The party, however, is called the Communist Party. Why? Obviously, we have to come up with some sound reason to explain why the party is called a communist party when our final goal does not appear to be communism, when we are pursuing other goals. For this reason, I suggest the addition of a statement to the effect that we still uphold the ideals of the communist movement and the communist development of society and that this is why the name of the party is still the Communist Party.

During the establishment of the rule-of-law state we have been discussing so much, we should underscore the party's relationship to the state in our program and stress

the fact that the Supreme Soviet is higher than the party, that the Constitution is higher than the Charter, and that the opinion of the people is higher than the opinion of the party, on the condition, of course, that it is clarified by a referendum, and then we must stipulate that the degree of party sovereignty must be the same as the degree of state sovereignty. In any case, I would vote against the Communist Party's withdrawal from the Soviet Union, but if the Supreme Soviet in the republic were to make this decision, I feel that the Central Committee would have to be convened the following day or the next day after that, and a congress would have to be held to make a decision on the party.

Today Latvia is part of the Soviet Union. In exactly the same way, the party should have some kind of agreed relationship with other union parties and other union republics.

I also support the suggestion that we draw up proposals for the 28th congress, because if we make the decision to establish a union of communist parties of the union republics instead of the CPSU, no one will pay any attention to us. This decision can only be made by the congress. It is obvious that these proposals should be voiced by our delegation.

The last thing I want to say, Comrades, is about the delegate from Daugavpils who addressed the whole congress and the whole population yesterday to urge us to make use of our last chance for consolidation. I would like to say that I agree with this delegate and with his apprehensions, and I would also like to address all of you: If we cannot achieve consolidation today or tomorrow, we must at least try to avoid a split. After all, we are all fully aware that any division would lead not only and not so much to a split in the party as to the loss of people and of the communist movement itself. [passage omitted]

A. Ivanov, Electrician at Daugavpils Locomotive Repair Plant

When I was preparing my speech for the congress, I gave a great deal of thought to the causes of the present crisis in the Latvian Communist Party. Why are we moving toward a split in the party exactly at the very moment when Communists have a greater need than ever before to unite their efforts in order to surmount the crisis. As a working man, I would like to express my, perhaps controversial opinions. The endorsement of a multi-party system in the country, and first in the Baltic republics, was followed by a struggle between various sociopolitical forces for the authentic right to serve as the leading force in the society. All types of methods have been used in this struggle, including the following: It does not necessarily take strength to defeat a rival. Victory can be secured by making the rival weak. In my opinion, all of those who are consciously or unconsciously supporting the liquidation or independence of the Latvian Communist Party are contributing to a

situation in which we Communists will no longer be able to influence sociopolitical processes and will turn into a weak political force.

I want to say that there cannot be two communist parties in Latvia. Either we do not understand each other, or one of the parties will not be communist. When we gave up the notation in the Constitution, we did not give up our right to fight for the leading role. Is it possible that we Communists do not understand this? I am the secretary of a shop party organization in one of the oldest plants in the republic. One of our members is the first secretary of the party gorkom. Comrades Gorbunovs and Sobolevs from the Central Committee buro were also members of our party organization. Our organization is experiencing the same difficulties as the whole party. Recently we accepted the resignations of six Communists from the party. I do not miss people who became members of our party by accident. I do miss those who were working energetically just recently and who did a great deal for the party organization. Why are Communists severing their ties with the party? One of the main reasons is that some Communists do not believe the present leadership is capable of changing the situation in the republic and the party. Yan Yanovich, why is it that the fulfillment—or, more precisely, the non-fulfillment—of plenum resolutions was never analyzed? Why is it that not one Communist was held personally responsible for this? This is why I propose a political evaluation of the performance of the Central Committee buro members who were to blame for the creation of the critical situation.

Another of the main reasons for the resignations from the party is the powerless status of the average party member. We have never had a chance to influence the decisionmaking process. A decision has been made—discuss it and carry it out! We are just screws in a huge machine. For some reason, however, they forget that the screws, and the machine itself, have a tendency to break. If we want to save the party and turn it into a genuine vanguard, we must make certain that no resolution is passed until the matter has been discussed on the lowest levels, and not just by party members. How could this be done? In our opinion, it could be done by acting on the following suggestion. All of the alternative drafts of all resolutions should be discussed in primary party organizations, and all comments should then be taken into account before the resolutions are passed. Party referendums should be held when necessary. We need to develop a mechanism for genuine participation by each Communist and each primary party organization in the formation of central bodies and we must improve the system of two-way communication between the Communist Party leadership and organizations on the lowest level.

Now I want to address those of you who are thinking of resigning from the party. Anticommunist forces are uniting and growing stronger. What are we waiting for? A civil war? The party must make every effort to stop the crisis and get things back to normal. I think that leaving

the CPSU, in which I have put my faith, is nothing other than betrayal at this time of great difficulty for the party and republic.

We are living in a multi-party system. If the party wants to keep its position as a real political force in the republic, it will need organizational and ideological unity. The absence of this unity led to defeat in the elections to local soviets and the Supreme Soviet in the republic. The party is in a new position—the opposition. The inactivity of the Latvian CP Central Committee and its buro contributed a great deal to the election defeats suffered by Communists. Our opponents, on the other hand, are uniting and are pursuing a single policy. They are efficiently coordinating their actions with a view to the current state of affairs, forming all sorts of inter-republic associations for this purpose. I think the new members of the Central Committee and, above all, the leaders of the republic Communist Party must start working in earnest on the investigation of various ways of strengthening our ideological unity, must arrange for cooperation with Communists supporting the CPSU position in other Baltic republics, and must coordinate the resistance of forces against perestroika.

The party was founded as the party of the working class. Today many people are trying to convince us that the workers are different now and that they have lost their sense of class identity. I deny this categorically. I do not agree that we are a faceless mob who can be bought with money and apartments and that workers are incapable of taking an interest in politics. The events in Vorkuta and in the Kuzbass disprove this. I also do not agree with this because we in Daugavpils held a workers' conference and formed a workers' committee, and almost all of the members won the elections to local soviets. Furthermore, the city soviet now has a commission for workers' affairs. We workers have seen that we can accomplish a great deal, and we cannot agree that television and the newspapers should be at the disposal of anyone but the workers. Everyone makes speeches on our behalf, but have we heard much from the workers and peasants themselves? We have been assured by leaders at every level from rostrums on every level that we are in charge, that we are in control. All decisions, however, are still being made on the highest level. Until the voice of the Communist worker can be heard from the highest rostrums of party forums, until the worker can decide the future of the party and participate in management on an equal basis, his faith in the party will not be restored.

I support the proposal that the congress be held in two stages. The proposal was made on the grounds that the documents submitted to the congress were not discussed in primary organizations, and I have already said that the most important decisions must be reinforced by comments from below.

Our republic television and radio stations and some of our printed publications sometimes resemble seasonal workers. For some reason they take a great interest in the

army in fall and spring. They launch a sweeping campaign against the army. If I had not served in the army myself and if my two sons had not served, I would think that all officers are cruel monsters and that all warrant officers and lower-echelon commanders are idiots. Of course, I must admit that only the smallest flocks have no black sheep. Every social stratum has its black sheep. What are you doing to our youth? Why are you asking our youth to refuse to serve in the army? What do you want them to be—criminals or real men? Why do you see only the bad things about the army and forget that each decent man is a defender of everything in the republic and the union? There is still a need for this defense. If there were no army, there would be no state.

I am asking the congress to pass a resolution on the party's attitude toward the army. I also want to talk about something that disturbs everyone. It is time for all of us, all of the people living in Latvia and all of the unofficial and official organizations to move from confrontation to national accord. This will require a willingness to communicate and to seek solutions to the problems we are facing. I propose the creation of a committee in the republic, made up of representatives of all sociopolitical organizations and movements, and I propose that it be called the Committee for National Accord. It could become the logical extension of the earlier Latvian People's Forum. I have no illusions. I know that the situation cannot change overnight, but all of us must begin by concentrating on what unites us instead of looking for the differences between us. The main thing today is the display of restraint, common sense, and responsibility. Only through concerted effort can we improve the life of the people living in the republic. [passage omitted]

S. Dimans, Docent at Latvian University

Respected Congress Delegates!

I will be talking about economic issues. Someone once said that politics takes a rest when the economy works. We are now witnessing the direct opposite. Politics has had to work hard because the economy is making no headway at all. When emotions die down, the party offering the public an acceptable economic program will be the winner. Things seem much simpler to the new political forces, including the advocates of independence in our Communist Party. In line with their theories, all economic problems will be solved sooner or later by the restoration of independence and private property. This would be nice, but you can only start something from scratch once. The 50 years of cohabitation in the USSR were neither an illusion nor a hallucination. A distinctive type of economic structure came into being. Independence and private ownership are no more than a prayer to which the heart is receptive but the mind is not. There is no question that the people want independence. Fifty years ago this wish would have had strength and impact. Today, wanting independence is not the same as being able to have it, especially since no one has the slightest idea of what we will do the day after we withdraw from

the USSR—after a real withdrawal, not the surrogate of independence Lithuania acquired.

Yesterday someone said that the people are moving toward independence and that we must move with them. Did you know that the people are being led? And irresponsibly, because no one knows the right road. I could understand if the People's Front were the only guide. It has not made its full quota of mistakes yet. It still has a right to make mistakes. We Communists, however, already led the people down a distant road, to the place where the sun comes up, and escorted them into a blind alley. The latest irresponsible behavior on the part of the Communists who support independence only arouses my anger. For example, I was angry when I heard someone say yesterday that after the restoration of independence, we should strive to maintain all of our existing economic ties with the East. This is very suspicious. Independence is still only an idea, but economic ties are already being broken as easily as if they were the flimsiest of threads. We should remember that the union is not a market; the union is a distributor.

This matter can be examined from another vantage point. Let us assume that normal state market relations have been established with the East—we sell and we buy. Up to 60 percent of the Latvian national product, however, makes its way across the border. Under these conditions, Mr Cēpanis would not be able to trade with Comrade Ryzhkov. Trade would be conducted by the producers themselves. In other words, a unionwide market would be in operation. This unified market would require unified economic jurisdiction. In other words, it would require a nationwide political structure. This would be the federation—not a renewed federation, but the normal type of federation Europe has chosen as the best type of political structure for the period of political integration.

I want to say a few words about the program. Its main flaw is the absence of any clear position on the issue of property. The program cannot be approved in this form. People have been talking about the plurality of forms of ownership, but no one can say what this means. Furthermore, all of the basic economic principles are not even principles, but are essentially incantations, or passwords to indicate which side the speaker is on. Let us take, for example, something quite simple—the question of private ownership. I am wholeheartedly in favor of private ownership because there is a structure in which it is the most effective form of ownership, but the talk about the predominance of private property is simply reckless. We immediately wonder where we will get this private owner? Will we order him from abroad or will we give the cooperatives a chance to save up their initial capital in our ragged market? You know, I could also suggest that we give property back to its former owners to compensate them for the losses caused by expropriation in the past, but then someone might ask how we will be compensated for the expropriation of our intellectual property. I was paid a salary of 120 rubles for around 10 years.

Besides this, I think there are still no grounds for all of the talk about private property, because we still do not know anything about property rights. The case of RIGAS BALSS is a good example. I am looking at it just from this one vantage point. If we make any mistakes today, no Western capitalist will ever invest a single dollar here, because we are not respecting the property rights of the party in this case. I have even considered the following possibility. The People's Front and the Communist Party could sign an agreement on the sale of the name RIGAS BALSS, only the name, to the People's Front for a million dollars. I am certain that Western businessmen would be standing in line to invest their money here the very next day.

I have another question about the ownership of union enterprises. As far as I know, our Council of Ministers intends to turn all of this into republic property. On the surface, this does not sound that bad, and maybe this is what should be done, but I also have strong doubts about our Council of Ministers' ability to manage this property. If we look at the experience of Lithuania, we can see that the enterprises of union jurisdiction are operating with the highest efficiency now, because they have been granted most-favored-nation status. Local industry, meanwhile, is facing some extremely serious problems, and the main problems still lie ahead. All of this indicates that we have a real need for an extremely serious, economically sound program which would correspond to the efforts to establish a union market. It is here that we will find a place for ourselves. This program could become an effective basis for the Communist Party's work on the ideological front.

I just want to say literally a couple of words about the state of affairs in the party. I do not know why we do not like to call a spade a spade. If we take a look at the suggestions the independents have made, if we take a look at who they are, we will see that they represent only the People's Front. We have been discussing extremely simple things here. All of these attempts to split the party have been undertaken as a political method of paving the way for independence. In this connection, I feel we must do two things. First, we must find some way of confining the competition to competition between platforms. This would be the best option. If this should be impossible—and, judging by the ultimatum that was issued yesterday, it is probably impossible—someone will have to leave. I see no other option.

I have something to say about the performance evaluation of our Central Committee bureau. You know, when I work with students I sometimes refuse to give them even a "D," because even a "D" has to be earned. No grade can be given here in principle.

A. Alekseyev, Chairman of Presidium of Republic Council of Latvian SSR International Labor Front

I represent the sociopolitical organization our first secretary said he could not understand, although it is supported, by his own admission, by around 60,000

Communists. This organization has been on the same ticket as the Latvian Communist Party in all elections. We are the organization, Comrade Vagris, which helped you, among others, win the election for USSR people's deputy and which you thanked the day after the election, although it is true that you expressed your regret that we supported you too openly.

Our organization can either support or not support candidates, but it cannot do both on the sly. We support the idea of a federated structure for our state, the creation of a strong economy capable of securing an adequate standard of living for its citizens, and the construction of a rule-of-law state. We are in favor of equal rights for all inhabitants of Latvia, which naturally excludes the possibility of privileges for one group of citizens and discrimination against another. Citizens cannot be more citizen or less citizen than others. We think it is absurd that some citizens should take an oath of loyalty to other citizens just because they are of different nationalities. We feel that all of the people who work for the good of the republic and create its material wealth are equally entitled to this wealth, and not as a form of charity, but in accordance with the laws of a civilized society.

The language question is an exceptionally vital issue in our republic. We share the population's concern about this matter. We are doubly concerned about the failure of our government, despite the law passed by the Supreme Soviet, to lift a single finger to teach the population the Latvian language. I think that the demand that the state language be mastered through self-instruction is utopian and provocative. It could lead to more heated disagreements. The administration's attitude toward the decisions of our highest government body has led to a situation in which it would be valid to say that the schedule for putting the Law on the State Language in force has already been disrupted. I wonder who will be blamed for this.

Political events in the republic are moving in the direction of a multi-party system, but the Latvian Communist Party has already been supplanted by the People's Front and its fellow-travelers. People conducting this policy have already taken seats in the republic administration, in the Central Committee of our party, and in the Supreme Soviet Presidium. The presence of people with different points of view is quite natural, and there is nothing bad about this. What is bad is that members of our party and the leaders of the republic party organization contributed to the development of this situation and to the loss of our party's authority. Should a member of the bureau of our party's Central Committee become involved in the violation of the Law on the Elections of People's Deputies, as our colleague Gorbunov did in the elections of people's deputies of the USSR when he misrepresented the opinion of the voters and helped 15 leaders of the People's Front win deputy seats? Should Communists Vagris, Gorbunov, and Bresis have headed

the commissions drafting laws and statutes ruled unconstitutional by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and taken an active part in their work?

Furthermore, our colleague Kezbers, the secretary in charge of ideological affairs, fueled inter-ethnic strife with his public statements and handed the news media over to the opponents of the plurality of opinions, and these media are now being used for slander and for the instigation of mass hysteria.

Esteemed Yan Yanovich! This kind of informational terrorism and violations of freedom of speech do not bother you. You are bothered by the fact that the members of the RIGAS BALSS editorial staff who tried to use this paper for the same purposes were rebuked. Incidentally, yesterday you violated the law of democracy when you did not submit my question, my proposal regarding the creation of the commission, for discussion.

The activities of our secretaries and bureau led our party to the verge of collapse. Primary party organizations are passing resolutions to express their mistrust of bureau members. They are refusing to turn over membership dues and are demanding the expulsion of some bureau members from the party. I feel that our main objective is the election of a new, capable party Central Committee and bureau, and that the new membership should not include any of the former Central Committee secretaries who discredited the work of the bureau and the Central Committee with their unprincipled stance.

As for the charter and program which were submitted to us for discussion, I think they can only be approved after the CPSU congress. This is in line with our opinion that the Latvian Communist Party should be a constituent part of the CPSU.

In conclusion, I would like to express my opinion that the Latvian Communist Party is suffering not from a shortage of rights, but from the inability of its leaders to make intelligent decisions and carry them out. They moved up through the ranks during the years of stagnation because they played by the rules of the bureaucratic game, and they are still playing by the same rules. Is the present report not a perfect example of the meaningless and verbose report of that time, when everything was covered but nothing was discussed in specific terms?

We say we need economic autonomy, but economic autonomy also has to be used competently. What do we mean when we say economic autonomy, and how will we use it? Priority was assigned to agriculture in the republic. There was a special priority program, and the rural community was granted a privileged status. What was the result? In the very first year of the expansion of autonomy and rights, the livestock herd was reduced, and this led to a sharp decline in livestock procurements last year. These procurements have already displayed another decline in just the first 2 months of this year. All of the experience in economic operations in our republic indicates that as soon as priority is assigned to a specific

program, the branch begins to deteriorate. No system can survive unless the people are mentally and professionally prepared for it.

[14 Apr 90, p 2]

[Text] G. Matyushonok, Secretary of Yelgava City Committee of Latvian Communist Party

The proposal Comrade Cepanis made yesterday—or, rather, the ultimatum he issued—made us even more certain that the creation of an independent party is just another attempt to find a comfortable niche. The ultimatum specified unacceptable terms for consolidation. Real politicians do not behave in this way. The days of ultimatums and political diktat are over.

Today, as we decide the future of the Latvian Communist Party, we must begin by deciding what we want our republic to be—a socialist sovereign state which is part of the USSR or is not part of the USSR? Most of the delegates and Communists in our city see the Latvian Communist Party as an autonomous organization with ideological ties to the CPSU. They see the republic as an autonomous part of the renewed federation of the USSR.

The Communists of our city are seriously alarmed by the dangerous processes leading to a split in the state and the party. The party still has no mechanism to secure the active participation of each party member in the planning and implementation of party policy. The development of democracy within the party and the elimination of the negative effects of bureaucratic centralism are taking too long.

Today Communists are leveling serious charges against the CPSU Central Committee, the Latvian CP Central Committee, its bureau, and the city party committee for the errors they have already committed during the years of perestroika, for their indecision and inconsistency in the management of perestroika processes, and for their failure to take a firm stand on issues of concern to Communists.

Communists are waiting impatiently for the resolutions of our congress. They expect them to answer all of the questions we could not answer during all of the previous years of perestroika.

After analyzing the published drafts of the policy documents and after hearing the political report, we decided that many of the statements are in line with the spirit of our times. Above all, this applies to the assessment of the political situation in the republic. Many sections of the draft program of the Latvian Communist Party, however, require thorough analysis and even some serious editing. This applies above all to the basic goals and principles of activity. After all, Communists expect the congress to produce an in-depth analysis of the processes occurring within the party and a specific program for its renewal.

This section seems fragmented, however, and does not contain an integral plan for the perestroika of the party. In our opinion, it needs more work. We have submitted our proposals to the Editing Commission.

When we begin the cardinal perestroika of the party, we must know exactly what we want to do, what the renewed party should represent, and what principles will lie at the basis of its actions. Otherwise, we will be doomed to a permanent lag. A fundamental question connected with the perestroika of the party is the question about its place and role in our renewed society, where the Communists of the primary party link should be the main protagonists.

We are disturbed by the absence of a serious approach to ideological education in the draft program of the Latvian Communist Party. The declaration of the plurality of opinions left the society open to all types of influence and leverage. Under these conditions, the party must fight even more persistently for the hearts and minds of people. The relevant question today is this: Who will lead the masses?

These questions will not be answered automatically. Today our society is more likely to be swayed by emotion than by reason. Furthermore, it has become obvious that the Latvian Communist Party does not have an integral ideological platform for the period of perestroika. In this connection, Communists are asking some completely valid questions: Why have the Central Committee and its bureau taken a defensive position instead of expressing definite views of its own in the atmosphere of the plurality of opinions? Why have they not noticed the attempts of our extreme radicals to call the very idea of socialism unrealistic? Why have they not made timely political assessments of the events in the republic? Why are most of the news media controlled by our ideological opponents?

We also have to consider the principles on which the party's future activity will be based. We are certain that the Latvian Communist Party will cease to be a real political force and will turn into an amorphous conglomerate of diverse groups unless we respond to the persistent appeals for the denial of the principle of democratic centralism. Why should we give up the centralized expression of the wishes of party members? The living organism of the party cannot exist without argument and debate.

It is probable that no delegate has any doubt that the principle of democratic centralism needs to be updated and to be restored in a form corresponding to the Leninist interpretation of the term. The plurality of opinions, however, should not be allowed to turn into a plurality of actions. Otherwise, we will be submerged in an intra-party struggle which will be quite far from intra-party democracy. Only this approach can lead to genuine party unity. We hope we will not have any extreme differences of opinion on these matters. The active exchange of opinions and views on this topic is

going on within the party itself. In principle, we feel that there is nothing frightening about this. This is a sign of the heightened political awareness of the masses and heightened political activity of the Communists who do not want to simply carry out the wishes of others.

What does worry us? Above all, the fact that some people are using the plurality of opinions as a pretext to foist the plurality of their far from selfless goals and actions on the party. In the struggle against the distortions of socialism, we allowed the very idea of socialism to be vilified, we portrayed the life of the older generation as an unbroken chain of errors, and we blamed them for all of today's problems. The struggle against the authoritarian system and bureaucratism is being used as a form of struggle for power, a struggle to exclude the party from the political arena and to establish a new government with the same attributes as the authoritarian system but with new, radical-leftist leaders.

We are approaching the point at which the Communist Party could lose its influence in a multi-party system and could even cease to exist as the only consolidating force in our society.

We feel that the draft policy documents submitted for discussion must be revised with a view to the suggestions and comments that have been made.

Persistent attempts have been made recently to convince the inhabitants of the republic that the party structures of soviet, economic, and law-enforcement agencies, organs of state security, the army, and so forth must be dismantled. This has aroused special concern for several reasons.

These are flagrant violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki accords, which stipulate that people are entitled to make their own career choices, regardless of their ideological convictions, religion, nationality, and race. We still have a clear memory of the events in the FRG, when teachers were fired from schools just for being Communists. Even our opponents had to acknowledge the violations of elementary human rights, but the Supreme Soviet of our republic has already approved the insertion of an additional article in the Latvian SSR Law on Shipbuilding in the Latvian SSR to stipulate that the duties of a judge are incompatible with membership in political parties or sociopolitical organizations.

Is this an attempt to implement the slogan calling for "Soviets Without Communists"? In the rule-of-law state we want to build, can a person's rights be restricted because of his philosophical views? The answer is obvious: This kind of "democratic" approach is unacceptable to us.

I would like to end my speech with a few specific proposals.

First, that the Latvian CP Central Committee restore the party press organs of city and rayon party organizations

as quickly as possible and arrange for a series of programs about Latvian Communist Party activity on republic radio and television.

Second, that no more than one-third of the personnel remain on the staffs of the CPSU Central Committee and Latvian CP Central Committee.

E. Pocs, Latvian SSR Minister of Foreign Affairs

This congress is a truly historic event in the life of the Latvian Communist Party. We could say that it will decide the fate of the party. This is why we must search for the best solutions, and not make the choices suggested by transitory considerations and ambitions. A great deal has been said about the proper place for the Latvian Communist Party—with the CPSU or separate from it. But is this the most important issue?

First of all, there is the question of the party's ability to serve socialist ideals and the public interest. If it is not able to do this, nothing can rectify the present situation, whether we continue operating as part of the CPSU or establish our own autonomous party or even several autonomous parties. The attempts to keep the Latvian Communist Party on the CPSU platform are the result of the peculiar composition of the republic population, and not the result of ideological conviction. For this reason, they are largely artificial. Party sovereignty is not a sign of betrayal. Let the party be united by common goals and the common content of work, not by a common organizational framework and structure.

What the Latvian Communist Party is experiencing today—the loss of initiative in the development of social processes, the loss of public respect, the loss of influence among the masses, and finally, the loss of members—are features common to not only the Latvian Communist Party and the CPSU, but also all communist parties in Europe and the world communist movement. I feel that these processes did not begin this year or last year. The first signs were evident back in the 1930's, when the Comintern announced, from the Moscow center headed by Stalin, the formation of a second strong current in the labor movement—the Social Democrats, the working class' worst and most vicious enemies.

The self-curtailment of activity by the Comintern must be dated back to 1943, but the main thing was not the fact that the communist parties of the world no longer had a single coordinating network and center or that they were only able to meet twice for rather unproductive conventions in the postwar years; the main thing was the fact, as we can clearly see today, that the communist parties turned out to be incapable of offering the working public a theory of economic development superior to capitalism. I remember what one American congressman said: I would be willing to accept any socioeconomic system as long as it could give me the same sense of emotional and physical satisfaction I feel in the United States today.

Today I am not advising the restoration of capitalism or the export of socialism, but there is a great deal of truth in the American's words. We have difficulty absorbing the facts we read regularly today, especially in recent articles in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and other central newspapers. We also had difficulty absorbing what the gray-haired veteran from Bauskiy Rayon said yesterday about the incredible crimes that were committed in the Soviet Union at the time of the Stalin cult of personality. Everything that happened in the Soviet Union as a result of party activity in the postwar period was criticized in a report yesterday. For this reason, now when he hear anything about 23 August 1939, we will remember how Moscow made an agreement with Berlin, with the Hitler regime, to return antifascist forces to Germany after they had taken refuge from the Hitler regime in the Soviet Union. There are many such facts. For this reason, after all that has happened and after all that we have experienced, anyone who reads the slogan inscribed above the stage, "The party is the mind, integrity, and conscience of our era," and does not realize how incongruous it is, is either immoral or politically obtuse. At one time this Leninist slogan and these words agreed with the spirit of the times, but not today. Let us finally become realists.

Today we should have the courage to openly announce that the road we were taking ended in a blind alley. We can only sigh with regret and ascertain the cost of the error. Anyone who does not agree with my statement should ask himself why the USSR has not been able to catch up with capitalism in labor productivity and the standard of living in more than 70 years. Maybe someone might say that this slogan was meant to cover a much longer period of history, but there has not been the slightest indication in all these years that we are even approaching our goal. It is more distant than ever before. How can it be that the three main demands of the Bolshevik revolution—Turn over all power to the soviets, all land to the peasants, and all factories to the workers—have still not been satisfied completely even today?

When we analyze these matters, we should try to find out what caused the cracks in the foundation on which the Communist Party was standing. Was the foundation laid properly? Was the wrong material used? What are the deep-seated causes of the present crisis? Only then can we decide which road the Communist Party will take in the future. We must remember that the wise man learns from his own mistakes and from the mistakes of others.

It is odd that in the midst of this crisis, some people in the Latvian Communist Party want to fight for the purity of Marxism instead of cleansing Marxism of obsolete and outdated dogmas. It is no coincidence that we have placed our hope in democratic socialism today. We must admit, however, that this kind of socialism is the goal of the labor parties in the West and elsewhere which are united in the Socialist International. For this reason, we must find a way to work with the social democratic parties in Europe and the rest of the world so that we can become involved in the international cooperation of

states, especially in view of the fact that the Latvian Communist Party was originally founded by social democrats and it is a realistic option. When ideas captivate the masses, they become a physical force. Today we must admit that the Latvian masses have been captivated by the idea of Latvian state independence. This idea is becoming increasingly international. To avoid losing contact with the masses, the Communist Party must accept this slogan and strive to make certain that the restoration of political and economic independence is accomplished as sensibly as possible and in civilized forms. No society will tolerate a weak leader. If there is no party, no efficiently operating party, another party or the front will take its place. No matter how harshly we criticize the leaders of the Latvian Communist Party, we must admit that some of them were farsighted enough to discern the possible patterns of future political and economic processes and made a significant contribution along the road to democracy, national self-determination, and independence.

When I meet foreign guests and delegations in Riga and ask them what they think of the three Baltic republics, they often give me evasive answers couched in the most general phrases. They give me the impression that the Baltic republics are now viewed as a Bermuda Triangle to be approached only with extreme caution or avoided. But after all, the Latvian Communist Party cannot make a detour; it must stay at the very center of the hot spot.

Finally, I want to say that the congress has to find an answer to a question that was asked at the very beginning of our work: Should the organizations of the Communist Party or other party organizations work in state committees and ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? I personally feel they should not. Any of our personnel, however, certainly can belong to any party or any religion. Any functions related to this membership, however, will have to be performed outside the civil service, especially in view of what Ya. Vagris said about the appeals for ideologization in his report. This is more relevant than ever before. We must be able to separate policy from ideology. Professionalism is the priority factor which can lead Latvia out of its difficulties.

J. Urbanovics, First Secretary of Latvian Komsomol Central Committee

It is quite symbolic that I was scheduled to speak last. In view of the fact that I am also a Communist and have belonged to the party since 1985, allow me to express the views of the Latvian Komsomol organization, as I was authorized to do by the last Komsomol Central Committee plenum.

The present situation in our organization is one in which the forces at both ends of the political spectrum have written off the Komsomol forever: We are too "leftist" for some and too "red" for others. Some people have said that the continued existence of our organization cannot be justified and that it should be disbanded. Our

Lithuanian and Estonian neighbors are trying to take the same road or almost the same road.

I think this list of opinions is enough to convince you that the Komsomol and the Communist Party are almost in the same position today. Of course, our relative strength differs, but the repeal of the sixth article of the constitution will soon make this difference minimal, and that is why we can already say that we and the party could use the same methods of emerging from the crisis. The main thing your organization has in common with mine is that it has reached a decisive phase in its continued existence from the standpoint of the level of preparedness, degree of unity, and ability to solve problems.

Taking a variety of opinions and views into consideration in our activity, we are moving gradually toward the attainment of our objectives in the knowledge that unity is the principal and deciding guarantor of stability at a time of sudden political and psychological changes. We are being criticized for our failure to take effective action and to make a difference in the society.

It is true that internal processes in our organization appear to be transpiring quite slowly in comparison with the swift changes of our time, but policy is the art of weighing options, and we must be guided by a recognition of this fact, and this might even be the reason that the Latvian Komsomol, in contrast to the Communist Party, is still united instead of divided. The effectiveness of our actions is a different matter. Today they do not seem effective enough to the public or even to us, because it is impossible to accomplish perestroika and acceleration simultaneously. This would simply derail us.

The crisis in the Komsomol did not come into being today or yesterday. The collapse of this organization was engineered, and quite successfully, by more than a few of the people here today. That is why the main thing we have to do now is to put our affairs in order and stabilize our ranks in line with our actual capabilities and level of popularity. Obviously, it is not very high.

We have to take this into consideration. In contrast to the party in past years, we are more concerned about our internal purification, about our recovery. We are still doing many things no social organization should do: We still put too much emphasis on regimentation. This is why we are not moving ahead.

If this were only a problem of the Latvian Komsomol, we could have blamed the present crisis on many past and present leaders, but the situation is the same in Russia, Kazakhstan, Estonia, and the Ukraine, and therefore we had to dig deeper and realized that an organization which had virtually no identity of its own or public trust for 70 years had no hope of regaining them. Today the members of our organization throughout the republic,

regardless of their profession, nationality, level of education, and other differences, realize that only an autonomous organization can be viable in our present situation.

We will never have 30,000 members again, but this is not even necessary. We are now making a conscious effort to unload all of the dead weight that joined the Komsomol solely because of the common and almost obligatory inclusion of each young person on the conveyor belt running from the "Children of October" to the "Pioneers" and then to the Komsomol. Of course, we are taking the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater, but we feel that it would make much more sense to begin forming the organization virtually from scratch, in line with new principles, than to start applying glue or a new coat of paint to things that can never be repainted or glued back together again. We certainly intend to keep the good features that were characteristic of the Komsomol during the years of stagnation and during other periods, even if our activities will be based on absolutely different principles. The main feature is autonomy. Today no one can be independent, but it is necessary to be autonomous. Within the context of this autonomy, our biggest problem is our relationship to the Communist Party.

Our present strategy was announced at the last Komsomol congress. We have been able to solve our problems without risking the division of our organization. For this reason, it would be inexcusable for us to show preference for either faction in the Communist Party. Each Komsomol member now has the right to join any sociopolitical organization or party, but the Komsomol organization as a whole will remain strictly neutral for the time being.

An impartial observer might feel that a youth organization should not have to solicit the patronage or support of any party. On the contrary, a party which will still exist half a year from now, or a year or even a decade from now, should begin looking today for well-trained and competent people to replenish the party ranks. For our part, the most we can do in a parliamentary system is to urge the administration to finally get to work on the elaboration and consistent implementation of a state policy on youth.

The basic purpose of the proposals, which were approved at our congress and were submitted to the Council of Ministers, regarding state policy on the affairs of youth and of the attached legislative bill was to guarantee that the first steps a young person takes in his career in a society distinguished by socialism and legal protection will not depend on his political affiliations. Mainly, we want the society—or, more precisely, the government—to establish the necessary conditions for the thorough development of the younger generation and the spiritual and physical growth of the young citizen. Policy on youth is regarded as a government matter all over the world, but the Latvian administration, unfortunately, has not been able to take care of this matter. This

is why we feel it is our duty to force the state to sympathize with the problems of youth. The Komsomol has always been assigned this function, but people have demanded, without any justification, that we assume the responsibility for all youth. We cannot cope with these problems all alone. This would be impossible. We need the support of the party, other youth organizations, and the government. We cannot decide which political or social forces in the republic are concerned about youth or judge the degree of their concern until we have restored order in our own ranks and mobilized our own members for action.

The elections held at different levels proved that almost no one gave any thought to our youth. The party actually ran against the Komsomol candidates and won. In this situation, no one has the right to demand our blind obedience and submission, especially in view of the fact that none of the Communist Party leaders or Communist rank and file at the recent Supreme Soviet session had the courage to openly oppose the tendentious resolution on the Komsomol's economic enterprises. We gave up the monopolistic privileges that were forced on us long ago, but if activity in the interest of youth is to be regarded as a privilege, we are clearly in disagreement.

When the people who still want to regard an organization as their ideological heir show no concern whatsoever about the stability and welfare of the organization, we have every right to doubt their loud declarations.

Arnolds Klauzens recently asserted on television that the Komsomol is not doing any work. If he is speaking of work in the form of slogans and mass rallies, he is right, but today we have done much more than our critics to guarantee that at least the young people of Riga, his own city, are not divided along the highly primitive line of nationality.

This is how we finally reached the point at which we could choose our future relationship to the Communist Party. The Komsomol has not been a party reserve and assistant for a long time. Party officials must be given most of the credit for this. The present situation in the republic is one in which any political or sociopolitical force must look for a partner, and not an opponent, to work with in the pursuit of common goals. In this context, we were happy to hear Yan Vagris' comment about the need for conscientious cooperation with youth organizations.

Today the Komsomol is gradually getting rid of the political baggage it collected over the years. This is not a temporary policy. Today we realize the need to concentrate first on promoting the social interests of youth and on becoming strong enough to help and support those who want more out of life than just a comfortable existence.

We might be accused of abandoning politics, but it would be impolitic to attempt to control our policies. Some of the parties whose members are present here today will understand and support our plans. Cooperation will benefit both sides. Today there is no other choice. This is why I want to conclude my speech with the wish that this congress will be able to rise above

personal ambitions and resentments. Although the Communist Party is in the opposition today, a split could do much to destabilize the situation in Latvia.

No one needs compromise for the sake of compromise, but it is in your interest and ours to have a Communist Party representing an undivided political force. No one was ever forced to join the party. For this reason, it seems to us that leaving the party at a time of crisis is not a heroic act, but an act motivated by the same kind of transitory considerations that once motivated many to become members.

We ask you to make a concerted effort to guarantee that the free individual in free Latvia will always feel secure.

Baltic Heads Hold Joint Press Conference

*90UN1956D Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 13 May 90 p 3*

[ETA report by R. Amos: "Press Conference in Toompea"]

[Text] After signing the documents of the meeting, the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the Baltic states met with representatives of the press. For unknown reasons the press conference began two hours later than it was scheduled.

Opening the press conference, A. Ruutel, chairman of the Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet, said, "Our peoples have always extended each other a hand at difficult moments. So it was on the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and so it is today. I have the great pleasure of telling you that today, working the whole day, we have felt a sense of fellowship. This is a feeling which was always characteristic of our mutual relations. Our desire for independence should not insult anyone, and it is not to anyone's detriment. It is just a way of realizing our personal rights."

V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, added that the economic blockade by the central powers has already lasted almost a month. By this action they wish to make the whole population of Lithuania suffer for the documents adopted by the Republic's Supreme Council. V. Landsbergis stressed that he views the blockade as a new form of psychological warfare. Pressure is being put on the inhabitants of Lithuania not only by the Kremlin but by the indifference of the leading states of the world as well. In protest against the sanctions of the central powers one Muscovite has hijacked an airplane, two Lithuanians have burned themselves, and one woman doctor from Moscow has declared a hunger strike. Lithuania's situation becomes increasingly difficult with each day. The Kremlin wishes to provoke more popular agitation by these actions, and in reality it shows what the so-called state of the working people really is.

It was declared at the press conference that all three leaders of the Baltic states are seeking a joint meeting with M. Gorbachev. Only in concrete negotiations can they achieve their goals. V. Landsbergis emphasized that he has been

proposing a dialogue with the Kremlin for two months. V. Havel, president of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, has offered to be a mediator. However the Kremlin has refused him. The same lot has befallen official offers from Iceland, Poland, and France. A personal message to M. Gorbachev from former U.S. President J. Carter was not taken into consideration.

A. Ruutel noted that there are forces in the USSR which blame M. Gorbachev for those changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe. Nor are they pleased with the process occurring in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. They blame the president of the USSR for not crushing Lithuanian independence and for not using force against Latvia and Estonia. "By their nature these are false accusations," said A. Ruutel. "Today's decisions express the deep essence of the processes which are occurring. On their basis Moscow must make a real decision corresponding to the aspirations and ideals of all of the world's civilized countries."

Asked whether he had received a telegram from M. Gorbachev, A. Ruutel answered, "Yes. It contains a request to present proposals on the democratic content of a new Soviet federation. I have also received such proposals and messages previously. Similar telegrams have also been sent to other union republics. I have always said that a renewed federation does not meet the wishes of the Estonian people. It would be more correct to give the Baltic republics full state independence, maintaining at the same time close economic ties with the USSR."

The leaders of the Baltic states refused to comment on the contents of a letter sent to M. Gorbachev and G. Bush, and they also considered it inappropriate to speak about a message from M. Thatcher to M. Gorbachev.

Someone asked why the above-mentioned documents were adopted today in particular. It was explained that there was no preliminary agreement concerning deadlines. The matter was hastened by processes in Lithuania, which have brought Lithuania's relations with the central powers to an impasse. A transitional period has been declared in all three republics. Many laws are no longer valid, and the new ones have not been created. "We cannot adopt them while the legal status of our states is not clear. We have also expressed this thought in letters to M. Gorbachev and G. Bush," answered the press conference's participants.

Moldavian Communist Party Draft Program

90UN1829A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 3 Apr 90 pp 1-2

["Program for Renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party (Platform for the 17th Moldavian CP Congress)"]

[Text] The Moldavian Communist Party is approaching its next regular congress in a complicated sociopolitical situation that was caused by the unresolved problems that had accumulated over the decades as a result of the deformation of socialism—problems in the sphere of the economy, social and interethnic relations, and in spiritual life. The course directed at the democratization of

the party and of society as a whole is proceeding slowly and inconsistently. Obsolete structures and the adherence to management methods based on administrative fiat have been shackling the initiative of the party agencies and organizations and a considerable number of Communists.

The situation in society is aggravated by the difficulties in introducing the radical economic reform, by the worsening of the state of the consumer market, by the threatening ecological situation, and by the distortions in the interethnic relations. In the situation that has been created, one can discern alarming tendencies in the Communist Party, there has been an increase in the number of people leaving the CPSU, a reduction in the number of people admitted into the party, and an intensification of the mood of confusion and alarm concerning the fate of the country and socialism.

The Moldavian Communist Party, while decisively censuring the errors in its previous activities, is presenting a program of renewal and calling upon all Communists and all the residents of the republic to provide active cooperation in implementing that program.

I. Deformations of the Past and Paths for Renewal

In our republic's sociopolitical life, in addition to positive changes, one has also observed the manifestation of negative consequences of the authoritarian-bureaucratic system, that had a detrimental effect on the fates of the Moldavian nation and its political, economic, national, and spiritual growth, and on the authority of the Communist Party itself. The unfounded repressions, hunger, mass deportations of innocent people, violations of people's elementary rights, and persecutions of the best representatives of the national intelligentsia during the Stalin and Brezhnev period perverted the Leninist principles of socialism.

The *diktat* of the central departments and the voluntarism of the republic's party leadership led to major distortions in the economy and the spiritual sphere and in cadre policy, to the intensification of the migrational processes, and to the aggravation of the social and national problems in the republic.

The Moldavian Communist Party rejects the attempt to use the pressure of administrative fiat, decisively censures Stalinism and stagnation, fails to share the simplified view concerning socialist property and commodity-monetary relations, and denies any management forms that lead to the alienation of man from the means and results of production, or to senseless economic activity and the unrestrained exploitation of the environment.

The Moldavian Communist Party strives to restore the complete truth about the history of the Moldavian nation, and to provide a genuinely scientific illumination of all the events in its fates, especially the years 1812, 1918, and 1940. On the path of its renewal, the party speaks out against any attempts to distort history to the benefit of situational interests, to take a nihilistic

attitude toward the culture of the population in this area, its traditions, or the carriers of those traditions, to disregard the spiritual values of the nation that gave its name to the republic, or to cause people to lose their sense of national self-awareness.

The Moldavian Communist Party will construct its political, organizing, and ideological activity on the basis of the creative development of the absolutely fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism in the context of social thought as a whole and the historical experience of the twentieth century. At such time it will not accept a dogmatized ideology that is divorced from real life, various kinds of illusions and schematic ideas in social development, or other antiscientific views or ideas. The Moldavian Communist Party preserves its adherence to socialism and is in favor of the rebirth of the scientific and moral founding principle of the communist idea, and in favor of the creation, in conformity with that idea, of a humanitarian, democratic society.

The Moldavian Communist Party, resting upon the ideological and organizational basis of the CPSU Program and Rules, and having taken the path of radical renewal, considers it to be its duty to state that it reflects to an identical degree the interests of the workers, the peasants, the intelligentsia, and the entire nation. The goals and interests that apply to mankind as a whole are its first-priority goals and interests. The Moldavian Communist Party is in favor of equal rights and opportunities for all political movements within the confines of the Moldavian SSR Constitution. It wins its influence among the masses by the landmarks that it has developed, by its contribution to perestroika, by its ability to use political methods to resolve constructively the problems that are confronting society.

The Moldavian Communist Party strives to guarantee the republic's political, economic, and legal sovereignty within the framework of a renewed federation, and strives to implement the new status and the independent party organization in the republic as part of the CPSU.

The Moldavian Communist Party sees the path toward socialism in its present-day understanding in the continuous process of implementing the ideals of progress and social justice, of forming and educating a harmoniously developed individual, of creating the conditions for his self-expression, and of completely revealing people's spiritual and physical potential.

II. Acting in People's Interests

The Moldavian Communist Party sees the chief meaning of its activity in creating worthy living and working conditions for people on the basis of qualitative reforms in all spheres of the economy, in guaranteeing political freedom, social justice, guaranteed protection, and actual equal rights, irrespective of a person's race, nationality, or religion. The party will actively support a major turning point in the economy in the direction of man's diverse interests and needs, the taking of all steps

to develop education, culture, public health, and the services sphere, and the improvement of the environment.

The Moldavian Communist Party is in favor of:

- the creation of a system of state law for implementing the right to work; the development of a state program to assure full employment of the population and to stop the illegal spheres of activity and the obtaining of nonlabor income;
- satisfying the public's needs for food products, good-quality commodities for which there is a mass consumer demand; the bringing of all types of services closer to the population's place of residence;
- guaranteeing that every family will have separate, well-equipped housing, by means of increasing the volumes of construction of apartments, the efficient use of the housing fund, the expansion of individual construction, the extension of new forms of housing cooperatives, and by building up the capacities of construction organizations and enterprises in the building industry;
- the implementation of the Zdorovye [Health] program; the improvement of the material-technical base of public health; the intensification of its emphasis on prevention, rather than treatment; the creation of an integrated system of high-grade medical assistance; the expansion of the scope of therapeutic work, physical culture, and sports; and the formation of a healthy way of life;
- the improvement of the ecological situation in the republic; the expansion of scientific-research activity in this area; the strict quality control of food products, the water, and the air; the development of joint ecological programs with Ukrainian SSR and Romania for the protection of the water resources of the Dnestr and Prut rivers;
- the restructuring of general, secondary special, and higher education; the reinforcement of the training-materials base; the carrying out of computerization; the development of the national school; the implementation of the guaranteed right to receive instruction in preschool and educational institutions in the Moldavian, Russian, and other national languages; the expansion of the opportunities for obtaining an education in other republics, as well as abroad;
- the intensification of the role played by the social sciences in all processes of the republic's life as an important structural element that unites around itself the entire training of people in the humanities;
- the rebirth of the cultural and spiritual values of the Moldavian nation; a careful attitude toward the heritage of its past, its customs, and its traditions, and toward talent as a national property; the development

of folk handicrafts and applied art; a respectful attitude toward the spiritual world of believers; the reinforcement of the moral underpinnings of society;

- the increase in the role played by the rural intelligentsia; the manifestation of universal concern for creating for that intelligentsia the necessary conditions for its creative labor; the satisfying of its vital social and everyday needs;
- the development and carrying out of a republic program for improving the social and material status of families that are poorly provided for, the elderly, retirees, mothers of large families and single mothers, war and labor veterans, disabled individuals and orphans; and the complete elimination of illegal privileges and benefits;
- the fulfillment of the Semya [Family] program; the improvement of the status of women in society; the creation of opportunities that enable women to achieve the harmonious combination of motherhood and their labor and social activity; the reduction of the use of female labor in night shifts; the acceleration of the implementation of the comprehensive program for motherhood and childhood; and the guaranteeing of the construction of new, modern children's institutions in the republic;
- the carrying out of an effective youth policy; the satisfying of the socioeconomic and spiritual needs of youth; the finding of permanent jobs for youth in production; the improvement of education and the raising of people's level of proficiency; the educating in youth of a spirit of patriotism, love of their Motherland, and readiness to defend the socialist Homeland.

In order to resolve all these problems successfully, the Moldavian Communist Party considers its first-priority task to be the achievement of economic results.

III. For an Effective Economy

The Moldavian Communist Party is in favor of the acceleration of the radical economic reform; the providing of it with the dynamic features that it requires; the formation of a planned-market economy based on the diversity of ownership forms that make it possible to eliminate the *diktat* of the producers, to encourage people's initiative and enterprise, to return to the workers the sense that they are the owners of the economy, and to overcome monopolism, the global centralization of the productive forces, and the disproportions between regions and the center, between the city and the countryside.

The Moldavian Communist Party feels that a dynamic, regulated market is impossible without opening up the wholesale trade in resources and means of production,

without the formation of markets in securities, currencies, scientific research and development, and investments, or without the reform of price determination and the financial and credit system.

The Moldavian Communist Party will strive to achieve:

- the carrying out of a political line aimed at converting the branches of the national economy to principles of cost accountability and self-financing; the elimination of the consequences of the mania for gigantic projects in industry, agriculture, and the social spheres; the intensification of the attention paid to developing and implementing a program of resource conservation and the saving of raw and other materials; and the orienting of the enterprises of union subordinate to the production of consumer goods;
- the development of a policy for developing scientific-technical progress; the assertion of self-government and of the variety of structures and competitiveness among academy, higher-educational, and branch scientific institutions; and the broad development of interrepublic and international scientific-technical ties;
- the deep restructuring of the relations of ownership; the creation of opportunities for the citizens to make a free choice of the forms and methods for applying their capabilities; the development of joint-stock, rental, and contract enterprises; and the completely equal functioning of the state, cooperative, and individual forms of ownership.

In the field of agrarian policy, the Moldavian Communists Party considers its primary task to be the accelerated resolution of the food problem; the satisfying of the public's demand for various food products; the bringing of the level of their per-capita consumption to the efficient norms.

For these purposes the party will strive for the development and implementation of a qualitatively new concept for developing the agroindustrial complex, a concept that takes into complete consideration the natural-economic, ecological, demographic, social, and other peculiarities of the region and its high population density. Forming the basis of that concept is the further intensification of the labor-intensive branches of vegetable and animal husbandry; and a careful attitude toward the land and the water, timber, and other natural resources.

The Communists of Moldavia consider it necessary to intensify the attention paid to improving the industrial-production structure of the agroindustrial complex; to eliminating the disproportions and disbalance; to the further development of the material-technical base of the food industry; and to the creation of a broad network of small preparatory and processing enterprises in the rural localities themselves, thus making it possible to achieve a substantial reduction in the losses of raw materials, to improve the quality, and expand the variety of the food products.

The Moldavian Communist Party will keep under constant scrutiny the questions linked with the assimilation of the new system of economic relations in the rural areas, with the implementation of the laws governing property, land, and rental, with raising the level of economic literacy among the cadres, and with increasing the economic independence and self-interestedness of the labor collectives and all the rural workers in the acceleration of scientific-technical progress and the efficient use of the production potential that has been created in rural areas.

The Moldavian Communist Party supports the completely equal development of various management forms—kolkhozes, sovkhozes, joint enterprises, agrofirms, cooperatives, and peasant farms—and the broad application of cost accountability and of rental and contract relations. It is in favor of developing just prices for agricultural output, improving the system of selling it, and reorienting the various kinds of enterprises toward their own processing of the raw materials.

Something that continues to be an object of special concern for the republic's Communist Party is the guaranteeing of the social protection of the peasantry; the development of the social infrastructure in rural areas; the improvement of the everyday living conditions for rural workers; the observance of the just distribution of budgetary appropriations, food allocations, and material resources between the city and the countryside. For purposes of preventing unemployment and the migration of rural residents, and improving their rate of employment, the Communists and the party committees and organizations consider it necessary to increase the size of the homestead plots; to create a broad network of various trades, shops and branches, and industrial enterprises; and to raise the prestige level of agricultural labor and its role in the life of society.

The Moldavian Communist Party feels that the carrying out of the radical reforms in the economy and in social life is impossible without changing over to republic cost accountability and self-government, which presuppose:

- the extension of the complete authority of the agencies of the state and economic administration of the republic to all the natural resources and to the production potential that has been created on its territory;
- the conversion of Moldavian SSR into a truly sovereign state that carries out mutually advantageous ties with other union republics and foreign states;
- the complete independence of the local agencies of authority in the formation and expenditure of the municipal budgets, in encouraging economic activity, and, on that basis, satisfying the needs of its citizens.

The Moldavian Communist Party is in favor of the economic independence of the republics also in planning; the formation of the budgets; the tax and credit policy; price determination; the use of labor and natural resources; the placement of the productive forces and the

organization of foreign-economic ties on the basis of a renewed Union treaty; and the establishment of direct agreements among republics and enterprises, with a consideration of the national traditions, the demographic situation, and the natural conditions.

IV. For Genuine Democracy and the Self-Governing of the Nation

The Communists of Moldavia are in favor creating a society in which there will be a complete triumph of the freedom that rests upon the humanistic idea of human rights and that rejects any manifestation of anarchy, greed, or wilfulness.

The policy of the Moldavian Communist Party is directed at creating a law-governed sovereign state that guarantees the supremacy of the law, that guarantees to all residents their participation in the management of its affairs and their ability to occupy any positions, irrespective of their social position, sex, nationality, or religious affiliation.

The Moldavian Communist Party supports an electoral system that is based on principles of the universal, equal, direct franchise and that is intended to allow people to fight on equal terms for representation in all agencies of authority.

Taking into consideration the existence of various citizen formations in the republic's sociopolitical life, as well as the possibility that other parties may arise, the Communists are in favor of a dialogue and cooperation with everyone who supports the creation and functioning of a law-governed state. The Moldavian Communist Party is decisively opposed to any forces that preach violence or interethnic enmity or pursue unconstitutional goals.

The Moldavian Communist Party considers it necessary to convert the republic's Supreme Soviet and the local soviets into agencies that truly have complete authority and that express the will of the nation.

Proceeding from the need to divide the functions of power—legislative, executive, and judicial—the Moldavian Communist Party is in favor of the more precise delimitation of the responsibility and competency of the state agencies, and in favor of the more decisive use of the advantages of parliamentarianism in their activities.

The Communist deputies and the workers in the executive agencies will act decisively and responsibly, in order to achieve the republic's stable development, to make the restructuring processes more dynamic, to guarantee the normal and effective functioning of all the state and public structures, and to protect the interests of Moldavian SSR and its representation on the international scene.

The Moldavian Communist Party is in favor of restructuring the state and economic apparatus and of increasing its professionalism, while keeping it at its optimal size. That apparatus must be accessible to

people, must be completely public and devoid of any secrecy in its operation, must correspond to the national makeup of the population, and must be under the supervision of the broad masses. The Moldavian Communist Party is an adherent of the autonomy of the local agencies of authority, and of asserting the genuine sovereignty of the people. An inseparable feature of its policy is the recognition of the sovereign will of the nation as its sole source of power.

The Moldavian Communist Party is in various of taking urgent steps to reinforce legality and law and order; the carrying out of a judicial reform; and the raising of the level of professional training, the prestige, and the self-interestedness of the workers in the law-enforcement agencies and the entire judicial corps.

Taking into consideration the fact that public opinion has a certain view concerning the performance of military service by Moldavian citizens locally, the republic's Communist Party feels that this question must be resolved constitutionally in accordance with a new Union treaty.

The Moldavian Communist Party is in favor of the development and adoption of a new republic Constitution that will reflect the socioeconomic and cultural peculiarities of the Moldavian nation and its traditions, and that will stipulate the expansion of rights and the improvement of the interrelationships between Moldavia and the other states.

V. National Policy

The Moldavian Communist Party proceeds from the assumption that Moldavian SSR must become a sovereign state that was formed with the purpose of implementing the right of the Moldavian nation to self-determination. The party puts at the basis of its national policy the principles enunciated in the CPSU platform entitled "The Party's National Policy Under Present-Day Conditions" and conducts its own practical course, taking into consideration the peculiarities of a republic in which, in addition to the Moldavian nation, the residents include Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauzy, Bulgarians, Jews, and representatives of other nationalities, and the fact that the republic's economic, social, and spiritual development is possible only if there is a common will and mutual respect for the interests and cooperation among all the residents of Moldavia.

The Moldavian Communist Party feels that an important condition for interethnic consent is the recognition by all those living in the republic of the right that the Moldavian nation has for self-determination, for state sovereignty, its territorial indivisibility, national symbols, and the respect for its interests, language, history, and cultural heritage. Communists call upon the Moldavian population to support and create guarantees to citizens of other nationalities who are residing on the territory of Moldavia to develop their own languages, culture, and traditions.

The Moldavian Communist Party will strive for the consistent and prompt implementation of the Moldavian SSR Law on Languages and the State Comprehensive Program for Guaranteeing the Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the Republic, and for the creation of the necessary conditions for developing the culture and language of the Gagauz nationality.

Moldavia's Communists decisively censure any infringements on people's rights on the basis of their nationality, or any manifestation of chauvinism, nationalism, or separatism.

The Moldavian Communist Party is in favor of:

- the enactment of Moldavian SSR laws governing the sovereignty of the republic, citizenship, the legal guarantees of the national minorities, migration, the use of the land, and archival affairs;
- the reinforcement of the trust and mutual understanding among the nations residing in the republic; the profound respect for their national feelings; and the unconditional observance of the rights granted to a citizen of any nationality;
- the guaranteeing of conditions for the complete satisfying of the economic and spiritual needs of all the national groups; their deeper acquaintance with the history of Moldavia and the traditions of the Moldavian nation;
- the organizing among the republics of an intensive cultural exchange with the purpose of satisfying the demands of the Ukrainian, Russian, Bulgarian, Gagauz, Jewish, and other population of Moldavian SSR;
- the development and reinforcement of ties with persons of Moldavian nationality who are residing in other union republics and outside the confines of the USSR;
- the concluding of a new Union treaty of sovereign states with the free choice of federative ties;
- broad cooperation with Romania and other countries in economics, spiritual life, and the propagandizing of national culture and art; and the opening of Romanian and Bulgarian consulates in Kishinev. The Moldavian Communist Party notes that the nations that have lived for centuries on land where they formed on their national territories, within present-day boundaries, two neighboring sovereign states (Romania and Moldavian SSR), and that have a common language, culture, and origin, will construct their interrelationships on the basis of the strictest observance of the Helsinki Accord concerning the stability of the boundaries in Europe.

Only the renewed Moldavian Communist Party can become the condition for the new understanding and carrying out of the radicalization of the economic and

political reforms, the expansion of the limits of democratization and glasnost, and the improvement of the interethnic relations.

VI. For a Renewed and Independent Party

The Moldavian Communist Party bears the responsibility for everything pertaining to the republic's past—both the positive features in carrying out the socialist reforms, and the negative phenomena that were allowed to happen. The party is reviewing the erroneous decisions that were previously made by its leadership, and that resulted in serious deformations and a crisis situation. The tendency toward authoritarian leadership, the monopoly on power, and the lack of principles among the former leaders of the republic deformed the intraparty relations and led to the suppression of live thinking and to the removal of the rank-and-file Communists from the formation and implementation of party policy.

Defining its place in society, the Moldavian Communist Party in the new conditions that have developed is aware that the further slowdown with perestroika—both within the Moldavian Communist Party and within the party as a whole—is fraught with a threat to the entire process of the renewal of society. It can preserve its vanguard positions and successfully carry out what has been planned if it can be qualitatively reborn.

The renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party is possible only if the activities of its primary links are reformed, if they are granted independence in resolving the questions of intraparty life, and if the bureaucratic-fiat and authoritarian work methods are rejected. By freeing itself of functions that are not inherent in it, the republic's Communist Party concentrates its efforts on developing the long-term trends in the development of society, on performing organizing and educational work among the masses, and in mastering political methods of working under conditions of democratization and glasnost.

The republic's Communist Party, true to democratic principles, strives for a vanguard role in society not with the aid of constitutional guarantees, but primarily by work that has real results, by its initiative and creativity. It is in favor of the consolidation of public movements and organizations and it calls for cooperation with all the progressive forces and for the extension of a constructive dialogue with them.

In its activities the republic's Communist Party is guided by the reborn Leninist principle of democratic centralism, with the development of democratic principles and the increasing of the role played by rank-and-file Communists in developing the party's policy and activities.

The political and moral purification will be promoted by the creation of new links in the activity of all its directive agencies—Control and Auditing Commissions.

The renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party is being carried out by means of:

- the affirmation of the pluralism of opinions and forms for the organization of party work; the inclusion of every CPSU member in the implementing of the party policy; the increasing of discipline and responsibility; and the ridding of the party of persons who act counter to its political-ideological or organizational principles;
- the complete democratization of the formation of the directive party agencies on the basis of a direct, secret, alternative election; and the creation of an effective mechanism for recalling the members of all the elected agencies;
- the conducting at all levels of an open cadre policy; the promotion to managerial work of competent persons who enjoy authority and who possess the necessary political and moral qualities;
- a decisive struggle against manifestations of irresponsibility, indifference, or passivity in its ranks; and the releasing of managerial workers who are incapable of doing their jobs or who violate party ethics;
- the delimitation of the functions of the party and state agencies; the showing of concern for its representation in the republic's elected state and economic agencies; and the increasing at such time of the responsibility borne by the Communists for implementing the party policy;
- the formation and improvement of the structure of the party apparatus; the promotion to that work of completely trained, competent people on the basis of recommendations from the primary party organizations; their complete subordination to the elected agencies; and the eradication of formalism and bureaucratism in party life;
- the granting to the primary party organizations of more rights in resolving questions of intraparty life—acceptance into the party, determining the basic trends to be followed in activities with a consideration of the specifics pertaining to the collective and its organizational structure, establishing the periods when meetings are conducted, reviewing personal files, electing delegates to party forums, and the use of part of the membership dues for the collective's own needs.

The republic's Communist Party supports the attempt by the trade unions, as an independent organization, to defend by deed the workers' interests. It decisively rejects the didactic approach in working with youth, relying instead on the ideological unity and cooperative with the Komsomol and other youth organizations.

The Moldavian Communist Party is in favor of improving relations with the party press, radio, and television; the expansion of their independence; and the

increasing of the responsibility borne by workers in the mass media for objectively illuminating the real-life situation.

Under conditions of the renewal of the political system and the transformation of the Soviet federation, the Moldavian Communist Party independently develops and carries out its own program of activity with a consideration of the specific socioeconomic conditions and the demographic and national peculiarities.

The Moldavian Communist Party strives to achieve its goals by means of political work among the masses and through the party committees, primary party organizations, and Communists working in soviet and economic agencies and public organizations.

The Moldavian Communist Party implements its independence through:

- the conducting of the political line in resolving practically all tasks with a consideration of the local conditions that pertain to the most important economic, social, and spiritual problems;
- the resolution of questions of intraparty life: the selection and assignment of cadres and their training and education; recommendations for filling managerial positions; the determination of the structure of party committees and the authorized size of its apparatus, the number of workers, and the size of their salaries; the consideration of other questions of economic-finance activity; the establishment of the share of deductions to be paid to CPSU Central Committee from the incoming party dues and other income;
- the development of independent economic and publishing activity; the use of the material and monetary funds and the buildings of party committees and institutions that are the property exclusively of the Moldavian Communist Party itself;
- the conducting of party discussions and referendums;
- the determination of the trend to be followed in cooperating with public and public-political organizations and movements;
- the carrying out of foreign relations with foreign political parties, movements, and organizations.

The republic's Communist Party determines the series of first-priority tasks at each stage of the restructuring, plans its work, develops its approaches, methods, and means; independently resolves all questions of internal structure and functioning; and makes decisions within the confines of the Moldavian SSR Constitution. It builds its interrelationships with the CPSU in conformity with the party's Rules; and coordinates its actions on the basis of permanent representation in the party's central elected agencies, voluntarily delegating to the center at such time the resolution of a number of problems having partywide importance. The CPSU Central Committee's decisions

that pertain to the Moldavian Communist Party must not contradict the Moldavian SSR Constitution.

[End of draft]

As it approaches the 28th CPSU Congress and the 17th Congress of the republic's party organization, the Moldavian CP Central Committee expresses the hope that the republic's Communists and all its citizens, by their specific suggestions, comments, and additions, will help to refine and enrich this document so that it can subsequently become a real program for renewal and for guaranteeing the progressive development of Moldavian SSR.

Moldavian CP Central Committee

[Editorial note] The persons who worked on the draft of the Program for the Renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party included members of the organizing committee for preparing for the 17th Moldavian CP Congress (their names have been published in the press), as well as a group of scientists from the Institute of Sociopolitical Research, Moldavian CP Central Committee, and other scientific subdivisions in the republic.

Please send any comments and suggestions concerning the draft of the Program for the Renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party to the Organizing Committee at the address: 277033, Kishinev, Ulitsa Lenina, 105.

Ukrainian SSR People's Deputy Runoff Election Results

90UN1712A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
24 Mar 90 pp 2, 3

["List of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies Elected During Runoff Election, as of 18 March 1990"]

[Text] Altunyan, Genrikh Ovanosovich—fitter from the Kinotekhprom Enterprise, not a party member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Kievskiy Election District No 370 in Kharkov Oblast.

Ananyev, Vladimir Ivanovich—deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR State Planning Committee, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Yampol Election District No 354 in Sumy Oblast.

Andriyaka, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich—first secretary of the Irpen Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Irpen Election District No 212 in Kiev Oblast.

Apter, Yakov Mikhaylovich—director of the Kerch Metallurgical Plant imeni Voykov, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kerch. From Kerch Election District No 246 in the Crimean Oblast.

Artemenko, Nikolay Mikhaylovich—general director of the Sad Scientific Production Association, director of

the Mliyevskiy Horticultural Scientific Research Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Forest Steppe imeni L. P. Simirenko, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Mliyeva in Gorodishchenskiy Rayon. From Shkola Election District No 429 in Cherkassy Oblast.

Arkhipova, Anna Grigoryevna—first secretary of the Slavuta Gorkom of the Ukrainian SSR Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Slavuta. From Slavuta Election District No 406 in Khmel'nitskiy Oblast.

Asseyev, German Stepanovich—director of the Nezhin Nezhinselmash (agricultural machine building) Plant, CPSU member, lives in the city of Nezhin. From the Nezhin City Election District No 440 in Chernigov Oblast.

Babanskiy, Yuriy Vasilyevich—member of the Military Council and chief of the political department of the Western Border District of the USSR Committee for State Security, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Turinsk Election District No 48 in Volyn Oblast.

Babiy, Dmitriy Vasilyevich—director of the Sovkhoz imeni Shevchenko in Sokiryanskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the city of Sokiryany. From Khmel'nitskiy Election District No 434 in Chernovtsy Oblast.

Badov, Vladimir Fedorovich—blast furnace attendant at blast furnace shop No 2 of the Krivoy Rog Metallurgical Combine imeni V. I. Lenin, CPSU member, lives in the city of Krivoy Rog. From Krivbassovskiy Election District No 92 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Bazilyanskiy, Lev Leonidovich—director of the Rovenkiantratsit Production Association Vorshilovskoye Mine Administration, CPSU member, lives in the city of Rovenki. From Rovenki Election District No 61 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Bayraka, Mikhail Nikolayevich—deputy general director of the Krivoy Rog Metallurgical Combine imeni V. I. Lenin, CPSU member, lives in the city of Krivoy Rog. From Dzerzhinskiy Election District No 89 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Balandyuk, Nikolay Stepanovich—shop boss of the Pridneprovskiy Chemical Plant Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dneprodzerzhinsk. From Bagleyskiy Election District No 84 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Bandura, Anatoliy Ivanovich—chief of the Azov Sea Steamship Company, CPSU member, lives in the city of Mariupol. From Mariupol-Primorskiy Election District No 138 in Donetsk Oblast.

Bandurka, Aleksandr Markovich—chief of the internal affairs administration of the ispolkom of the Kharkov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Dergachevskiy Election District No 388 in Kharkov Oblast.

Barabash, Aleksandr Leonidovich—chief of the technological bureau of shop No 6 of the Elektron Plant, not a party member, lives in the city of Krivoy Rog. From Zheltyye Vody Election District No 87 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Batig, Mikhail Ivanovich—editor of the Lvov Oblast newspaper LENINSKA MOLOD, CPSU member, lives in the city of Lvov. From Busk Election District No 270 in Lvov Oblast.

Bashkirov, Mikhail Vladimirovich—chairman of the council of the Nikolayevoblagropromsovet State-Cooperative Association, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Bereznegovatoye in Nikolayev Oblast. From Snigirevka Election District No 292 in Nikolayev Oblast.

Bidenyy, Vasily Konstantinovich—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin in Vizhnitskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Lukovtsy in Vizhnitskiy Rayon. From Vizhnitsa Election District No 432 in Chernovtsy Oblast.

Belyy, Vasily Pavlovich—second secretary of the Dubno Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Rachina in Dubnovskiy Rayon. From Dubno Election District No 334 in Rovno Oblast.

Belyy, Leonid Savelyevich—maintenance brigade foreman of the Melitopol Avtotsvetlit Plant, not a party member, lives in the city of Melitopol. From Melitopol Election District No 193 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Belousenko, Aleksandr Fedorovich—first deputy chairman of the ispolkom of the Zaporozhye Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies—chief of the main planning-economic administration, CPSU member, lives in the city of Zaporozhye. From Tokmak Election District No 188 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Bogatyeva, Raisa Vasilyevna—deputy chief doctor of the Kramatorsk Central City Hospital, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kramatorsk. From Kramatorsk Election District No 127 in Donetsk Oblast.

Boyko, Vadim Leonidovich—senior editor of the main editorial office of programs for youth of Ukrainian Television, VLKSM member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Kremenchug-Avtotzavodskiy Election District No 320 in Poltava Oblast.

Boyko, Ivan Vasilyevich—second secretary of the Chernovtsy Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Chernovtsy. From Pershotravnevyy Election District No 431 in Chernovtsy Oblast.

Boyko, Ivan Grigoryevich—chairman of the Kamensko-Dneprovskiy Raykom of the agroindustrial complex workers' trade union, CPSU member, lives in the city of

Kamenka-Dneprovskaya. From Kamenka-Dneprovskaya Election District No 192 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Boyko, Yekaterina Vladimirovna—general director of the Cherkassy Sewing Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Cherkassy. From Pridneprovskiy Election District No 416 in Cherkassy Oblast.

Bondarenko, Anatoliy Dmitriyevich—chairman of the ispolkom of the Sumy Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Sumy. From Lebedin Election District No 351 in Sumy Oblast.

Bondarenko, Viktor Aleksandrovich—head of the surgery department of the Ukrainian Institute for the Advancement of Doctors, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Frunzenskiy Election District No 377 in Kharkov Oblast.

Bondarenko, Viktor Stepanovich—director of the Chemical Plant imeni Petrovskiy in the city of Petrovskoye, CPSU member, lives in the city of Petrovskoye. From Antratsit Election District No 66 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Bondarev, Valeriy Petrovich—first secretary of the Ovruchskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Ovruch. From Ovruch Election District No 164 in Zhitomir Oblast.

Bondarchuk, Andrey Ivanovich—Volyn and Rovno oblasts correspondent for the newspaper PRAVDA UKRAINY, CPSU member, lives in the city of Lutsk. From Gorokhov Election District No 44 in Volyn Oblast.

Borzykh, Aleksandr Ivanovich—director of the 40 rokiv Zhovtnya Sovkhov in Slavyanoserbskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Khoroshoye in Slavyanovserbskiy Rayon. From Kamennobrodskiy Election District No 53 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Bortnik, Vladimir Fedorovich—chief of the main administration of material-technical support of the Ukrainian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Izyaslav Election District No 411 in Khmelnytsky Oblast.

Budko, Valentin Semenovich—first secretary of the Narodichskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Narodichi. From Malin Election District No 163 in Zhitomir Oblast.

Butenko, Anatoliy Ivanovich—first deputy chairman of the ispolkom of the Odessa Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Ivanovka Election District No 310 in Odessa Oblast.

Valenya, Ivan Yuryevich—head of the scientific research department of the Kharkov Aviation Institute imeni N. Ye. Zhukovskiy, CPSU member, lives in the

city of Kharkov. From Komsomolskoye Election District No 372 in Kharkov Oblast.

Vaneyev, Gennadiy Ivanovich—professor at the Chernomorskoye Higher Military-Naval School imeni P. S. Nakhimov, CPSU member, lives in the city of Sevastopol. From Gagarin Election District No 238 in Sevastopol.

Vasilyev, Vasily Ivanovich—cutting face miner of the Krasnoarmeyskugol Production Association Mine imeni Stakhanov, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dimitrov. From Krasnoarmeysk City Election District No 129 in Donetsk Oblast.

Vasilyeva, Galina Ivanovna—director of the Belaya Tserkov Stroyindustriya Combine, CPSU member, lives in the city of Belaya Tserkov. From Belaya Tserkov City Election District No 208 in Kiev Oblast.

Vasin, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich—chief of the Poltava Diesel Engine Repair Plant, CPSU member, lives in the city of Poltava. From Leninskiy Election District No 316 in Poltava Oblast.

Veretennikov, Viktor Aleksandrovich—general director of the Pridneprovskiy Dairy Production Combine, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. From Industrialnyy Election District No 79 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Vinogradskiy, Maksim Pavlovich—chief of the internal affairs department of the ispolkom of the Leninskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies of the city of Nikolayev. From Leninskiy Election District No 282 in Nikolayev Oblast.

Voyevoda, Nikolay Trofimovich—director of the Kanev Magnit Electromechanical Plant, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Litvintsy in Kanevskiy Rayon. From Kanev Election District No 418 in Cherkassy Oblast.

Vorobyev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich—technological engineering programmer at the Sumy Machine Building Scientific-Production Association imeni M. V. Frunze, CPSU member, lives in the city of Sumy. From Kovpakovskiy Election District No 343 in Sumy Oblast.

Gavrilenko, Nikolay Mefodyevich—USSR deputy minister of geology, chief of the Ukrgeologiya Main Geological Coordination Administration, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Sverdlovsk Election District No 63 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Gavrilov, Anatoliy Vasilyevich—chief of the state auto inspection department of the internal affairs department of the ispolkom of the Razdolnenskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Razdolnoye. From Razdolnoye Election District No 256 in the Crimean Oblast.

Gayevoj, Vladimir Maksimovich—chairman of the Party Control Commission under the Ukrainian CP

Central Committee, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Chervonarmeysk Election District No 166 in Zhitomir Oblast.

Gaysinskiy, Yuriy Aleksandrovich—procurator of Moskovskiy Rayon in the city of Kharkov, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Moskovskiy Election District No 373 in Kharkov Oblast.

Galas, Ivan Ivanovich—first secretary of the Irshavskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Irshava. From Irshava Election District No 171 in the Transcarpathian Oblast.

Galtsev, Pavel Sazontyevich—chairman of the Bolshhevik Sovkhoz in Belgorod-Knestrovskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Nikolayevka in Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Rayon. From Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Election District No 303 in Odessa Oblast.

Ganzha, Nikolay Alekseyevich—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Gorkiy in Sakhnovshchinskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Lebedevka in Sakhnovshchinskiy Rayon. From Pervomayskiy Election District No 391 in Kharkov Oblast.

Gerasimenko, Stanislav Dmitriyevich—chairman of the Put Ilyicha Kolkhoz in Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Nikolayevka in Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon. From Krasnoarmeysk Election District No 149 in Donetsk Oblast.

Gerts, Ivan Ivanovich—chairman of the governing board of the Zakarpatles Tenant Organization Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Uzhgorod. From Perechin Election District No 173 in the Transcarpathian Oblast.

Getman, Vadim Petrovich—chairman of the governing board of the Ukrainian Republic Bank of the USSR Agroprombank, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Uman Election District No 425 in Cherkassy Oblast.

Gnatkevich, Yuriy Vasilyevich, department head of the Kiev Polytechnical Institute, not a party member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Industrialnyy Election District No 8 in the city of Kiev.

Goloborodko, Aleksandr Nikolayevich—director of the Kharkov Instrument Production Cooperative, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Chervonozavodskiy Election District No 378 in Kharkov Oblast.

Golovatyy, Sergey Petrovich—senior scientific associate of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Social and Economic Problems of Foreign Countries, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Syretskiy Election District No 18 in the city of Kiev.

Golovach, Vladimir Mikhaylovich—cutting face miner at the Pervomayskugol Production Association Mine imeni V. P. Menzhinskiy, CPSU member, lives in the

city of Pervomaysk. From Pervomaysk Election District No 60 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Golovenko, Nikolay Yakovlevich—department head of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Physics and Chemistry Institute imeni A. V. Bogatskiy, city of Odessa, not a party member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Kievskiy Election District No 296 in Odessa Oblast.

Golovko, Yuriy Petrovich—locomotive engineer of the Nikopol Locomotive Depot, not a party member, lives in the city of Nikopol. From Nikopol Election District No 96 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Gordiyenko, Anatoliy Leontyevich—manager of the Kharkovgazkommunistroy Trust, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Izyum Election District No 379 in Kharkov Oblast.

Gorin, Eduard Alekseyevich—general director of the Avtosborochnyy zavod Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Leninskiy Election District No 293 in Odessa Oblast.

Grabin, Vladimir Vladimirovich—second secretary of the Sumy Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Sumy. From Glukhov Election District No 344 in Sumy Oblast.

Grebenchenko, Leonid Grigoryevich—director of the Gorlovka Furniture Plant, CPSU member, lives in the city of Gorlovka. From Gorlovka-Kalininskiy Election District No 118 in Donetsk Oblast.

Gryniv, Yevgeniy Andreyevich—department head of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Social Sciences Institute, city of Lvov, CPSU member, lives in the city of Lvov. From Drogobych Election District No 271 in Lvov Oblast.

Grinchuk, Ivan Adamovich—manager of the autogarage of the Kolkhoz imeni Pervoye maya in Pogrebishchenskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Novofastov in Pogrebishchenskiy Rayon. From Pogrebishche Election District No 35 in Vinnitsa Oblast.

Grinev, Vladimir Borisovich—department head at Kharkov Polytechnical Institute imeni V. I. Lenin, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Industrialnyy Election District No 369 in Kharkov Oblast.

Gritsay, Ivan Trofimovich—chairman of the ispolkom of the Nikolayev Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Nikolayev. From Nikolayev Election District No 290 in Nikolayev Oblast.

Grishchenko, Ivan Mikhaylovich—first secretary of the Krolevetskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, From Krolevets Election District No 350 in Sumy Oblast.

Gudyma, Aleksandr Vasilyevich—teacher at the Lutsk Pedagogical School imeni Yaroslav Galan, CPSU member, lives in the city of Lutsk. From Lutsk-Tsentralnyy Election District No 41 in Volyn Oblast.

Gusev, Viktor Ivanovich—director of High School No 92 in the city of Donetsk, CPSU member, lives in the city of Donetsk. From Kirov Election District No 113 in Donetsk Oblast.

Danchevskiy, Vladimir Akimovich—director of the Mukachevo Experimental Ski Factory, CPSU member, lives in the city of Mukachevo. From Mukachevo City Election District No 168 in the Transcarpathian Oblast.

Dashivets, Grigoriy Arsenteyevich—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni XXII syezda KPSS in Slavyanskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Nikonorovka in Slavyanskiy Rayon. From Slavyansk Election District No 152 in Donetsk Oblast.

Demidov, Grigoriy Viktorovich—department procurator of the Azov-Chernomorskiy Nature Conservation Procurator's Office, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Lenino in Leninskiy Rayon. From Lenino Election District No 254 in the Crimean Oblast.

Dzyuba, Nikolay Grigoryevich—car driver at autotransport enterprise No 13070 of the Kiev City Administration of Freight Autotransport, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Obolonskiy Election District No 11 in the city of Kiev.

Didorenko, Eduard Alekseyevich—chief of the internal affairs administration of the ispolkom of Voroshilovgrad Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Voroshilovgrad. From Leninskiy Election District No 49 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Dmitrishin, Yaroslav Ivanovich—deputy chief of the technical control department of the state bearings plant No 28, not a party member, lives in the city of Lutsk. From Lutsk Election District No 40 in Volyn Oblast.

Dmitruk, Leontiy Mikhaylovich—director of Peremoga Poultry Factory in Cherkasskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Budishcha in Cherkasskiy Rayon. From Cherkassy Election District No 426 in Cherkassy Oblast.

Doroguntsov, Sergey Ivanovich—chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Ukrainian SSR Production Forces Study Council, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Suvorovo Election District No 299 in Odessa Oblast.

Dorofeyev, Vladimir Nikolayevich—rector of the Kommunarsk Mining and Metallurgical Institute, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kommunarsk. From Kommunarsk Election District No 56 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Doroshenko, Ivan Kirillovich—mining drift repair worker at the Donetskugol Production Association

Mushketovskaya Mine, CPSU member, lives in the city of Donetsk. From Budennovskiy Election District No 109 in Donetsk Oblast.

Drobinskiy, Vitaliy Grigoryevich—general director of the Uman Megommetr Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Uman. From Uman City Election District No 420 in Cherkassy Oblast.

Dubnikov, Gennadiy Alekseyevich—first secretary of the Kazatinskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kazatin. From Kazatin Election District No 33 in Vinnitsa Oblast.

Dubovskiy, Anatoliy Ivanovich—chief doctor of the Zaporozhye City Clinical Hospital No 5 Ambulance Service imeni XXIV syezda KPSS, CPSU member, lives in the city of Zaporozhye. From Ordzhonikidze Election District No 183 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Dubrov, Leonid Vasilyevich—first secretary of the Dneprodzerzhinsk Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dneprodzerzhinsk. From Dneprovskiy Election District No 85 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Dudchenko, Vitaliy Ivanovich—chairman of the Odessa Oblast Trade Unions Council, CPSU member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Belyayevka Election District No 307 in Odessa Oblast.

Duntau, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich—chairman of the People's Control Committee of the Soviet Dunay Steamship Line, CPSU member, lives in the city of Izmail. From Iszmail Election District No 304 in Odessa Oblast.

Duplyak, Nikolay Stepanovich—director of the Reya Sovkhoz in Berdichevskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Reya in Berdichevskiy Rayon. From Andrushevka Election District No 159 in Zhitomir Oblast.

Dukhov, Boris Innokentyevich—chief of the Military Ground Forces Air Defense Academy, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Zaliznichnyy Election District No 7 in the city of Kiev.

Yevtukhov, Vasily Ivanovich—director of the Krivoy Rog Kommunist Mining Equipment Plant, CPSU member, lives in the city of Krivoy Rog. From Tsentralnyy City Election District No 94 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Yelchenko, Yuriy Nikoforovich—Ukrainian SSR CP Central Committee secretary, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Talnoye Election District No 424 in Cherkassy Oblast.

Yeliashevich, Igor Vladimirovich—general director of the Transcarpathian Production-Trade Shoe Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Uzhgorod. From Uzhgorod Election District No 167 in the Transcarpathian Oblast.

Yemelyanov, Aleksandr Sergeyevich—deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR State Planning Committee, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Sosnovskiy Election District No 417 in Cherkassy Oblast.

Yemets, Aleksandr Ivanovich—scientific associate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Higher School imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Tsentralnyy Election District No 21 in the city of Kiev.

Yeshchenko, Valentina Nikolayevna—chief doctor of the Novyye Petrovtsy Sectional Hospital in Vyshgorodskiy Rayon, not a party member, lives in the city of Novyye Petrovtsy. From Vyshgorod Election District No 217 in Kiev Oblast.

Zhukov, Vladimir Romanovich—first secretary of the Makeyevka Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Makeyevka. From Makeyevka-Gornyak Election District No 131 in Donetsk Oblast.

Zadorozhnyy, Boris Vasilyevich—docent of the Mariupol Metallurgical Institute Labor and Environmental Protection Department, not a party member, lives in the city of Mariupol. From Mariupol-Tsentralnyy Election District No 139 in Donetsk Oblast.

Zayets, Ivan Aleksandrovich—Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Economics Institute engineer, not a party member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Svyatoshinskiy Election District No 17 in the city of Kiev.

Zayko, Yakov Yakovlevich—chairman of the Posrednik Journalist Cooperative of Zhitomir, CPSU member, lives in the city of Zhitomir. From Bogunskiy Election District No 153 in Zhitomir Oblast.

Zaludyak, Nikolay Ivanovich—temporarily not working, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kremenchug. From Kremenchug-Kryukovskiy Election District No 321 in Poltava Oblast.

Zbitnev, Yuriy Ivanovich—doctor at Clinical Hospital No 2 in the city of Kiev, CPSU candidate member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Gagarin Election District No 4 in the city of Kiev.

Zvyagilskiy, Yefim Leonidovich—director of the Donetskugol Production Association Mine imeni A. F. Zasyadko, CPSU member, lives in the city of Donetsk. From Kievskiy Election District No 112 in Donetsk Oblast.

Zinchenko, Arseniy Leonidovich—docent of the Vinnitsa Pedagogical Institute imeni N. Ostrovskiy general history department, CPSU member, lives in the city of Vinnitsa. From Zamostyanskiy Election District No 24 in Vinnitsa Oblast.

Ivasyuk, Valeriy Petrovich—graduate student at the Kiev Medical Institute imeni Academician A. A. Bogomolets, not a party member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Leningradskiy Election District No 9 in the city of Kiev.

Ivashko, Vladimir Antonovich—first secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Darnitskiy Election District No 6 in the city of Kiev.

Ignatenko, Vladimir Vladimirovich—director Peregonovka Sugar Combine in Golovanevskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the city of Peregonovka in Golovanevskiy Rayon. From Gayvoron Election District No 231 in Kirovograd Oblast.

Izmalkov, Valeriy Nikolayevich—serviceman, CPSU member, lives in the city of Zaporozhye. From Shevchenkivskiy Election District No 185 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Istratenko, Nikolay Vasilyevich—metal-working brigade foreman of the rail girder shop of the Dneprovskiy Metallurgical Combine imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dneprodzerzhinsk. From Zavodskiy Election District No 86 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Kazak, Leonid Vasilyevich—first secretary of the Simferopolskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Simferopol. From Simferopol Election District No 257 in the Crimean Oblast.

Kamenchuk, Sergey Aleksandrovich—first secretary of the Vladimiretskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Vladimirk. From Vladimiretsk Election District No 335 in Rovno Oblast.

Kapshtik, Ivan Markovich—director of the Kievskaya Poultry Factory, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Brovary Election District No 210 in Kiev Oblast.

Karasik, Vladlen Mikhaylovich—general director of the Kharkov Sugar Beet Production, Procurement, and Processing Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Bogodukhov Election District No 384 in Kharkov Oblast.

Kasyanenko, Anatoliy Ivanovich—second secretary of the Kherson Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kherson. From Dneprovskiy Election District No 393 in Kherson Oblast.

Kvasov, Vladimir Ilyich—general director of the Voroshilovgradteplovoy Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Voroshilovgrad. From Vatutinskiy Election District No 51 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Kelman, Dmitriy Ivanovich—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin agrotrade enterprise in Mukachevskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Rakoshin in Mukachevskiy Rayon. From Mukachevo Election District No 172 in the Transcarpathian Oblast.

Kisilev, Anatoliy Vasilyevich—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni XXI syezda KPSS in Shakhterskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Stepanovka in Shakhterskiy Rayon. From Snezhnoye Election District No 142 in Donetsk Oblast.

Kislyy, Pavel Stepanovich—deputy director of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Super Hard Materials, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Promyslenny Election District No 15 in the city of Kiev.

Kivshik, Petr Andreyevich—general director of the Poltava Oblast Agrosupply, CPSU member, lives in the city of Poltava. From Globino Election District No 325 in Poltava Oblast.

Kinakh, Anatoliy Kirillovich—chief of the production-dispatch department of the Okean Shipbuilding Plant, city of Nikolayev, CPSU member, lives in the city of Nikolayev. From Korabelny Election District No 284 in Nikolayev Oblast.

Kiparis, Fedor Sergeyevich—head of the Poltava Higher Military Command School of Communications, CPSU member, lives in the city of Poltava. From Kievskiy Election District No 317 in Poltava Oblast.

Kovalenko, Nikolay Mitrofanovich—first secretary of the Baryshevskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Baryshevka. From Baryshevka Election District No 215 in Kiev Oblast.

Kovinko, Anatoliy Ivanovich—second secretary of the Poltava Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Poltava. From Khorol Election District No 331 in Poltava Oblast.

Kozarenko, Vasily Ivanovich—section chief of the Antratsit Production Association Partizanskaya Mine, not a party member, lives in the city of Antratsit. From Antratsit City Election District No 54 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Kolesnik, Sergey Vitalyevich—drift miner at the Torezantratsit Production Association Krasnaya zvezda Mine, VLKSM member, lives in the city of Torez. From Torez Election District No 143 in Donetsk Oblast.

Kolesnik, Aleksey Nikolayevich—first secretary of the Valkovskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Valki. From Valki Election District No 385 in Kharkov Oblast.

Kolinet, Vladimir Vladimirovich—teacher in the Russian and foreign literatures department of Ternopol State Pedagogical Institute imeni Ya. Galan, not a party

member, lives in the city of Ternopol. From Ternopol Election District No 355 in Ternopol Oblast.

Kondratyev, Yaroslav Yuryevich—administration chief of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Pecherskiy Election District No 12 in the city of Kiev.

Kondryakov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich—director of High School No 53 in the city of Sevastopol, CPSU member, lives in the city of Sevastopol. From Nakhimovskiy Election District No 239 in the city of Sevastopol.

Korzh, Anatoliy Vladimirovich—turning and boring lathe operator at the Dnepropetrovsk Heavy Press Plant, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. From Babushkinskiy Election District No 76 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Korzhik, Valentin Ivanovich—senior organizer of the Kharkov Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Volchansk Election District No 386 in Kharkov Oblast.

Korneyev, Albert Vasilyevich—docent of the Donetsk Polytechnical Institute, CPSU member, lives in the city of Donetsk. From Voroshilovskiy Election District No 110 in Donetsk Oblast.

Korniyenko, Leonid Yakovlevich—deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR State Planning Committee, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Lozovaya Election District No 381 in Kharkov Oblast.

Korolenko, Yevgeniy Sergeyevich—chief doctor of the Zaporozhye Oblast Clinical Hospital, CPSU member, lives in the city of Zaporozhye. From Kommunariskiy Election District No 181 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Kostenko, Yuriy Ivanovich—scientific associate of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Arc Welding Institute imeni Ye. O. Paton, not a party member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Krasnoarmeyskiy Election District No 22 in the city of Kiev.

Kotik, Bogdan Dmitriyevich—chairman of the executive committee of the Lvov City Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Lvov. From Radyanskiy Election District No 262 in Lvov Oblast.

Kotsyuba, Aleksandr Pavlovich—docent of the Ukrainian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee Republic Higher School of Administration, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Radyanskiy Election District No 16 in the city of Kiev.

Krivolap, Vladimir Ivanovich—engineer-instructor of the Locomotive Depot imeni T. Shevchenko, not a party member, lives in the city of Smela. From Smela Election District No 419 in Cherkassy Oblast.

Kryzhanovskiy, Vladimir Petrovich—department chief of the Ukrainian Proyecktstalkonstruksiya Scientific

Research Institute, not a party member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Levoberezhnyy Election District No 10 in the city of Kiev.

Kryuchkov, Vasiliy Dmitriyevich—department head of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Malaya Viska Election District No 232 in Kirovograd Oblast.

Kuzmenko, Nikolay Ivanovich—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Oktyabrskaya revolyutsiya in Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Aleksandrovka in Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon. From Krasnogvardeyskoye Election District No 253 in the Crimean Oblast.

Kurashik, Vitaliy Vladimirovich—chairman of the ispolkom of the Crimean Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Simferopol. From Yevpatoriya Election District No 245 in the Crimean Oblast.

Kutsay, Ivan Leontyevich—first deputy chairman of the ispolkom of the Kiev Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies—head of the main planning-economic administration, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Pereyaslav-Khmelnitskiy Election District No 213 in Kiev Oblast.

Kuchma, Leonid Danilovich—general director of the Yuzhnyy Machine Building Plant Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. From Krasnogvardeyskiy Election District No 81 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Kushnarev, Yevgeniy Petrovich—department head of the Kharkov Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Saltovskiy Election District No 376 in Kharkov Oblast.

Kuyanov, Viktor Vasilyevich—deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee, chief of Main Administration of Agricultural Technical Supply, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Mena Election District No 445 in Chernigov Oblast.

Lebedik, Petr Vasilyevich—turner at the Kakhovka Arc Welding Equipment Plant, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kakhovka. From Novaya Kakhovka Election District No 396 in Kherson Oblast.

Levchenko, Gennadiy Petrovich—director of the Plant imeni Malyshev Production Association assembly production facility, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Kominternovskiy Election District No 371 in Kharkov Oblast.

Lemish, Valentin Panteleyevich—first deputy chairman of the Republic Cooperative-State Agroindustrial Construction Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Kivertsy Election District No 46 in Volyn Oblast.

Lysenko, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich—director of the Chernigov Khimvolokno Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Chernigov. From Novozavodskiy Election District No 439 in Chernigov Oblast.

Lishchina, Bogdan Nikolayevich—general director of the Azot Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Severodonetsk. From Severodonetsk Election District No 64 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Lobach, Vyacheslav Ivanovich—first secretary of the Lisichansk Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Lisichansk. From Lisichansk Election District No 59 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Lobenko, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich—chief doctor of the Chernomorskiy Central Clinical Hospital for Water Transport, CPSU member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Chernomorskiy Election District No 302 in Odessa Oblast.

Loktev, Sergey Vladimirovich—drift miner of the Artemugol Production Association Kochegarka Mine, CPSU member, lives in the city of Gorlovka. From Gorlovka-Tsentralnyy Election District No 120 in Donetsk Oblast.

Lubkivskiy, Roman Maryanovich—chairman of the governing board of the Lvov Organization of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, CPSU member, lives in the city of Lvov. From Yavorov Election District No 281 in Lvov Oblast.

Lyubenchuk, Nikolay Ivanovich—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Kotovskiy in Kamenets-Podolskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Slobodka-Gumenetskaya in Kamenets-Podolskiy Rayon. From Chemerovtsy Election District No 414 in Khmel-nitskiy Oblast.

Lyashko, Viktor Ivanovich—Ukrainian SSR deputy minister of housing and municipal services, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Yenakiyev Election District No 125 in Donetsk Oblast.

Mazur, Vladimir Dmitriyevich—first secretary of the Verkhnedneprovskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Verkhnedneprovsk. From Verkhnedneprovsk Election District No 101 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Mazur, Yuliy Markovich, editor of the Odessa Oblast newspaper ZNAMYA KOMMUNIZMA, CPSU member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Ilyichevsk Election District No 295 in Odessa Oblast.

Makarenko, Sergey Mikhaylovich—stone mason at the construction-installation section of the Makeyevugol Production Association Chaykino Mine, CPSU member, lives in the city of Makeyevka. From Makeyevka-Chervonogvardeyskiy Election District No 134 in Donetsk Oblast.

Makeyenko, Vladimir Vladimirovich—air traffic controller of the Ukrainian Strela Center of Automated Air Traffic Control, CPSU member, lives in the city of Borispol. From Borispol Election District No 209 in Kiev Oblast.

Markov, Boris Ivanovich—chief economist of the Kherson Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies ispolkom labor and social issues administration, not a party member, lives in the city of Kherson. From Suvorovskiy Election District No 395 in Kherson Oblast.

Martynenko, Vladimir Petrovich—general director of the Poltava Mining-Enrichment Combine, CPSU member, lives in the city of Komsomolsk. From Komsomolsk Election District No 319 in Poltava Oblast.

Martynchuk, Vasiliy Iosifovich—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Buyko in Fastovskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Yaroshovka in Fastovskiy Rayon. From Fastov Election District No 214 in Kiev Oblast.

Marchenko, Vladimir Romanovich—department chief of the Romny Automatic Telephone Exchanges Plant, CPSU member, lives in the city of Romny. From Romny Election District No 347 in Sumy Oblast.

Marchenko, Ivan Dmitriyevich—director of the Artemovsk Pobeda truda Machine Building Plant, CPSU member, lives in the city of Artemovsk. From Artemovsk Election District No 117 in Donetsk Oblast.

Maslov, Mikhail Ivanovich—political unit deputy chief of the Khmelnik Central Military Sanatorium, CPSU member, lives in the city of Khmelnik. From Khmelnik Election District No 28 in Vinnitsa Oblast.

Maslyuk, Gennadiy Yevgenyevich—electric fitter at the Donetskugol Production Association Underground Mine imeni Chelyuskintsy, CPSU member, lives in the city of Donetsk. From Petrovskiy Election District No 115 in Donetsk Oblast.

Matveyev, Vladimir Iosifovich—second secretary of the Nikolayev Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Nikolayev. From Tsentralnyy Election District No 285 in Nikolayev Oblast.

Matiyko, Anatoliy Semenovich—doctor at the surgical department of Alushta Central City Hospital, CPSU member, lives in the city of Alushta. From Alushta Election District No 243 in the Crimean Oblast.

Matsyalko, Mikhail Vasilyevich—general director of the Ukrgaz Scientific Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Kremets Election District No 360 in Ternopol Oblast.

Mayakin, Valentin Andreyevich—director of Konstantinovka Metallurgical Plant imeni Frunze, CPSU

member, lives in the city of Konstantinovka. From Konstantinovka Election District No 126 in Donetsk Oblast.

Medvedev, Vladimir Guryanovich—drift miner brigade foreman at the Pavlograd Coal-Mining Production Association Mine imeni Leninskiy komsomol, CPSU member, lives in the city of Pavlograd. From Pershotravensk Election District No 99 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Melnik, Boris Pavlovich—deputy chairman of the ispolkom of the Odessa Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies—chief of the economic planning administration, CPSU member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Tarutino Election District No 314 in Odessa Oblast.

Melnichuk, Vitaliy Grigoryevich—chief economist of the Zhitomir Vibroseparator Plant, not a party member, lives in the city of Zhitomir. From Promyshlennyy Election District No 155 in Zhitomir Oblast.

Meshcheryakov, Valeriy Fedorovich—docent of Kharkov State University imeni A. M. Gorkiy, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Vuzovskiy Election District No 366 in Kharkov Oblast.

Mikhaylyuk, Vasiliy Petrovich—first secretary of the Vasilkov Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Vasilkov. From Vasilkov Election District No 211 in Kiev Oblast.

Movchan, Pavel Mikhaylovich—secretary of the governing board of the Kiev Organization of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, not a party member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Berezen Election District No 2 in the city of Kiev.

Mokin, Boris Ivanovich—rector of the Vinnitsa Polytechnical Institute, CPSU member, lives in the city of Vinnitsa. From Leninskiy Election District No 23 in Vinnitsa Oblast.

Mokrousov, Anatoliy Alekseyevich—first secretary of the Vatutinskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Troyeshchinskiy Election District No 19 in the city of Kiev.

Moroz, Aleksandr Vladimirovich—chief of the legal bureau of the Kristall Experimental Plant, city of Nikolayev, CPSU member, lives in the city of Nikolayev. From Zavodskiy Election District No 283 in Nikolayev Oblast.

Moroz, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich—head of the agrarian department of the Kiev Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Tarashcha Election District No 224 in Kiev Oblast.

Moskovka, Vladimir Nikolayevich—engineer at the Kharkov Indeks Experimental Practice Plant, CPSU

member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Leninskiy Election District No 365 in Kharkov Oblast.

Mostisskiy, Andrey Bogdanovich—Kovel Geological Survey Party geologist, VLKSM member, lives in the city of Kovel. From Kovel Election District No 42 in Volyn Oblast.

Nagulko, Taras Dmitriyevich—doctor at the Shepetovka Railway Hospital, not a party member, lives in the city of Shepetovka. From Shepetovka Election District No 407 in Khmel'nitskiy Oblast.

Naumenko, Nikolay Viktorovich—senior teacher at the Khmel'nitskiy Higher Artillery Command School, CPSU member, lives in the city of Khmel'nitskiy. From Central Election District No 404 in Khmel'nitskiy Oblast.

Nekrasov, Vladilen Petrovich—member of the Military Council-chief of the Political Administration of the Black Sea Fleet, CPSU member, lives in the city of Sevastopol. From Balaklavskiy Election District No 237 in the city of Sevastopol.

Nechiporenko, Aleksandr Lavrovich—lawyer at legal consultation office No 1 in Zaliznichnyy Rayon in the city of Kiev, CPSU member, lives in the city of Boyarka in Kiev-Svytoshinskiy Rayon. From Kiev-Svyatoshinskiy Election District No 220 in Kiev Oblast.

Nikolayenko, Ivan Andreyevich—first secretary of the Mironovskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Mironovka. From Mironovka Election District No 222 in Kiev Oblast.

Novikov, Vladimir Yakovlevich—director of the Slavyansk Insulator Hardware Plant imeni Artem, CPSU member, lives in the city of Slavyansk. From Slavyansk City Election District No 141 in Donetsk Oblast.

Novitskiy, Yevgeniy Antonovich—second secretary of the Ivano-Frankovsk Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Ivano-Frankovsk. From Rozhnyatov Election District No 204 in Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast.

Nosov, Vladislav Vasilyevich—electronic engineer at the Poltava Artificial Diamond and Diamond Instruments Plant, not a party member, lives in the city of Poltava. From Oktyabrskiy Election District No 318 in Poltava Oblast.

Omelchenko, Nikolay Grigoryevich—second secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. From Novomoskovsk Election District No 102 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Osadchuk, Petr Ilyich—secretary of the governing board of the Kiev Organization of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Tlumach Election District No 207 in Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast.

Ostapenko, Aleksandr Fedorovich—general director of the Krasnodonugol Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Krasnodon. From Krasnodon Election District No 57 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Ostroushchenko, Svetlana Viktorovna—special correspondent for the Odessa Oblast newspaper ZNAMYA KOMMUNIZM, CPSU member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Primorskiy Election District No 298 in Odessa Oblast.

Pavlenko, Feliks Yemelyanovich—general director of the Aleksandriya ETALScientific Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Aleksandriya. From Aleksandriya Election District No 228 in Kirovograd Oblast.

Pavlichenko, Vitaliy Kupriyanovich—chief of the Simferopol Higher Military-Political Construction School, CPSU member, lives in the city of Simferopol. From Zheleznodorozhnyy Election District No 240 in the Crimean Oblast.

Pavlov, Vladimir Alekseyevich—chief doctor of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Clinical Hospital imeni Mechnikov, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. From Vuzovskiy Election District No 77 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Pavlyuk, Stepan Petrovich—senior scientific associate of the Lvov Branch of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Art Criticism, Folklore, and Ethnography, CPSU member, lives in the city of Lvov. From Turka Election District No 280 in Lvov Oblast.

Panasovskiy, Oleg Grigoryevich—director of the Uglegorsk GRES [State Regional Electric Power Plant] imeni XXV syezda KPSS, settlement of Svetlodarskoye, CPSU member, lives in the city of Debaltsevo. From Debaltsevo Election District No 121 in Donetsk Oblast.

Panasjuk, Fedor Timofeyevich—first secretary of the Chudnovskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Chudnov. From Lyubar Election District No 162 in Zhitomir Oblast.

Panchenko, Vladimir Yevgenyevich—senior secretary of the Kirovograd Oblast Organization of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, docent of the Kirovograd State Pedagogical Institute imeni A. S. Pushkin, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kirovograd. From Leninskiy Election District No 225 in Kirovograd Oblast.

Pasichnik, Ivan Davydovich—first secretary of the Chernobayevskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Chernobay. From Chernobay Election District No 428 in Cherkassy Oblast.

Paul, Viktor Iosifovich—shop chief of the Zuevka Experimental Central Electric Heating Plant of the All-Union Thermotechnical Institute, not a party member,

lives in the city of Zugres. From Khartsyzsk Election District No 144 in Donetsk Oblast.

Peredriy, Boris Ivanovich—first secretary of the Lohvitskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Lohvitsa. From Lohvitsa Election District No 328 in Poltava Oblast.

Petrenko, Nikolay Yakovlevich—first secretary of the Gadyachskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Gadyach. From Gadyach Election District No 324 in Poltava Oblast.

Petrov, Viktor Mikhaylovich—director of the Lybny Adding Machine Plant, CPSU member, lives in the city of Lybny. From Lubny Election District No 322 in Poltava Oblast.

Pilepenko, Viktor Vasilyevich—chief of the Chernomorskiy Steamship Line, CPSU member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Morskoy Election District No 306 in Odessa Oblast.

Pilipchuk, Vladimir Mefodyevich—docent of the Ukrainian Hydraulic Engineers Institute accounting and analysis of economic activity department, city of Rovno, CPSU member, lives in the city of Rovno. From Zhovtnevyi Election District No 333 in Rovno Oblast.

Piven, Nikolay Ivanovich—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni 118 pogibshikh kommunarov in Shakhterskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the city of Makeyevka. From Makeyevka-Sovetskiy Election District No 132 in Donetsk Oblast.

Podyablonskiy, Mikhail Ivanovich—deputy chairman of the trade union committee of the Metallurgical Combine imeni Ilyich, city of Mariupol, CPSU member, lives in the city of Mariupol. From Mariupol-Ilyichevskiy Election District No 136 in Donetsk Oblast.

Piskun, Aleksandr Ilyich—senior teacher of the Sumy Branch of Kharkov Polytechnical Institute, CPSU member, lives in the city of Sumy. From Zarechnyy Election District No 342 in Sumy Oblast.

Plyushch, Ivan Stepanovich—chairman of the ispolkom of the Kiev Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Markarov Election District No 221 in Kiev Oblast.

Podzharov, Ivan Ivanovich—deputy chairman and chairman of the planning committee of the ispolkom of the Kiliyskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiliya. From Kiliya Election District No 311 in Odessa Oblast.

Podches, Grigoriy Stepanovich—chairman of the Gaysinskiy Rayon Selkhozkhimiya Agrochemical Services to Agriculture Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Gaysin. From Gaysin Election District No 32 in Vinnitsa Oblast.

Polychko, Andrey Vasilyevich—chief of the Vinograd Mobile Mechanized Column No 78 of the Zakarpatyemeliiovodkhoz Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Vinogradov. From Vinogradov Election District No 170 in the Transcarpathian Oblast.

Polyakh, Vitaliy Ivanovich—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Michurin in Zolotonoshskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Krivonosovka in Zolotonoshskiy Rayon. From Zolotonosha Election District No 423 in Cherkassy Oblast.

Popov, Nikolay Mikhaylovich—second secretary of the Voroshilovgrad Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Voroshilovgrad. From Starobelsk Election District No 73 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Popovich, Ivan Vasilyevich—general director of the Zakarpatnerudprom Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Khust. From Khust Election District No 177 in the Transcarpathian Oblast.

Porada, Aleksey Nikolayevich—general director of the Zaporozhye Abrazivnyy kombinat Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Zaporozhye. From Levanevskiy Election District No 182 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Porovskiy, Nikolay Ivanovich—senior secretary of the secretariat of the Ukrainian Popular Front for Perestroika, not a party member, lives in the city of Rovno. From Rovno Election District No 340 in Rovno Oblast.

Portnoy, Vladimir Stepanovich—first secretary of the Priluki Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Priluki. From Priluki City Election District No 441 in Chernigov Oblast.

Potebenko, Mikhail Alekseyevich, Ukrainian SSR procurator, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Novyy Bug Election District No 291 in Nikolayev Oblast.

Pravdenko, Sergey Makarovich—in-house correspondent of the newspaper EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Samarskiy Election District No 83 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Prikhodko, Viktor Andreyevich—chairman of the ispolkom of the Nosovskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Nosovka. From Nosovka Election District No 447 in Chernigov Oblast.

Prichkin, Aleksey Alekseyevich—second secretary of the Zaporozhye Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Zaporozhye. From Vasilyevka Election District No 190 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Protasov, Valentin Ivanovich—senior rolling press operator at the seamless pipe shop of the Dnepropetrovsk Pipe Rolling Plant imeni V. I. Lenin, CPSU member,

lives in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. From Leninskiy Election District No 74 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Pulinets, Pavel Nikolayevich—director of the Kherson Oblast Internatsionalist Military-Patriotic Center, CPSU member, lives in the city of Tsyurupinsk. From Belozerkha Election District No 397 in Kherson Oblast.

Pustovoytenko, Valeriy Pavlovich—chairman of the ispolkom of the Dnepropetrovsk City Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. From Zhovtnevy Election District No 78 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Pshenichnikov, Anatoliy Yegorovich—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni XXI syezda KPSS in Dzhankoyskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Medvedevka in Dzhankoyskiy Rayon. From Dzhankoy Election District No 244 in the Crimean Oblast.

Rapiy, Roman Konstantinovich—chief of the Akhtyrka Oil and Gas Extracting Administration, CPSU member, lives in the city of Akhtyrka. From Akhtyrka Election District No 346 in Sumy Oblast.

Reva, Vitaliy Mikhaylovich—Ukrainian SSR first deputy minister of transport, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Feodosiya Election District No 249 in the Crimean Oblast.

Reznik, Boris Yakovlevich—head of the pediatrics department of the Odessa State Medical Institute imeni N. I. Pirogov, CPSU member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Tsentralny Election District No 301 in Odessa Oblast.

Rybalchenko, Anatoliy Andreyevich—Ukrainian SSR first deputy minister of highway construction and operation, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Kotovsk Election District No 305 in Odessa Oblast.

Rodygin, Valeriy Nikolayevich—first secretary of the Amvrosiyeviskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Amvrosiyevka. From Amvrosiyevka Election District No 147 in Donetsk Oblast.

Romanov, Yuriy Sergeyevich—head of the astronomical observatory department of Odessa State University, CPSU member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Zhovtnevy Election District No 294 in Odessa Oblast.

Romanchuk, Vladimir Nikolayevich—boiler maker at the Zaporozhtransformator Production Association imeni V. I. Lenin, not a party member, lives in the city of Zaporozhye. From Leninskiy Election District No 178 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Romanyuk, Vasiliy Sergeyevich—first secretary of Yarmolynetskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Yarmolintsy. From Yarmolintsy Election District No 415 in Khmelnytskiy Oblast.

Rudenko, Vasiliy Nikolayevich—deputy chairman of the ispolkom of the Goshchanskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Goshcha. From Goshcha Election District No 336 in Rovno Oblast.

Rudik, Vasily Nazarovich—first secretary of the Oleviskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Olevsk. From Olevsk Election District No 165 in Zhitomir Oblast.

Ryabokon, Aleskandr Grigoryevich—chairman of the Zapovit Illich Kolkhoz in Skvirskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Pishchiki in Skvirskiy Rayon. From Volodarka Election District No 218 in Kiev Oblast.

Ryabchenko, Nikolay Andreyevich—director of the Krivoy Rog Cement Mining Combine, CPSU member, lives in the city of Krivoy Rog. From Dolgintsevskiy Election District No 90 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Savvin, Aleksey Mikhaylovich—metropolitan and the Vinnitsa and Bratslav Agafangel, not a party member, lives in the city of Vinnitsa. From Starogorodskiy Election District No 25 in Vinnitsa Oblast.

Savelyev, Oleg Yefremovich—first secretary of the Baltskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Balta. From Savran Election District No 313 in Odessa Oblast.

Saliy, Ivan Nikolayevich—first secretary of the Podolskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party of the city of Kiev, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Podolsk Election District No 13 in the city of Kiev.

Salnichenko, Vitaliy Nikolayevich—manager of the Rubezhanskkhimstroy Trust, CPSU member, lives in the city of Rubezhnoye. From Rubezhnoye Election District No 62 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Sanin, Vasiliy Nikiforovich—chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs political department of internal security forces for the Ukrainian SSR and the Moldavian SSR, lives in the city of Kiev. From Zhovtnevy Election District No 368 in Kharkov Oblast.

Satskiy, Vitaliy Antonovich—general director of the Zaporozhstal Combine, CPSU member, lives in the city of Zaporozhye. From Zavodskiy Election District No 180 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Sviderskiy, Fedor Feofilaktovich—chief of the technological bureau of the Novovolynsk Osnastka Production Association, not a party member, lives in the city of Novovolynsk. From Novovolynsk Election District No 43 in Volyn Oblast.

Sevastianov, Vladimir Ivanovich—deputy chief of the educational department of the Simferopol Military

Combined School, CPSU member, lives in the city of Simferopol. From Kievskiy Election District No 241 in the Crimean Oblast.

Semenets, Sergey Vladimirovich—first secretary of the Ichnyanskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian LKSM [Komsomol], CPSU member, lives in the city of Ichnya. From Borzna Election District No 443 in Chernigov Oblast.

Serbin, Yuriy Sergeyevich—manager of the Shostkhistroy Trust, CPSU member, lives in the city of Shostka. From Shostka Election District No 348 in Sumy Oblast.

Serebryannikov, Yuriy Filipovich—laboratory head of the All-Union Scientific Research, Planning and Design, and Technological Institute of Blast Protection and Mining Electrical Equipment, CPSU member, lives in the city of Donetsk. From Kalininskiy Election District No 111 in Donetsk Oblast.

Sivkova, Lidiya Nikolayevna—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Chapayev in Dobropolskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Novofedorovka in Dobropolskiy Rayon. From Dobropolye Election District No 123 in Donetsk Oblast.

Sidorenko, Nikolay Yakovlevich—first deputy chairman of the ispolkom of the Donetsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, chairman of the council of agroindustrial formations of Donetsk Oblast, CPSU member, lives in the city of Donetsk. From Novoazovsk Election District No 151 in Donetsk Oblast.

Simonenko, Valentin Konstantinovich—chairman of the ispolkom of the Odessa City Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Malinovskiy Election District No 297 in Odessa Oblast.

Sychev, Viktor Aleksandrovich—chief of the Melitopol City Department of Administration of the Ukrainian SSR Committee for State Security for Zaporozhye Oblast, CPSU member, lives in the city of Melitopol. From Melitopol Election District No 187 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Skorik, Larisa Pavlovna—docent of Kiev State Art Institute, not a party member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Artemovskiy Election District No 1 in the city of Kiev.

Slesarenko, Viktor Mikhaylovich—senior investigator for especially important cases of the internal affairs administration of the Zaporozhye Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies ispolkom, CPSU member, lives in the city of Zaporozhye. From Zhovtnevyi Election District No 179 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Slednev, Vladimir Petrovich—director of the Donetsk Metallurgical Plant imeni V. I. Lenin, CPSU member, lives in the city of Donetsk. From Leninskiy Election District No 108 in Donetsk Oblast.

Slobodenyuk, Vladimir Nikitovich—chief of the Ukrainian SSR Committee for State Security Dnepropetrovsk

Oblast administration, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. From Zapadno-Donbasskiy Election District No 98 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Smetanin, Vladimir Ilyich—chief of tunnel unit No 38 of the Dneprometrostroy Design and Construction Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. From Kirovskoye Election District No 80 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Sobolev, Sergey Vladislavovich—teacher at Zaporozhye Pedagogical Institute No 1, CPSU member, lives in the city of Zaporozhye. From Khortitskiy Election District No 184 in Zaporozhye Oblast.

Spic, Nikolay Mikhaylovich—first secretary of the Yalta City Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Yalta. From Yalta Election District No 250 in the Crimean Oblast.

Stadnichenko, Vladimir Yakovlevich—editor of the newspaper RADYANSKA UKRAINA, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Tatarbunary Election District No 315 in Odessa Oblast.

Starichenko, Aleksandr Gavrilovich—director of the Krasnaya zvezda Sovkhoz in Konstantinovskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the city of Druzhkovka. From Druzhkovka Election District No 124 in Donetsk Oblast.

Stepenko, Vasily Ivanovich—first secretary of the Poltavskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Poltava. From Poltava Election District No 330 in Poltava Oblast.

Stetskiv, Taras Stepanovich—junior scientific associate of the Lvov Museum of Ukrainian Art, not a party member, lives in the city of Lvov. From Mostisskiy Election District No 275 in Lvov Oblast.

Stupnikov, Yuriy Ivanovich—second secretary of the Sevastopol Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Sevastopol. From Leninskiy Election District No 236 in the city of Sevastopol.

Sugonyako, Aleksandr Anatolyevich—senior engineer-economist at the Zhitomir Branch of the Kiev Polytechnical Institute, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Zarechany in Zhitomirskiy Rayon. From Korolevskiy Election District No 154 in Zhitomir Oblast.

Sukhoy, Vasily Vasilyevich—first secretary of the Pavlogradskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Pavlograd. From Pavlograd Election District No 103 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Sukhorukov, Andrey Aleksandrovich—docent of Kharkov State University imeni A. M. Gorkiy, not a party member, lives in the city of Kharkov. From Dzerzhinskiy Election District No 367 in Kharkov Oblast.

Tanyuk, Leonid (Les) Stepanovich—director, deputy chairman of the governing board of the Kiev Branch of the Ukrainian Theatrical Figures' Union, not a party member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Vatutinskiy Election District No 3 in the city of Kiev.

Tarasenko, Aleksandr Grigoryevich—first secretary of the Znamenka Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Znamenka. From Znamenka Election District No 227 in Kirovograd Oblast.

Terekhov, Vladimir Pavlovich—writer, member of the USSR Writers' Union, CPSU member, lives in the city of Simferopol. From Tsentralnyy Election District No 242 in the Crimean Oblast.

Teryanik, Viktor Ivanovich—cutting face miner of the Donbassantratsit Production Association Mine imeni 60-letiya Velikoy Oktyabrskoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii, CPSU member, lives in the city Krasnyy Luch. From Krasnyy Luch Election District No 58 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Timchuk, Sergey Artemovich—chairman of the Shlyakh do komunizmu Kolkhoz in Kamenets-Podolskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Grushka in Kamenets-Podolskiy Rayon. From Kamenets-Podolskiy Election District No 405 in Khmelnytskiy Oblast.

Tikhonov, Viktor Nikolayevich—party committee secretary of the Voroshilovgradteplovoy Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Voroshilovgrad. From Zhovtnevyi Election District No 52 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Tkachuk, Anatoliy Fedorovich—design engineer of the Khmelnytskiy Radiotechnical Plant imeni XXV syezda KPSS, not a party member, lives in the city of Khmelnytskiy. From Zavodskiy Election District No 403 in Khmelnytskiy Oblast.

Tolstoukhov, Anatoliy Vladimirovich—deputy editor of the Volnovakhiyskiy Rayon newspaper ZNAMYA TRUDA, CPSU member, lives in the city of Volnovakha. From Volnovakha Election District No 148 in Donetsk Oblast.

Tolubko, Vladimir Borisovich—serviceman, CPSU member, lives in the city of Pervomaysk. From Pervomaysk Election District No 287 in Nikolayev Oblast.

Topalov, Valeriy Andreyevich—miner at the Dzerzhinskugol Production Association Mine imeni Artem, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Novgorodskoye of the Dzerzhinsk City Soviet. From Dzerzhinsk Election District No 122 in Donetsk Oblast.

Trizna, Valentin Sergeyevich—mechanic for mining machines of the Donetsugol Production Association Oktyabrskoye Mine Administration, CPSU member, lives in the city of Donetsk. From Kuybyshevskiy Election District No 114 in Donetsk Oblast.

Umanets, Yuriy Ivanovich—construction blaster at the Kherson Shipbuilding Production Association imeni 60-letiya Leninskogo komsomola, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kherson. From Komsomolskiy Election District No 394 in Kherson Oblast.

Usatenko, Vladimir Ivanovich—chief power engineer at the Krasnograd Experimental Station of the Dnepr Corn Scientific Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Krasnograd. From Krasnograd Election District No 389 in Kharkov Oblast.

Fileiko, Vladimir Filippovich—party committee secretary of the Sovkhoz imeni Gagarin in Gotvaldovskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Shchudkovka in Gotvaldovskiy Rayon. From Gotvald Election District No 387 in Kharkov Oblast.

Fomenko, Gennadiy Petrovich—chairman of the ispolkom of the Stakhanov City Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Stakhanov. From Stakhanov Election District No 65 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Khananov, Eduard Akhatovich—first deputy chairman of the ispolkom of the Voroshilovgrad Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Voroshilovgrad. From Svatovo Election District No 71 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Khilyuk, Aleksey Alekseyevich—chairman of the ispolkom of the Berdichev City Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Berdichev. From Berdichev Election District No 156 in Zhitomir Oblast.

Khmelnyuk, Valeriy Yakovlevich—first secretary of the Odessa Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Odessa. From Tairovo Election District No 300 in Odessa Oblast.

Khodorovskiy, Georgiy Ivanovich—department head of Chernovtsy State Medical Institute, CPSU member, lives in the city of Chernovtsy. From Leninskiy Election District No 430 in Chernovtsy Oblast.

Khomenko, Nikolay Grigoryevich—secretary of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Konotop Election District No 345 in Sumy Oblast.

Khomich, Dmitriy Mikhaylovich—first secretary of the Krivoy Rog Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Krivoy Rog. From Ingulets Election District No 91 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Khotlubey, Yuriy Yuyevich—first secretary of the Mariupol Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Mariupol. From Mariupol-Zhovtnevyi Election District No 135 in Donetsk Oblast.

Tsekov, Sergey Pavlovich—doctor at the Sakskiy Central Rayon Hospital, CPSU member, lives in the city of Saki. From Saki Election District No 248 in the Crimean Oblast.

Tsert, Nikolay Petrovich—master demolition specialist of the Voroshilovgradugol Production Association Perevalsk Mine, not a party member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Bugayevka in Perevalskiy Rayon. From Perevalsk Election District No 69 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Charodeyev, Aleksandr Vasilyevich—party committee secretary of the Donetsugol Production Association Mine imeni 60-letiya Sovetskoy Ukrainy, CPSU member, lives in the city of Donetsk. From Proletarskiy Election District No 116 in Donetsk Oblast.

Cheban, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich—chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin in Arbuzinskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Semenovka in Arbuzinskiy Rayon. From Arbuzinka Election District No 288 in Nikolayev Oblast.

Chervoniy, Vasily Mikhaylovich—apparatus member of the Rovno Azot Production Association, not a party member, lives in the city of Rovno. From Leninskiy Election District No 332 in Rovno Oblast.

Chernyavskiy, Aleksey Filippovich—chairman of the agroindustrial formations council of Sumy Oblast, CPSU member, lives in the city of Sumy. From Sumy Election District No 352 in Sumy Oblast.

Chepurnoy, Anatoliy Grigoryevich—chairman of the Zarya Kolkhoz in Borovskiy Rayon in Kharkov Oblast, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Boguslavka in Borovskiy Rayon. From Kupyansk Election District No 380 in Kharkov Oblast.

Chernokur, Vladimir Romanovich—director of the Mine Administration imeni XX partsyeyzda, CPSU member, lives in the city of Krivoy Rog. From Gornyskoye Election District No 88 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Chumak, Arkadiy Stepanovich—department head of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Velikaya Aleksandrovka Election District No 399 in Kherson Oblast.

Churakov, Valeriy Nikolayevich—chief engineer of the Shakhterskugol Production Association Shakhterskaya-Glubokaya Mine, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kirovskoye. From Shakhtersk Election District No 145 in Donetsk Oblast.

Shapoval, Vladimir Nikiforovich—chairman of the ispolkom of the Cherkassy Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, lives in the city of Cherkassy. From Chigirin Election District No 427 in Cherkassy Oblast.

Shvedenko, Nikolay Nikolayevich—director of the Voroshilovgrad Oblast Fish Production Combine, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Stanichno-Luganskoye. From Stanichno-Luganskoye Election District No 72 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Shvets, Valentin Rodionovich—first secretary of the Kagarlykskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kagarlyk. From Obukhov Election District No 223 in Kiev Oblast.

Shevchenko, Viktor Ivanovich—general director of the Makeyevka Metallurgical Combine imeni S. M. Kirov, CPSU member, lives in the city of Makeyevka. From Makeyevka-Tsentralnyy Election District No 133 in Donetsk Oblast.

Shevchenko, Aleskandr Tikhonovich—Ukrainian SSR minister of industrial construction materials, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Zaleshchiki Election District No 357 in Ternopol Oblast.

Shevchenko, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich—senior secretary of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences UKRAINSKIY BIOKHIMICHESKIY ZHURNAL, not a party member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Goloşeyevskiy Election District No 5 in the city of Kiev.

Shepa, Vasily Vasilyevich—director of the Transcarpathian Scientific Research Institute of Agroindustrial Production, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Vary in Beregovskiy Rayon. From Beregov Election District No 169 in the Transcarpathian Oblast.

Shershun, Nikolay Kharitonovich—general director of the Rovno Oblast Rovnoles Forestry Management Production Association, CPSU member, lives in the city of Rovno. From Kostopol Election District No 339 in Rovno Oblast.

Shekhovtsov, Aleksey Dmitriyevich—leading engineer of the specialized planning and design and technological bureau for modernization and technology of repair of equipment, not a party member, lives in the city of Kramatorsk. From Novokramatorskiy Election District No 128 in Donetsk Oblast.

Shinkaruk, Vladimir Maksimovich—chief agronomist at the Zavet Ilyicha Kolkhoz in Krivoozerskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Krivoye Ozero in Nikolayev Oblast. From Domanevka Election District No 289 in Nikolayev Oblast.

Shishkin, Viktor Ivanovich—deputy chairman of the Kirovograd Oblast Court, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kirovograd. From Kirovskiy Election District No 226 in Kirovograd Oblast.

Shkarban, Nikolay Ivanovich—chairman of the Radyanskiy Kolkhoz in Kobelyakskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Radyanskoye in Kobelyakskiy Rayon. From Kobelyaki Election District No 327 in Poltava Oblast.

Shlemko, Vladimir Teofilovich—actor at the Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast Musical Drama Theater imeni Franko, not a party member, lives in the city of Ivano-Frankovsk. From Kosov Election District No 201 in Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast.

Shovkoshitnyy, Vladimir Fedorovich—writer, member of the USSR Writers' Union, not a party member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Kharkovskiy Election District No 20 in the city of Kiev.

Shulga, Nikolay Aleksandrovich—department head of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, CPSU member, lives in the city of Kiev. From Lutugino Election District No 68 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Eysmont, Vladimir Yefimovich—general director of the Belaya Tserkov Ros Agroindustrial Combine, CPSU member, lives in the city of Belaya Tserkov. From Belaya Tserkov Election District No 216 in Kiev Oblast.

Yurchenko, Anatoliy Petrovich—first secretary of the Golopristanskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Golaya Pristan. From Skadovsk Election District No 402 in Kherson Oblast.

Yagoferov, Anatoliy Nikolayevich—director of the Voroshilovgrad Machine Building Plant imeni Parkhomenko, CPSU member, lives in the city of Voroshilovgrad. From Artemovsk Election District No 50 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Yakovishin, Leonid Grigoryevich—director of the Bobrovitsa Sovkhoz-Tekhnikum, CPSU member, lives in the city of Bobrovitsa. From Kozelets Election District No 444 in Chernigov Oblast.

Yanushevich, Stanislava Antonovna—rayon obstetrician-gynecologist of the Chernyakhovskiy Central Rayon Hospital, not a party member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Chernyakhov. From Zhitomir Election District No 160 in Zhitomir Oblast.

Yaryshev, Nikolay Mikhaylovich—director of the Lisichansk Sovkhoz in Popasnyanskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the settlement of Lisichanskin Popasnyanskiy Rayon. From Popasnaya Election District No 70 in Voroshilovgrad Oblast.

Yarchuk, Nikolay Nikolayevich—director of the Narkevichskiy Sugar Plant in Volochisskiy Rayon, CPSU member, lives in the urban-type settlement of Yasnoye in Volochisskiy Rayon. From Volochissk Election District No 408 in Khmel'nitskiy Oblast.

Yakheyeva, Tatyana Mikhaylovna—docent at the Chernigov Branch of Kiev Polytechnical Institute, not a party member, lives in the city of Chernigov. From Desna Election District No 438 in Chernigov Oblast.

Yatsenko, Vladimir Mikhaylovich—second secretary of the Korosten Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist

Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Korosten. From Korosten Election District No 157 in Zhitomir Oblast.

Yatsuba, Vladimir Grigoryevich—first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, CPSU member, lives in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. From Amur-Nizhnedneprovskiy Election District No 75 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Union of 'Democratic Forces' Formed in Donetsk

90UN1748A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
14 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by A. Gordeyev, RATAU correspondent: "'Yednaniya' Union Formed"]

[Text] DONETSK, 13 April (A. Gordeyev, RATAU correspondent)]—Formed in Donetsk Oblast, the "Yednaniya" Union has the mission of uniting and coordinating the efforts of all the democratic forces in this region. The new public organization is operating in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution and legislation, as well as with the international-legal obligations of this republic and the Soviet Union. The first large-scale action which it has begun to carry out is preparation for the 45th Anniversary of the Victory over Fascism.

Included in this union are departments of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, Red Cross, Peace Fund, Ukrainian Cultural Fund, Society for the Ukrainian Language imeni Taras Shevchenko, the regional organization of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka (Rukh), the "Alef" Jewish Cultural and Educational Center, as well as other organizations and associations.

As written in its charter, "Yednaniya" will promote and assist the restructuring of political, socioeconomic, and cultural life in accordance with the principles of humanism, democracy, freedom of speech and publication, freedom of conscience, and internationalism. The efforts of this union's members are being channeled into forming, within the multi-national Donetsk Basin, a climate of trust and friendship among people, into the revival of the culture, traditions, and customs of all the peoples living in this region. The new organization will also direct its efforts at solving inter-ethnic, labor, ecological, economic, political, and other problems by non-violent methods and means.

Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers Discusses Culture, Chernobyl, Economy

90UN1748B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
13 Apr 90 p 3

[Report by the Information Sector, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers: "Increase Responsibility for the Assigned Task"]

[Text] The regularly scheduled session of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers discussed the Comprehensive

Program for the Basic Directions of Cultural Development in the Ukrainian SSR During the Period Until the Year 2005.

This problem was "assigned" by practical life itself. In August of last year a government commission was set up with the participation of the concerned republic-level ministries and departments, as well as the Ukraine's creative unions and public organizations. And it was this commission which prepared the above-mentioned document.

The Comprehensive Program sets as its goal the preservation, revival, and development of Ukrainian culture as an original, uniquely independent historical phenomenon of world civilization, and, together with it, the culture of other national or ethnic groups living on this republic's territory, along with the creation of the necessary material and spiritual conditions for each and every person's multi-faceted and harmonious development, the discovery of his capabilities and talents, and, based on this, ensuring further enhancement of the role played by the spiritual sphere in the society's life. Provisions have been made, in particular, to implement measures for a further upsurge of music and the fine arts, the restructuring of cinematography and video, the development of television, radio broadcasting, book publishing and the press, cultural-educational work, and popular or folk-type amateur creative amateur activity, as well as organizing leisure-time activities for the population.

The spiritual attainments and heritage of the Ukrainian SSR's other peoples, as well as those of the entire world civilization, must be a substantial factor in the function of contemporary Ukrainian culture. And, therefore, provisions have been made to significantly expand cultural ties and cooperation with the union republics and foreign countries.

The program has specified tasks with regard to broadening scientific research in the field of building culture, elucidating problems in the history, theory, and sociology of Ukrainian culture, as well as training personnel and upgrading their qualifications and skills.

The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers has approved the proposed program and obligated the oblispolkoms, Kiev and Sevastopol gorispolkoms, together with the republic's ministries and departments, to ensure by 1 July of the current year the working out of analogous programs in oblasts, cities, and rayons, as well as at enterprises, in associations, and on kolkhozes.

Gosplan, along with the ministries, departments, and Gosagroprom of the Ukrainian SSR, and the gorispolkoms have been assigned the task—while the plans for economic and social development are being worked out—of providing for the allotment of funds and material resources to implement the Comprehensive Program, for strengthening the material and technical base of cultural institutions, as well as for ensuring that they are utilized in accordance with present-day requirements.

The mass media must regularly or systematically inform the population about the progress being made in implementing the Comprehensive Program of the Basic Directions of Cultural Development in the Ukrainian SSR During the Period Until the Year 2005.

The Presidium examined the progress being made in executing the decrees of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers with regard to speeding up the resettlement of inhabitants from the populated centers of the Narodichskiy Rayon, Zhitomir Oblast and the Poleskiy Rayon, Kiev Oblast.

It was noted that the ministries, departments, and oblispolkoms participating in this cause have unsatisfactorily organized the execution of the assigned tasks, they have underestimated the social importance of the measures provided by the government with regard to resettling people from the area contaminated by radiation. The construction of housing and facilities for social and everyday purposes to accommodate the newly resettled people are evolving very, very slowly. There are no guarantees that the planning-and-estimate documents will be made and completed prior to the deadline which has been set. Recruiting skilled workers for the construction units and outfitting them with mechanisms, machinery, and motor transport have all been delayed.

Despite the government's mandate, the Volynsk, Kiev, Odessa, and Sumy oblispolkoms have reserved housing for families to be resettled from the rayon centers of Poleskoye and Narodichi in houses to be put into use during the second half of 1990 rather than during the first half, as they were assigned to do. Despite the urgent need to speed up the resettlement of people and the availability of apartments set aside for this purpose in a number of oblasts, the Zhitomir Oblispolkom has not issued a single permit to citizens, whereas the Kiev Oblispolkom has issued only two.

For failing to adopt timely measures ensuring the implementation of the assigned tasks, the Presidium has strictly reprimanded Comrade G.A. Gordeychuk, the Ukrainian SSR first deputy minister of construction. Consideration was given to his statement that the housing now under construction by the ministry's contract organizations will be put into use prior to 15 September of the current year.

For unsatisfactorily monitoring and being too slow in adopting effective measures to organize the execution of specific tasks assigned by the government, as well as for inefficiency in solving problems connected with the resettlement of families and the creation of proper conditions for people living in populated centers contaminated by radiation, Comrade N.S. Stepanenko, deputy chairman of the Kiev Oblispolkom, was reprimanded.

The leading officials of ministries, departments, and oblispolkoms have been charged with the obligation of doing everything without delay to carry out the tasks assigned by the government.

In executing the decree of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, dated 17 February 1990 and entitled "On the Ecological Situation in the Republic and Measures To Radically Improve It," the oblispolkoms have been assigned the task of setting aside an additional 800 apartments in apartment houses to be put into use during the second and third quarters of this year for the resettlement in them from the rayon centers of Poleskoye and Narodnichi of families which include minor children and pregnant women. With these same goals in mind, the Kiev Gorispolkom has set aside during the first six months of 1990 some 400 apartments under construction by an order from the Administration of Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and which were provided for the organizations, ministries, and departments under its jurisdiction.

The Presidium obligated the Kiev and Zhitomir oblispolkoms during the course of April-May to complete work on drawing up lists of families with minor children and pregnant women living in populated centers under rigid monitoring controls for resettlement—at their wishes—to other regions of the republic during the years 1991-1993.

There was discussion of the problem of the lack of accord permitted by several of this republic's ministries and departments between the plans for profit and the payments from it to the budget by indicators approved in the Ukrainian SSR State Budget for 1990.

It was noted that many labor collectives have undertaken plans lower than those assigned to them by the control figures and even lower than the level attained last year with regard to profits and the payments from them to the budget. This has created additional difficulties in fulfilling the revenues of the State Budget and financing the measures provided by it. This pertains, above all, to enterprises and organizations of the republic-level Ministry of Light Industry, State Committee for Petroleum Products, Ministry of the Timber Industry, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work, and Ministry of Grain Products.

The ministries and departments indicated above, as well as others, do not provide a principled assessment to the leading officials whose collectives, proceeding from narrow-group interests, adopt economically unjustified financial plans, fail to manifest persistence with regard to every sub-department enterprise performing its obligation with respect to payments made to the budget.

The Presidium directed the attention of the ministries and leading officials of the Ukrainian SSR departments to the necessity for introducing the needed order in this matter, for taking urgent and timely measures to seek out internal-economic reserves for increasing product output, reducing its production cost, and increasing its profitability and profit growth.

The Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Finance has been assigned the task of implementing the financing of the expenditures provided for in the budget, taking into

account the performance of the obligations to the budget by the appropriate ministries and departments.

Information Sector, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers

Allocation of 1989 Ukrainian Communist Party Funds

90UN1759A Kiev KOMMUNIST UKRAINY in Russian No 4, April 90 pp 91-92

[Unattributed article: "On the Ukrainian Communist Party Budget"]

[Text] **Recurring questions in letters addressed to the editorial staff are: What does the Ukrainian Communist Party budget consist of and how is it being used? The following information on the Ukrainian Communist Party budget for 1989 was provided at the request of the editors by the Administration of Affairs of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.**

The Ukrainian Communist Party budget for 1989 has been fulfilled by 107.7 percent in terms of income and by 96.3 per cent in expenditures.

The primary source of budget income was party membership dues, amounting to 273.1 million rubles or 75 percent of total receipts. Additional income was derived from profits earned by party publications and other sources of revenue, including proceeds from the sale of property by party organs and the cost of party forms.

Expenditures for the maintenance of the Ukrainian Communist Party committees and institutions, including those associated with raising the wages of party workers as of 1 October 1989 and with the construction or repair of the buildings of party committees and publishing houses, were entirely provided for from party budget revenues; they totaled 235.8 million rubles or 10.4 million rubles less than approved allocations, of which 5,037,900 rubles set aside for wages were not utilized.

A total of 87.9 percent of all party budget expenditures went to finance the activities of local party committees and institutions and develop their bases of material supply, including the sum of 156.7 rubles to maintain party city, oblast, and rayon committees and for workers in the primary party organizations relieved of their duties. It is estimated that expenditures of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee amounted to 6.7 million rubles, of which 5.9 million rubles—or 4.4 percent of the total outlays for the upkeep of party organs—went to maintain the Ukrainian CP Central Committee administrative system.

A total of 11.7 million rubles was spent to maintain party institutions and mass political activity.

Expenditures for the training and retraining of party, soviet, and ideological workers and for the maintenance of higher party schools in Kiev and Odessa amounted to 7.5 million rubles.

In a resolution dated 18 February 1989, the CPSU Central Committee adopted a resolution setting aside funds for the needs of the primary party organizations equal to 3 percent of party membership dues, providing 6.6 million rubles for the Ukrainian Communist Party budget, of which 4.2 million rubles or 63.6 percent was used and 2.1 million rubles was left to the primary party organizations. For example, 285,800 rubles or 54.3 percent of funds allocated to the secretaries of the primary party organizations in Kiev remained were not spent, while 56.3 percent of funds for Sumy Oblast and 53.2 percent of funds for Odessa Oblast remained unused. At the same time, a number of the primary party organizations propose to increase the share of membership fees expended for their needs to 50 percent. The Ukrainian CP Central Committee is studying these proposals and will submit them for the consideration of the 28th Ukrainian CP Congress and the 28th CPSU Congress.

To provide assistance for communists, particularly communist pensioners, 881,600 rubles or 99.4 percent of funds allocated for this purpose were spent.

For the construction of buildings to accommodate local party organizations and publishing houses, to construct new housing, and repair existing living quarters, 38.7 million rubles were spent.

With due regard for the primary tasks in developing the social sphere for both urban and rural populations, the Ukrainian CP Central Committee in 1988 and 1989 reviewed construction plans and eliminated 47 (almost one half) the new construction projects at an estimated cost of 83 million rubles.

Six buildings, including a building of the Lvov party obkom and oblispolkom, have been assigned to the local soviets for the needs of environmental protection. However, their renovation is proceeding extremely slowly, and only the building of the Mirgorod party gorkom and gorispolkom had been adapted for use as an outpatient clinic and put back in use as of December 1989.

The party organization in Kiev and 10 oblast party organizations covered all their expenses in 1989 with their own revenues. The remaining 15 party oblast organizations received subsidies of redistributed income from the Ukrainian Communist Party budget.

Expenditures for the maintenance of the party Institute of History, an affiliate of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, and for the Kiev and Lvov affiliates of the Central Museum of V. I. Lenin amounted to 971,400 rubles.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee and auditing commissions at all levels have been maintaining systematic oversight control over the disposition of the party budget.

Substantial discrepancies in the payment of membership dues have been noted in the course of reviewing and checking the annual financial statements of a number of party organizations.

The expenditure of funds from the party budget occurred within the limits of authorized allocations and for the specific purposes intended. No gross violations of financial discipline were detected by audits.

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Lawyers' Union Chairman on Role of MVD Interior Troops

90UN1800A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 17, Apr 90 p 5

[Interview with Andrey Adamovich Trebkov, chairman of the USSR Union of Jurists, conducted by SOYUZ correspondent Nikolay Aleksandrov: "Interior Troops: Rights and Responsibilities"]

[Text] For how many years we knew practically nothing about them. Now, having experienced Tbilisi, Sumgait, Baku, and Nagornyy Karabakh, we speak of them almost every day.

A month ago a law was adopted in the USSR Supreme Soviet. It will be discussed in the conversation of our correspondent Nikolay Aleksandrov with USSR Union of Jurists Chairman Andrey Adamovich TREBKOV.

[Correspondent] How did it happen that the interior troops had no legal status for over 70 years?

[Trebkov] That is not entirely true, since in the first years of Soviet rule, more precisely in 1920, a resolution signed by V. I. Lenin was adopted by the RSFSR Council of Labor and Defense regarding the republic's interior defense troops. This resolution was in essence the first normative statute regulating the activity of the interior troops. This normative statute provided specifically for their participation in defending the state structure and maintaining public order. Unfortunately, after the death of V. I. Lenin, for a period of almost 70 years the legal base defining the functions, responsibilities and rights of these troops was practically not developed. And it could hardly have been any other way, if we realistically evaluate the state of our society since the mid-80's.

It is only those changes which are today taking place in the economic, political, social, international and other spheres of Soviet society that have elevated this question to first priority importance. It has become perfectly clear that the standards of the 20's which regulated the activity of the interior troops have become hopelessly outdated. In this sense, the 28 July 1988 Ukaz adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, "On the Responsibilities and Rights of the Interior Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in Protecting Public Order" was the first step by legislators directed at bringing the legal mechanism of the interior troops' activity into line with the processes of democratic development of society and formulation of a legal state.

At the same time, at the first Congress of People's Deputies it was subjected to serious criticism, and the Congress charged the USSR Supreme Soviet with the task of studying the question of the constitutionality of this Ukaz. This was done by the Committee on Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order. Upon completion of its work, the committee concluded that the activity of the interior troops must be regulated not

by ukazes of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and especially not by departmental orders and instructions, but rather by USSR Law, since it is directly associated with the defense of the constitutional rights and freedoms of USSR citizens. Such a Law was adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, and published on 31 March 1990.

[Correspondent] What kind of interior troops are needed: Professional or conscript?

[Trebkov] I believe that a high degree of professionalism combined with responsibility are the most reliable guarantees in any endeavor, and particularly in defense of the constitutional rights and freedoms of the citizens. Therefore, the formulation of the interior troops according to the professional principle, i.e., on a voluntary basis by means of concluding a contract, I believe, is preferable.

However, we must remember that for the successful activity of these subdivisions we must adhere to certain requirements: They must be mobile, live in barracks (and not in apartments which are located at different ends of the cities), etc.

Is this possible today? I believe that we are not yet ready for this. Therefore, the law makes provision for the interior troops to be staffed by personnel called up to active military service. The duties of the soldiers and sergeants may be complemented by USSR citizens on a voluntary basis.

We must also note that considerable supplemental expenditures will be needed for maintaining professional interior troops, and not only for paying their salaries, but also for equipping them and providing them with everything they need. Economizing on safety often leads to human sacrifice, and this, you will agree, is too high a price to pay.

[Correspondent] According to the law, these troops are subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Perhaps it would be better to turn them into a national guard, or to formulate them after the example of the UN troops, or to make them subordinate to the USSR President?

[Trebkov] According to the UN Charter, the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the Security Council, which has been granted the right of special formulation and use of the armed forces of the UN members. Thus, UN troops may only be used to maintain international peace and security or to stop an act of aggression. Therefore, the principles of formulation and activity of UN troops cannot be applied in national legislation which regulates questions of ensuring domestic security.

As for the question of subordination of interior troops, in most foreign countries the special police units of a militarized character which are analogous to our interior troops: stand-by police in the FRG; the mobile forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs public security police in

Italy; the republic security unit in France, etc., are subordinate to the ministry of internal affairs.

The interior troops may also be subordinated directly to the President's Council, and in this case their authority would be increased. However, the institution of the Presidency in our country has existed for just over a month. We need time to gain experience in such governing. Therefore, at the current stage, the resolution of the question of subordination of interior troops as provided by the law corresponds to the existing realities. Our problem is that certain important questions are being resolved in haste. Moreover, at first only the positive moments are seen in the adopted decision, and then later the negative aspects are manifested, in connection with which it becomes necessary to introduce corrections.

[Correspondent] Could it happen that the militia does not decide to take action, but the troops go overboard on it?

[Trebkov] The basic principle of a legal state is the adherence to legality. I believe that with correct and timely application of the legislation regulating this group of legal relations, such questions will not arise. At the same time, perhaps, we should also review in the law the responsibility of the interior troops for the loss inflicted as a result of violation of the law.

[Correspondent] Unfortunately, we have enough examples of cases where an adopted law does not work. How can we explain this?

[Trebkov] The effectiveness of realization of the statutes of any law depends on a minimum of three factors.

First of all, the legal standards secured in it must bear not a declarative character, but rather must contain a real mechanism for legal resolution of a clearly defined circle of questions. In other words, they must contain a guarantee, i.e., ultimately everything depends on the quality of the law itself.

Secondly, we need a high professional level of workers of the appropriate law enforcement organs, which is largely determined by the quality of selection and training of the cadres.

And finally, thirdly, the level of legal culture of all members of society and their readiness and capacity for social-legal activity within the framework of the existing legislation is of great importance.

[Correspondent] Don't you think that it would be more correct to adopt, along with this law, also a law on national relations?

[Trebkov] I am convinced that the interior troops cannot serve as a means of resolving international relations, including conflicts. They must be used exclusively for defending the constitutional rights and freedoms of the USSR citizens, which I stated at the beginning of our conversation. Therefore, the need to have a special law

on national relations cannot, in my opinion, be made dependent on whether or not there is a law regulating the activity of the interior troops.

Statistics on Moscow Crimes Committed by Non-Residents

90UN1662A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 15, Apr 90 p 18

[Interview with Major General A. Bugayev, deputy chief of GUV D, Moscow City Ispolkom, by Yevgeniy Leonov: "In the World of 'Visitors' Crimes"]

[Text] The capital... The streets are full of city dwellers and guests. But it is not always with good intentions that Moscow's guests cross its thresholds. Who, then, are the criminals who are bringing misfortune to Muscovites and their friends?

The peculiarities of this problem are discussed by Major General A. Bugayev, deputy chief of GUV D [Main Administration of Internal Affairs], Moscow City Ispolkom.

[A. Bugayev] As a rule, the crimes committed by persons living in other cities are of a mercenary nature and frequently also are fraught with danger to the health and life of the victims. This tendency is especially discernible in the example of the commission of apartment break-ins, out of the total number of which last year 34.7 percent represents the share of the uninvited guests.

For example, 2969 crimes were committed in 1987 (18 percent of the total number of crimes recorded in the city); in 1988, 2943 (respectively, 19.9 percent); and in 1989 the increase already came to 4815, of 24.3 percent of the total number. The share of heinous crimes committed by non-residents has been characterized by large growth rates. Incidentally, an increase has been observed in practically all types of crimes. Something that is especially alarming is the fact that during the past three years there has even been a more than quadrupling (from 242 to 1071 cases) in the number of group crimes. And it is already completely intolerable that there has been an increase from 9.2 percent to 22 percent in the number of instances in which non-residents have involved minors in their criminal activities.

From a statistical summary:

The growth rates of individual types of crimes committed by non-residents during the period from 1987 through 1989 were as follows:

- heinous crimes: from 455 (16.6 percent) to 1131 (26.6 percent);
- thefts of state property: from 6.2 to 28.1 percent;
- robberies with the purpose of taking personal property away from citizens: from 30.6 to 47.3 percent;

—manufacture, possession, transportation, and sale of narcotics: from 19.5 to 60.7 percent;

—thefts of narcotics: from 14.8 to 30.3 percent.

One must add to this that there has been a corresponding increase in the percentage of crimes against the individual that have been committed by non-resident citizens:

—rape: from 9.8 to 15.9 percent;

—sodomy: from 27.8 to 53.8 percent;

—attempted murder: from 15.4 to 26.1 percent;

—heinous bodily injury: from 15.2 to 21.3 percent.

[A. Bugayev] The non-resident criminals who commit the largest number of crimes are those who have reached the age of 30 to 49 years. At the same time, the number of persons aged from 18 to 24 years who have been brought to criminal responsibility has increased to 31 percent; and last year the number of minors who were brought to criminal responsibility increased to 15 percent.

Of the persons who received criminal punishment, more than 30 percent are workers. The next most sizable group is PTU [vocational-technical school] and technicum students, and students at institutions of higher learning. It is typical that 86.6 percent of the total number of persons brought to criminal responsibility have secondary or incomplete secondary education. Incidentally, among the criminals only 8.6 percent are women.

From a statistical summary:

More than 35 percent of all the non-resident citizens who were brought to criminal responsibility in 1989 were residents of Moscow Oblast, especially from such rayons as Lyuberetskiy Rayon, 22.3 percent; Mytishinskiy Rayon, 8.2 percent; Balashikhinskiy Rayon, 7 percent; Chimkinskiy Rayon, 5.7 percent; and Podolskiy Rayon, 5.4 percent.

From the adjacent oblasts, the largest number of citizens brought to criminal responsibility lived in Kalinin, Vladimir, Tula, and Kaluga oblasts.

[A. Bugayev] There are a very large number of so-called "bombzhi" [those without a specific place of residence]. It is becoming increasingly difficult to work with them. Today Article 198 of the RSFSR UK [Criminal Code] (violation of the rules governing the internal passport system) is practically invalid. At the present time, nothing more effective has been planned by legislation. So the "bombzhi" frequently live in the city for months wherever they want, and commit crimes (especially apartment break-ins).

For example, last year a certain "bomzh" named Volodin was detained. During the period from September through November he had committed apartment break-ins at 14 Moscow addresses.

Incidentally, committing apartment break-ins in the capital is somewhat easier than in other parts of the country, since the punishment will be lighter. For example, in Georgia a person who is found guilty of breaking and entering can receive up to 10 years of incarceration, but the RSFSR UK stipulates no more than 7 years. That gives people food for thought.

Most frequently the non-residents commit pickpocket crimes—as many as 81 percent of the total number. Recently there has also been an increase in the number of thefts of weapons, which constitute 43 percent of the total number.

During the first two months of this year, 680 crimes were committed, and during the corresponding period last year, 540. On the whole the increase in the number of crimes committed by non-residents during the period from the beginning of the year (as compared with 1989) comes to 26 percent. There has also been a 21.6-percent increase in the number of crimes committed by non-residents in a group.

Recently, for example, on the territory of militia districts 64 and 89, criminals who had not yet been identified committed two bold holdups that were similar to one another and that used taxis. In the course of the work to investigate these crimes, the MUR [Moscow Office of Criminal Investigation] received an operational report to the effect that they could have been committed by two southerners, known by the names or nicknames Alik and Roma, who had been helped by prostitutes who live permanently near the Ivushka and Pechora cafes that are situated on Kalininskiy Prospekt.

Using the incoming information, as well as the information that had been previously known, the GUV D began to carry out its plan to combat the crimes being committed with the aid of taxis, and special measures were carried out. As a result, 56 southerners were detained for good cause at the cafes that were mentioned. They proved to include 11 "bombzhi", and others had been registered in the city on a limited basis and for a period of instruction, but they had been engaging in affairs quite remote from the stated purposes of their residency.

This motley crew proved to include the criminals who were being sought, who, together with two prostitutes Z. and K., were caught in the act of committing attacks on citizens. In addition, it was revealed that they had committed similar crimes on the territory of militia districts 45 and 74.

From a statistical summary:

During the first months of 1990, the crimes that continue to be the predominant types of crimes committed by non-residents of Moscow are: robberies (46.2 percent); thefts of citizens' private property (36.7 percent); possession and sale of narcotics (47 percent); apartment break-ins (35.5 percent); pickpocketings (82 percent); and extortion (28.6 percent). There is a high percentage of murders (33.3 percent) and rapes (28.2 percent).

A total of 785 non-resident citizens have been brought to criminal responsibility (this is 31.3 percent more than during the corresponding period last year).

There is information to the effect that the non-residents committed 37.5 percent of their crimes while in a state of intoxication.

How should one evaluate that fact? In February of this year, P., a cashier at TsUM [Central Department Store], was murdered in her apartment in a building on Ulitsa Odesskaya. Her body was discovered with knife wounds and signs of strangulation.

It was established that, the night before the murder, P. had been in the Arbat Restaurant, where she met three men who had allegedly arrived from the city of Kuybyshev. At about 2300 hours, P. left the restaurant with one of them.

A day later, citizen S. was brought to the hospital with knife wounds. He was a resident of Irkutsk Oblast and for a certain period of time had rented an apartment in a building on Prospekt Mira. He had been robbed of approximately 4000 rubles. He stated that the crime had been committed by three men from the city of Kuybyshev whom he had recently met.

An intensive search for the criminals began. All the on-duty units of the Moscow militia subdivisions were checked. As a result it was established that the three Kuybyshev residents had been brought to the militia subdivision responsible for guarding Sevastopol Hotel. Their photographs were shown to S. and to a female friend of P., who definitely recognized the criminals. As a result, the group was located and detained.

The quoted figures and facts attest to a very serious situation that has developed in Moscow with regard to crimes committed by non-residents. The fight against this requires the expenditure of additional funds and the sending of operatives on detached duty to all parts of the country. Of course, we are always pleased to accept the help provided by our associates in other parts of the country. We hope that this interaction will be reinforced, since we have observed the arising of a large number of problems that are shared by all the subdivisions of USSR MVD, problems that are linked with interregional crime, with criminals who are roaming all over the country, and with the same kind of uninvited guests in many major cities where it is easy to get lost and escape punishment.

In conclusion I would like to add that, in order to stop the crimes being committed by the uninvited thugs, the militia needs the population's assistance. It needs even the tiniest bit of information concerning crimes that are being planned, and about the persons who are planning them.

Kazakh Procuracy Official on Combating Speculation
90UNI801A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 90 p 4

[Article by A. Konstantinov, Kazakh SSR deputy procurator: "Facing the Law: To Stop Speculation"]

[Text] Existing problems of availability of manufactured consumer goods and food for consumers are being greatly

exacerbated by the intensified activity of the criminal element, such as various bribe takers, wheeler-dealers and especially speculators. Speculation is one of the most dangerous economic crimes hurting the interests of Soviet consumer trade and citizens, and it is related to abuses in the service sector, theft, bribery and other crimes. Speculators often enter into illegal deals with officials and, benefiting from the poor organization and control over movements of goods from producer to consumer and knowing that excess demand exists for some types of goods, profit at workers' expense. The lure of easy and often large profits entices many onto the path of crime and if a couple of years ago black market goods had a 40-60 percent markup over their nominal price, now that markup has gone up to 3-to-4 times.

In 1989, R400,000 [rubles] worth of valuables was seized from speculators. The growth of speculation has been noted in all oblasts except Guryev, Dzhambul and Kzyl-Orda.

Like a cancerous tumor, this phenomenon has penetrated into all area of our life. Speculators sell goods not only on flea markets but near stores, on the streets, in organizations and enterprises and in their own apartments. Direct sale of imported goods from warehouses, wholesale facilities and storerooms persists, accompanied by concealment of such goods from consumers.

Yielding to numerous demands by citizens and public organizations to take decisive measures to intensify the fight against speculation, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium passed the Ukase "On Strengthening Penalties for Abuses in Retail Trade and Speculation" on March 22, 1990. The ukase came into force on March 24 of this year.

The ukase introduced changes into the Kazakh SSR criminal code and the Kazakh SSR administrative violations code.

For instance, Article 160 of the Kazakh SSR administrative violations code, which sets penalties to retail and public catering employees for violating rules of consumer trade, was divided into three parts by the new law.

Part 1 of this article states that all consumer trade employees, including managers, can be fined for violating rules of consumer trade set by industry regulations and orders, even if their activities do not contain criminal actions.

The law specially separated penalties for selling goods from warehouses, wholesale facilities and storerooms, as well as for concealing goods from consumers, committed by persons other than managers of consumer trade organizations into Part 2 of the article. Such activities are punishable by fines of R100 to R500. Managers who commit such offenses are to be charged under Article 166-2 of the Kazakh SSR criminal code.

Retail trade and public catering employees can be fined R500 to R1,000 for a second administrative offense described in Part 2 committed within a year.

Given the importance of combating drunkenness, violations of consumer trade rules on selling alcoholic beverages fall into a separate article of the administrative violations code which raises the minimum fine to R200 (Article 161). However, sale from warehouses, wholesale facilities and storerooms, as well as concealment of alcoholic beverages from consumers, are punishable under Article 160, Part 2 of the administrative violations code, while managers are to be charged under the criminal code.

Article 164 of the Kazakh SSR administrative violations code defines penalties for private vending activities in urban centers outside specially designated locations, setting them at a fine of R50 with or without confiscation of merchandise. This article was also supplemented by Part 2, setting larger penalties for private vending of manufactured goods at unauthorized locations in the form of a fine of R50 to R200 and confiscation of merchandise.

The ukase introduced administrative penalties (Article 164-2) for citizens selling products or other goods not made by them at prices exceeding existing state retail prices on such products or goods in the form of fines of R100 to R200 and confiscation of merchandise.

The same infraction repeated within a year entails a fine of R200 to R500 and confiscation of merchandise, or correctional labor for a term of 1 to 2 months with 20 percent of salary withheld and confiscation of merchandise.

Administrative penalties for petty speculation (Article 165) have been increased substantially. According to changes introduced by the ukase, the fine for such actions can amount to R100-R300 with confiscation of merchandise. A repeat conviction of petty speculation within a year is punishable by a fine of R300 to 1,000 with confiscation of merchandise or correctional labor for a term of 1 to 2 months with 20 percent of salary withheld and confiscation of merchandise.

The ukase of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium amended Article 166-2 of the Kazakh SSR Criminal Code. Now, only managers using their office to sell goods from warehouses, wholesale facilities and storerooms, as well as to conceal them from customers, can be charged under Part 1 of this article. They can be punished by incarceration for a period of up to 1 year or correctional labor for the same period or a fine of R500 to R1,000, accompanied by a ban on holding certain offices or engaging in certain activities.

Part 2 of this article states that violations of rules of trade perpetrated by employees in collusion with a group of individuals or by a manager repeatedly (two or more times) is punishable by incarceration for a period of time of up to 2 years with or without confiscation of property or correctional labor for the same term with or without confiscation of property, or a fine of R1,000 to R3,000, accompanied by a ban on holding certain offices or engaging in certain activities.

Actions listed in Parts 1 and 2 of this article, when perpetrated on a large scale (sale or concealment of R2,500 worth of goods or more), or by persons previously convicted of the same offenses, are punishable by incarceration for a period of 3 to 7 years or a fine of R3,000 to R5,000 with or without confiscation of property and with a ban on holding certain offices or engaging in certain activities.

Changes were made in all parts of Article 168 of the criminal code. According to Part 1, purchase and resale of goods or other objects for personal gain in the amount of R100 to R200 is punishable by incarceration for a period of up to 3 years with or without confiscation of property or correctional labor for up to 2 years with or without confiscation of property or a fine of R1,000 to R3,000.

Part 2 of Article 168 of the republic criminal code, in addition to existing crimes, such as repeated speculation or speculation involving large sums (R200 and more), lists new crimes, such as conspiracy to engage in speculation with a group of individuals or involving state, cooperative or other public institutions. The addition of the latter crime was meant to discourage those who, for instance, misrepresent themselves as employees or state, cooperative or public organizations or associations in order to sell goods for personal gain.

Part 3 of the present article states that speculation involving especially large sums (R1,000 and more), or committed by persons previously convicted of speculation or by an organized group, is punishable by incarceration for a period of 5 to 10 years with confiscation of property.

Penalties for violating rules of sale of alcoholic beverages (Article 212 of the Kazakh SSR criminal code) were made stiffer. Now persons previously penalized for such transgressions can be punished by correctional labor for a period of up to 2 years or fined R200 to R1,000 with a ban on working in retail trade or public catering enterprises for a period of 3 to 5 years.

We do not expect, of course, that by simply passing this ukase of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium we can successfully solve problems related to combatting speculation and abuses. Effectiveness in uncovering and closing speculators' channels for obtaining deficit goods greatly depends on the initiative and intensity of work of the OBKhSS [Department for Combating Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation], people's inspectors and trade union workers' inspectors. The consumer himself should not stand idly by. Only then will the new law be effective.

Street Crime Among Kazan Youth Gangs Grows

90UNI765A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 29 Apr 90 Second Edition p 6

[Article by N. Sergeyev from Moscow and Kazan in the "Criminal Report" column: "The One-Way Ticket"]

[Text] They are becoming particularly aggressive late in the evening, when the capital's bustling daytime life quiets

down and its streets become somewhat empty. A group of teenagers selects its "subject" in advance. It is almost always someone like themselves, a visitor, who is feeling insecure in the vast nighttime city. A "truce emissary" is sent to him, demanding that he surrender his money or a thing to which they have taken a fancy. If the peaceful "negotiation" does not suffice, the entire group quickly surrounds the stubborn individual. And, in this case, other "arguments" come into play: fists, metal rods, and even knives....

They arrive in Moscow on the "Tatarstan" industrial enterprise train, which runs daily between Kazan and the capital's railway station of the same name. They arrive traveling light, not burdening themselves with luggage, but not with empty hands. In Kazan Railway Station's police [militia] division, I was shown a whole arsenal. In it one can find excellently made imitations of the "TT" pistol [Tokarev automatic pistol made by the Tula Arms Plant], files sharpened at one end, homemade nunchakus, chains, pieces of reinforcing bars [rebars], lead pellets.... "These are for self-defense," the boys protest when such objects are found in their possession. However, as is apparent from the numerous reports, it is more often necessary to defend oneself from the teenagers themselves. They have thoroughly mastered the maxim: The best defense is the attack.

"The stripdown" ["zachistka"]—that is what the police officers call their check of the waiting rooms, the area around the railway station, the underground passageways, and the platforms. It is conducted long after midnight.

And here we are, moving slowly through the rooms, walking around piles of handbags, suitcases, and boxes. My companion, S. Khodash, has been doing enforcement work at the railway station since 1950. He knows: Sleepiness has overcome most of the passengers now, and the time has come for pickpockets and robbers; cardsharps and prostitutes are becoming more active, and the bomzhi [those with no specific place of residence] are returning from the city. At just this time, several months ago, a teenager, who had come from Kazan, inflicted knife wounds on boys of his own age from Kolomna, near Moscow, who did not want to share their money.

There are a good many places at the Kazan Railway Station, where it is possible to hide from outsiders' eyes. However, the teenagers prefer the military room. Here, having seated themselves in plastic chairs, they can spend the night, find out the news from acquaintances, and reach agreement on joint actions. How they get in here is not understood. Indeed, a military patrol, which does not admit outsiders, stands at the entrance to the room. But it is precisely this room that always yields the greatest number of arrestees.

"An abrupt leap in criminality among teenagers has been observed in the last 3 years," says Police [Militia] Major R. Kashuba, chief of the Moscow-Kazan Station's Inspectorate for Juvenile Affairs. "Nothing like it has

ever happened before, during the 18 years of my work. In the past, not as many teenagers were arrested during a year as are arrested now during any day. The groups cause particular concern. They buy tickets to Moscow for one purpose—to get money here, obtain stylish things, and have a good time. They speak openly of their intentions. 'I mean to have some blue jeans,' a boy arrested for stealing told me. 'If I can't raise the money, I'll take them off somebody. They'll buy themselves some more.'"

Sometimes the teenagers use "civilized" methods for increasing their wealth. I was shown a 15-kopeck coin on a string. You drop this "bait" into an automatic ticket-vending machine, obtain a ticket, and then pull the coin back out. The money is undamaged, and you can sell the ticket. But this method is "delicate" and not very profitable. It is far more customary to use force. However, the youngsters rarely engage in extortion and thievery at the railway station. It is considered "their own" territory. The groups of teenagers prefer crowded streets, parks, and large motion-picture theaters. Their favorite places are Arbat, the park in Sokolniki, Kalinin Prospect, and the "Seasons of the Year" café in the Central Park of Culture and Recreation [TsPKiO] imeni Gorkiy....

"On school vacation days and on Fridays, we go out to meet every train from the Tatar ASSR [Tatariya], the Chuvash ASSR [Chuvashiya], and the Mordovian ASSR [Mordoviya]," relates R. Kashuba, "and try to find those who came in on a one-way ticket. However, it is becoming harder and harder to do this. The teenagers are now getting off at the station closest to Moscow and arriving on suburban electric railway trains. A card file is being kept, several thousand boys, arrested for various offenses, have been registered in the Crime Detection and Suppression Department [ugolovnyy rozysk], and liaison is being maintained with police officers in other cities. However, the situation will remain the same unless circumstances are changed in the places where conditions for child criminality's emergence exist."

I was warned immediately in Kazan: "Do not walk about the city alone in the evening. Such a risk, of course, did not exist as recently as a few years ago, but, when night falls, it is best to stay at home." There are rayons into which it is dangerous for an outsider to wander, even if he is a native Kazanian. Internal Affairs Administration [UVD] press service reports are constantly being published in the evening newspaper. Not one of them manages to avoid mention of the "hopniks" ["gopniki"]. That is what they call the teenagers—the members of the youth gangs. These do not differ just in their behavior—intentionally presumptuous and provocatively rude. The "hopniks" or "hoppers" ["gopery"] also endeavor to set themselves apart appearancewise. I have seen them on the street many times—a short, "crew-cut" hairstyle, a knitted cap with a pom-pom, a short sports or work jacket, baggy trousers of the sort worn in the 1950's, and boots.

They notice each other at a distance. However, they feel no great attachments to one another. It is for our sake that the "hopniks" are alike. They have their own table of ranks. The notorious "Tyap-lyap" [roughly: "Chop-Chop"] Gang gave up its leader status, and others came in to replace it—young, strong, and no less brutal. According to Tatar ASSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] data, 65 gangs in all, 7 of them particularly dangerous, are active in the city.

In Kazan, special subdivisions operate under every police division. Included in their tasks are control of youth gangs, detection of criminal elements, and prevention of population uprisings. A "prevention" program, developed by MVD specialists, is in operation. Already one may speak of some successes. One-eighth as many cases of criminally punishable hooliganism as before were recorded during the most recent period, and the number of thefts, forceful extortions, and fights was considerably reduced. It seems, however, that there are few causes for optimism. The total number of crimes is increasing as before.

According to USSR MVD data, 212,457 teenagers took part in the commission of crimes last year. The increase amounted to 14.9 percent in comparison with the preceding year. Moreover, a third of the crimes was committed by gangs. About 25,000 lawbreakers, who were members of rival gangs, were arrested. The Tatar ASSR's share in all of these indices was rather large.

Kazan is one of Russia's oldest cities. I would like to add the word "prettiest" to that, but, alas, this is not so. The city has tremendous disorders in the social sphere. For many years, the giant enterprises' parochial interests hindered the development of housing construction and the erection of social, cultural, and everyday-service [sotskultbyt] facilities. To this day, there are whole blocks of terrible, too-small, run-down, and dirty housing units. Their occupants live under conditions that one would not dare call humane. An old woman declared that she has to screen herself off from the rats with hardware cloth when lying down to sleep. There are 120,000 families on the waiting list for housing in the Tatar ASSR capital.

What happens in the soul of a boy out of a decaying hovel, with the walls damp from constant moisture and the ceiling propped up with oak logs—I happened to see such—and with the chronic stench of the garbage that piles up for decades below a window, when he suddenly finds himself in the loud, neon-lighted world of a capital discotheque? Is not his behavior to be explained by this: Let there be a day of such living, and afterwards—let come what may! And if there is no money—no matter: "My fists are hard. I'll take it myself if it isn't offered out of kindness...."

For teenagers from Kazan, Cheboksary, and Naberezhnyye Chelny, where there are not enough motion-picture theaters, libraries, sports halls, and many other things, even a trip on the Moscow Metro is a memorable event.

Far from all of these arrive in the capital without the money for a return ticket. Many simply break themselves away to come here for entertainment, not intending to get into fights, commit robbery, or offend people of their own age. However, there also are many of those who have received "tempering" in one of the youth gangs. And the habit of living by gang law makes these brutal, sly, and socially dangerous.

"The problem of fighting against teenage criminality is complex from both the legal and the purely psychological standpoint," P. Brazdnikov, the Moscow-Ryazan transportation procurator [prokuror], tells me. "Jurists, teachers, and scientists will have to work on it. However, much is within our powers even today."

Several years ago, Moscow was in panic over the "Lyubers" ["Lyubery"]. Almost nothing is heard of them now. Why? Not only the precinct inspectors and the investigative apparatus officers, but also the Komsomol, athletic figures, and the deputies of the local soviets gave their attention to the young people. Dialogue, rapport, and adult example are needed—and the majority will take the right path. United efforts are required because the fight for today's teenager—this is a fight for tomorrow's citizen.

Funding Sought for Creation of Special Uzbek Police Force

90UN0904A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
20 Apr 90 p 4

[Article by S. Levakin: "A Base for Spetsnaz [Special Assignment Detachments]"]

[Text] We do not have a material basis for the creation of special sub-units called upon to conduct the struggle against organized crime, terrorism and extremism. Today we are hard-pressed for many things. An enormous number of problems await our solution, but the guarantee of the security of peaceful citizens during—I emphasize—peace time, is one of the most important for society.

Since the rate of all types of crimes is growing, no one, in a manner, has any doubts about the necessity for special assignment detachments. One of the reasons for this is the growing technical equipment of the gangster formations, the constantly improving physical and psychological training of the members of revolutionary fighting groups.

And the militia, for reason of poor professional training, cannot resist the racketeer and terrorists. The intervention of the army in the establishment of social order calls forth inadequate public resonance, what is more it has completely different functions.

In extreme circumstances, snatch groups [gruppy zakhvata] are formed in the rayon departments of internal affairs, as a rule, from staff members that are free of

routine business and frequently, in carrying our operations, sustain losses. The reason is the lack of professionalism of the members of such groups. I do not want to offend the militia officials who carry out this difficult work, but a special assignment detachment for such purposes is a more perfect formation. This is not only the good mastery of arms and personal courage, but something else.

"A special assignment detachment is above all the faultless, automatism-like mastery of the methods of hand-to-hand combat and the various systems of fire arms and cold steel. The ability to orient oneself in a difficult, non-standard situation, to instantly make decisions on which the lives of many people may depend," says the commander of the first special assignment company of the regiment of the patrol post service of the Internal Affairs Administration of the Tashkent Gorispolkom, Captain of the Militia Vladimir Aleksandrovich Lanskikh.

The sub-unit formed in 1985 has proved its *raison d'être* through the deed. The arrest of armed criminals who had committed murders in Chimkent Oblast, robberies in Tashkent, the seizure of a gang of racketeers, the exposure of crimes connected with the sale of narcotics and the high-jacking of motor transport—this is a far from complete list of what the lads have been engaged in as of late alone. Professionals. This is how one can characterize Marat Sherkayev, Komil Toshev, Radik Shangareyev, and Ravshan Mirzamakhmudov, who are bearing the difficult service with honor. But is everything all right in the company today?

"We need the best lads of the best, and the selection is nothing special What is to be done, service in the militia is not prestigious nowadays: Low wages, the practically complete lack of days off, the constant risk. People leave, not all are able to work on bare enthusiasm. We cannot even "beat out" a new uniform, let alone special devices (*spets sredstva*), but society does have an acute need for us—who will defend in a difficult moment?" Vladimir Aleksandrovich continues.

A need. And there cannot be any doubt on this score. What is to be done? I am not discovering America here, considering that there is the experience of other regions of the country, where they started not to wait until the wave of crime will catch the hopes for a quiet life in a noose. The concern for special assignment detachments of the militia was assumed by large industrial enterprises, and all proved to the winner from this.

Is it not worthwhile to follow a good example? In Tashkent are located such giants as TAPOiCh [not further identified], the tractor plant, the excavator plant, and Tashselmash [Tashkent Agricultural Machinery Plant], and 10,000-20,000 rubles for any of them is a drop in the bucket. But together a sum is collected for which one can sew a uniform for the company, purchase computers, automobiles, and other equipment—the kind of thing without which in present-day conditions it is impossible to manage, working in one of the most dangerous directions in the system of the maintenance of public order.

There is still another aspect that requires attention. Sometimes in the press they flash reports to the effect that, during the arrest of a group of racketeers, large sums of money were removed, etc. Why not pay part of what is removed (the smallest) as a bonus to those who, risking their life, rendered the gang harmless? Let this idea become the subject of subject of reflection by lawyers. After all, we don't live on the Moon [as published], we know that life is getting more expensive, and for the 190 rubles, which is the average per capita income in the militia, increasingly fewer hunters will be found to offer their head to a bullet.

To be victorious, it is necessary to be stronger. To be victorious, it is necessary to be reliably defended, including by the Law. But it has become hopelessly obsolete. Is it not really absurd: In the West, the depositions of a policeman who caught a criminal red-handed, are equated with the depositions of three witnesses. In our country they don't listen to the militia officials at all: They say, an interested party. It is necessary to find three witnesses. There are quite a few such cases in judicial procedure. . . .

OGONEK Anti-Aids Fund Issues Appeal

90US0791A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 12,
17-24 Mar 90 p 3

[Appeal of the Administrative Council of the Soviet Charitable Fund OGONEK ANTI-AIDS to the USSR Supreme Soviet and national government]

[Text] The Administrative Council of the Public Charitable Fund OGONEK ANTI-AIDS set up under the journal OGONEK has been forced to turn to you with a statement concerning the catastrophic situation which has arisen in the nation in line with the approaching AIDS epidemic.

More than a year ago, the first Soviet AIDS patient died and up to the present the virus has carried off another 14 lives. While 2 years ago there were fewer than 50 carriers of the virus in our nation, at present they number almost 500. According to the data of the USSR Ministry of Health, 440 persons carrying the virus have been discovered. A majority of them is children.

By the end of 1990, according to a computer forecast made by Soviet scientists, the human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] will have infected over 1,600 persons, in the year 1991, some 6,200, in 1992, 23,500 and in 1993, 89,000 persons. By the end of the decade, the nation can expect from 1 million to 1.5 million infected persons and over 30,000 severely ill.

However, even these terrible figures must be viewed as optimistic assessments as in the opinion of a whole series of specialists, the number of persons infected with the HIV in our nation during these years will be significantly more. Moreover, the quality of the test systems produced in our nation to test for AIDS does not make it possible to assert that we currently know the true figures.

According to a long-range forecast made by co-workers at the Scientific Research Institute for Epidemiology and Microbiology imeni N.F. Gamaleya of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, if the state does not undertake immediate measures, the epidemic will assume the following scale: the peak of the HIV infection will be reached in the Soviet population in the year 2006, with the number of virus carriers being around 50 million persons. From 1989 through 2010, in the USSR up to 20 million persons can die from AIDS; the annual direct expenditures on servicing the AIDS epidemic in the USSR after the year 2000 can exceed 3 trillion American dollars, that is, surpass the USSR gross national product in 1989. The high AIDS infection rate can cause a disorganization in the nation's economy by the year 2005. HIV will primarily effect the young and children. After the year 2010, there is a real threat of the dying out of up to 40 percent of the nation's younger generation.

At the basis of this terrible forecast are our domestic realities. In contrast to the civilized nations of the world, where the main source of infection is the drug addicts,

homosexuals and prostitutes, in our country the medical facilities have become the hothouse of the infection. Just think: virtually all the children infected with the virus received it in medical facilities!

Someone might say that the reason is in the negligence of the medical workers! Yes, there is also negligence. But, judging from the letters which the fund OGONEK ANTI-AIDS receives from the hospitals in various regions of the Soviet Union, there has been a sharp deterioration in the supply of hospitals with even reusable syringes and certain hospitals have virtually none at all. And certainly the reusable systems for blood transfusions and reusable intravenous catheters in principle do not exist and should not exist. It is monstrous to say but the medical workers at times due to the acute shortage are forced to use the disposable syringes, the disposable blood transfusion systems and the disposable intravenous catheters.

The shortage of disposable medical products means planned human sacrifices. This means mass infections in hospitals. But...last year the USSR Ministry of Health received 500 million disposable syringes, and this year our industry will produce 650 million. But the children's medical facilities alone need 2 billion syringes. The requirement of the nation as a whole is 6 billion.

And in 5 years, when the nation will now have tens if not hundreds of thousands of infected persons, industry proposes to produce just 3,450,000,000 disposable syringes or almost 1/2 of the requirement.

The situation is no better—indeed much worse!—with disposable intravenous catheters, blood transfusion systems and blood storage containers. In 1990, industry proposes to produce 80-fold fewer such containers than will be needed, 4.1-fold fewer blood transfusion systems and 5.5-fold fewer intravenous catheters.

Generally, much essential equipment is not produced at all, for example, disposable dental drills. Thus, dentistry in our nation will be one of the main possible routes of the spread of the infection.

In the nation there is a very severe scarcity of domestic test systems for diagnosing AIDS as there is not enough money for imported ones while those produced by domestic industry provide such a high percentage of errors that it can be considered that they are unusable. Here high-quality domestic test systems have been developed but their industrial production has not been organized. This means that hundreds if not thousands of virus carriers do not know of their plight and are continuing to infect others. This also means that "tested" donor blood absolutely cannot be considered safe. Finally, this means that we will have no way of knowing the true figures of how many are infected in our country.

The nation has a very acute shortage of disposable ordinary surgical gloves, there are no mail gloves or other

devices for protecting physicians at all. This means that each day surgeons and laboratory workers are subjected to mortal danger.

Nor is the Soviet youth at all protected against AIDS. The drug stores have virtually no condoms. What are we hoping for? That to conversations about morality or even appeals for a rebirth of patriotic spirit sexual relations will disappear completely from the life of Soviet people? It is already understood that by our hypocrisy we have irreversibly doomed thousands of completely innocent persons to infection.

The Charitable Fund OGONEK ANTI-AIDS over the first months of its existence has received as charitable gifts from various countries several million disposable syringes and has forwarded these to children's hospitals in various regions of the nation. We have collected around a half-million dollars and with this we will begin to purchase disposable medical articles for children's hospitals in order to at least somewhat lessen the shortage in the children's hospitals and maternity homes this year.

Nevertheless, the Charitable Fund is just a fund. Only the state has it within its power to reduce the scale of the approaching epidemic.

The state must take emergency measures.

In order not to have the terrible forecast come true, the emergency measures must be carried out over 2 years. Then it will be too late. The epidemic will descend on our nation.

It is essential:

1. To set up a nationwide state commission (in the United States, an analogous body has been established under the President) and this would be able to take emergency extreme measures to prevent a global AIDS epidemic in the USSR.

2. To instruct prominent physicians and economists in the nation to draw up a realistic forecast of the losses—both human and economic—which AIDS will threaten over the coming decade.

3. To work out and implement a national program to prevent a global epidemic of AIDS in the USSR. This program must be given one of the highest state priorities.

4. To work out and implement immediately specific subprograms in pediatrics, the blood service, surgery, dentistry, gynecology and so forth aimed at preventing mass HIV infection and completely close off the "objective" routes of HIV infection in hospitals, polyclinics and maternity homes.

The most immediate measures of the program should be the following:

- a) It is essential to put into production high-quality domestic test systems for testing for AIDS. During the

introduction period, the required number of imported testing sets must be purchased.

- b) We must immediately seek out foreign exchange to purchase lines which would produce disposable medical products so that the "fleet" of production equipment in the USSR could fully supply the nation with disposable medical articles. According to tentative estimates, some 284 million foreign exchange rubles would be needed for this.

And while the purchased production lines are being installed and production organized at them, for this period of time we must purchase overseas as many disposable medical articles so that there is no shortage of them. In 1990, this would require 580 million foreign exchange rubles. If in the year we are unable to purchase the production lines and start them up, in 1991, we must make an analogous purchase.

- c) We must rapidly build up the "fleet" of equipment for producing condoms, in the meanwhile purchasing a sufficient quantity of them abroad. Simultaneously, we must extensively propagandize "safe sex" among the youth.

- d) We must organize the production of protective devices for surgeons and other physicians including mail gloves, long obstetric gloves and so forth. Until production has been started, this must all be purchased.

- e) We must organize the production of disposable dental tools. In the meantime, the required amount of them should be purchased. For sterilizing the reusable tools, the dental offices must be provided with special sterilizers which do not spoil the dental tools.

5. We must sharply intensify fundamental scientific research and on the basis of this create fundamentally new methods and means of diagnosis, prevention and treatment of AIDS. For this it is essential to establish a network of comprehensive base centers which are specially equipped for handling the very dangerous viruses, the existing laboratories must be modernized and provided with the necessary chemicals and instruments. The main thing is to involve in this work the most gifted and productive scientists and create the proper financing conditions for them as was done in developing the nuclear project by I.V. Kurchatov, A.D. Sakharov and Yu.B. Khariton.

All these expenditures will not seem excessive if one considers the fact that in the United States where there are disposable products, special diagnostic centers and AZT, some \$150,000 are spent on treating and maintaining one AIDS patient (from the moment of the diagnosis). The total expenditures for treatment and the economic loss due to the future deaths of tens of thousands of people at the beginning of the 1990s has been estimated in the United States at \$1 trillion. The annual budgeted "AIDS expenditures" in U.S. public health in 1996 will exceed military expenditures.

If expenditures of hundreds of millions are not made now, then tomorrow hundreds of billions will be of no help.

Our economy will not be capable of functioning under the conditions of such a global epidemic.

The nation itself will be threatened with extinction.

Let us repeat, tomorrow will be too late.

*Administrative Council of the Soviet Charitable Fund
OGONEK ANTI-AIDS*

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Journalist Questions Distorted Material Losses From Dushanbe

90US0792A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 15, 11 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by N. Asadulloyev, regular LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent for Tajikistan: "But Some Did Not Resist...."]

[Text] The events in Dushanbe, thank goodness, did not become a war, but they caused a good deal of damage, including material....

Immediately after the tragic days in February, a commission was organized of the Presidium of the Tajik Supreme Soviet to investigate the circumstances of the dramatic events in February. The commission included prominent workers, lawyers, scientists, a writer and USSR people's deputies. One of its tasks was to determine the losses caused to various institutions and departments.

The leaders of a number of organizations submitted documents to the Tajik Council of Ministers and according to these the direct losses from the pogroms and fires were around 6 million rubles.

"At our request, the reliability of the submitted documents was checked out by inspectors from the republic Ministry of Finances," related the deputy commission chairman S. Kendzhayev. "For Tadzhiipotrebsoyuz [Tajik Consumer Union Society] (chairman of the board, Ya. Mirzoyev), judging from the documents, the total losses were 1,054,000 rubles, but actually turned out to be 29,000! The Concern Khizmat (president, S. Turayev) requested 1,065,000 rubles, but the total loss was 476,000 rubles. In the Ministry of Trade (Minister O. Katayev), many could not hold out against the enticement of large gains. In the republic Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources (Minister Kh. Nasredinov), the total losses were exceeded by 30-fold; other data: for the Ministry of Motor Transport (Minister N. Yakubov), the total padding was 407,000 rubles, for the republic gosstroy (Chairman G. Muravyev), 77,000 rubles and the Ministry of Local Industry (Minister A. Baymatov), 35,000 rubles....

Everyone in the republic has shown trust and respect for the work of the commission. Everyone except for the Tajik procurator's office and the MVD. The commission turned to the procurator's office to find out who had given permission to release 60 apprehended participants in the disorders? There was no reply. They asked for data on victims and on the circumstances under which gunshot wounds were sustained. In reply came silence. They turned to the MVD to find out what amount had been returned to the state in money and materials but there was no response.

And the people, incidentally, have the right to expect an answer to the question of who was personally responsible for what happened.

Discrimination Against Working Women Examined

90US0792B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 8 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by T. Sidorova, sociologist: "Disabled According to Point 2"]

[Text] In questionnaires, as we remember, the second point is sex. Are our women sufficiently well aware of their own interests? Let us turn to data from a sociological study conducted by the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee.

Wages. If one compares the degree of satisfaction of men and women with their earnings, we will not see a difference in their replies. Some 41 percent of the women and 42 percent of the men are satisfied ("completely and not bad") with their earnings; correspondingly, 54 and 55 percent are not satisfied. Here a majority of the women (77 percent) and the men (81 percent) feels that their material situation is approximately the same as the majority.

But if there is virtually no difference in the degree of satisfaction with wages between men and women, in an analysis of the data of the actual wages of the respondents, a striking contrast is disclosed. Almost ¼ of the questioned women (22.5 percent) earned a miserly wage of 50-100 rubles, while only 10 percent of the men were in this category.

A predominant majority of the women, some 85 percent, receive not more than 200 rubles including bonuses; the men in this group are 59 percent.

The higher the wages, the greater the gap in the wages of men and women, and this gap increases even more in the group of families with children. Thus, a wage, including bonuses, within limits from 201 to 300 rubles is received by 12 percent of the women and 27 percent of the men; among family persons with children, women comprise 13 percent and men 38 percent. The difference is obvious.

Some 6 percent of the men receive over 300 rubles and only 0.8 percent of the women in this group, that is, 7-8-fold less.

It must be considered that such a major difference in the wages is not related to educational levels: among the

respondents some 17 percent of the women had a general secondary education and 24 percent of the men; the figures respectively for a secondary education were 32 and 22 percent; a higher education for 35 percent of the women and an equal number of men.

Differences in wages cannot be explained by differences in the length of employment, and the length of labor employment for the questioned women was even somewhat greater than for the men.

I feel it is valid to raise the issue of violating the principle of social justice in distribution relations. The sources of this are in the voluntarism which for many years reigned in wages. It can also be seen now. So-called discriminatory wage practice [vyvodilovka] has become widespread as it is impossible to pay a man at an enterprise less than 200 rubles, otherwise he will quit, while a woman is more patient and has nowhere to go—this is usually how the line leaders figure. In institutions with the existing "spread" in wages for specialists the women, as a rule, receive a wage at the least rate.

One can clearly trace differences in wages by national economic sectors and where female labor predominates the earnings are significantly less than in sectors with predominantly male employment. Here no consideration is given to the very high level of female labor intensity, for example, in the textile industry. For the female textile workers of Ivanov, production operations take up around 90 percent of the working time and such concentration is not found in any other profession. Noise, increased humidity and nighttime shifts.... According to the estimates of scientists, the labor of female textile workers can be equated to the 3d and 4th categories of severity, that is, to heavy and very heavy employment. However, with such super exploitation of female labor, the average wage level in the textile industry is lower than, for instance, in machine building.

It is also heard that men are supposedly the providers of the family and consequently they must be paid more. But in conducting the polls we have frequently heard from women that they must not only support the family but also the husband, since, alas, drunkenness is still part of our lives. We must not forget the numerous category of women who must be the sole provider in the family.

The ideological support for such discrimination—and I am not afraid of using this word—is the old stereotype which gave rise to the view of women as an incomplete worker as she is forced to interrupt her professional activities in line with pregnancy and birth, the tending of neonates and in line with the illness of children. In order for a woman to be able to work, there must be allocations for children's preschool and after-school institutions—if that is not too much trouble? Moreover, on the job it is also essential to consider the special legislation concerning the protection of female labor. Hence, the conclusion that a woman should be grateful for even being hired.

At the basis of such an approach is the notion that maternity, the family and the raising of children are a particular matter for only the woman.

But, in the first place, the child is the most important social value and hence society and the state are obliged together with the family (and in certain situations in replacing the parents completely) to participate in the upbringing and educating of the child.

Secondly, it is not considered that the biological features of the female organism and the special role of women in "the production of man himself" (in using the terminology of K. Marx) in no manner should serve as grounds for the discriminatory status of women in society.

Consequently, the state and all society should recognize maternity as the social function of a woman with the ensuing duties of protecting the labor of the woman, in creating the best conditions for combining her professional labor and social activity with maternity and with family obligations. Precisely such an approach underlay the Leninist policy in the 1920s.

The social guidelines which have been lost over the last decades are beginning to be resurrected on the state level. Proof of this is the recent message of the nation's president to the USSR Supreme Soviet. In emphasizing that it was a matter of a fundamental question in the life of society, M.S. Gorbachev proposed on a priority basis to review and adopt a number of immediate measures to improve the status of women, to protect maternity and childhood and strengthen the family. One can only hope that these are only the first steps of presidential power to improve the status of women in the nation. Certainly, judging from everything, even in the not distant future new difficulties threaten the weaker sex. The more strongly the private ownership psychology permeates social awareness (and with the development of private entrepreneurship this is inevitable) the more widespread will be the view of woman as a person of second rank. And all the more defenseless the woman will become doomed to defeat in the fierce competitive struggle for survival which the so-called "free" market relations will bring us.

Uzbek Official on Religious Activity in Tashkent

90UNI782A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
19 Apr 90 p 4

[UzTAG report of interview with Tursunkul Iskanderov, plenipotentiary for religious affairs, city of Tashkent, under the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers: "Religion Today"]

[Text] Serving as the occasion for this interview was a telephone call. A citizen, who did not give his name, congratulated us on the holiday—on the principal Christian holiday of Easter. Let's be frank: such a call could hardly have been expected even as recently as a year ago.

And our news agency's veterans do not recall anyone ever congratulating us on the occasion of a religious holiday.

But after congratulating us, the citizen then asked us a few questions. We addressed them to Tursunkul ISKANDEROV, the plenipotentiary for religious affairs, city of Tashkent, under the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers. His answers are provided below.

Indeed, the mass media organs fail to provide sufficient information to readers concerning those processes of perestroika which pertain to mutual relations with religion. And this topic is an urgent one these days inasmuch as the USSR Draft Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations is now being examined and considered.

A number of important religious organizations are located in Tashkent. They include the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the Tashkent and Central Asian Eparchial Administration of the Russian Orthodox Church, centers of the Evangelical Christian-Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, and the Islamic Institute. The following are in operation: 25 mosques, 5 churches, 4 synagogues, 2 Baptist meeting-houses, as well as a meeting-house for the Seventh-Day Adventists and Pentacostals.

These statistics testify that new approaches are now being taken to church-state relations which are appropriate to the essence and spirit of perestroika.

But quite a bit has been accomplished even prior to the establishment of legal foundations for the participation of religious organizations in public dialogue and charitable activity. You will recall that Mufti [Chairman] Mukhammad Sadyk Mukhammad-YUsif was elected a USSR people's deputy, while his agents also included Lev, the bishop of Tashkent and Central Asia. Other clergymen were likewise elected as republic-level people's deputies and to the local soviets.

At the time of the tragic events in Fergana, as well as the disorders in Buka and Parkent, many believers at the promptings of their hearts, as the saying goes, traveled out to these "hot spots" in order to bring people words of kindness, consolation, and mercy.

The most active participation is being engaged in by believers in the Week of Mercy, which has already begun. The republic-level Home for the Aged is frequently visited by believers from the Uspenskiy Cathedral, who care for the seriously ill and bring them warm clothing and fruit. The Eparchial Administration of the Russian Orthodox Church has contributed funds to obtain a laboratory for children's nutrition and a children's rehabilitation center. The community of Evangelical Christian-Baptists has organized three benefit concerts the collections from which were contributed to the Children's Fund. We could also talk about other acts of mercy which have now become quite commonplace among believers.

International contacts are also being strengthened. A few days ago a special airplane delivered to Tashkent the first batch of Korans—from the million copies which the King of Saudi Arabia has donated to the Moslems of the Soviet Union. In the Pentacostal community a religious service was conducted by Osmo Khaavisto, a preacher from Finland. The synagogues were visited by Robert Spitzer, president of Jewish Association of Greater Seattle. He concluded an agreement on a cultural and tourist exchange between the religious communities of the two cities [i.e., Tashkent and Seattle].

It has become a tradition for the leaders of various religious communities to congratulate each other on the occasion of their holidays. Thus, Moslem religious leaders congratulated the parishioners of the Orthodox churches and synagogues on Easter and Passover respectively, as well as the members of other religious confessions. Here is what Simkho YUsupov, chairman of the executive organ of one Tashkent synagogue and a participant in the Great Patriotic War, said about this: "I'm 80 years old, and this is the first time that I've seen members of other religions come to visit us for a holiday. Our thanks go to the government from all believers—for creating the present-day conditions whereby, regardless of their religious faith, each of them can feel like a fully entitled member of the multi-national Soviet family."

Are there sometimes complications in relations with believers? Such complications are rare, but they do occur. Recently our Council was appealed to by a group of Christians led by Father I.A. Svidnitskiy with regard to registering a Catholic community in Tashkent's Frunzenskiy Rayon. And we had already prepared the documents, but, as it turned out, many signatures to the statement been falsified and were executed in the same handwriting. On this score I had a talk with Marina Yurchenko—one of the "authors" of this statement, and she did not deny this. But, as the saying goes, once having agreed, who would check it out...? But such instances, believe me, are only exceptions to the rules.

Statistics Note High Cost, Low Quality of Life for Uzbek Youth

90US0923A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 26 Apr 90 p 4

[Article by Sergey Svetlov: "What, Where, Why"]

[Text] Prices and fates. The close interrelationship between these things is indisputable. I shall undertake to prove this with the aid of statistics, which, as everyone knows, say everything. We are continuing to supplement the Book of Records and its next pages—those dealing with the problems of the youth of Uzbekistan that are linked primarily with the increasingly high cost of living.

Every third resident of Uzbekistan is a young person between the age of 14 and 30 years.

In many oblasts in the republic the income level for youth is considerably lower than the average for Uzbekistan as a whole: in Fergana Valley, 86.8 per cent; Koresm Oblast, 80.3 per cent; Samarkand Oblast, 89.6 per cent; Kashka-Darya Oblast, 76.9 per cent; and Kara-Kalpak ASSR, 81.4 per cent. In Kara-Kalpakia, Fergana, Kashka-Darya, and Khorezm the income level for youth is less than one-half the average indicators for the USSR.

The wages paid to a young person in Uzbekistan are 80-100 rubles (average), or 50-70 per cent of the nationwide level.

Young workers receive less than the older workers in industry (by a factor of 1/1.7); transportation (1/2.3) the nonproduction sphere (1/2.1); and agriculture (1/3.5).

A total of 117,100 students receive a stipend from the budget; 6500 at enterprise expense; and 50,700 republic students do not receive a stipend. The size of the stipend is below the subsistence level.

In the oblast center, young married couples are on a housing waiting list for 7-8 year. In Tashkent the waiting period is 10-15 years. Sixty-five per cent of the young city dwellers do not have their own housing. The rate of provision with dormitories in the republic constitutes 73.6 per cent of the nationwide level. Only 64.8 per cent

of the students have been provided with dormitories. (We shall remain silent here about the living conditions there.) The cost of renting housing is 80-100 rubles a month.

Young families have been provided with children's institutions (kindergartens, day-care centers) to the extent of 35.8 per cent.

The number of deserted children in Uzbekistan is much lower than in other parts of the country, but their maintenance is worse than the national: 300 rubles a month. But for some reason single mothers are paid much less—55 rubles.

The typhoid fever disease rate is 3.4 times higher than in the country as a whole, and 20 times higher than in the Ukraine.

Last year there was a 13.1 per cent increase in the number of recorded crimes committed by minors. The increase in mercenary crimes is linked with the increasing differentiation of income.

That which lies behind all these figures scarcely needs any commentary. Broken fates, broken families, children without parents... The commentary is all around us. Life itself gives the commentary to the statistics.